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INTRODUCTION
1. Background 
By late 2012, the Ecolabel Index1 had 432 eco-labels on record. In the first quarter of  2010, 
the same Index measured only 340. This reflects an increase in the interest in eco-labelling 
in the last couple of years. While it is unclear why this sudden interest in eco-labelling, it is 
true that markets for certified goods have become more visible and relevant in some sectors. 
For instance it has been reported that up to 20 percent of world exports of bananas are 
certified. Considering that in 2008 the total value of  international banana trade was 
estimated at US$ 5.8 Billion per year, 20 percent is quite significant. Certified coffee 
represents 17 percent of global production. In the US alone the estimated value of  the coffee 
market is of  US$ 19 billion per year, which again makes certified coffee quite important. 
However, in other sectors such as forestry, fisheries, cocoa, cotton, and tea certification is 
relatively small. In the forestry sector, the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) has certified the 
equivalent of  5% of the worlds productive forests, which is relatively small, but it is the 
equivalent of  125 million hectares of  forest over 80 countries. Moreover the value of FSC 
labelled sales is estimated at over US$ 20 billion in 2008. Similarly, the Marine Stewardship 
Council (MSC) for certified sustainable seafood is estimated to have a value of US$ 1.5 
Billion. MSC represents only 7% of the total global landings of  marine fisheries (fish taken 
out of the water on to land), which is equivalent to 5.25 million tons of  fish. These examples 
show  that while the numbers seem relatively low, the absolute impact is still very relevant, 
because of the scale, the scope and their value.2 
These products are different from average fish, timber, tea, bananas or coffee because they 
have environmental and social attributes. These attributes however are unobservable, for 
both consumers and marketeers (upstream producers, retailers and other intermediaries). 
The consumer will not be able to extract the information it needs about the product on its 
own. Hence, there needs to be an external instrument that conveys such information. This 
external instrument is certification. Certification’s role is to provide proof that the attributes 
that a good claims to have is really there. Without certification the market would not even 
The Law and Economics of Eco-labels
1
1 The Ecolabel Index is a global directory for eco-labels. 
2 Data from: Certification and roundtables: do they work? WWF review of multistakeholder sustainability 
initiatives, WWF September 2010. As well as from: Toward Sustainability, The Roles and Limits of 
Certification, Final Report, June 2012, prepared by the Steering Committee of the State of Knowledge 
Assessment of Standards and Certification. 
exist, as the consumers will be unaware of the attributes or goods they cannot observe. 
Therefore, if  there is a market for environmental attributes or environmental goods, there 
needs to be certification otherwise the market will not function, or it would not even exist. 
There are two ways to prove that a good is certified: with a certificate or a mark. In the case 
of consumer goods, the mark is more appropriate as it can be placed on the product for the 
consumer to see. These marks are called certification marks, and in the environmental 
arena they are deemed eco-labels. 
In simple terms, an “eco-label is an independently verified, on-pack label [mark] intended to 
communicate environmental and/or social performance to consumers. It’s underlying 
purpose is to make production more visible.”3 In essence eco-labels are very simple tools 
that communicate or inform consumers about certain desirable attributes of a good, which 
will aid consumers decide whether to buy it or not. However, overtime eco-labels have been 
regarded as regulatory tools. Hence they are also expected to incentivise and promote 
environmental protection. In theory, eco-labels allow  “...consumers to “vote” with their wallets 
by selecting certified goods and services over other, less desirable alternatives, thus 
providing incentives for industry to produce those goods and services.”4  Hence there is an 
underlying assumption that consumers find environmental and social attributes (or general 
sustainable attributes) desirable, thus they are willing to pay for them, at a premium price. All 
these assumptions and expectations look well in paper, however the reality is quite different. 
For instance, in many cases this price premium, which is the key motivator for industry to 
engage in sustainable behaviour is not always present and when it is, it might not be very 
large. For example, coffee can command up to 10 cents per pound; tea’s premium can reach 
up to US$ 1.3 per kilo; the premium for cocoa can reach 29 cents per kilo; and, the premium 
for bananas is of US$ 1 per box5 (if  it is organic the premium can go all the way to US$ 2.30 
per box). Other cases, such as fish do not even command premium. This can be extremely 
puzzling, as this premium is supposed to be the primary motivator for firms to seek voluntary 
certification. If such premium is not present or is small, then premium prices are not what 
incentivises the behaviour. Another problem with this model is that it is assumed that 
Introduction
2
3 SustainAbility. Signed, sealed and delivered? Eco-labels, trust and behaviour change across the value 
chain, White Paper, March 2011, p. 2
4 Environmental Law Institute. Harnessing consumer power. Using Certification systems to promote good 
governance.
5 The boxes are normally 18.4 kilos each.
consumers have an interest in environmental attributes. While it is true that there is 
consumer preference for environmental goods; it is unclear whether it is enough to provide 
the incentives needed to obtain the environmental impacts that are expected. This is 
because it is estimated that only 15% of consumers are truly committed to environmental 
causes. Notwithstanding these observations, eco-labels have still managed to evolve and 
multiply over a wide range of  sectors and countries. An increase of eco-labels can be 
considered positive, as more eco-labelled goods means better environmental performance 
However, it has not been without its drawbacks. 
Eco-label’s drawbacks can be reflected on both the market and the environment. On the one 
side, an increase in demand of certain environmental attributes lead to an increase in 
production of environmental attributes. An increase in production can be considered as a 
drawback because such increase, might imply an increase in pollution even if  it is 
‘environmentally friendly’. It has to be considered that maybe producing the normal good at a 
smaller scale is a better solution. In addition, because it is voluntary certification, firms will 
opt for the environmental attribute that is easier to achieve or is trendy at the moment. Then 
other more pressing matters might be overlooked. Furthermore, this improvement in one 
environmental attribute might distract from a deterioration of another. Notwithstanding these 
undesirable consequences, the most harmful of the eco-labels side effects is opportunistic 
behaviour. The unobservable attributes of a product are called credence attributes. The 
problem with credence attributes is that unlike other attributes, that are observable either 
instantly or through experience, the normal learning mechanisms do not work. Other types of 
goods allow  for reputation building so a consumer can learn a product’s quality over time 
and then create brand or product preferences. This does not occur with credence goods, 
even if  they have a mark. Credence attributes permit opportunistic behaviour because the 
buyer cannot recognise the degree of truth of the statement by the seller and has no chance 
of verifying the product’s ‘green’ attributes through experience.6  This opportunistic behaviour 
is what is commonly called ‘greenwash’. In theory eco-labels have the potential to tackle 
greenwash, as they provide credible information about environmental attributes. However, 
the problem with greenwashing is that it undermines the credibility of the entire eco-labelling 
mechanism. A mechanism that relies almost entirely on the mark’s capacity to convey 
credibility. This creates a scenario similar to Akerlof’s ‘market for lemons’, in which the 
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market may break down because there will be too much greenwash. Real or truthful eco-
labels will not be able to establish themselves in the market, hence they will be forced to 
leave. 
2. Research Relevance
In June 2012 the Rio +20 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (or 
simply Rio +20) took place. Its predecessor the Rio Earth Summit of  1992 (or the Rio 
Summit) had important results regarding environmental policy, hence by 2012 many results 
were expected. In anticipation to this summit, the academic, environmental and political 
spheres became interested in evaluating, analysing, improving or even creating 
environmental policy tools. This environmental-policy hype placed much of its attention on 
corporate sustainability. Based on the idea that engaging private-parties into the 
sustainability agenda is one of the best strategies. During the course of  this analysis, it 
became clear that many of the policy tools used and promoted since the Rio Summit were 
never evaluated or even followed. Hence, it was not possible to make any concrete 
recommendations as there was practically no information available. Therefore, in the last 
years academics, Non-Governmental-Organisations (NGOs), governments and other 
entities have focused their attention into finding tangible results of  tools such as eco-
labelling, environmental ratings, corporate reporting, sustainable branding, private-public 
partnerships, sponsorships, and all the array of  corporate environmental strategies that are 
in place. 
In sum, these events created a huge gap in the economics, legal and policy arena. In the 
early 1990s around the Rio Summit the same type of hype was created regarding 
sustainability-tools. The main difference is that in the 1990s the tools were new, their effects 
were unknown and the community was still very sceptical. The discussions were oriented on 
whether they would work, if there was in fact a market or how  and who would implement 
those tools. However, 20 years later the scenario changed drastically, eco-labels and other 
corporate sustainability tools became popular, and it is only now  that their real effects can be 
observed. Hence, the studies from twenty years ago serve as a mere stepping stone for the 
type of analysis that can be done today. What once were predictions have now  become a 
reality. Hence, this work attempts to take advantage of  this situation and actualise the theory 
behind eco-labels specifically.
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3. General Scope of Research
This work is focused on answering whether eco-labels call for legal intervention. This is the 
core of the work. Through out this research other questions will appear. These specific 
questions will aid to build on the scope and form law  can take to improve eco-labels. In the 
end, the expected result is to see how  the legal and economic status quo of  eco-labels can 
be improved. This will be achieved by using different insights from different disciplines, 
specifically Law  and Economics. In short the central research questions are: Do eco-labels 
call for legal intervention, and if so, what type of intervention would be the most appropriate?
This is not the first study on eco-labels that has been done recently. Due to the corporate 
sustainability hype, many articles, dissertations, case-studies and large research projects 
have emerged in recent years attempting to provide new  insights into eco-labelling. This 
work, presents the unique advantage of being within the Law  and Economics field. Law  and 
Economics uses economic insights and methodologies to better understand the Law. Hence, 
this Law  and Economics approach to eco-labelling gives some very useful insights that other 
disciplines would not be able to attain. 
This research targets a wide audience. First, policy makers in the environmental, trade and 
consumer protection areas will find some useful insights. Specifically, towards the conclusion 
where the recommendations of how  the governments should deal with eco-labels are 
addressed. Another target are businesses. Business can be considered producers of  the 
eco-labelled good, the eco-labelling entity itself, retailers and other intermediaries. The 
research addresses organisational issues, incentives as well as a clear understanding of 
consumers. Hence, it will be possible for them to understand consumers so that their 
environmental efforts are better capitalised. The eco-label industry will be able to use this 
research as a guideline of their roles and duties, which will hopefully improve their 
performance. And stating the obvious, this research is also relevant for the academic 
community from different areas. For those that study corporate environmentalism from a 
scientific perspective, it will be useful to see how  this research translates their findings into 
useful policy recommendations. On the other hand, social sciences and in particular law  and 
economics, will benefit from this classic analysis. This has been done by understanding the 
market and using economic models as tools, not as the purpose of the research. It will be 
The Law and Economics of Eco-labels
5
shown how  the economic insights clearly reveal the problems of the market and how  those 
insights can improve the law.  
4. Boundaries and limitations
From all the corporate sustainability tools, eco-labels were chosen because they are the 
most salient. In addition, they involve different actors such as governments, businesses and 
consumers which allows for a richer analysis. This is because it allows eco-labels to be 
analysed from many perspectives. Moreover, other sustainability tools are not as widespread 
or are very recent, hence analysing them would have proven complicated and maybe even 
precipitated. Nonetheless, many of the issues addressed in the research can be applied to 
other corporate sustainability tools. 
This research is focused on consumer goods. The analysis is done with on-pack marks in 
mind. This is because they are what the market can actually observe. As it will be seen in 
the research, eco-labels are one of  the many available corporate sustainability tools. 
However, not all of  them result in on-pack marks; hence their impact is quite different. Eco-
labels and other tools might have things in common, such as compliance with standards, 
verifications and even the granting of certificates. However, as it will be shown, the marks or 
labels themselves are crucial for the functioning of the eco-label market, it is not just the 
certification. In addition, while the thesis refers to all eco-labels, it was written with the most 
salient eco-labels in mind. These eco-labels are Rainforest Alliance, Forest Stewardship 
Council, Marine Stewardship Council, Fairtrade International and UTZ Certified. There are 
many studies and much information about these eco-labels, hence it made the research 
easier. Nonetheless, it is acknowledged that not all eco-labels and certification schemes are 
of such scale and importance. Smaller eco-labels and accredited certifiers (that normally 
work behind-the-scenes) are taken into consideration. In a similar note, this research does 
not consider organic labelling as an eco-label. While, in a broad sense organics are a type of 
eco-label, they differ from a regular eco-label because they are perceived to be healthy. This 
little detail gives organics a completely different set of  incentives and allows them to reach 
into other markets. This is shown with the fact that the price-premiums for organics is very 
well established and can be very high, whereas eco-labels’ premiums are still uncertain. 
However, there are many similarities with eco-labels. This is the reason why some literature, 
references and examples will be occasionally used. Finally this research will focus on 
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environmental attributes. Nonetheless, it has to be acknowledged that eco-labels are not 
exclusive to the environmental field, as they also refer to general sustainable practices which 
include social and economic factors as well. Most of the analysis of  the research will be 
applicable to general sustainable practices, and sometimes it will be specifically pointed out. 
From the legal perspective, it is important to note that this research is not meant to be a 
comparative law  study. It analyses eco-labels as market or policy tools. Hence, no distinction 
will be purposely made between different legal systems; though it will be seen that different 
legal systems have different approaches. These will be duly analysed with the purpose of 
seeing what laws and regulations can be applied to eco-labels, and what alternatives there 
are at hand. The analysis will be kept at a general level, where possible. Hence, the results 
of this research could be implemented in any system, precisely because the analysis is on 
the tool itself. In a related topic, eco-labels in the international trade system are only 
discussed briefly. This is because at the moment there is not a clear standing from the World 
Trade Organisation or any other body, on eco-labels. It will be seen, even though there have 
been cases taken before the WTO’ Dispute Settlement Body, such cases are so particular 
that it is not possible to make general inferences for other eco-labels. Furthermore, 
International Trade has very specific definitions and literature that was not taken into 
consideration. While it is possible to analyse eco-labels from such point of view  (and it has 
been done) this research does not address it in depth and does not use the terminology and 
tools of that area. 
5. Structure of Research
To address the underlying question of  this research, it is necessary to understand the story 
behind eco-labels. The stories will be told from different perspectives. Each chapter of  this 
thesis will address a particular perspective. By the end, all the information and insights will 
be taken into consideration to answer the research questions.  
The first chapter, Defining Eco-labels and Eco-certification, is the base of  all the thesis. Its 
main purpose is to limit and define eco-labels. To do so, it first goes to the origins of eco-
labels and shows how  they have evolved over the last 30 years. This will be seen by 
analysing the different definitions that have appeared over time. In the end, the definition 
that will be used for the research will be set. In addition, this chapter will also address eco-
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labelling. Eco-labelling refers to the mechanism that is created due to the use of eco-labels. 
In short, when a consumer buys an eco-labelled good at a premium price, it sends a signal 
to businesses. Businesses observe this signal and are incentivised to obtain the certification, 
which is a substantial investment. Business will have to change their production to more 
sustainable ways to be able to comply with the certification criteria. Hence, these changes 
will lead to better environmental practices that will benefit the environment. In other words, 
the more consumers are interested in eco-labels, the more incentives businesses will have 
to obtain certification, which will overall lead to improved environment quality. In addition, 
this chapter will also make a classification and typology of eco-labels, which make it easier 
to identify the eco-labels addressed in the research. Finally, a brief  explanation of  other 
corporate sustainability tools will be made. 
The second chapter, Eco-labels’ place in the market, makes an extensive economic analysis 
of eco-labels. It starts with information economics, as eco-labels are information-tools. By 
using information economics certain potential market failures will be observed. Furthermore, 
the role of certification will be determined. In the analysis of  eco-labels as information tools it 
becomes obvious that eco-labels share similar traits to trademarks or brands. Following this 
idea eco-labels are analysed from an Intellectual Property perspective. This analysis is what 
reveals that eco-labels are in reality certification marks, which is a crucial finding, as 
certification marks have Intellectual Property rights. In addition to informational insights, this 
chapter also addresses eco-labels from a competition perspective. Here it will be seen 
whether eco-labels enhance or hinder competition. To do so, the market will be analysed, 
including the different market segments. Where there are market segments, there will always 
be product differentiation, hence the eco-labels standards will also be addressed. In 
addition, eco-label pricing and the price-premiums will be addressed. Finally the negative 
effects of eco-labels will be addressed. Specifically the economics of  greenwashing will be 
analysed. This section will show  how  easy it is to engage in greenwashing as well as getting 
away with it. 
Chapter III, Eco-labels and business, attempts to find the incentives of  businesses to engage 
in pro-environmental behaviour, that will allow  them to obtain eco-labels. The interest of this 
chapter is the fact that eco-labels are voluntary, hence they imply an over-compliance from 
the mandatory standards. To obtain eco-labels firms are expected to go beyond and above 
what they are legally required. In addition to compliance to the eco-labels criteria, 
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certification is costly in itself. It is this puzzle that allows this chapter to go deeper into the 
firms incentives. It addresses Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) as it is a discipline that 
normally addresses these type of issues. However, it will be seen that eco-labels are a small 
part of CSR. In addition, many times CSR is more related to Industrial Organisation and 
refers to management and other areas which are out of scope. When it comes to explaining 
the incentives, CSR simply suggests that it is altruism. However, it will be stressed that firms 
cannot be altruistic as they are not people. Only people can be altruistic, not firms. Firms 
may have altruistic type behaviours, such as doing good for others. However, the purpose 
will always be profits. Therefore if a firm engages in pro-environmental behaviour it is 
because it sees a benefit in doing so. Such benefits are likely to come in the form of 
increased market share, reputation or salience, which are all very desirable. These 
motivations have to be considered before governments decide to intervene, as interventions 
may alter motivations and produce undesired or unforeseen consequences. 
Chapter IV turns to the demand of  eco-labels, Eco-labels and consumers. This chapter is in 
essence a summary of  behavioural approaches to consumer’s decision making and pro-
environmental preferences. It argues that human rationality is not always what economists 
suggest or want it to be. Nonetheless, by applying psychology, neurology and other 
behavioural sciences much can be understood about consumers and their behaviour. For 
example, certain mistakes, biases and other ‘anomalies’ are actually predictable. It will be 
seen that eco-labels and other tools harness these biases and errors making them more 
effective. In addition this chapter will also analyse what motivations or incentives individuals 
have to engage in pro-environmental activities. It will be seen that reputation and other 
image or social concerns are crucial for this type of behaviour. 
Chapter V changes the direction of  the previous chapters as it addresses the law: Eco-labels 
and the Law. This chapter addresses how  the law  handles eco-labels. While there is no 
specific law  that addresses eco-labels as such, there are other regulations that are 
potentially applicable to them. For instance, deceptive marketing laws could potentially apply 
to environmental claims and labels. In some countries, they have specific guide-lines for 
environmental claims. However, the circumstances change when certification is involved. In 
addition, it will be seen that eco-labels may have different types of owners, which has 
different consequences. For example, if the owner is an NGO it might be heavily monitored 
by the State, whereas if it is for-profit it will not. On the other hand, and more importantly 
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public eco-labels might have their share of  unintended consequences, as they risk being 
considered a technical regulation, which is a protectionist measure according to the WTO. 
Moreover, this chapter will address the legislation in the countries where certification marks 
are regulated within the Intellectual Property laws. These laws will be duly analysed as they 
are the only ones that refer directly to the matter at hand. Their characteristics and the 
procedures will also be addressed as they provide valuable insights on what governments 
already deem relevant. 
Chapter VI is, the Law and Economics of Eco-labels, as its title suggests, this chapter is in 
charge of answering the research questions. This chapter is divided in to two parts. The first 
part goes through rationales for regulating eco-labels. In this sense, the different market 
failures will be pointed out as well as the legal failures (lack of law  specifically). The second 
part of the chapter will deal with how  the law  of eco-labels should be designed to improve 
the status quo. This section uses the insights and principles of smart regulation. By doing 
this the optimal eco-labelling regulatory strategy will be obtained. 
The Mexico-US Tuna Conflict and the Role of the ‘Dolphin-Safe’ Eco-label will be analysed 
in Chapter VII. This chapter offers a complete analysis of  the Dolphin-Tuna case between 
the United States and Mexico. This case was brought to the WTO in 2008 and it was only 
resolved in May 2012 (though the enforcement and compliance from the parties is due only 
in June 2013). Which makes this analysis one of the first on the subject. Nonetheless, the 
chapter has the purpose of illustrating by means of this case the impact of eco-labels in 
international trade. The ‘dolphin-safe’ eco-label was one of  the original eco-labels and is one 
of the few  eco-labels that has reliable data regarding its effects (because of all the law-suits). 
Moreover, it is a label that has proved effective in protecting dolphins, hence it is normally 
used as a positive example of  eco-labelling. In addition, the fact that it was recently taken to 
the WTO means that there is now  legal precedents on eco-labels, which in cannot be 
ignored. Moreover, it provides a nice comparison between two countries with different 
regulatory approaches towards the same problem. This will bring up some interesting 
debates regarding the effectiveness of voluntary tools in pressing environmental matters, 
such as biodiversity conservation.
Chapter VIII is a brief  chapter that provides a series of  specific Policy Recommendations. 
The purpose of the chapter is to offer a series of  changes or adaptations to the current 
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system that is aimed at increasing the credibility of  eco-labels. It takes as the base the 
current regulation for certification marks. Finally, the conclusions of  the work will be 
summarised. In the conclusions, the main findings of the work will be discussed. In addition, 
it sets several proposals for further research. 
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CHAPTER I
Defining Eco-labels and Eco-certification
1. Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is introduce and limit the topic of eco-labels and eco-labelling. At 
first glance, eco-labels do not seem very complicated. In fact, the idea of eco-labels is quite 
simple: it is a mark that conveys information about environmental aspects of  a particular 
good or service. However, for the purpose of this research this idea of eco-labels is too 
simple. Hence, before embarking into finding the scope of law  in eco-labelling, it is 
imperative to have a strong background and clear understanding to avoid confusion. This 
chapter is mostly descriptive. Its purpose is to layout the origins, evolution, scope and 
functioning of  eco-labels. To do so it will start by presenting the origins of eco-labelling. 
Subsequently, the focus will shift to defining eco-labels and eco-labelling. This part will show 
how  eco-labels and eco-labelling have been defined and described by academics and policy 
makers over time, resulting in an actualised definition that will be the basis of  this research. 
Closely related to the definition of eco-labels and eco-labelling is their goals and their 
criteria. In addition, a detailed classification and typology of  eco-labels will be presented 
based on the most commonly used concepts in academia and policy arenas. This chapter 
will also give a brief introduction to certification. It is imperative to make the link between 
eco-labels and certification at this point, as it will become a central point in further chapters. 
Finally, a very brief  analysis of other corporate environment-information tools is provided. 
This is because, there are many types of  environmental instruments that are similar to eco-
labels, but are not eco-labels. Hence, it is possible to use the present analysis for other tools 
which might share characteristics of eco-labels.  
2. Development of Environmental Labelling
Eco-labelling is a fairly recent phenomenon. In 1977 Germany created the first eco-labelling 
programme and by today there are over 432 eco-labelling active programmes around the 
world.1  This section will address the evolution of  eco-labels by following the different 
environment-related international summits that started in the 1970s sponsored by the United 
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Nations and other international organisations. This chronological recollection will shed light 
on how  different policies have affected eco-labels and has shaped them into what they are 
today. Hence, it can be argued that eco-labels have evolved from the ‘original’ eco-labels 
into the ‘new generation’ eco-labels. 
2.1 The First Earth Summit and the Seventies
The 1970s was a decade characterised by the active involvement of society in political 
matters. Such is the case for environmentalism. In spring 1970 the first Earth Day2 was 
celebrated in the United States. Its purpose was to raise awareness of the environmental 
degradation caused by human activities. Shortly after, the United Nations Conference on the 
Human Environment,3 dealt with the widespread concern for the human environment. Out of 
this conference emerged the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP). The main 
objective of  this programme is to assist countries in developing and implementing 
environmentally sound practices and policies. In October 1977 the first intergovernmental 
environmental education conference was held in Tbilisi, Georgia (USSR). This conference 
was organised by the UNEP in collaboration with the United Nations Education, Scientific, 
and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO). The results of this conference, known as the Tbilisi 
Declaration, are mainly the framework, principles and guidelines for environmental education 
at different levels. 
The Tbilisi Declaration suggests that environmental education has the objective to create 
patterns of  behaviour towards the environment. Furthermore this education should be 
targeted to all non-specialised public, whose daily behaviour has decisive repercussions on 
the preservation or deterioration of  the environment. Finally, it endorses the participation of 
the public. In order for the public to take responsibility for their actions, governments would 
need to provide skills and tools to distinguish the environmental consequences of  their 
actions. Consumers should be aware of  the environmental consequences of their decisions 
and should be well informed about the best available environmental decisions.4  
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Nelson proposed Earth Day as a teach-in (were common for rally’s against the Vietnam war in the 1960’s) to be 
held on April 22, 1970 in all Colleges and Universities through out the United States. To this first Earth Day, over 
20 million people participated.
3 Stockholm, June 1972.
4 See: http://www.gdrc.org/uem/ee/tbilisi.html  (as consulted on November 25, 2010).
2.2 The Blue Angel and the following years
Following the tendency of the United Nations, Germany took the lead in creating and 
implementing such tool.  In 1978 the Blue Angel (Der Blaue Engel) eco-label was created on 
the initiative of the Federal Minister of the Interior and was approved by the Ministers of the 
Environment (both at Federal and State levels). It was conceived as a market-conform 
instrument of  environmental policy designed to distinguish the positive environmental 
attributes of products and services. Also, this instrument would be voluntary which would 
enhance competition of environmentally friendly products. This product-related 
environmental tool would achieve the goals of  consumer participation and orientation 
towards more environmentally aware decisions, set by the UNEP. Furthermore, the design of 
the label is based on the UNEP logo. This is a clear indicator of  the alignment the German 
new  instrument with the UNEP’s proposals of the time. Also it shows a certain formality that 
the “new” generation of eco-labels do not share.
Figure 1. The logos of the UNEP and the Blue Angel.5 
During the 1980s public awareness about the state of  the environment intensified. Products 
proudly presented their environmental attributes such as “recyclable”, “CFC-free”, 
“biodegradable” or simply “nature friendly”. In 1985 only .5% of products in American 
markets were considered green, by 1990 this number had increased to 9.5%, almost 20% 
more. Consumers wanted to contribute in protecting the environment and were willing to do 
so through their everyday purchases.6 This was supported by surveys, which indicated that 
up to 80% of consumers were willing to pay up to 10% more for an environmentally friendly 
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‘official, which is a trait ‘new generation’ eco-labels do not share.
6 In 1988, The Green Consumer’s Guide: From Shampoo to Champagne: High-Street Shopping for a Better 
Environment by John Elkington & Julia Hailes was a best seller, translated into 17 languages. 
product.7 In this sense, eco-labels were very well suited tools to provide consumers with the 
information they required to make their contributions to the environment. In 1988 Canada 
and Japan issued their own eco-label. By 1991 Norway, Sweden, Finland (in a common 
programme), France, Portugal, Austria and New  Zealand had plans for issuing their own 
eco-labels as well. 
The apparent change in consumer attitude that characterised the late 1980s and early 1990s 
was the element that allowed the idea of eco-labels to spur. At the time he OECD viewed 
eco-labels as a “voluntary economic instrument which promotes more environmentally 
friendly purchasing on the side of the public and a precautionary approach on the side of the 
industry.”8 They were a promising environmental initiative and the OECD was very optimistic 
about them. Jim Salzman, co-writer of the first OECD documents regarding eco-labels, 
describes how  governments and environmental groups viewed eco-labels “as powerful, 
high-profile, low-cost, market-based instruments to promote environmental protection.” At 
this time the trend was to move passed the traditional command-and-control measures 
imposed by governments towards a model of market governance, self-regulation and new 
environmental policy instruments.9 Furthermore, the fact that they were voluntary was very 
attractive because then it would fall into “soft” policy instruments, which complement and 
enhance the traditional environmental regulation (command-and-control). 
2.3 The Rio Earth Summit and Agenda 21
Rio de Janeiro, June 1992 was the venue for the United Nations United Nations Conference 
on Environment and Development (UNCED). “The central focus was the question of how  to 
relieve the global environmental system through the introduction to the paradigm of 
sustainable development. This notion emphasises that economic and social progress 
depend critically on the preservation of the natural resource base with effective measures to 
prevent environmental degradation.”10  From this conference several important documents 
came out. The first is the Framework Convention on Climate Change, which in turn led to the 
I. Defining Eco-labels and Eco-certification
16
7 Jim Salzman. Green Labels for Consumers, The OECD Observer, 1991, p. 29.
8 OECD, Environmental Labelling in OECD Countries, 1991, p. 11.
9 Ralph E. Horne. Limits to labels: the role of eco-labels in the assessment of product sustainability and 
routs to sustainable consumption, International Journal of Consumer Studies, No. 33, 2009. 
10 http://www.eoearth.org/article/United_Nations_Conference_on_Environment_and_Development_%28UNCED
%29,_Rio_de_Janeiro,_Brazil as seen 8:00pm 19 march 2011.
Kyoto Protocol. The second,  is the Convention on Biological Diversity (normally referred to 
as Biodiversity Convention) which is a binding agreement by which countries agreed to 
conserve and use in a sustainable manner their biodiversity. It also has in its goals the fair 
and equitable use of benefits from resources. This last point is relevant because within this 
framework the concepts of fairness and equity stand in pair with environmental concerns. 
This means that sustainability must include indigenous communities and their local traditions 
in matters regarding their natural biodiversity. When it comes to sustainable development 
social matters are just as important as environmental ones.  The natural environment is not 
the sole purpose of sustainable development. This is one of the key achievements of the 
Earth Summit, was precisely positioning the term sustainability in the agenda right next to 
environment.
Another important document produced in the Earth Summit is the ‘Agenda 21’. Agenda 21 is 
the international plan of  action to sustainable development. It is supposed to be 
implemented and adapted at local levels by governments, businesses and communities. 
Therefore it mainly outlines key policies and strategies for achieving sustainable 
development. It attempts to define a balance between production, consumption, population, 
development, and the Earth's life-supporting  capacity.11  Agenda 21 explicitly identified 
environmental labels as a way to encourage consumers to adopt more sustainable 
consumption patterns in their daily activities. It states that governments, industry and other 
groups ‘should encourage expansion of environmental labelling and other environmentally 
related product information programmes.” Also, it suggests that these entities ought to 
support the informed consumer by providing accurate information about the health and 
environmental impact of products. Finally, it stresses that governments should increase the 
demand for environmentally sound products as well as promoting the environmentally sound 
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‘use’ of  products.12  Meaning that consumers should also be aware of  their responsibilities 
towards the environment, e.g. consumers should wash their clothes with cold water, if not 
the efforts of producers to make detergents that work in cold temperatures become 
irrelevant.
2.4 World Summit on Sustainable Development 
Agenda 21 proposes a review  of its progress on a 10-year basis. Consequently, in 2002 the 
Summit took place in Johannesburg, South Africa. It is known as the World Summit on 
Sustainable Development (WSSD). It had the purpose to review  Agenda 21 and adopt new 
strategies by identifying new  targets and evaluating the previous ones. An interesting 
difference is that in its plan of implementation it stresses constantly that ‘developed’ 
countries must to guide and aid ‘developing’ nations so that they too become integrated in 
the sustainable development schemes. In this sense, Article 15 of the Implementation act 
suggests “All countries should take action, with developed countries taking the lead, taking 
into account the development needs and capabilities of  developing countries, through 
mobilisation, from all sources, of financial and technical assistance and capacity-building for 
developing countries.” These actions could consist on developing ‘awareness-raising’ 
programmes for all relevant segments of  countries, such as the youth. Specifically, it states 
that countries could, “e) Develop and adopt, where appropriate, on a voluntary basis, 
effective, transparent, verifiable, non-misleading and non-discriminatory consumer 
information tools to provide information relating to sustainable consumption and production, 
including human health and safety aspects. These tools should not be used as disguised 
trade barriers”. One of eco-label’s main criticisms has always been that they might disguise 
non-tariff trade barriers. Up today this issue has not been solved, it is true that some eco-
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4.21. Governments, in cooperation with industry and other relevant groups, should encourage expansion of 
environmental labelling and other environmentally related product information programmes designed to assist 
consumers to make informed choices.
4.22. They should also encourage the emergence of an informed consumer public and assist individuals and 
households to make environmentally informed choices by: 
(a) Providing information on the consequences of consumption choices and behaviour so as to encourage 
demand for environmentally sound products and use of products;
(b) Making consumers aware of the health and environmental impact of products, through such means as 
consumer legislation and environmental labelling;
(c) Encouraging specific consumer-oriented programmes, such as recycling and deposit/refund systems. 
Section II. Conservation and Management of Resources for Development. Chapter 9 Protection of Atmosphere. 
9.12 Governments at the appropriate level, with the cooperation of the relevant United Nations bodies and, as 
appropriate, intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations, and the private sector, should: (l) Establish 
or enhance, as appropriate, in cooperation with the private sector, labelling programmes for products to provide 
decision makers and consumers with information on opportunities for energy efficiency.
labels have posed as a trade-barrier, but not all of  them are considered as such. This 
proposal gives line to what is expected and needed from an eco-labelling system: on a 
voluntary basis, effective, transparent, verifiable, non-misleading and non-discriminatory
2.5 Towards Rio+20 
In 2012 the Rio+20 or the ‘Earth Summit 2012: Vision, Cooperation, Transformation’ will take 
place in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.13 In 2009 the UN by resolution of the General Assembly, it 
was decided that such summit would take place and the preparations began. Besides 
evaluating and improving the previous goals, the Summit will also focus on two specific 
themes: a green economy in the context of  poverty eradication and sustainable 
development, and an institutional framework for sustainable development. It is because of 
this drive that eco-labels have gained attention once more. The main concern today is 
whether eco-labels are a relevant ‘environmental’ strategy, i.e. are they effective in 
ameliorating environmental issues. The recent papers and studies focus on the 
environmental performance and impact of  eco-labels. Whereas with previous studies this 
had not been an issue, the focus was on the label’s internal processes and governance. 
Today according to the 2010 Global Eco-label Monitor survey 67% of  its respondents have 
never studied or even plan to study the environmental and social impacts of their 
programmes. 
2.6 The earth summits role in the evolution of eco-labels. 
In synthesis eco-labels have evolved since the first Summit in Stockholm where even if  the 
term ‘eco-label’ was not yet carved, it gave the a key element for its creation. It was stressed 
that governments needed to increase environmental awareness of the private sector and 
consumers, through education. Furthermore, the public (enterprises and consumers alike) 
had to take responsibility for the consequences of their actions on the environment. This 
attempt to share responsibility over the environment with the public is a key step for the 
establishment of eco-labels. 
Germany’s Blue Angel Eco-label was a clear breakthrough. It gave the strategies and 
recommendations of the UN a tangible tool that was very promising. The Blue Angel eco-
label was to be awarded by the German government, through an independent Jury 
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(composed with people from different sectors), to those products that proved to be 
environmentally friendlier than other serving the same use. The eco-label was a base for the 
all the following programmes, who copied  the basic features of  the tool, giving each one 
unique characteristics and results. At the time, eco-labels were defined as “the voluntary 
granting of labels by a private or public body in order to inform consumers and thereby 
promote consumer products which are determined to be environmentally more friendly than 
other functionally and competitively similar products.”14 Interestingly, at this moment eco-
labels were conceptualised as a governmental instrument, the idea of  private entities 
awarding them was not clear. A private eco-label would have meant an industrial association 
type of label, which would not have been very trust worthy in the public eyes.  
It was until the Rio Summit and its Agenda 21 that eco-labels were specifically 
recommended the use of eco-labelling programmes to inform consumers about 
environmental characteristics of products. This Earth Summit, as mentioned before, includes 
societal values in pair with the environmental ones. This was a cornerstone for eco-labelling 
programmes. After Rio it is common to see programmes that include in criteria that are 
supposed to tackle social development, fairness, equity or other issues of the sort. Even if 
the focus of a label is primarily environmental, it will still include social criteria. But also, Rio 
spurred other trends such as ‘private certification schemes’ which are key to understanding 
the current concept of eco-labelling. 
Notwithstanding the achievements and relevance of the ‘Earth Summit’ in Rio, non-
governmental organisations (hereinafter referred to generally as NGO’s) were not convinced 
about how  certain problems were tackled. Specifically, they were unhappy with the results of 
the Forest Principles, enacted in such conference. NGO’s were disappointed that no binding 
document resulted from this intergovernmental forum. This intensified the ideas that private 
initiatives were needed to fill the void created by intergovernmental approaches. As an 
example, the Forest Stewardship Council15  (FSC) emerged in 1993 out of the frustration of 
NGO’s and governments alike. Specifically the Worldwide Fund for Nature/World Wildlife 
Fund (WWF) took on the task of creating this certification association. The Austrian 
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15 FSC is the first certification association. It is the responsible for awarding eco-labels to the products that come 
from sustainable-managed forests in accordance to the principles it has set as an association as well as those 
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government supported the WWF economically. Austria had banned tropical timber from 
forests that weren’t environmentally sound, of course countries exporting tropical timber 
threatened to go to the GATT claiming a protectionist ‘non-tariff  barrier to trade’. Before 
anything happened, Austria rescinded the law  and manage to funnel the funds it had for its 
implementation towards a private certification programme: the FSC.16  The birth of 
independent certification programmes introduced eco-labels as their private standpoint. 
From this moment on, eco-labels stopped being “just” soft governmental policies and 
became actual competing “green” brands. 
Finally, the Summit held in Johannesburg in 2002 addressed the importance of  voluntary 
tools used to inform the public about product’s sustainability, health and safety. Moreover, it 
mentions that these tools have to be transparent, meaning that the need to be drawn up in 
an open or democratic multi-stakeholder17  context. The process of formation and the 
management of  eco-labels must be transparent in order for them to be considered 
democratic. In other words, they should not be authoritarian, top-to-bottom governmental 
acts. Nonetheless, by this time, many of the ‘successful’ eco-labels were not governmental, 
they were being fostered or sponsored by independent governmental organisations (NGOs), 
contrarily to what was expected previously. Furthermore, it states that these instruments 
need to be verifiable. Since environmental qualities are difficult to observe it is imperative to 
be able to prove that the information on the labels are accurate and true. In this sense, 
certification is the key element to give assurance to the public.  Finally, the labels have to be 
effective, meaning that they have to produce a positive or at least a neutral effect on the 
environment and communities, as well as inform the public and raise awareness of 
sustainability measures. The effectiveness would need to be measured scientifically which is 
why the document also proposes the use of Life-cycle analysis to determine the products 
actual effects on the environment. Life cycle analysis also has the benefit that it increases 
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transparency on the supply-chains and industry networks that support the product. As it will 
be dealt on further, eco-label’s effectiveness is measured by their impact both on the market 
and the environment. Many problems have risen due to this note. Because it was only at this 
point when it was realised that there were no data on the impact of eco-labels. It is crucial to 
determine whether eco-labels have an impact or not, so they can be included in the political 
tool-box for climate change. Current research is focused on the effectiveness of eco-labels.
3. Defining Environmental labelling and Eco-labels
Any allegation made by a firm about the positive environmental qualities or characteristics of 
their goods and services is considered an environmental claim or green claim. They can 
refer to the environmental advantages of  the products’ production process, packaging, 
distribution, consumption or even their disposal. Environmental claims can appear on a 
product-label, on its package, related literature or advertising material, promotional or points-
of-sales material, and other forms of marketing. These claims can take diverse forms such 
as words, symbols, emblems, logos, graphics, colours and product brand names.18 
Environmental claims are very broad. Almost any claim about the “positive” environmental 
and social qualities of a product can be considered an environmental claim. Environmental 
claims comprise environmental labels and even eco-labels. However, not all environmental 
claims are an environmental label or even an eco-label. 
An environmental label would, consequently, be a type of environmental claim, which 
consists of a logo or seal placed on a product or package of a consumer product considered 
to be less harmful to the environment than other functionally and competitively similar 
products. Ultimately, an eco-label is a type of  environmental label that today is understood 
as a “trust mark or certification given to the independently verified, on-pack labels intended 
to communicate environmental and/or social performance to consumers.”19 This concept has 
evolved since the appearance of the first eco-labels in the 1980s. An eco-label has to 
“independently verified” meaning that the mechanism is very close to the notion of 
certification. However, the line between eco-labels and environmental certification is not 
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clear anymore. Whether eco-labels today are a merged version of eco-labels and 
certification, or a new breed altogether, will be discussed further down.  
3.1 The Early Definitions of Eco-labels
The OECD first defined environmental labelling in 1991, as “the voluntary granting of  labels 
by a private or public body in order to inform consumers and thereby promote consumer 
products which are determined to be environmentally more friendly than other functionally 
and competitively similar products.”20 Similarly, in 1993 the UNCTAD defined environmental 
labelling as “the use of  labels in order to inform consumers that a labelled product is 
environmentally more friendly relative to other products in the same category.”21  This seal 
would help identify and segregate the environmentally less harmful product from its 
‘environmentally unfriendly’ competitors. 
The then General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1992 first defined 
‘environmental labelling’ as ‘systems for the usually voluntary granting of labels by a private 
or public body in order to inform consumers’.22  Nowadays the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) refers to the use of eco-labels as “labelling products according to environmental 
criteria.”23  These broad definitions are well justified. The WTO focuses on the effects of 
environmental labelling on international trade and limiting the definition would not be very 
useful for its purpose. Even though WTO recognised eco-labels as efficient market 
instruments; they do pose a threat to international trade or at least potentially provide a 
clever way for countries to circumvent their GATT obligations.  The official position of the 
WTO before eco-labels is still to be determined by the Committee on Trade and 
Environment, as ordered by the 2001 Doha Ministerial Conference. Notwithstanding the 
above, the Dispute Settlement Body on the recent case ‘United States- Measures 
Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products’ that is due in 
early 2011, also has to solve the matter of eco-labels as a marketing tool.  
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A caveat worth pointing out is that very few  products actually ‘benefit’ the environment. 
Products are likely to harm the environment at some point of  their ‘life-cycle’. Therefore, it is 
inaccurate to call a product ‘environmentally friendly’. As acknowledged by the UNCTAD and 
the OECD in their definitions, a product holding an environmental label is only relatively 
more benign than others in its category.24 
Eco-labels are a specific type of environmental labels and they are not to be considered 
synonyms. Specifically, eco-labels are those that represent a complete judgement of  a 
product’s relative environmental qualities compared to other functionally and competitively 
equivalent product. Furthermore, they will always be voluntary. It is the manufacturers choice 
whether to apply for an eco-label or not. Other environmental labels can be mandatory and 
sometimes only consider one environmental quality, these are typically not considered eco-
labels.25  In other words, environmental labelling refers to any label used to differentiate a 
product based on the provision of environmental information, and ‘eco-labelling’ refers 
specifically to environmental labels awarded based on a life-cycle analysis.26
The previous ideas are all part of  the original analysis of eco-labels in the early 1990s when 
they were considered the ‘next best thing’. However, in reality all these conceptualisations of 
the different international bodies did not manage to perm-through to the market. The term 
eco-label in practice is used to refer to anything that involves environmental requirements 
and the application of a seal of approval. The term is so unclear that it fails to distinguish 
among, eco-labels that may have different characteristics and effects altogether.
3.2 Eco-labelling and eco-labels
An eco-label is specifically the logo or mark that is placed on the product “to inform the 
purchaser that it was created using methods that are more sustainable than those of  similar 
products from different makers.” In this sense, the mark itself  has the sole purpose to inform 
the purchaser of  the product. Eco-labelling on the other hand, is the initiative that promotes 
the “making relevant environmental information about a product available to the appropriate 
consumers through the product label to promote an environmental goal, cause or objective 
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through consumer choice.”27  The eco-label is the trigger that enables the eco-labelling 
mechanism. This mechanism, follows  the assumption that, within a given class of products, 
not all the products will place the same burden on the environment. Producers that are able 
to lower their environmental cost will want to distinguish themselves from competitors, by 
placing the eco-label on their product, which will create a competitive advantage for such 
producer. Furthermore, if  environmentally concerned consumers are willing to pay a 
premium for eco-labelled products, producers will have even more incentives to take the 
necessary steps to comply with the standards and obtain the eco-label. The eco-label will 
inform consumers which products satisfy their environmental ‘needs’. This mechanism will 
eventually lead to an enhanced environmental performance and awareness of the market.28 
Behind the eco-label there is an administrative body that is in-charge of the executing the 
programme. The programme, in turn, is the framework composed of principles, standards, 
criteria and general internal rules that are set in coordination with the stakeholders. The 
programme will ensure how  eco-labels are going to be awarded and to whom, as well as 
addressing the supervision, inspections and sanctioning. It is here where the fine line 
between certification and eco-labelling can be found. In the original eco-labels, like the Blue 
Angel, the producer would certify its products with an independent certifier and then ask for 
the administrative body of the eco-label to be placed on its products. However, today what 
can be observed is that it is the programmes are complex organisations who certify the 
products (e.g. the FSC, FLO and MSC) either themselves or by authorised or subordinated 
certification bodies. In this sense, the eco-label would in reality be an environmental 
certification mark. If an environmental certification mark and an eco-label are equivalents, 
will be duly analysed below.
4. The goals of eco-labels
In essence the ultimate objective of  eco-labels is to accelerate sustainable behaviour of all 
players in the market. However, eco-labels are mere on-pack logos that tell consumers a 
product was produced or can be consumed in a more sustainable way. It is a complex idea 
that combines sustainability standard-setting, information and branding, underpinned by the 
The Law and Economics of Eco-labels
25
27  Magali Delmas, WIne Consumer Research Team, UCLA . Spring 2010, University of California, Los Angeles. 
28 Jim Salzman, OECD, Lyfe-cycle management and trade, trade implications of eco-labelling. The trade 
implications of trends in eco-labelling,, p. 43
credibility of  an independent body. The idea of  eco-labels seems quite simple, however it is 
not. It is expected that these simple logos go beyond the promotion of sustainable 
behaviours, by delivering measurable social and environmental impacts. It is presumed they 
will also offer a credible yet simple assurance on sustainability claims as well as increasing 
brand value. Notwithstanding the previous, they are also expected to have a reasonable 
return on the investments for all the concerned stake-holders.  It is because of all these 
expectations that policy makers in the 1980s and early 1990s were very optimistic about 
eco-labels. 
These expectations are based on the simple idea that an eco-label creates a mechanism 
which strives for sustainable behaviour of  all players in the market. In this sense, “The basic 
purpose of an eco-label is to tell the consumer a credible story about what’s happening in 
the rest of the value chain. The story is intended to create demand for more sustainable 
value chains by influencing or affirming performance improvements upstream and 
purchasing decisions downstream.”29 From the mechanism we can derive the three distinct 
functions of the eco-label. 
a) Performance. An eco-label is expected motivate producers to achieve operational 
improvements in social and environmental arenas, by committing to the use of 
voluntary standards. 
b) Trust. Eco-labels must provide credible assurance around sustainability performance 
to consumers, customers, NGOs and other stake-holders. In this sense, it goes 
beyond marketing practices by committing to accountability and transparency. 
c) Demand. Eco-labels are expected to increase demand by modifying purchasing 
decisions and behaviour by communicating sustainability performance to consumers 
at the point of purchase, and more broadly, by increasing awareness and changing 
the social norms and expectations associated with a product category.30 
Eco-labels strive to improve the market’s environmental performance. It has done so by 
targeting adjacent causes of low  environmental performance such as low  consumer 
awareness, lack of  market segmentation or insufficient financial rewards for environmental 
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innovations.  In this sense, eco-labels serve as a communication tool that companies use to 
publicise their environmental credentials. The information disseminated in an eco-label is a 
mere means to an end, which is environmental performance. However, to determine the 
environmental performance of a product it is necessary to measure it. It is necessary to 
count with metrics to point out the environmental improvement attributable to the eco-label. 
4.1 Defining the eco-label’s impact
An eco-label’s effectiveness will be measured with its impact. The “impact of an eco-label is 
a function of both the marginal environmental improvements associated with it and its rate of 
adoption.”31  Considering that eco-labels are considered a commercial as well as an 
environmental policy tool it has to be evaluated in both aspects and how  they interrelate with 
one another. Effects can be observed in the market or the environment that not necessarily 
can be attributable to the eco-label. Even if  the effects are attributable to the eco-label, such 
effects have to be both-sided (trade and environment) to be able to consider the impact of 
the eco-label otherwise, the eco-label is not considered effective. The eco-label’s impact 
equation has two variables: the marginal environmental effects attributable to the eco-label 
and its rate of adoption. 
A point can be raised in measuring the eco-labels effectiveness and not its efficiency. 
Efficiency or in this case eco-efficiency has been defined as “adding maximum value with 
minimum resources use and minimum pollution.” Eco-efficiency is a mere measure of a 
products environmental qualities. It is necessary to know  the eco-efficiency of the products 
to be able to identify where the improvements can be made. However, the improvements 
need to be on the whole process not just the product, the industry has to adapt and modify 
its behaviour to become sustainable. 
4.2 Eco-labels impact: marginal environmental effects
Measuring the eco-label’s effectiveness should be as simple as measuring the effects and 
improvements it has had on the environment. In principle it would be possible to use life-
cycle analysis or other evaluating methodologies to gather quantifiable data reflecting 
marginal environmental improvements associated with compliance to specific eco-labels. In 
real life, gathering environmental data and establishing causation, is very difficult, at least. 
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Data regarding programmes effectiveness is normally anecdotal and not necessarily 
scientific or even objectively measurable. 
Environmental problems are generally created by different interrelated factors. To measure 
the effectiveness of  an eco-label these other factors also have to be considered. 
Furthermore, if  there were competition between an eco-label and other eco-labels or any 
other policy instrument, it would also have to be considered in the assessment. If 
competition among eco-labels were strong, an eco-label would not submit to this type of 
evaluation unless it were obligatory or all the other competitors were doing so. If  that were 
not enough isolating the effect of  one single programme might be difficult, and if performed, 
it would be incomplete.
Although it is intuitively appealing to believe that eco-labels will improve the environment, 
there is no replacement for evidence based-research.32  This evidence is not available 
precisely because the attention on the effects of the environmental labels on the 
environment is fairly recent. Most (if  not all) environmental-labels did not design and 
implement monitoring and evaluation impacts systems early on. There is a time lag between 
the establishment of the programmes and the implementation of the impact evaluation 
systems.33  Modern environmental-labels need to incorporate these monitoring and 
evaluation systems from the beginning. Only then will the information be reliable, and 
attributable to the system. 
Surveys and other research on the matter back the view  that these evaluations are not 
practised. A survey performed in 2010 by Duke University that includes over 150 eco-
labelling programmes found that one-third of surveyed labellers had never attempted to 
monitor the environmental or social benefits of their programmes and had no intentions of 
doing so. Furthermore, over a half of the single-standard labels surveyed had never 
conducted an impact study to assess the effect of certification on the environment.34 
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Furthermore, the oldest eco-label, Der Blaue Engel, which is over 30 years old, has never 
performed an independent scientific assessment on the environmental improvements of the 
programme.35 Of course there are exceptions, e.g. organic agriculture, which has proven to 
improve the soil and water quality and the ‘dolphin-safe’ tuna label (in the USA), which 
performed several scientific assessments as a consequence of litigation. Nevertheless, it is 
possible to state that there is no clear evidence of  the effectiveness of eco-labels in the 
environment. 
4.3 Eco-labels impact: rate of adoption 
An eco-label’s influence in a market also involves its adoption rate. Impact or influence is 
easier to measure, since it involves other types of information. There is quantifiable data, 
which includes, for example, the number of product categories covered by a label, the 
market share of  an eco-labelled product, growth in sales, number of companies certified and 
how  often the criteria are updated. There is also qualitative information that indicates an eco-
label’s credibility, which is normally based on how  the eco-label was developed and the type 
of organisations that support it. These are proxy indicators that assess the success eco-
labelling and “…are currently the only available quantifiable indicators of success.”36 
The main objection to proxy indicators is that they are focused on consumer behaviour and 
the impending price premia, not necessarily their environmental characteristics. While it is 
true that consumer acceptance is key for the success of a programme, is it because of 
environmental concern or another private motivation. In other words, whether the consumer 
buys an energy-efficient appliance because he is concerned about the environmental 
impacts of energy consumption and his ‘carbon foot-print’ or he buys it because he has a 
private motivation, like reducing operation costs and cutting bills in the long run, makes 
results unclear. Of course, what matters is that the market segment is created and that 
energy-efficient appliances will eventually improve the environment (or harm it less), 
regardless of the consumer’s motivation. However, if it is not possible to separate and 
understand the motivations behind these purchases, it is not correct to state that it is a 
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consumer-oriented market-tool.37 It is as if  eco-labels took credit for something they might or 
might have not caused. 
5. Eco-labelling criteria: their determination and content 
The higher impact of an eco-label the better is its quality, therefore its effectiveness. The 
quality of  an eco-label can only be determined by the quality of its standards/criteria and its 
credibility. How  an eco-label is designed can determine the success or failure of  a 
programme. The programme’s criteria are precisely its unique characteristic, which will 
differentiate it from its competitors and what will determine the impact. Whether the chosen 
criteria are the ‘right’ ones to address certain problems will never be straightforward. This 
may explain the multiplicity of labels addressing the same issues. Furthermore, criteria are 
dynamic, they change with innovation of technologies and processes, as well as with the 
market (industry and consumer) needs. 
5.1 Criteria selected for specific environmental problems
An environmental problem is normally noticed at the moment someone is affected by it. The 
environmental problems are hard to predict. There are uncountable activities that harm the 
environment (present and past human activities) and in a huge scale. When a specific 
problem arises, it is important to identify the source of  the problem and attempt to stop it and 
if possible reverse it. If it is unclear to individualise the responsible (firm) for the damage, 
there might be a need for general government intervention. Top-to-bottom regulation might 
not be popular however, because they are reactive measures. Due to the ‘precautionary’ 
approach of environmental regulation, ‘retrofitting’ or end-of-pipe corrections are not well 
regarded. They not very welcome because they are expensive, short-sighted and normally 
they are accompanied by government pressure. In this scenario a specific eco-label to 
address to problem would be an aid to governmental regulation. 
Sustainability and precaution are compliments. Sustainability is not only about the 
environmental harms and the losses, its about enduring. Resource management is an area 
in which eco-labels can play an important part. Consuming natural resources with no limit 
just because it is possible has proven unsustainable. In this sense, an eco-label could aid in 
the awareness of the problem before it becomes a causes harm. It attacks the problem from 
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the source in a preemptive manner. Such is the case of the ‘dolphin-safe’ eco-label, which is 
purpose is to reduce the dolphin mortality in the tuna fisheries. No more, no less. 
Notwithstanding the achievements of  this label, it is important to note that the same problem 
has been addressed more efficiently through a government mandated standard. In this 
sense, the fait of the fishery was not left in the hands of the market, specifically consumers. 
There are several Multi-stakeholder sustainability initiatives (MSI), promoted by the WWF 
that refer to specific industries. Different criteria, different programmes for specific resources, 
specifically regions with different needs. MSIs not necesarily end-up in certification, when 
they do they are eco-labels. Their purpose is to have a democratic and transparent 
consultation and negotiation to develop criteria or principles or indicators to promote 
sustainable production across a specific sector or product. Famous examples are the FSC 
and the MSC. Even if the focus is on the resource, like palm tree oil or forestry, the approach 
would be holistic and would address economic and social issues as well. Therefore, even if it 
is not created in a ‘Life-cycle’ approach they are effective in the sense that they are well 
sponsored and tailored. 
A criticism about labels that address specific resources or species, is that it may raise 
attention and consumption of the good. Consumers might select an eco-labelled tuna from 
the Mediterranean, which is not endangered (but close to), instead of  a more common 
variety which is not eco-labelled.  Finally, the main criticism is that it is not a comprehensive 
sustainable approach. 
5.2 Life Cycle Assessment as a way to determine the criteria
Firms and governments are expected to be pro-active and take pre-emptive measures to 
avoid the environmental problems from the beginning. Todays firms, theoretically strive to be 
eco-efficient.  To deliver competitively priced goods and services that satisfy human needs 
and bring quality of  life, while progressively reducing ecological impacts and resource 
intensity throughout the life cycle. By identifying and attacking the source of the 
environmental problem, within the production process or throughout the supply chain, firms 
would become more sustainable as a whole. The tool used to identify and assess the eco-
efficiency of a product is precisely ‘life-cycle’ analysis. 
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Life Cycle Assessment (LCA) is the investigation and valuation of  the environmental impacts 
of a given product or service caused by its existence. Once the investigation is performed, 
and all the information is available, the programme to determine the criteria for the eco-label. 
To determine the criteria the eco-label would consider the LCA results, the expected 
performance improvements as well as the current regulations on the industry.  It would 
select the areas where the process can be improved at the different stages of  the products 
life-span and design criteria to overcome the problems. LCA based criteria, would apply the 
same metrics to all similar products, meaning it can compare the eco-effectiveness of all 
similar products and award eco-labels to those that can prove they outperform the average 
similar product.
5.3 The content of the criteria: process or performance based 
Standards can be systems based or performance based. Systems-based or “general 
principle” standards specify the management systems that must be in place, but do not 
specify any minimum level of performance or benchmark that must be achieved. This means 
that two systems-certified companies could in practice have very different environmental 
performance. Furthermore, it is more difficult to determine whether these standards are 
being observed. Conversely, performance standards specify a benchmark level of  on the 
ground performance, but do not specify how  it should be achieved.38 Eco-label programmes 
are most effective their criteria are performance based, specific, implementable, and 
auditable at the field level. 39 However, as said before environmental impact evaluations are 
normally not required therefore performance is difficult to prove. In addition, process or 
systems-based standards are more widespread and have served as a proxy to 
environmental and social performance. 
Nonetheless there are new  eco-labels that appear to be performance based such as the one 
promoted by the Carbon Trust in the United Kingdom. It is a mere pilot, but its objective is to 
grade the overall performance of the product, by stating the product’s carbon-footprint. The 
objective is not only to know  the carbon content but eventually reduce it up to zero. By 
constant monitoring and evaluation.
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5.4 Ratcheting up the criteria: the eco-label’s ever raising bar 
Since the first analysis of eco-labels it was conceived that eco-labels had to be dynamic. In 
theory, a regulatory approach would be slow  and could be captured by industry, thus 
skewing it towards technologies that might not be the optimal for the environment. It would 
be slower, because from the moment a technology is available, a regulatory body would not 
have the means to regulate it immediately, furthermore it would hinder research and 
development for other even better technologies. Eco-labels were expected to solve these 
issues by promoting innovation. Additionally, because of the immediacy with the industry and 
the flexibility of  the standards it would be easier to ratchet up the criteria along with 
innovations and demand. 
The first analysis of this point, visualised only a small share of  the market as eco-label 
holders, and whenever more products were meeting the criteria, these would need to be 
reviewed and raised. One of  these reports states, “Frequently these environmental criteria 
are drafted in such a way that only a limited number of products in a given product area will 
meet them (usually about 15 percent). If  in a later date, more than the target number meet 
the threshold criteria, these requirements can be reviewed and raised. This assures that 
manufacturers will continue to look for ways to improve the environmental characteristics of 
both their products and their manufacturing processes.”40 It is suggested that eco-labelled 
products would only represent about 15% do the market of  such product. Where this number 
came from and why is there a limit is unclear, but surprising because it also coincides with 
other reports (such as the OECD and GATT). Eco-labels are conceived in a way that only a 
few  products in a market can meet the criteria. Not all producers in a market should thrive to 
obtain eco-labels. They are supposed to be difficult and costly to obtain. This is what allows 
the eco-label holders to increase the price of  their products and recoup their investments. 
However, over twenty years of  eco-labelling have proved that the most successful eco-labels 
are those that have increased market presence.
In reality, eco-labels do not really ratchet up when they get too many certified clients. As 
mentioned previously, monitoring and evaluation mechanisms were not implemented in 
many programmes until very recently. This means that data about effectiveness of standards 
is not available and will not be available for at least 10 years after the mechanisms were 
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placed. Once this data is available it will be possible to know  if the criteria actually had an 
improvement on the environment. This suggests that firms’ that fulfil the criteria have 
improved their environmental performance.  Only then criteria should be reviewed and 
ratcheted up. If the results are negative, the they should also be corrected. Without a stable 
system of monitoring and evaluation, criteria are unlikely to be raised. Other eco-labels, such 
as the European Energy labelling scheme, which grades the eco-efficiency from A to G, in 
addition to a colour scheme. Another labelling scheme that uses this grading system is 
‘Cradle-to-Cradle’ certification (C2C) have tiered labels. The eco-label can be basic, silver, 
gold and platinum (the tiers) which will be awarded conditional on the criteria that are met, 
the more criteria the firm meets the higher the ranking it obtains.41  Tiers or ranking eco-
labels might be a solution to motivate innovation and development of ‘better’ processes 
(considering that C2C is about the life-cycle) even if a label is already awarded. 
6. Classification Of Eco-labels
Addressing eco-labels today is general and imprecise. There are deep differences among 
programmes, not only in their outcomes and structures but also in the incentives and effects. 
The confusion and generalisation of the term indicates that the market sees them as a single 
tool whose purpose is communicate the environmental credentials of  a firm. A systematic 
categorisation is needed to analyse and determine the effectiveness of environmental-
labelling as a policy tool. 
6.1 The classic classification
In their first analysis both the UNCTAD and the OECD identified three types of 
environmental labels. These were ‘life-cycle’ labels, single-issue labels, and negative labels. 
At that time attention was focused on life-cycle schemes, as they yielded the most potential. 
However, it was Jim Salzman who divided environmental labels into eco-labels (life-cycle 
schemes), single-issue (or single-standard) voluntary labels, and single-issue mandatory 
labels.42  As it will be duly analysed, each type of label is expected to create different 
incentives and effects on the market. 
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6.1.1 Single-issue (single-standard) mandatory labels
It is a normal practice for governments to require (by law) labelling of products with 
consumer information such as the carcinogenicity of cigarettes, nutritional content of foods, 
or toxicity of  chemicals. These regulations are important because they allow  the consumer to 
make an informed judgement regarding the product’s ‘direct’ or ‘immediate’ effect or risk on 
his health. In the environmental arena, the immediacy of the products’ repercussions on the 
consumer is not that evident. The label, in the environmental case, would be directed on the 
effect or risks the product has on the environment not the consumer. 
Single-issue mandatory environmental labels, describe one or more specific attributes in a 
product’s life-cycle (production, use or disposal), but do not provide the overall view  of  the 
product’s environmental characteristics. These labels can be divided in two types. 
6.1.1.1 Negative single-issue mandatory labels
The first type is the negative label. This label reveals negative characteristics or impacts of  a 
product. The label identifies possible dangers to human, animal or plant life or health 
associated with the products use or disposal. The whole purpose of these labels is to warn 
and inform consumers of important health and safety risks of consumption and disposal of 
the product. Therefore, even if the labels may discourage sales, they are normally welcome 
by the market and dodge criticisms.43  Labelling in this sense is a ‘paternalistic’ approach 
from the government. Its purpose is to nudges consumers to make better choices or to 
promote awareness about certain health hazards. The government wants to protect 
consumers from their own ‘flawed’ judgements either by informing or warning.
6.1.1.2 Process and Production Method (PPM) labelling 
The second class of labels reflects how  the product is manufactured. Specifically the 
‘process and production methods’ (PPMs) used in the products manufacture. It is specifically 
addressed to producers and manufacturers, not consumers. States are free to regulate how 
products are manufactured. PPMs can be product related or product related (product 
related-PPMs). The difference is very subtle and lies in the effect it has on the final-product. 
a) Product related PPM
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The PPM is considered product related if  the product itself can be differentiated due to its 
physical characteristics. If an apple is grown using pesticides, the pesticide can be traced, 
thus this apple can be differentiated from one grown pesticide-free. In general countries are 
free to regulate product-related PPMs, under certain rules.
b) Non-product-related PPM
The key question for a non-product related PPM is whether the final-product has different 
qualities that would cause it to be treated differently in its use, handling or disposal from a 
practical substitute (the “average” product). In other words non-product related-PPMs do not 
affect the product’s physical or other identifiable characteristics.44  This type of unverifiable 
characteristics is much more complicated to assess because they do not alter or leave 
traces on the product itself. As an example one can think of a ‘fair trade’ apple, where the 
attribute of  ‘fair trade’ cannot be traceable by any physical means. Furthermore, the ‘fair-
trade’ apple performs in every sense exactly the same as the “average” apple. It can be 
concluded that the ‘fair-trade’ attribute is a non-product related PPM, since it has a trivial 
effect on the final-product. 
Mandatory labels apply to all products in a market, both national and imported. Therefore if  a 
government where to issue a non-product related PPM it could be deemed unlawful by 
international trade laws, specifically with the WTO. The reason it would be controversial is 
that such measure could pressure firms in other countries and jurisdictions to adopt specific 
PPMs and non-product related-PPMs. Consequently it may lead to foreclosure of foreign 
products or preferential treatments to national products, which are sanctioned by the 
international trade laws. 
6.1.2 Single-issue voluntary labels 
Just as single-issue mandatory labels, this label only refers or emphasises on one or more 
specific traits of the products’ life-cycle. The difference is that these have a voluntary nature. 
The main benefit of these schemes is that they are a potential marketing advantage for the 
manufacturer. Single-issue labels advertise specific environmental traits of  the product to 
benefit from a particular environmental issue that might be ‘trendy’ at a given moment and 
place. 
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From a consumer point of  view, single-issue labels allow  them to identify products with a 
particular environmental trait that they deem important. The information is presented to the 
consumer in a simple and straightforward manner: “no animal testing”, “dolphin-safe”, 
“organic” are clear examples. There is no additional effort required from the consumer to find 
out what the label stands for. It is imperative that consumers trust the labels for the 
mechanism to work. As it will be detailed further down, the assessment of  the veracity of 
these claims by experts is crucial. 
Contrarily, producers might be compelled to adapt their PPMs to specific environmental 
qualities that are ‘trendy’ and consumers demand. In this sense, manufacturers will address 
specific environmental problems as long as it is demanded, thus profitable. Furthermore, it is 
much simpler and cheaper for producers to apply and adapt their manufacturing processes, 
to comply with the environmental issue at hand, than it is to apply a life-cycle schemes. In 
addition, the producer has a wider option of attributes he could highlight. Moreover, he would 
have the flexibility to redesign the process (at relatively low  cost) if the environmental 
awareness of consumers were to shift to another environmental problem. 
Single-issue labels may have the effect of  increasing consumer and corporate awareness of 
specific environmental problems. However, if  they also have a positive or ‘less bad’ effect on 
the environment is not so evident. First, producers have an incentive to misuse the labels. 
Manufacturers can easily incorporate the label in the products’ packaging and send it to the 
market reaping the benefits from a higher price or increased sales. Because it is not 
government mandated, the risk of  being caught is low. Second, because there is no limit to 
the single-issues a producer can focus on, the market could become flooded with single-
issue labels. One single product can bear several single-issue labels. This overflow  of 
information will lead to consumer confusion. In the same line, if there are many ‘cheaters’ in 
the market, consumers will not only be confused but they will eventually mistrust all the 
labels. As said before the key for this mechanism to work is the consumer’s trust in the label. 
Finally, focusing on only one environmental attribute can hide other even more serious 
environmental effects of  the product. An appliance might be energy efficient, but utterly 
pollute water. If  this appliance increases its sales it will also increase water pollution, in an 
‘energy efficient’ manner. 
6.1.3 Multi-criteria and life-cycle labels (eco-labels) 
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Only multi-criteria45  voluntary environmental labels should be referred to as ‘eco-labels’. 
Eco-labels give environment-related information on the overall environmental quality or 
characteristics of a product. To obtain the label the product has to satisfy several criteria. 
The criteria would be set to measure the holistic or overall environmental impact of the 
product on the environment. This holistic approach is what led to the idea of life-cycle 
assessment, thus the name ‘life-cycle’ labels. Nevertheless, this name can be misleading 
because as studied further on, there is no clear way to measure the products true life-cycle 
effect on the environment. 
Life-cycle assessment is a tool used to evaluate the environmental effects associated with a 
product, process or activity by identifying and assessing the inputs used and wastes 
released into the environment at different points. This may encompass extraction and 
processing of  raw  materials, manufacturing, transportation, distribution, use and reuse, 
maintenance, recycling and final disposition. In essence a ‘life-cycle’ assessment would be 
performed to define the different criteria of multi-criteria label. This assessment will 
determine which are the criteria that should and can be measured, which reflect the desired 
environmental qualities of the product. 
Multi-criteria labels can be very sophisticated or simple, depending on the industry and 
technologies available for a given industry. In general multi-criteria labels can evaluate a 
product’s effects on the three separate media (air, water, soil), as well as the use of 
renewable energy, product durability, safety and maybe even social impact. It is not as 
thorough as life-cycle is supposed to be, however it’s the best approximation. For example 
Cradle-to-Cradle Certification makes its evaluation based on criteria for material health 
(toxicity of  chemicals in the product), material reutilisation, renewable energy use, water 
stewardship and social responsibility.46 
For a manufacturer to engage into a multi-criteria scheme, the motivation goes beyond 
marketing. The initial investment to achieve this type of label is much more expensive and 
requires a meaningful change in the normal course of  business. Furthermore, production 
processes are complicated and normally involve complicated supply chains or production 
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networks, where the identities upstream suppliers and producers are unknown. To qualify for 
a multi-criteria label, the products’ chain of custody is key in the assessment. The gathering 
of all this information can be very costly. If this were not enough, as it will be studied further 
on, certification is essential for this label. Needless to say, this type of certification does not 
come cheap.  The incentives have to be strong enough for a producer to engage in these 
efforts. This is matter of an independent chapter of this work. 
This type of  multi-criteria labels could be conceived in a mandatory (governmental) scheme. 
This would prohibit the sale of unlabelled products in a particular market, in other words it 
would be like a ban. This would obviously affect the imports of competing products and thus 
would be in breach of the WTO rules. This is why there are no such schemes in existence. 
However, if many firms were to have these labels it might signal to the government that such 
environmental thresholds are easy to meet and that is what the public wants. Furthermore, if 
the presence of  eco-labels in the market were large, consumers might also be inclined to 
think that such labelling is mandatory, therefore they would de facto discriminate foreign 
products. 
Inversely to the idea of widespread obligatory labels, eco-labels are conceived in a way that 
only a few  products in a market can meet the criteria. Not all producers in a market should 
thrive to obtain eco-labels. They are supposed to be difficult and costly to obtain. This is 
what allows the eco-label holders to increase the price of  their products and recoup their 
investments. However, over twenty years of eco-labelling have proved that the most 
successful eco-labels are those that have increased market presence. 
6.2 The ISO classification: Types I, II, III
During the preparation period leading up to the Earth Summit in 1992, the UNECD had to 
ensure that it had the full support of the business sector. As a result it created the World 
Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD).  This Council approached the 
ISO and other organisations to see what were their advances in the area of  environmental 
management and to motivate their involvement. After the WBCSDs request to ISO 
established alongside other organisations the Strategic Advisory Group on the Environment 
(SAGE) to study the situation and present recommendations. SAGE had two major 
contributions, first was a series of recommendations on environmental management, which 
were submitted to the UNCED preparatory conference in January 1992, which became a 
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backbone of  Agenda 21. The other contribution was the recommendation to develop 
standards in the area of environmental management, headed by ISO. In 1993 ISO created a 
Committee to address environmental management standards.47  The Committee (officially 
called ISO/TC 207) continued to create the environmental management standards in the 
ISO 14000 series. The EMS standards were designed in a way that does “not set limit levels 
or performance criteria for operations or products; instead, its activities are based on the 
philosophy that improving management practices is the best way to improve the 
environmental performance of  organisations and their products.”48 This idea has been the 
centre of the criticisms of this series, in essence “there is not much convincing evidence on 
the table which would suggest  that the implementation of an EMS standard has indeed 
boosted environmental performance.”49    Besides environmental labelling, the Committee 
also developed general standards on Environmental Management Systems (EMS), as well 
as specific standards for the other types of EMS such as Environmental Auditing & Related 
Investigations, Environmental Performance Evaluation, Life Cycle Assessment, Greenhouse 
Gas Management and Related Activities. 
6.2.1 The ISO-14020 series 
The ‘ISO-14020 Environmental labels and declarations - General Principles’, as its title 
describes sets the general principles for environmental labelling. Environmental labelling is 
defined as ‘a set of voluntary tools aimed at stimulating the demand for products and 
services with lower environmental burdens by providing relevant information on their life 
cycle to address purchaser’s demands on environmental information.’ It enumerates nine 
general principles to be applied to all environmental labels and declarations. A relevant 
principle suggests that whenever there is a conflict with a more specific standard, the more 
specific one should take preference. Another principle suggests that the development of the 
environmental labels and declarations should take into account all relevant aspects of the 
life cycle of the product (even if  some eco-labels are specific such as recyclability). Its 
purpose is to standardise the development of  the programme criteria and the design of  the 
programmes. It does not limit what the programme should be about or any ‘threshold’ 
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criteria. It is about the process and requirements a programme should have to be considered 
an eco-labelling programme. In theory, any established programme could seek the ISO 
verification, so the eco-labelling programme would be ISO certified.
6.2.2 Type I Eco-labels 
This type of eco-labels are contained in the ISO 14024. Type I eco-labels “...are voluntary, 
multi-criteria based, third-party programmes that awards labels to products with overall 
environmental preferability based on life cycle considerations.”50 It is understood that its aim 
is to identify environmentally superior products, however the definition refers to 
‘environmental preferability’. This represents a problem because environmental superiority is 
not the same as preferability. In a market with a 100 products, 99 are likely to be preferable 
to the worst performing one. The product has to be environmentally superior to justify its 
higher price. Whether this is a mistake or if it is on purpose is not clear, however there is 
pressure to change it. This eco-label has pre-set criteria, in the sense that the criteria are 
standardised and not ad-hoc to a specific product. This criteria should ‘consider’ simplified 
life cycle inventory and or other method of environmental impact assessment.
The definition states that eco-labels are voluntary, third party schemes run by an 
independent body. It does not claim that the product needs to pass third-party certification to 
obtain the eco-label, it claims that the eco-label is the actual certifier. In this case, the 
independence is from the producer not the eco-labelling programme. The entity that 
administers the eco-labelling programme is the independent entity.  Consequently the eco-
label is a certifying scheme in itself, and the eco-label (the logo or mark) is a specific type of 
certification-mark. However, this means that the criteria are set and verified by the same 
entity, which may represent a problem unless the criteria are determined by an other body 
altogether. Another problem, is that an eco-labelling programme, with set criteria that asks 
for ‘third-party certification’ from an ‘independent’ certifier would not be considered a Type I 
eco-label. Eco-labels that are self-standing certification schemes are rare thus this definition 
is limited. This definition and characteristics resemble the Blue Angel, the Nordic Swan and 
all the other government based approaches were developed and in full operation at the time 
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this standard was established. There is no account for how  many schemes have or even 
follow the ISO 14024 standard. 
Other features of  this standard is that it describes operational procedures to assist the 
creation of  new  programmes. It also provides a framework for mutual recognition between 
programmes. In this case, if these schemes are based on the original eco-labels, it makes 
sense to be able to recognise foreign eco-labels in the sense that the majority of the labels 
were government-sponsored. Furthermore, even though ISO is an NGO its members are the 
national metrology-normalisation or standardisation bodies of countries, therefore where 
national eco-labelling programmes are in place they are likely to follow this Standard.  
6.2.3 Type II Eco-labels 
The ISO 14021 refers to environmental claims that are made directly by manufacturers, 
importers, distributors, retailers or other stakeholders about the environmental friendliness of 
their products without third-party certification. They can come in the form of  statements, 
symbols or graphics on product package labels or in other forms such as product literature, 
advertising, technical bulletins or other sources of  product information.51  These ‘green-
claims’ are normally regulated by the government as ‘misleading advertisement’ or 
specifically as ‘green advertisement’. Because there is no third-party certification it is treated 
as advertisement. The Standard sets out general requirements for truthfulness and accuracy 
applying to all claims. It provides specific guidance for the most common claims. It deals with 
ways producers can verify their claims, even if  it is not intended to be used as a seal of 
approval. By defining the most common claims and symbols it gives certainty in the 
international trade arena, both for producers and consumers. However, because the 
definitions are meant to be adapted to national legislation and be used by industry world-
wide the concepts tend to be very vague and imprecise. It also sets the principles of  such 
declarations, precisely due to the fact that they are not third party verified, the labels are 
arguably not very informative. Hence, countries such as Australia and the US have made 
enacted laws where the claims must be scientifically verifiable. 
The criticism here, is that they can be verified by an independent third party scheme. In 
reality what differs from the Type I and III labels is not the body issuing the information, what 
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matters is the ‘type’ of information provided. These claims, verified or not, are mere single-
issue labels. This means that a label such as ‘dolphin-safe’, which is a third party certified 
single issue label, does not enter in this category, neither in the previous one. 
6.2.4 Type III Eco-labels
In 2006 another type of label was added, the ISO 14025. This environmental label has 
“quantified environmental data for a product with pre-set categories or parameters based on 
ISO 14040-series of  standards but not excluding additional environmental information 
provided within a type III environmental declaration program.”52 The ISO 14040 is the series 
that addresses life cycle assessments and inventories. For this classification these are life 
cycle labels, contrarily to the previous classification which would consider Type I as life cycle 
labels. In this sense, a third party certification agency or an independent body will use a 
number of environmental performance indicators, including energy consumption, air 
emissions, water emissions, and others, to obtain a score, which serves as a template for 
each product group. It is assumed that such templates will help costumers compare different 
goods and then purchase the one with the best score. The downside of this label is that if 
the costumer is not acquainted with the parameters, the information is of little use. Reason 
why these environmental declarations are more appropriate for use in business-to-business 
communications.53  With this type of  eco-label there are no benchmarks or scales as in the 
Type I, they do not judge products they just present the information in a report known as the 
Environmental Product Declaration (EPD). 
6.2.5 The ISO classification in reality
The shortcomings of each type has been duly pointed out, however in overall the most 
relevant shortcoming is that eco-labels today do not reflect the characteristics set in the 
standards, the majority of labels are a mix of  the types. A Type II (green claims) can be and 
is encouraged to be verified by a third party certifier, if  it does it ceases to be a Type II, even 
if the verification was a step up. The most common labels today, Fairtrade, FSC or the MSC 
do not fit into any of the categories. Therefore people suggest calling them ‘Type I-like’ or 
even consider them a different type all together. The suggested Type IV eco-label which 
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would refer to single-issue, independent third-party certified programmes. However ISO has 
not taken any action into this. The relevance of ISO is that it is the reference industry, 
governments and prospect programmes use to create eco-labels. The attempt to unify how 
eco-labelling programmes are created and administered is an accomplishment of the ISO. 
6.3 Categories of eco-labels
Eco-labels, today can be very broad and confusing, they have different objectives, different 
targets, different administration forms. In the end, the types of  eco-labels proposed by the 
‘authorities’ in this matter (or at least the once authorities) do not reflect on the market. The 
market is flooded by different eco-labels and few  can sort them out (if it is they notice them 
at all!) Consumers see them on their products, and will act based on its ideas about the 
product, brand and personal tastes (a chapter will be dedicated to see the consumers 
standpoint). Producers will have incentives to become more sustainable in the long-run, it is 
trendy and the market pressures, but when it is time to decide, the decision is going to be a 
business decision, not an environment-oriented decision (NGOs and governments play that 
role, not business). Again, selecting which eco-label can be time consuming and can lead to 
losses if the wrong eco-label was chosen. 
Eco-labels, are different among them however they still share common characteristics. They 
are voluntary, cooperative in nature (criteria setting is normally done in a transparent, 
democratic or inclusive process) and they are independent and reliable (it goes beyond 
mere marketing, the certification is key). Whenever these characteristics are not met, it is not 
an eco-label. Eco-labels can be classified but as sub-types of eco-labels, which will be 
briefly addressed. 
6.3.1 Targeted at individual consumers, industrial customers, investors, governments or 
others 
The information each of these actors needs is very different, there are some eco-labels that 
are very efficient in signalling certain information to the rest of the industry or supply-chain, 
but that consumers do not need to understand, (e.g. the green dot) and vice-versa. The final 
consumer, might not understand every detail of the programme. The decision to buy an eco-
labelled is not necessarily based on pure environmental motivations. Many consumers see 
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eco-labels as brands. To an industrial costumer, on the other hand, environmental and 
supply-chain management might be crucial, to make important business decisions.  
6.3.2 Single-issue or multiple-issue 
An eco-label can focus on one specific environmental issue, such as natural resource, i.e. 
dolphin safe tuna. However, it can also addresses the whole life-cycle of  the product or 
multiple criteria to address social, economic and environmental issues concerning the 
production of the product. This last approach is what would be expected from all eco-labels, 
however in reality both types have proven to co-exist and have diverse results. 
6.3.3 Awarded due to consumption effects, production impacts or the product’s complete life 
cycle
Criteria can evaluate a wide variety of  things. Presumably, life-cycle programmes would truly 
assess a products’ repercussions on the environmental at every moment of its existence. 
However, these type of  labels do not exist, because even if a producer traces every moment 
of the product, the moment the product is sold, the responsibility is transferred to the 
consumer. What is clear is that many eco-label criteria are focused providing assurances 
about planning and implementation of sustainable management and governance schemes 
rather than the ‘absolute measures of environmental performance’. Studies have proven that 
many firms that undergo through certification have improved operational effectiveness and 
internal governance, however whether their environmental and social impacts are also 
improved, is not assessed (at all!).54 
6.3.4 Single or multiple sectors 
Certain eco-labels such as the Rainforest Alliance Certification, or the Carbon Trust, and 
even the Blue Angel, have one common label but different criteria sets for different products 
or industries. Others, only focus on one industry sector, like apparel, palm oil or forestry 
goods. It does not mean they have less criteria, it is just addressed to a specific industry with 
a specific problems. There are also resource based labels, such as carbon, energy and 
water. These cross-through different industries but focus on the correct management of 
these resources, the lower the scores the better the product.  
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6.3.5 Criteria or scope defined locally, regionally or internationally 
Different regions have different problems. It is hard to imagine a truly international set of 
criteria. There might be some minimum requirements, but it is precisely the democratic 
nature of the criteria setting that allows regional problems to be addressed specifically. A 
one-size fits all label would be difficult to draft in an international setting. The largest problem 
is recognition and validation of foreign eco-labels. As an example flower-growers in 
Colombia had a problem with their eco-label because it was not recognised by the Dutch 
market, because the standards did not match their own eco-label. This problem is hard to 
solve, because it is not a matter of the government but it does create a barrier to trade. 
6.3.6 Second or third party certifications, or self declarations of conformity 
Currently an eco-label has to be certified to be considered an eco-label. As mentioned 
before, any self-declaration is considered a green claim and are subject to specific rules (at 
least in the US, Australia and England). Second party certifications are what are known as 
industry or association related validations. A producer would have to meet certain standards 
in order to be part of  this industry-association. Once met, the association would allow  him to 
use the label. The problem with these labels is that even if  its not self-declared it is awarded 
within the same group of interest. They might be useful as internal communication tools, 
however the consumer might not really trust them. Third party certification is not without 
criticism either. As any other certification scheme the fact that a producer literally pays the 
certifier it could create biases in the process, some authors even suggest a forth party 
certification scheme, in which a government or international body would take care of  the 
certification, as to ensure unbiasedness. 
6.3.7 Impacts of a single product, a range of activities or a defined manufacturing site 
Eco-labels are designed to communicate a products environmental impacts. Chapter 2 will 
discuss the fact that some author’s consider eco-labels a bundled product, where the 
consumer is buying 2 products,  the good, e.g. a coffee; and an environmental benefit, e.g. 
more trees for tropical birds (this is the case of shade-grown coffee). However, it is possible 
that a producer (for internal Corporate Responsibility policies or Public Relations and 
Marketing) decides to donate or participate in an environmental programme or partner up 
with an NGO. It is seen that when producers commit to these activities they want to 
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communicate it to the consumers and obtain the price premiums. When this information is 
presented on the product’s label it is interpreted as an eco-label and the consumer is 
mislead. In 2009 Cadbury, placed on its chocolate bars label that made it clear that it was 
using sustainable palm oil. This was essentially true, Cadbury was a founder member of the 
RSPO (Roundtable for Sustainable Palm Oil) in coalition with the WWF. At the time RSPO 
was not concluded, reason why Cadbury was obtaining its certified palm oil from an 
independent certifier. The problem was, it only bought 2,800 tons out of the 40,000 it uses in 
a year. Cadbury was attacked by environmentalists and upset consumers for greenwashing 
and eventually removed such label.55 In this case, communicating CSR through the products 
label is not an eco-label,  even though committing to an eco-label is CSR. Furthermore, 
certain resource-based labels focus on the geographical areas, such as a forests, palm tree 
or coffee plantations. In this case, the label communicates the efforts to improve the 
ecosystem, again it does not mean that the end-product is sustainable in itself. 
6.3.8 Initiatives are environmental, social or economic, or a combination of these 
Since the Rio Summit it was established that sustainability has a triple bottom-line: social, 
economic and environmental. Any instrument or policy would have to address the triple 
bottom-line to be deemed ‘sustainable’. Today it would not be common to find a purely 
‘environmental’ eco-label. Normally all criteria are a combination of  these, some as 
mentioned before, focus on the social aspects, such as the Fair-trade organisations (FLO) 
that focuses on human rights and social aspects. However, within their criteria there are 
economic and environmental factors too. The multi-criteria that address several aspects of 
the product is the closest thing to a ‘life-cycle’ label, which is expected to be comprehensive, 
thus effective. 
6.3.9 Type of organisation sponsoring the eco-label
The type of organism that fosters the eco-labelling programme can influence the rate of 
adoption of the label. As it can be seen from the graphs from the Global Eco-label Monitor 
2010 report (below), 58% of  eco-labels are managed by non-profits, which is probably due to 
the credibility of  the eco-label. For-profit or private-led eco-labels comprise 18% of  the eco-
labels, however an eco-label that is representative of  this type is not evident in the market. 
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Eco-labels are normally created in a transparent multi-stakeholder inclusive process, the 
criteria that arise from these processes are normally very similar. The type of entity that 
manages the label once the criteria are set is not relevant for the quality of  criteria, it is 
relevant in the market presence and assurance in the market.  For example, the non-profit-
led eco-labels tend to have more in-site visits, audits and third party certifications than other 
privately-led eco-labels.56 This might reflect on the trust consumers place on this type of eco-
labels, hence their popularity.
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Figure 2. Type of Organization Running the Eco-label57
Government sponsored eco-labels are voluntary environmental standards such as the EU 
flower or the Blue Angel, they can run in parallel with obligatory schemes. The companies 
that decide to comply with those might see benefits such as closer relationship and 
improved image before the authority, leading to preferential treatments from the authorities 
such as less inspections and bone-fide presumptions in case of faulty performance. 
However, the consumer might not be aware of this label or confuse it with a mandatory 
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programme. The private or for-profit eco-label, is a business in itself. It operates certifying 
and awarding labels to interested parties in exchange of a price. This is not the same as an 
industrial association eco-label which suggests that in order to be a member of such 
association, the firm should certify that it covers certain benchmarks (probably set by the 
association itself). A firm might be motivated by the shared reputation effects of being part of 
a ‘cleaner’ industry or supply network, however if  a firm wants to standout from its peers this 
type of  eco-label might not be optimal. Non-profit organisations or NGOs can also foster 
eco-labels, the WWF for example has backed many eco-labels, by aiding in the formation 
process by providing know-how  as well as by endorsing the new  labels with its reputation.58 
Firms might seek this NGO-sponsored eco-labels to buff  their own brand as being ‘altruistic’ 
or ‘responsible’.  
7. Environmental Certification 
After analysing the different definitions of  eco-labels, the term certification constantly stands-
out.  Certification is not new. There is evidence to suggest that even in ancient Greece and 
Rome (in the Mediterranean area) a verification and marking system for olive oil trade was in 
place. The  amphoras were marked and sealed, containing information such as the 
geographical precedence of  the olives, as well as the name of  the farmer that pressed the 
olives, the weight of the oil and the name of the shipper (person who handled the oil during 
its transport). This information was then verified by a Roman official. While this information 
was crucial for the Roman epicureans of the time, its real purpose was to insure the olive oil 
from one of the greatest scams of the time: switching the oil for inferior quality or stealing 
part of the oil while in route.59
Romans left a vast institutional heritage, including verification and certification systems. 
Today the basic idea remains the same, a third party will verify that the information that is on 
the labels is accurate. There is a difference between verification and certification, especially 
in the sustainability arena. Though the differences are subtle and can be interpreted 
differently depending on the programme. 
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Figure 3. Rainforest Alliance eco-labels: certified and verified. 
- Verification, is carried out by a second or third party certifier and its only purpose is to 
observe and testify how  sustainable the producer or product is with regards to the 
criteria. Verification can be performed by an NGO or a local independent auditor or a 
business association, whenever there are no certifiers that are certified by the 
programme available. It is useful for business to business communications specially 
along the supply chain. Small farms can verify their standards, so an upstream retailer 
can use that verification in their chain-of-custody evaluation to obtain certification. It can 
be a pre-requisite for certification and in some cases, when there is no certification 
programme established, it serves the purpose of assurance to consumers (but it is not 
common). 
- Certification, is a guarantee through a certificate or certification mark that a set of 
criteria have been met in a specific environment (individual producers, collective 
producers, co-operatives, or regions). An independent certified or accredited auditor 
makes the evaluation that the criteria are met. When the confirmation of  the status is 
cleared the producer will obtain the certificate which can serve as a guarantee. 
7.1 Reliance of eco-labels on third party certification. 
As in many qualities, olive oil’s characteristics are not observable until after the oil is 
consumed,  it is an experience good. Therefore it relies on trial and error purchase to know 
which quality is the preferred one. Once the preferred one is identified the consumer needs 
to be able to identify it, thus the need for a mark. However, whether there were any 
chemicals involved in the process, or if  the farm has a sound water or waste programme, or 
even if  its employees are treated and paid fairly cannot be clearly observed even after 
experience. These attributes, are considered credence goods. As noted promptly by Caswell 
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and Mojduszka, environmental attributes are principally credence attributes. The key factor 
that makes them credence attributes is that it is not practicable for individual consumers to 
assess the quality of  the product, either because it is economically or physically unfeasible. 
The consumer cannot measure the quality and also cannot learn it from his or her 
experience in consuming the product. There is no market mechanism that solves the 
problem with credence goods because consumers cannot punish the producer by not 
purchasing the product in the future in response to false claims (in advertising or labelling). 
In the long run there is no market for high quality credence goods.60 
7.2 The modern international sustainability certifiers and eco-labels
When analysing the ISO type I eco-label it was clearly pointed out that an eco-label is a 
third-party certification scheme. This is striking because normally, the definitions claim that 
the goods are certified or verified by a third party, as a pre-requisite to obtain the eco-label. 
Which suggests there is a firm, an independent certifier and an eco-labelling entity. The firm 
would go to the certifier, obtain the certification (understood as some type of  document) and 
only then go to the eco-labelling entity to obtain the eco-label (by signing a time-limited 
licensing contract). However the doubt rises when not only the ISO claims that eco-labels 
ARE the certifying schemes, but also the large eco-labels today are considered certification 
schemes rather than ‘eco-labels’. Which suggests that there is only a firm and a certifier and 
the certifier itself  awards the eco-label. Additionally, there are very different approaches in 
the literature regarding eco-labels and certification, some equalise it, some make a distinct 
separation, some when analysing one do not mention the other. What can be deduced is 
that the line between eco-labels and environmental certification is very thin if  not non-
existent. 
Certifications schemes today are likely to vary from one another, however, the key 
components are identified as “(1) establishment of standards, (2) certification assessment 
for compliance with the standards, (3) certification seal or label, (4) accreditation of the 
certifier by the certification body, and (5) compliance monitoring.”61 The point that stands 
out is precisely the difference between the traditional concept of  eco-label and the new 
‘sustainability’ certification schemes.  Traditional eco-labels agreed on the standards, going 
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to the third party certifier, obtaining the label and compliance monitoring, eventually renewal 
of the label could take place by re-certifying. However, this point is clearly pointing out that 
the certification body and the certifier are independent entities. The certification scheme is 
the certification body, the one that orchestrates the criteria setting, and designs the label and 
does all the administrative work, which includes accrediting the certifiers. With this 
responsibility it is up to the famous labels, through accreditation, to ensure and guarantee 
that these independent certifiers are competent. This is precisely how  they form the 
international networks. They collaborate with local authorities and stake-holders by adapting 
their criteria to local necessities, and accredit local organisms to perform the certification. It 
is up to the certification bodies to ensure that the accredited certifiers are competent and 
trustworthy because their ‘brand’ depends on them. Finally, local producers who already 
obtained the certification can approach the certification body for the award of the eco-label. 
In this sense eco-labels are a complex version of  certification marks. To be more precise a 
sustainable certification mark. The main difference being that traditionally after the 
certification is performed if its a company it would receive a certificate, but if  its a product it 
can receive a mark. However, the certification is a step previous to the award of the eco-
label, to be able to use the eco-label a licensing contract has to be signed with the eco-
labelling programme (or certification body). Notwithstanding the previous, each programme 
differs and it is possible to find simpler schemes in which the eco-label is exactly the 
certification mark. In conclusion, today eco-labelling programmes are complex sustainability 
certification schemes that create, promote and are at the the centre of international 
certification networks. 
8. Other corporate ‘sustainability’ communication tools 
A corporation, once it commits to an environmental management system, any pro-
environmental or sustainability action that is beyond their legal obligations, will very likely 
want to communicate these actions to its stakeholders. As mentioned before there is an 
underlying idea that sustainable corporations have more value in the eyes of  stakeholders. 
Furthermore, there are many benefits for the corporation once it takes real action. However, 
if such actions are not communicated to stakeholders and the public in general, the benefits 
are very likely to be limited (reduced water and electricity costs, probably). It can be possible 
that corporations invest in environmental schemes and do not communicate it, however this 
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scenario is unlikely, corporations seek profits. Always. There is no sense in todays market 
place to not communicate pro-environmental actions. Transparency is crucial in the business 
world. Levelling the information with the public is regarded as a positive, and perhaps even 
imperative. There are many instruments a corporation could use to communicate its 
sustainability engagement. These other tools and strategies will be briefly described below, 
as a manner to understand the differences with eco-labels.  
8.1 Environmental Ratings
In short environmental ratings, rankings, indices and awards are instruments that seek to 
measure, compare or reward corporate sustainability performance. They essentially follow 
the same business model as financial ratings. Conventional financial ratings aim at 
assessing the financial standing of a company, whereas environmental or sustainability 
ratings measure sustainability performance. After an evaluation, against the agency’s 
measuring system the company will obtain a sustainability score. The sustainability score is 
based on an intricate weighting system that examines company actions regarding things 
such as corporate governance, environmental performance, energy efficiency and climate 
change strategies. This score is used as a metric to compare a specific companies with 
others, there precisely the ‘rating’ they use one common language making it easier to 
identify the best performers. The evaluations normally focus on long-term sustainability and 
environmental performance, rather than short term as the financial scores. Therefore in the 
financial performance of  companies with high environmental ratings might not be as good as 
companies with good financial ratings. There are many studies on this matter, the majority 
inconclusive. However, if the investor is interested in profits tobacco, alcohol and weapons 
seem to outperform their sustainably competitors. 
Sustainability rating agencies have “all the inherent conflicts in the business models of  credit 
ratings agencies, the same false sense of security applies to sustainability ratings as well.” 
After the financial crisis of 2007 where rating agencies where at the heart of the problem, 
attention was brought to other rating agencies as well. The main problem with sustainable 
ratings is that rating agencies are spurring the market place increasing the amount of 
information. Raters strive to differentiate their ratings by taking different approaches to 
evaluating sustainability performance. This leads to a market where some ratings focus on 
performance and others gauge transparency; some ratings focus on triple-bottom-line issues 
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and others focus on single issues; some ratings require company input and others rely 
entirely on third-party information sources. Furthermore, there is demand for specific 
information from stakeholders that want to know  how  companies perform or communicate on 
issues that matter to them.62  Therefore there ratings that focus on carbon efficiency, 
diversity, water risk and employee engagement. Making them single-issue ratings. 
The target of ratings is the corporation itself, its supply-chain and relations with other actors 
within its sphere of action. They do not relate to their specific products. The environmental 
rating of the company that produces certain eco-friendly product does bear the score on the 
product. Its target are investors not the general public. 
8.2 Sustainability Reporting
Just as environmental ratings, reporting has the purpose to be ‘transparent‘. Firms would 
report their performance, their results and the achievements of their strategies. It is also 
known as non-financial reporting, even if it is common to see reports with both financial and 
non-financial information. Precisely after the financial crisis, attention has been placed on 
these reports, that are self-generated by the company (maybe verified by an external 
auditor). Promoters of reporting suggest that it serves as a self-check to the advances, 
mistakes and opportunities on sustainability issues in the company. 
The biggest problem with reporting however is that information can be edited and tailored to 
specific needs. For example, BP’s sustainability review  2010 had to report the terrible oil spill 
of the 20 of April 2010 in the Gulf of Mexico. Even if there is a hearty part of  the document 
dedicated to the spill and how  it was dealt with. The relevant information about carbon 
emissions, the number and volume of spills, which were not optimal, did not receive much 
attention. Furthermore, there were no sustainability goals for 2011. For stakeholders that 
follow  the company this particular point can be worrying. The main critic is that the report 
was lacking real information and it was full of sustainable discourse. This report is generated 
on an annual basis, the nature of  BPs operations call for this type of report, it is a high-risk 
international corporation. Additionally, this report was audited by a renown firm. Problem 
was, the comments of  the auditors did not seem as an outside perspective, causing doubt in 
the role of the auditor.63  This shows that reporting is delicate the public will judge the 
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performance and thus determine the trust-worthiness of the company and its products. If 
information is not regarded as accurate or if  the information is incomplete by the public it can 
receive bad publicity and consumers would stop trusting altogether. 
8.3 Emerging environmental communication tools
There are other corporate environmental initiatives, that are similar to eco-labelling in their 
motivations and effects. They can be considered alternatives as well as complements to 
eco-labels. These corporate initiatives lack certification, therefore assurance. This means 
that they could be regarded as ‘sustainability marketing’ strategies. However, if  there is a 
programme in practice (potentially verifiable), then it would be appropriate to consider them 
as tools to communicate sustainability efforts.  These tools also have the benefit of 
increasing overall brand and corporate image and eventually this will influence the demand 
for sustainable products. 
8.3.1 In-house standards and trusted brands 
Certain companies have decided to pursue sustainability within their own sphere of action. 
They relate their sustainability programmes directly with their own supply-chains. Therefore 
the effectiveness of these internal standards and codes will be directly related to the 
company’s home brand. If the programme fails or is deemed as ‘greenwash’ the 
repercussions will be directly on the companies profits and reputation. Reasons a firm might 
have to do this vary. For example, in contexts where the practices or the supply-network is 
so particular that no pre-set eco-label criteria fits it. Additionally if the home-brand is already 
strong in itself, it might not want to share the reputation (and risk) with other companies that 
might have lower standards and that are its competitors. Examples of  these schemes are 
Starbucks CAFE Practices or HP Eco Highlights.
In the presence of a trusted brand or a notorious house brand the situation is very similar to 
the in-house standards. The difference is that it does not involve the whole supply chain, 
they use their corporate brand to engage in bold sustainability commitments, and the brand 
itself  is the ‘guarantee’ of  the good sustainability performance. This is the case of  companies 
such as Patagonia, the Body Shop or even Ben & Jerry’s. 
8.3.2 New sourcing models and partnerships with NGOs
The Law and Economics of Eco-labels
55
Companies can outsource their sustainability projects with specialised NGOs or other 
entities. Alternatively they can partner with a renown NGO to create a project in conjunction, 
to improve business practices or to transform their operations to a more sustainable manner. 
Additionally,  firms can make donations to the NGO so it can use the resources as it 
considers appropriate. Consumers trust the NGO and when they see that the NGO supports 
the corporation, they extend the trust to the corporation. These schemes can be used either 
to complement or instead of  in-house standards and labels. For example, the WWF has 
several corporate partners such as IKEA, Toyota, Wal-mart, Nike, Johnson and Johnson, 
IBM, HSBC and Alliance, additionally The Coca-cola Company, has a transformation 
partnership the WWF to create business operations with sustainable water considerations. 
In other parts of  the world, depending on specific problems corporations might partner with 
local NGOs or even governments. In Mexico, for example, in some places it is easier to 
access a Coca-cola than water. An average Mexican consumes annually 140 litres of the 
liquid (data from 2007). Coincidentally Mexico also holds one of the highest rates of obesity, 
closing up to the United States. Coca-cola Mexico, has consequently received very bad 
publicity by almost being blamed for the obesity pandemic. Therefore, it decided to partner 
up with the National Sports Commission and the Ministry of Public Education. The results 
are programmes, entirely funded by Coca-cola for public schools focused on teaching 
healthy living habits, as well as promoting physical education.  Coca-cola also organises and 
sponsors sports events nation wide.64 Another example is Cadbury’s. The chocolate industry 
has been attacked since the early 1900s, in fact in 1907 Cadbury’s Brothers were victims of 
the first CSR scandal when it was made public that these Quakers were using slaves in their 
cacao plantations in Africa. Cacao grows in the tropics, in places that poverty is wide-spread. 
In the 1900 it is true that slaves were used, however today whilst slavery is officially not an 
issue, the working conditions are still hard, to say the least. Slavery and other allegations 
have been present throughout chocolate’s history. Consequently, Cadbury’s partnered with 
the United Nations Development Programme and local authorities, farmers and communities 
and created the Cadbury Cocoa Partnership. In addition, its Cadbury Dairy Milk chocolate 
obtained the Fairtrade label in some countries and it has partnered with FLO to expand the 
label to other lines of chocolate. 
8.3.3 Linking sustainability performance to the place of origin instead of a label
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This type of claim is increasing, a company forgoes a label and commits to buying regionally 
produced goods.65  The sustainable argument is that the supply-chain is considerably 
shortened. Transportation costs are less and it promotes environmental and economic 
development of the consumers locality. It is very appealing for the consumer, as it is true that 
by eliminating transportation costs and intermediary costs, the prices are going to decrease 
(environmental costs too). Additionally by treating directly with the farmers and communities 
in the local markets trade becomes personal again and the ‘guarantee’ is the farmers 
personal reputation (as it once was).  It does not have to be very extreme, even emphasising 
that a product is nationally produced my sway national consumers to prefer these products. 
This is precisely the philosophy of  Slow  Food’s Earth Market’s network. They promote 
regional production and consumption as well as promoting the local culinary traditions. 
However, these actions go beyond the mere obligatory labelling and tracing (such as in cows 
after the mad-cow  epidemic in Europe). These initiatives normally work well where regional 
and national pride is high. 
8.3.4 Tagging and mobile technologies that connect the dots across the value chain 
Technology has reached a point that people can access almost any information at the 
moment they want it. A decade ago, bad business practices were being noticed and 
publicised within days.   Now  it can be done within minutes. However, the same goes for 
‘good’ practices. If  the company has reasonable practices overseas and has sound supply-
chain engagement, it can grant access to NGOs to film, and to allow  the direct traceability of 
goods. Technology is being created, in food sector, to trace material to aid in outbreaks or 
other matters where traceability is keen. With this technology there can be direct live-feed 
contact between the different intermediaries in the supply-chain and consumers. For 
example, GoodGuide66 puts sustainability data in consumer’s hands at the point of purchase 
via iPhone or text messaging. In addition social networking tools such as tweeter have 
channels regarding sustainability, where people create positive or negative ‘word-of-mouth’ 
regarding product’s sustainability.67
8.3.5 Other initiatives 
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As seen, these types of green claims are spurring in today’s markets. Other initiatives that 
are observed are branded product lines, where multi-product corporations commit one or 
two product lines to sustainability. There are vast examples of these lines, Nike Considered, 
Philips Green, Office Depot Green. Another initiative is choice-editing, where the retailer 
commits to sustainability by not distributing unsustainable products. The choice is not left to 
the consumer, it is on the retailer. In the UK Tesco and Sainsbury (also in the UK) committed 
to phase-out incandescent bulbs, before legislation requires them to do so.68 Other retailers 
including UKs Tesco, Sainsbury’s and Marks & Spencers pre-select eco-labelled products, 
locally-produced goods and organics. So consumers do not have to worry about 
sustainability.  
9. Conclusions
The aim of this chapter was to define and limit eco-labels and eco-labelling. Thereby 
providing a uniform and clear understanding of the terms that will be used throughout this 
work. Nonetheless, even if this chapter was descriptive in nature it still had some interesting 
findings. The first finding is that the eco-labels that are seen in the market today are very 
different from the ‘original’ generation of  eco-labels. This has a tremendous impact in this 
specific research as it means that the ‘classic’ literature on eco-labelling today might not be 
very useful. Hence, a theoretical gap has been created due precisely to this evolution. Proof 
of the evolution of eco-labels is the current prevalence of multi-criteria or LCA eco-labels. 
Single criteria eco-labels that were very common in the 1990s, such as the ‘dolphin-safe’ 
label, which is analysed in Chapter VII, are not anymore. Today eco-labels, while they might 
focus on a specific sector, include general sustainability criteria over a broad range of 
indicators. In addition, eco-labels today are likely to be owned by private entities not 
governments. Whereas the original eco-labels were actually devised as government tools. 
This difference in conceptions has had repercussions in the policy arena, as it will be 
discussed in Chapters V and VI.   
Another finding of  this chapter is that eco-labelling systems are in fact complex sustainability 
certification schemes. This strengthens the notion that certification is the base of eco-
labelling. Any other environmental label that is not third-party certified cannot be considered 
an eco-label. Moreover, by defining eco-labels as certification schemes a door is opened to 
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a different set of  literature (both economic and legal) that will complement the traditional eco-
labelling theories. Furthermore, in the legal arena the repercussions of  this view  are 
tremendous as it will be discussed in Chapter V.
This chapter provides an overview  of  the world of eco-labelling. However, many topics have 
remained at an introductory level. Subsequent chapters will address many of the issues 
brought up and pointed out in this chapter. Specifically the following chapter will be focused 
on analyzing the role of eco-labels in the market. With the aid of  economic tools and theory it 
will be possible to demonstrate how  eco-labels, regarded as marks and certification 
schemes, affect the market. Furthermore, some of the most salient pitfalls of eco-labels will 
also be identified. 
The Law and Economics of Eco-labels
59

CHAPTER II
Eco-labels’ place in the market
1. Introduction
The first thing that would have to be determined is whether there is a market for eco-labels. 
This question is essential, as it would be useless to continue this analysis if  there were no 
market. The real world provides this answer, as eco-labels can be seen in many products 
and services. However, on a theoretical level the story might be slightly different. Behind the 
eco-labels that can be seen in the market are complex mechanisms at place that make eco-
labels work (or not work). This chapter will use a wide variety of economic theories and tools 
to explain eco-labels and its mechanisms. First, the economics of information is the branch 
that has traditionally dealt with eco-labels. Hence, it will be the first approach to the analysis. 
It will be shown that eco-labels have certain characteristics that make them rely on 
certification for the markets to exist. Without certification eco-labels would be mere 
advertisement. However, eco-labels are environmental certification marks, this means that 
they are proof  that the good has been certified. Hence, the market will work as if it were a 
normal experience good market, in which reputation and branding have an important 
function. Section 3 will precisely deal with eco-labels from a branding and intellectual 
property (IP) perspective. In this section, different IP tools will be analysed, including 
certification marks. It will be shown that eco-labels are certification marks. Subsequently, 
eco-labels will be analysed from a competition perspective. This section has two main 
arguments; the first is that the market is segmented, hence eco-labels are a mere response 
to the need to distinguish goods and second that eco-labels have the potential to restrict 
competition. The following section, refers to pricing and premium pricing. The premise of  this 
idea is that firms will supply eco-labelled goods because they can charge a premium. Much 
of the eco-labelling mechanism depends on this ‘eco-premium‘. This section, draws on the 
array of experiments and studies on the matter and provides a simple pricing scheme that 
eco-labels are likely to follow. Finally, the disincentives or the negative effects of eco-labels 
in the market are shown. Eco-labels have a side-effect that is known as greenwashing. 
Greenwashing has the potential to hinder the whole eco-labelling mechanism.  
2. Information and Environmental Attributes
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Daniel Goleman, points out that “the tiny patch of real estate on product labels is one of the 
most hotly contested in the world of commerce”.1  The value of  labels is that they have the 
power to change consumer behaviour. Every detail (phrasing, colour and graphics) in the 
label is planned in a way that maximises the probabilities of  capturing consumer attention. 
The consumer reacts to the labels by buying the product (or not buying it). The change in 
consumer behaviour in the long run leads to market changes. Thus, the information 
presented in the label plays a crucial role in the market. Eco-labels present certain 
information, that has the purpose of  stirring consumers into buying products with 
environmental attributes. 
All products have environmental attributes. A products environmental attributes are the 
specific traits that are enhanced during the products life-cycle so it has less harmful effects 
on the environment.  These traits or elements can be achieved by adhering to certain 
standards, such as those proposed by an eco-labelling scheme or by adapting the life-cycle 
to reduce negative impacts. In more technical wording, the actions taken to internalise the 
externalities of  production are deemed environmental attributes. These are namely process 
attributes, meaning they do not alter the functions of the product. However, the do alter the 
characteristics of products enough to be considered of a different variety or a different quality 
of the original product. 
2.1 Quality
Quality is a complex and multifaceted notion. Commonly quality has two basic denotations. 
One refers to a standard of something as measured against other things of a similar kind. 
This idea suggests that quality has a vertical or hierarchical dimension, a kind of  grading. 
This standard can be both objective (i.e. if  a product is made out of recyclable material it 
would have higher environmental quality against the same product without it) or subjective 
(i.e., when an individual buys shade-grown coffee because it helps save the birds in tropical 
countries, making that coffee superior than others for that individual). The other denotation of 
quality pertains to a distinctive attribute or characteristic possessed by someone or 
something. In this sense, particular characteristics of  goods are what define its quality. For 
the purpose of  this thesis product quality should be understood as a bundle of 
characteristics or attributes that define and differentiate a good. The combination and the 
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amount of  these attributes can then be assessed, valued and ranked by the consumers. 
There will be products that there is a general understanding of  the value and rank but there 
are others that will be determined by each consumer. 
Environmental quality, thus would be the characteristics or attributes that make a product 
more environmentally sound than others. When a product has these environmental 
attributes, that are different from the average good making the good environmentally 
superior, the producer normally communicates this to the consumers. A way to communicate 
a products environmental quality is precisely through its label. Nonetheless, environmental 
attributes are process-related, therefore it is close to impossible for the consumer to 
experience them. Eco-labels certify that the environmental attributes that the producer 
claims the product has are really there.  
2.2 Information
Eco-labels communicate the environmental quality of a product. This communication is how 
the consumer gets informed or how  he learns about the product’s characteristics. 
Information is defined as the facts provided or learned about something or someone. 
Information plays a central role in all markets. In healthy markets information is 
communicated and transferred between actors openly. However, if withholding information or 
keeping secrets would lead to more profits, there is very little incentive to divulge it. 
Furthermore, if the information concerns negative environmental effects, producers are 
unlikely to reveal it, unless they are compelled by an authority. This hiding information about 
product qualities, such as environmental characteristics, generates a gap in the market 
mechanism. The information gap, will put pressure in the market, and may lead to a market 
failure. Not only withholding information creates market failures. In the case of  environmental 
attributes of  the products throughout their life-span the information may not be available 
because the information simply does not exist. This leads to the problem of information 
uncertainty. Inexistent or uncertain product information may also hinder or distort the market 
mechanism. 
Since the 1970’s economics of information theory has classified products into three 
categories based on the way consumers acquire information on quality: search, experience 
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and credence goods.2 In recent years, some scholars contend that this classification does 
not comprise the new  raise of  ‘sustainable’ product attributes and have included further 
classifications such as ‘Potemkin goods’3  and ‘indeterminate goods‘, proposed by Sylvie 
Lupton. 4  
2.3 Information Asymmetries 
The information gap between market actors has been named ‘information asymmetry’. 
“Information asymmetry corresponds to an unequal repartition of information between two 
agents, which allows an opportunistic behaviour of the best-informed agent.”5 When selling 
goods, the seller will always know  more than the consumer. This creates an advantage of 
sellers over consumers. Beyond the ‘unfairness’ of this situation there is an actual loss in 
consumer welfare. “The quality offered at a given price is inferior to the quality level the 
consumer would have chosen if s/he had been perfectly informed”6. It is not expected that all 
products have the same quality, in all markets good and bad products co-exist. However, 
because of the lack of  complete information market will be constantly confronted with 
problems of  adverse selection and moral hazard. The information asymmetries between 
consumers and sellers vary accordingly to the product’s attributes. The less observable the 
quality the bigger the information asymmetry. When consumers are presented with 
information that is not easily verifiable a certain degree of  uncertainty arises. This 
uncertainty is inherent to consumers inability to discern the quality of  the good that the seller 
is offering. Whether this uncertainty is inherent to the information asymmetry or if it is a 
phenomena worthy of independent analysis will be discussed in the following sections. 
2.3.1 Search Goods
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6 At Sylvie Lupton, Op.cit.
With search attributes consumer information is plentiful and easily attained. Quality can be 
identified prior to purchase by simple inspection. With search attributes or goods the main 
issue is product selection. Gathering information from all the products available implies a 
“search cost” for the consumers. The more products in the market the higher the search 
costs for consumers. With respect to environmental attributes, they are normally not 
observable by simple product inspection. 
2.3.2 Experience Goods
For experience attributes, the most cost-effective way to get the information is to consume 
the product. The quality of the product can only be ascertained until after the good is 
consumed. Frequency of transactions is relevant with experience goods. If a producer sells 
experience goods to one-time customers he has strong incentives to only sell goods that are 
at the lowest possible quality level acceptable to this one-time consumer. Therefore, there is 
moral hazard on the producer side. This problem can be overcome if the producer offers an 
adequate and enforceable warranty. 
Another way to mitigate information problems in markets with experience goods is through 
repeated purchase. Consumers make repeated purchases of  a product where their choices 
are based on prior experience with product quality. When the product has persistent quality, 
it earns a ‘reputation’ “and reputation commands a price (or exacts a penalty) because it 
economizes on search”. In this sense reputation transforms an experience good into a 
search good. In the long run this repeat purchase creates brand loyalty which in turn gives 
incentives to producers to continue producing high-quality otherwise consumers might 
punish him by switching to other brands. 
A key factor in determining whether markets for higher quality experience attributes operate 
effectively is the success of quality signalling by producers to consumers. Improving 
information through means such as advertising and labelling may solve or mitigate the 
quality-signalling problem. Vendors are able to issue reliable quality signals by binding 
themselves through investing large amounts in advertising. Phillip Nelson, analysed the 
incentives producers have in revealing truthful information about their products. If  the claims 
are misleading or untruthful, the producer will suffer the cost of non-credibility of future 
advertisements in addition to the cost of  processing the lost costumers. With experience 
goods, the producer maximizes his profits by telling the truth as long as it is possible for him 
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to make the advertised statement true rather than false at no cost. However, producers will 
generally disclose only information advantageous to them. All producers have the same 
incentives. It is expected that producers who can make a quality claim will do so and 
consumers will assume that any firm not making a claim has low quality products. 
For experience attributes, reputation models with quality signalling match how  markets 
operate. Government is unlikely to become heavily involved in requiring informational 
labelling of  these attributes because with repeated purchases the market can satisfactorily 
self correct. However, environmental attributes are not experience goods either.
2.3.3 Credence Goods 
In 1973 Darby and Karni introduced credence goods to extend the information acquisition 
classification into a more precise taxonomy. The key factor that makes them credence 
attributes is that it is not practicable for individual consumers to assess the quality of the 
product, either because it is economically or physically unfeasible. The consumer cannot 
measure the quality and cannot learn it from his or her experience in consuming the product. 
“Economic models of  quality hit dead end when they come to discussion of  credence 
attributes or goods because information is so imperfect that these markets for quality simply 
do not function well.” There is no market mechanism that solves the problem with credence 
goods because consumers cannot punish the producer by not purchasing the product in the 
future in response to false claims (in advertising or labelling). In the long run there is no 
market for high quality credence goods. 
McClusky explains that “in this scenario, the consumer receives the same utility payoff 
whether the producer used environmentally friendly production processes or not. Therefore, 
if the payoff  is larger that zero, the consumer will buy the environmentally friendly product. 
The producer will choose the lowest cost method, which is not environmentally friendly”. The 
consumer cannot relate his payoff  with the environmentally friendly characteristic and 
consequently will never know  what the producer did in reality. Consequently there is no 
market for credence attributes because all the claims are potentially cheap talk. 
Process-attribute differentiated goods fit well in the credence goods classification. They are 
not correlated with end-use attributes and, hence, an asymmetric information problem rises. 
These goods suffer an ex post information asymmetry. However, that view  is just a simplified 
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version of the credence good problem. The ‘complete‘ credence good problem involves two 
potential sources of information asymmetry. The first type of uncertainty rises when 
consumers are “unaware of the repair service to satisfy I given want”7. Only an expert can 
diagnose a consumer’s true needs8, for example only a doctor can determine whether you 
need your appendix taken out. Experts do not face uncertainty, therefore the uncertainty is 
unilateral (consumer) and consequently there is an information asymmetry. Which, makes 
fraud likely to occur, especially if the diagnostic by the expert and the rendering of the 
service are made jointly.9  The second type of  uncertainty, appears when the consumer 
cannot detect the quality of the good or service.10  Only the seller may know  the level of 
service actually provided.11  Following Balineau et al, the first scenario will be referred as 
uncertainty type one (UT1) and the latter as uncertainty type two (UT2). Roe and Sheldon 
suggest that only UT2 is relevant for consumer products because consumers are likely to 
know  their preference for a process attribute. In a sense, the consumer is a type of  ‘expert’ 
and does not need anyone telling him his ‘needs’. If a consumer wants dolphin-free, not-
animal-tested or bio-diversity favourable attributes because those are his preferences, then 
he would only face the UT2. Roe and Sheldon note that credence goods involving consumer 
products with ‘unverifiable’ process attributes is a special case, which potentially includes 
some UT1.  
In credence goods the demand for quality information is very strong because they have no 
means to assess quality via search or experience. There is a need of a quality assurance 
mechanism.  Warranties and brands work well for experience goods, but not for goods 
whose qualities cannot be evaluated through normal use. Consumers would have to look for 
the provider’s credentials. Licensing focuses on the inputs of the product, rather than the 
outputs (as the mechanisms for experience goods do). Licensing is normally addressed by 
government agencies, however private entities can also provide credentials, via 
certification.12 The certifier would disclose the information to the consumer, in this particular 
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case environmental information through an eco-label. The eco-label then would serve both 
as a brand and as a warranty of the product’s environmental qualities. In many cases eco-
label removes the uncertainty type 2. However, eco-labelled goods sometimes just infer the 
properties of the goods. For example, people who buy shade-grown coffee probably aim to 
conserve the birds and other animals in the tropical areas where coffee is produced, this is 
their ‘want’ according to Darby and Karni. Subsequently, the problem is that consumers may 
not be able to assess ‘the ability of  services to satisfy their wants’.13   In other words, the 
process attributes are seen as a means to achieving other goals. Consequently, consumers 
do not know  if the eco-labels’ standards can really achieve its goals. Which is different from 
knowing whether such standards were really met in the production process. 
2.3.4 Potemkin Goods
Recently, the literature has included the so-called Potemkin goods. Potemkin attributes are 
characterized by the fact that neither the buyer nor external institutions are able to carry out 
controls at the end-product level. These are process-oriented attributes, such as organic 
farming, fair-trade or Geographical Origin. The problem of Potemkin goods is that they 
cannot even be detected in a laboratory analysis done by external third parties. Credence 
attributes, product contamination, fraud and mislabelling can be revealed by inspections. 
With strict third party monitoring and high disclosure rates credence goods could 
theoretically be treated as experience goods, such as Caswell and Mojduszka demonstrate. 
The information asymmetry that these authors relate to Potemkin attributes, however, cannot 
be bypassed by classical quality signals such as advertising, branding and guarantees. 
Quality characteristics are closely connected to the production process that is hidden to the 
outside observer. The only way to detect fraud is the direct monitoring of the company’s 
internal production process. Direct monitoring, may be difficult because only public 
authorities are allowed to practice it. Furthermore, with self-regulatory practices such as eco-
labels there is no legal basis to grant access to third parties for inspections. 
With Potemkin goods, quality statements can be made with impunity. There are hardly any 
risks of discovery, due to the inability to learn about the opportunistic behaviour and verify 
marketing claims. What is needed to circumvent this process is an investigation scheme that 
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covers the whole supply chain and ensures on-site inspections throughout the production 
process. Certifying systems are able to guarantee these inspections. 
Credence goods also have a need to certify and monitor to assure that the good is actually 
being provided, as sustained and proved by McClusky. The existence of a market for 
credence goods depends on certification. Subsequently, in essence there is not much 
difference with a Potemkin good.  The extent of the verification that is expected from a 
Potemkin good is life-cycle analysis. Whether this Potemkin goods are an entirely different 
classification of goods or they are just credence goods that require stricter certification 
processes can be debated. Furthermore, whether the producer’s incentives differ in 
presence of normal certification to the life-cycle analysis, would have to be modelled and 
analysed. Notwithstanding the above, LCA with in-site visits and regular inspections is still 
certification, a more comprehensive and expensive certification, but certification nontheless. 
Therefore, Potemkin goods should be considered a type of credence good.
2.4 Uncertain information and ‘indeterminate goods’
One of  the biggest problems with environmental quality of goods is that many times it is 
unknown. The interest about the effects of a product’s life-cycle on the environment is fairly 
new, therefore much of the information is still undiscovered. This problem is not 
encompassed by asymmetric information because neither the buyer or the seller are aware 
of the products environmental attributes. It is a problem of information uncertainty. This type 
of uncertainty is shared by all actors in the market not just consumers. “The consumer, the 
producer (or seller) of  the product, and all the agents linked to the market do not have a 
clear cut definition of the product.” The information about the product is ‘incomplete’ and 
further scientific information would be required to make a better assessment. Lupton 
challenges the assumption in economics that “characteristics of  the good are assumed to be 
known to the producer: products are identified a priori by the producer”.  In the former 
classification of  search, experience and credence goods the products characteristics are 
clearly defined. The uncertainty thus lies in the consumer who has to acquire the information 
about the product’s quality at certain costs. As already noted, the bigger the information 
asymmetry the higher the costs to obtain the information. Still, the information is known 
beforehand by the producer or seller, the uncertainty is entirely on the consumer. This view 
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makes the sellers seem omniscient, they know  exactly what they are selling or producing. 
However, with environmental information, at least, this is seldom the case.
Shared uncertainty among market agents is represented (analytically) as information 
symmetry, a symmetric ignorance to be more precise. Symmetric information is considered 
analytically identical to perfect information. Consequently, there are no means to act 
opportunistically or strategically. It is only when one agent possesses more information than 
another that he can take advantage of the other’s ignorance and act opportunistically. 
Shared uncertainty is a neutral element and theoretically should not disturb the market. 
However, Lupton suggests that shared uncertainty may create economic problems different 
to moral hazard or adverse selection. Based on this shared uncertainty on goods’ 
characteristics Lupton suggests a new  class of goods is need to be added to the former 
classification of search, experience and credence goods, precisely because these do not 
take into account bilateral uncertainty. Lupton proposes calling these goods ‘indeterminate 
goods’. She defines indeterminate goods “as goods/services whose characteristics cannot 
be known either before purchase, or once they are consumed (directly after purchase), or 
again through additional costly information (credence goods). Information about the 
characteristics of these goods/services is not available, taking into account the actual 
knowledge at the time and is not possessed by any agent or group of agents”. This definition 
only applies to certain situations where the information uncertainty creates market problems. 
2.4.1 Indeterminacy of new products in the market 
Lupton suggests that “with the creation of new  products, it is possible that producers do not 
know  exactly what to offer, and consumers have not yet formed their preferences since the 
goods or service are new”.14  This happens when there is a strong rise in demand on a 
certain good (or service) and producers do not have knowledge on how  to produce it. In 
response to this market demand, some producers would come forward to blindly supply the 
good. This becomes a learning experience for the producer who learns to produce the good 
or render the service ‘on the job’.  Consumers on the other hand, have no way to measure 
quality, because it is a new  product or service, thus they do not know  what to expect from it. 
Here the problem is not about informing or educating the consumer, but to do so for the 
producer. The low  quality product is not due to opportunistic behaviour of the producer, it is 
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due to his ignorance. Nonetheless, this uncertainty will not last forever as this is just a 
learning phase. There will be a discovery phase and at some point agents will ‘renegotiate’ 
and set standards and maybe even legislate. After the learning phase quality should 
improve.15 
Lupton’s explanation seems to clarify on how  green markets appeared. There was a rise in 
demand of environmentally friendly goods and during this discovery phase many tools came 
into play to discover and communicate that missing information. Once markets 
acknowledged that there is a lack of information the discovery phase started and with it 
eventually adaptation and renegotiation came along. Ignorance and uncertainty regarding 
the product’s environmental attributes is not something that can be dealt with once and for 
all. It is a trial and error process, where markets learn from the new  acquired information. 
Eco-labels are one of the communication tools between producers and consumers that allow 
for this ‘renegotiation’ of standards and rule-setting. This is why eco-labels are conceived as 
open forums, where consumers can give feedback to the industry. Traditional economics, 
would suggest dissatisfied consumers would search different providers, and if  they are all 
unsatisfactory the consumer would eventually leave the market. However, if  there is a real 
demand and no good satisfies the consumer, the consumer instead of exiting the market 
would have to express its dissatisfaction. Expressing the dissatisfaction opens the door for 
improvement, which eventually would lead to the provision of a higher quality good. 
2.4.2 Indeterminacy due to rival hypothesis concerning the past of the product
In this case, ignorance is not the problem. When a product’s past is uncertain, doubts may 
arise regarding its quality. Therefore, an expert opinion or certification would take place to 
clarify the doubts and determine the products quality. However, expert opinion is not always 
unanimous. For example, an expert may argue that a product’s environmental qualities can 
be scored with just its carbon output; whereas an other expert can claim that carbon 
footprints are not as accurate as cradle-to-cradle certification. In this case, one opinion is 
just as valid as the other one. This is because (at this particular moment) it is impossible to 
know  the ‘true’ environmental impacts of the product. The uncertainty here rises due to rival 
hypotheses. “The hypotheses are rivals of each other in the sense that they all refer to the 
same question, and that only one of them can prove true.” The problem here is that 
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environmental quality is not observable, expert opinions or certifications are crucial for the 
existence of the market. If  there is doubt on the product’s environmental attributes the 
market can be completely altered to a point of eliminating demand. 
2.4.3 Indeterminacy concerning future impacts of the product
The products future impacts is normally related to product safety. There is a keen interest in 
informing consumers of the potential risks, correct uses and disposal of  the product to avoid 
personal or environmental damages. However, there is still room for uncertainty when there 
is no information regarding the impacts on health or the environment. In this sense, eating 
organic fruits and vegetables would be sensible because fertilisers and pesticides are 
chemicals that are easily linked to environmental and/or health matters. However, the 
problem lies in those products where this direct link cannot be made. Potentially dangerous 
substances maybe identified, but there are limitations to scientific knowledge of  their effects. 
Ulrich Beck, in his definition of  ‘risk’16, suggests that the effects of  radioactivity, toxins and 
pollutants in the air, water and ‘foodstuffs’ evade human perceptive abilities, and have short 
and long-term effects on humans, animals and plants. “They induce systematic and often 
irreversible harm, generally remain invisible, are based on casual interpretations, and thus 
only initially exist in terms of the (scientific or anti-scientific) knowledge about them. They 
can thus be changed, magnified, dramatised or minimised within knowledge, and to that 
extent they are particularly open to social definition and construction.”17  This type of 
uncertainty surpasses experience and credence attributes. The risk of  this uncertainty, is 
precisely that it opens the possibility to anyone with ‘some’ information to fill in the gap. 
Specifically, this open-ess to definition, interpretation and construction of information is likely 
to create rival ideas in different social groups. Some groups might reject a product based on 
scientific data while others may reject a good for the lack of  such data. Europe, for example, 
functions under the ‘Precautionary Principle’18 , according to which, measures should be 
taken to prevent, anticipate and attack serious or irreversible environmental damages, even 
if there is a lack of full scientific certainty. Institutions have to take measures to protect 
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human health and the environment without having to wait for the consequences to be fully 
apparent. This has led to several restrictions in the importation of food. These restrictions 
have more than once created conflict in the WTO with countries that follow  regimes that 
require scientific proof to create standards. However, the argument is strong and simple, 
when faced with uncertainty its better to be safe than sorry. However, these trade restrictions 
that originate from product refusal and bans do distort markets and create inefficiencies.  
2.5 Placement of eco-labelled goods within the classifications
The classification of goods with environmental attributes is not a straightforward task. It is 
safe to say that there might be a few  environmental attributes that can be considered 
‘search’ or  ‘experience’ attributes. Packaging, for example, leads to excessive waste. The 
consumer can ex-ante observe if  the good comes with little or no packaging, and determine 
whether it will be more environmentally friendly (i.e., less waste). Regarding experience 
attributes for environmentally friendly goods, as example would be the recyclability of a 
good. The good states it is recyclable, but the consumer will not know  if this is true, until s/he 
tries to recycle it. Notwithstanding the previous cases, environmental attributes are normally 
considered to be credence goods. Balineau and Dufeu go beyond the credence 
classification and suggest that, in some cases, environmental attributes19  can also be 
considered ‘indeterminate’ goods as suggested by Lupton. 
2.5.1 Eco-labelled goods as credence goods
The uncertainty that environmental attributes generate is that consumers cannot assess if 
the environmental standards were met (UT2). However, Roe and Sheldon note that 
credence goods involving consumer products with ‘unverifiable’ process attributes is a 
special case, which potentially creates uncertainty regarding if  the environmental standards 
actually work (UT1). This is an issue that is problematic because if  consumers do not know  if 
eco-labelled goods deliver on their promises (if  they are effective) they would not buy such 
products. Consumers need to trust the entities that set the standards, in other words the 
eco-labels. 
Eco-label organisations are complex entities that set standards, authorise certifiers and 
license the eco-labels to the suppliers of the good. Darby and Karni, the UT1 “is only an 
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issue if informed experts consulted by uninformed consumers are also the sellers of  the 
good or service about which consumers are seeking advice”. This scenario of information 
asymmetry gives incentives for the ‘expert-seller’ to suggest unnecessary products to sell 
more. The mechanism suggested to avoid this opportunistic behaviour is to separate the 
diagnosis from the treatment. In the case of eco-labels, the standard-setter should be 
independent from the sellers of these goods. In the case for environmentally friendly goods, 
eco-labels create the standards and determine the course of  action consumers must take to 
support the environment, therefore they are the experts. In order for them to preserve their 
credibility, they should not produce and sell their eco-labelled goods. The certifiers will be 
selected and authorised by the eco-label, however they preserve their independence from 
the sellers. The blurry line is between the eco-label and the seller, who after obtaining the 
certification, sign a license contract for the use of the eco-label logo on their products. Not to 
mention that this license agreement includes fees. In this sense, even if the eco-label is not 
selling the goods directly, it is being paid by the seller. The majority of the eco-labels income 
is precisely the membership and monitoring fees. Furthermore, the sellers are likely to 
participate in the establishment of  standards. Points of potential fraudulent behaviour due to 
conflict of interests evidently exist within these mechanisms. However, eco-labels’ income 
depend directly on the amount of licensees and the amount of eco-labelled products that 
were placed in the market. If an eco-label wants to expand it needs these fees, even if  it 
leads to scrutiny about its credibility. The only solution to this lack of credibility is to create 
trust among consumers by being even more transparent. 
2.5.2 Environmental qualities as ‘indeterminate’
The problem of eco-labels‘ standards being effective to tackle environmental problems, or if 
LCA is sufficient to reduce negative environmental impacts of production is still at the 
research stage. At this moment there are many unsolved problems regarding the 
environment. People want to know  the harmful effects of  chemicals in the natural 
environment and on human health. However, there is simply no information because it does 
not exist. There is a shared uncertainty about products environmental qualities. Therefore, 
eco-labelled goods have an ‘indeterminate‘ quality. 
The market for eco-labelled goods (and for environmental attributes) is fairly new. 
Consumers expectations are being structured and the producers and eco-labels are looking 
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into the effectiveness of the standards to deliver better environmental attributes. 
Indeterminacy due to a new  market is temporary. Eventually the information will be 
generated, generating a simple information asymmetry which can be solved with 
certification. Regarding the other type of  indeterminate goods, as long as there is no ‘true’ 
information there will always be rival eco-labels which claim that their standards are more 
effective and complete than others. Preferences will be formed with the little information 
available and eco-labels will strive to satisfy them. Disagreements among rival eco-labels 
can be regarded as simple competition. Nevertheless, rivalry of standards may also serve as 
eco-labels worst enemy.  As Lupton suggested, uncertainty can also be used strategically to 
‘discredit’ eco-labels. If there is no true information eco-labels can easily be effectively 
foreclosed from the market. 
Balineau and Dufeu point out that one of the implications of indeterminacy is the low 
consumption of eco-labelled goods. People are uncertain about eco-label’s effectiveness, 
therefore even if they are willing to pay for a better environment, they do not trust eco-labels 
achieve their goals. Additionally, they suggest that with indeterminacy it is crucial to 
communicate the benefits (the known ones) of consuming the eco-label. To increase their 
impact, eco-labels have to increase their market share, and that can only be done if  they 
communicate their achievements. The final implication is that if eco-labels are considered 
indeterminate goods, then the threat of market collapse is larger than from adverse 
selection. As long as there is no conclusive information regarding eco-labels effectiveness 
and competition between eco-labels increases “the uncertainty will be used as a competitive 
weapon”. Regardless if the conflicts are between eco-labels or eco-labels and normal firms 
“these conflicts will increase the level of indeterminacy of the environmental attributes. 
Criticism and scepticism will exacerbate doubts about effectiveness and could clearly cause 
the FT market to collapse”.20  The market of eco-label goods is “based on a fragile 
equilibrium which prevents players from starting a negative advertising war in which each 
FTO would try to discredit others”.21 In this sense, uncertainty is much easier to exploit than 
information asymmetry. The essential attribute of  this market is uncertainty, therefore if an 
eco-label is attacked ALL eco-labels in the market will be questioned. Therefore, competition 
cannot be to aggressive because the risk of losing the market is high.   
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2.6 The eco-label organisations and the certifiers. 
Certification is crucial for the existence of credence goods markets. Certification maybe the 
only way to provide information about products unobservable attributes. “Certification is 
vouching for the truth of certain information. To certify is to proclaim certain, to declare, attest 
or assure about something by formal or legal certificate.”22 This certificate is different from 
the certification mark. “The certificate provides assurance that some act has or has not been 
done, or some event occurred, or some legal formality has been complied with.” It is 
awarded by a certifier. There is an implicit requirement that who ever certifies, is competent 
to do so. The eco-label organization will search for the independent certifiers and accredit 
them as such. The bigger the scale of the organization the more certifiers they will have 
spread out in the different geographic areas. Certification marks, are then, the eco-labels 
which are awarded by the eco-label organization. 
Markets trust certifiers to provide precise and unbiased information about products quality. 
Therefore, there is a concern about the efficiency of  third-party certification schemes. As 
pointed out in Chapter 1, eco-labelling programmes are complex sustainability certification 
schemes that create, promote and are at the centre of international certification networks. 
There is a variety of certification systems, generally an independent entity (the certifier) 
would inspect and evaluate a product based on the regulations or standards laid down by 
external organisations (the standard-setter). In the previous section it was pointed out that 
the standard-setter should not be the seller of the product to avoid opportunistic behaviour. 
In this case, the problem is inherent to the relation between the producer/seller and the 
certifier. Evidently, the certifier is independent from the standard-setter and the seller. 
However, the standard-setter in many cases is also the accreditation entity, it decides 
whether the certifier is competent to certify or not. However, this relation is unavoidable and 
very unlikely to incentivize opportunistic behaviour, given that eco-labels and certifiers 
depend on their reputations. The relation that is in question is between the certifier and the 
producer. The producer will pay the certifier to evaluate its product. The certifier has an 
incentive to favour the producer to secure future business. This means that the product does 
not meet the standards and would still get the eco-label. Therefore both the certifier and the 
producer would benefit. 
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Eco-label organisations, are the standard setter’s and also they are the ones who ultimately 
grant the licenses to use the eco-labels. It is the proprietor of  the eco-label and as such it is 
responsible for controlling its use. The eco-label is on a delicate equilibrium, and for its 
market to exist there is an interest to monitor and exclude non-compliers, being these either 
certifiers or producers. A situation might arise when the eco-label organization is also the 
proprietor of the eco-label.
3. Eco-labels: branding and certification an IP point of view 
It has been previously established that eco-labels are environmental certification marks. A 
certification mark “is a mark which indicates that certain characteristics of  goods or services, 
in connection with which the mark is used, are certified. (...) Thus the certification mark is a 
guarantee that goods or services, in connection with which the mark is used, conform to 
certain standards”.23    In some countries such as the US certification marks are regulated 
within the intellectual property regulation. The World Intellectual Property Organisation 
(WIPO), along with Continental Europe and other civil-law  countries, equally regulate 
geographical indications, which is a type of certification mark. Given the similarities to these 
intellectual property instruments, eco-labels can also be analysed from their perspective. 
Furthermore, trade marks and other collective mark’s purpose goes beyond filling 
information gaps in the market. They have their own value and are a commodity by 
themselves.
3.1 Collective and geographic marks 
Even though amphora (olive oil and wine) markings where a common practice in the Roman 
Empire, it was not until the Middle Ages that marking had a regulatory value. Certification 
marks,  as such, may have their origin in the guild system.24 Guilds were a type of trade 
association, they were entities that saw  for its members’ interests without carrying on a trade 
itself. The trade was carried on by individual members, who were independent but subject to 
the guild’s bylaws. “By controlling, among other things, the use of markings on products, the 
guilds controlled, policed and enforced standards of  workmanship, the quality of 
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merchandise, and weights and measures.” The mark represented the whole association, not 
its individual members. It resembles what today we know as collective mark. 
3.1.1 Collective Marks
Collective marks are owned by an association for the use of  its members. The association is 
proprietor of  the mark and the members are entitled to use it, to indicate they are part of 
such association. Collective marks are not contingent upon the goods’ or services’ 
conformity to standards. They indicate membership to the association, in other words 
collective marks’ access is limited to the members of the association.  
Not all countries recognise the difference between certification marks and collective marks. 
In such countries, the mark would be registered as a collective mark. Such is the case of the 
Benelux Trade Marks Act of 1996, which states “(c)ollective marks shall be considered all 
signs that are thus indicated upon their application and that serve to distinguish one or more 
characteristics of goods originating from different enterprises applying the mark under the 
supervision of the proprietor”. In this sense, the characteristics of the goods are 
distinguished by the proprietor who somehow  ‘supervises’ such characteristics. It is not clear 
whether this supervision is a simple verification or an actual evaluation of the product. The 
WIPO also follows the idea that collective marks serve to distinguish goods or services with 
common characteristics from goods without those characteristics. Nevertheless, it is different 
from a simple membership marking, by which the sole membership entitles marking. These 
laws refer to certification. This certification, is what is known as second party certification. 
The industry might condition their members to comply to certain standards for membership 
or renewal. The certification would be carried out by the association itself. Thus, it is a type 
of certification, though not third-party certification. 
It can be concluded that collective marks can also be certification marks, if there is an 
evaluation of conformity to standards that go beyond association membership. If  this is the 
case eco-labels could easily be registered as a collective mark. However, the collective mark 
strictly represents membership to an industry or association, then eco-labels as 
environmental certification marks do not conform to this instrument. 
3.1.2 Geographical name certification marks. 
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The geographical name is another type of collective mark. It comprises the geographical 
name of  the place from where the product originates. These are namely known as 
Geographical Indicators, or in the European Union they are regulated under the framework 
of Protected Geographical Status, which comprises specific regimes such as protected 
designation of  origin, protected geographical indication and traditional speciality guaranteed. 
Regardless of the specific name or regime, a geographical name certifies the origin of the 
goods. “The desirability, for traders, of using geographical place names as certification 
marks may derive from valuable public association of  the place names with special 
traditional skills or particular geographical features.”25  The last part, indicates that the 
guarantee of the geographical name is a conformance to the expected attributes of the 
products of the region. The distinctive feature of  geographical indications is that “the quality 
attributes of  the goods they identify are considered to be inherently linked to the nature of 
the geographic location in which production takes place”.26 These distinct features are what 
consumers are interested in. 
Geographical indications are not homogeneously regulated. As collective property marks 
they of course are subject to registration, which denotes exclusivity. As a general rule, the 
proprietor of the mark cannot prevent bona fide use of the geographical name from a person 
whose goods originate in the involved area. In all cases, the right to use the name is only 
limited to those that actually produce in the implicated area. Some countries, namely those 
with roman-law  traditions, also require proof  of quality conformance, to the region’s 
standards. In other words it is not enough for the product to originate in the area it has to 
conform to quality standards. This system is sui generis known as an ‘appellation’ system, 
because of these two requirements.27 This compliance to product specifications is a stronger 
type of certification than simple product origin.   
3.2 Trade marks  
The individual members of the guild also had markings, they were known as craftsman 
markings which served the purpose of  tracing or policing the products back to their owner or 
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manufacturer.  Eventually, traders (or craftsmen) assumed personal responsibility for their 
marks and trade mark law  developed to replace regulatory law 28 as the means of preventing 
unauthorised use of such marks. Just as in the middle ages, trademarks essentially serve to 
distinguish the goods or services of one individual source from another. Today the term 
trademark “includes any word, name, symbol, or device or any combination thereof adopted 
and used by a manufacturer or merchant to identify his goods and distinguish them from 
those manufactured and sold by others”.29 A trademark has to be capable of distinguishing 
the product from one firm from those of other firms. To achieve the ‘distinction’ from other 
producers of similar products it is imperative the product the trademark covers has 
distinctive features, to build its identity.
The registration is designed to protect a trade mark when used as a badge related to 
specified goods and services. It endows the proprietor with a monopoly. 30 Trade marks are 
private and exclusive by nature. They serve to identify and distinguish the undertakings or 
competitors in the market. Distinctiveness is an indispensable property for trademarks. 
Consumers normally do not know  what firm is behind what product, a trade mark becomes 
the link between producer and consumer. The exclusivity of  the identity that the trade mark 
signifies and confers means that it can provide a focal point for a reputation and thus for 
goodwill. 
Trade marks are not limited by the producers, the owner of the trade mark may be 
independent from who ever produces the good. The owner of the trade mark can use the 
trade mark or authorise its use to third parties. This gives trademarks flexibility and 
versatility, which has lead to organisational structures such as franchising and sub-
contracting. These organisational structures work precisely because consumers attach 
significance to the distinctive identity that a trade mark signifies, such that it can be a source 
of value to its owner. 
3.2.1 Trade mark’s quality reassurance
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Trade marks influence consumer behaviour. They are expected to enable consumers to use 
their own experience as a source of  information. Thus, inducing a repeated purchase 
mechanism,31 so consumers become faithful to the trade mark. For this mechanism to work, 
trade mark’s need to acquire positive reputation, a positive image in the consumers eyes. “A 
good reputation can provide reassurance to consumers and reduce the risks and costs of a 
lack of information about the attributes of the product.”32 On the other hand, owners have an 
equal incentive to maintain or improve the reputation of their trade mark, and they will do 
that by conserving constant quality. This alignment of interests of consumers and producers 
gives trade marks a ‘self-enforcing’ aspect.33 
3.2.2 Effects and affects on the market
Trade marks are also how  firms compete in the market. In this competitive market scenario 
the size of  the trade mark is measured by the presence not of the firm but of the trade mark. 
“In marketing, the power of some trade marks to catch the attention of consumers and 
attract them to products has been termed ‘salience’, It is the product of  a number of factors 
including a trade mark’s familiarity to consumers -which should be sustained by publicity and 
exposure- a high likelihood that consumers will notice and recall the trade mark, and a 
positive reputation. A positive reputation might be due to the trade mark’s triggering of 
positive associations in the minds of consumers and not necessarily due to having earned a 
good reputation for the quality and reliability of  marked products.”34 In this sense, salience is 
not market power it is selling power. 
It has been argued that salient trade marks may weaken competition and thus reduce 
economic efficiency. The argument is that “trade marks distort the operation of the market 
and enable dominant firms to gain and consolidate excessive market power”. Additionally, 
trade marks in conjunction with advertising, persuade consumers that products, which are 
essentially the same as lower-priced alternatives, are somehow  superior and of  charging 
them excessive prices accordingly. Thus distorting the effect of price-based competition and 
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“give the owners of  familiar trade marks unfair market power”. Law  and Economics has 
responded to this argument by suggesting that “all undertakings should be able to enjoy the 
benefit of  premium prices through generating good reputation for their trade marks and 
providing the same quality of reassurance”.35
3.2.3 Brands
There is no agreed definition of  brand, either in marketing or legal discourse. At most it is 
suggested that a brand is the unregistered trade mark. However, brands are understood to 
have a value which transcends the product with which is it associated. Brands are regarded 
as constituting something more than a trade mark as it is legally defined. A useful way to 
conceptualise a brand is as an aggregation of assets which includes, but is not limited to a 
trademark. In this sense, a trade mark, geographical indications, collective marks and 
certification marks are all brands.
3.3 Certification Marks.
Certification may be regarding geographical origin, material, mode of manufacture of goods 
or performance of services, quality or accuracy, but it is not limited to such characteristics. 
They are for the use of multiple sources, provided that their goods or services meet the 
proprietor’s required standards. Certification marks are collective by nature. The proprietor is 
the entity who registers and owns the mark, he is responsible for its use. The proprietor 
controls the use of  the mark and ensures that his authorisation to affix the mark is not 
abused by the use on non-compliant goods. Certification marks cannot refuse certification to 
anybody who complies with its standards, certification is open access, which is contrary to 
both collective marks (limited to association members) and geographical indications (limited 
to regional producers). The proprietor is precluded from using the mark on his own goods 
and services. This is to guarantee the independence of  the supply and certification 
processes. An additional function of the proprietor is to establish the standards/criteria by 
which products are going to be certified. 
Just as trademarks, certification marks need to be distinctive, not only in the ‘mark’ but in the 
criteria behind the certification. Eco-labels, as seen in the previous chapter, normally 
demand for several criteria to be met and it might be true that they overlap with other similar 
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eco-labels, since they all want to achieve the same goal. However it is the mix of the criteria 
and the emphasis they put on one criterion over an other that would give an eco-label its 
‘distinctiveness’. Furthermore, eco-labels could (like other certification or trade marks) 
eventually acquire a distinctive character to the public through use. For example, ‘fair trade’ 
immediately leads to think about social aspects of production, and C2C (cradle-to-cradle) 
certification would lead to think of LCA, regardless of the specific criteria or even if  their 
criteria do contain that specific type of criteria.  It is the consumer’s perception what matters 
in the end. 
3.3.1 Assurance of quality: trade marks vs certification marks
Both certification and trademark are bound up with quality perceptions, but in different ways. 
In trademarks quality is considered to be an assurance to the consumer of a consistent level 
of quality in the product as a whole, whereas certification mark’s attest to attainment of  an 
absolute level of quality. In practical matters, a trademark can alter the ingredients or nature 
of its product without any liability, as long as the quality remains reliable. Contrarily, 
certification marks act as a guarantee of particular and absolute level of quality, which 
cannot be altered precisely because it guarantees that the described traits are present in the 
product. It is bound to its criteria. This means that if  a buyer can prove that the certified good 
does not comply with its description, as stated in the certification statement or mark, s/he 
can bring suit against the seller for breach of contract. Consequently, certification marks 
imply a quasi contractual standard of quality. This feature is precisely what takes certification 
marks to the level of guarantee, contrarily to a trade mark that depends on its reputation. 
Trade marks are proven to solve problems regarding experience goods. When the quality 
cannot be observed at the point of purchase, the consumer will eventually discover the 
quality by actually consuming the good. In this sense, consumers will be able to identify 
whether the product is high or low  quality, in economic terms they will identify the firm’s 
‘type’. Once a consumer defines the ‘type’ then it can formulate its beliefs, and adjust 
whenever it receives new  information. In this sense, trade-marks work as signals, and 
reputation is a type of signalling game. Certification on the other hand, is crucial for the 
existence of  markets of goods with credence attributes. Certification relies on its credibility, 
which is (in this particular sense) its reputation. When the uncertainty is regarding actions of 
the firms or process attributes, reputation is modelled as a dynamic structure in which 
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‘past’ (good) quality is assumed to persist until the firm cheats by cutting its quality.36 When 
an eco-label (or other certification schemes) earns credibility among consumers, it is as if he 
established a good reputation. Consequently, eco-labels strive to earn credibility and once 
that is established, it can search to be salient. 
3.3.2 Are eco-labels certification marks?
Eco-labels are undoubtedly certification marks. However from the analysis of the framework 
regulating certification marks, legislation basically refers to collective marks and 
geographical indications. The concern is that these two instruments even though named 
certification marks, do not necessarily require a formal certification procedure. A formal 
certification procedure would simply be the process of evaluating the conformity to the pre-
set criteria, either by an association or a third party entity. In the existing legal framework, 
when there is the pre-requisite of  conforming to quality standards, the certification is deemed 
‘sui generis’. Eco-labels, do require conformity to their criteria, it is what differentiates them 
from the more general ‘environmental-claims’. It can be argued that eco-labels are 
certification marks just as collective marks and geographical indications. In particular, the 
European ‘sui generis’ approach on geographic indications require producers to conform to 
quality standards in order to be awarded, in the same manner as eco-labels require firms to 
conform to production processes focused on the reduction of negative environmental 
impacts.  Consequently, eco-labels could also be regarded as sui generis certification marks, 
and thus can be regulated as such. However, why Intellectual property has not been used to 
regulate eco-labels, under the supervision of the WIPO is not clear. Specially because it is 
obvious after this analysis, that eco-labels do share the legal and economic nature of other 
certification marks, specially those deemed as ‘sui generis’ like geographical indications. 
Trade marks and certification marks, have earned intellectual property protection because of 
their role in mitigating information related market failures. They need protection precisely 
because in order for them to work, they depend on their credibility. If they are not protected 
then they are nothing else than images and self-advertisements. In the same sense, 
following the argument that eco-labels also serve the purpose of  palliating market failures as 
do other branding forms, they should also be protected by intellectual property.   
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3.4 Reputation in relation with certification
The relation between reputation and trademarks has already been identified. However, 
whether certification marks (including eco-labels) and reputation have the same sort of 
relation is not that evident. As it has been previously addressed, trade marks function 
properly with experience goods. Shapiro stated that for the development of  reputation it is 
necessary that both “the quality of the product is observable after it is purchased and that 
this information is communicated by other potential buyers”. Therefore, it can be inferred that 
reputation, will never be developed with credence attributes because consumers can neither 
observe the quality after its consumption nor communicate their findings with other 
consumers. This is true as long as the product is not certified, when the product is certified 
and obtains a certification-mark a new  mechanism is triggered. Certification marks brand 
products and assure overall product quality to consumers. Therefore, if consumers trust the 
eco-labels, because they know  the product is certified, then there is potential for reputation 
building. 
Eco-label markets, are characterised by the presence of great uncertainty. The little 
information available not only needs to be reliable37, it needs to have credibility38. 
Consumers expectations about product quality are assured to be met, as long as the product 
is certified. The proprietor of the certification mark (aka the eco-label organization) has to be 
competent enough for it to be able to provide credible and reliable certification. The 
information conveyed in a certified good is quasi contractual, therefore the eco-label is 
bound to its quality. Deviating from the criteria would risk being held accountable for such 
divergence. Consequently, the eco-label’s reputation depends on the proprietors ability to 
provide credible and reliable information. The proprietor’s competence and consistency is 
what will build the eco-label’s reputation. The proprietor is responsible in maintaining the 
quality of  all the products that bare the eco-label. In this sense, eco-labels, also depend on 
reputation; however their reputation is conditional to the organisations’ credibility. 
Certification marks have the advantage of portraying a degree of credibility precisely 
because of the assessment the product underwent to obtain it. 
3.4.1 Building a reputation 
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Reputation is a dynamic process  in which, according to Shapiro, past quality becomes a 
signal for the products in the present.39 In this sense, trade marks link products to quality, 
making it simple for consumers to identify the product with his preferred quality attributes. 
Menapace and Moschino, extended Shapiro’s reputation model by introducing certification 
marks (geographic indications, specifically) with and without verification of  minimum quality 
standards. These models can be easily adapted to the eco-label scenario, supporting the 
idea that eco-labels are sui generis certification marks that aid to solve informational market 
failures. 
In Shapiro’s setting, if a seller wants to enter the high-quality market segment, it has to make 
investments to earn its reputation. This investment has to be focused on producing high-
quality products. During the first period, the seller has to lower its prices, even below  cost. 
The entrance cost is the market price and the seller is a price taker. It is assumed that high 
quality products are more expensive to produce than average-quality products. However, in 
this first period consumers do not know  whether the product is as high-quality as it claims. 
Consumers need to experience the good to determine the quality. Therefore, the price in this 
first period has to be the average product market price, which might be lower than the 
production costs of the high quality product. Ultimately, consumers will learn the product’s 
quality, hence they would also expect that such quality will be constant in later stages. Once 
reputation is established, the seller can command high-quality prices (premiums). In the 
investment period the seller cannot command high-quality prices, because reputation is not 
yet established. In later stages, once reputation is established the firm might earn a flow  of 
profits, that are according to Shapiro, ‘merely a competitive return on their investments in 
reputation’. Sellers will theoretically seek to maintain their high reputation, so they can 
continue to benefit from the profit-flows that accompany their initial sacrifice.
The higher the quality produced, the larger the initial losses and the subsequent profits. The 
time lag between the initial investment and the moment the seller can start to command high 
prices will depend on the consumer’s ability to detect the quality and the speed such 
information travels among consumers. In this sense, if  the quality is hard to detect and 
consumers do not trust the claims (as it occurs with credence attributes without certification), 
the investment period can be extended indefinitely, including the losses. Only when 
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reputation is established, and consumers learn the product’s quality, can producers 
command the high quality price. The differentiated price can be charged as long as the high 
quality stays constant. 
In equilibrium, once the reputation has been adjusted, consumers expectation about the 
product quality is formed. Because, the high quality firm can earn high quality prices over 
time (as long as quality is unchanged) they have an incentive to maintain such quality. 
Therefore, price must exceed cost to prevent quality deterioration. Good reputation is a 
valuable asset for firms, as it allows them to set prices, not just ‘take’ them. Shapiro’s model 
is a steady state configuration in which firms maintain quality over time, fulfilling consumers’ 
expectations and in which the price as a function of reputation is unchanging over time.40 In 
this sense, consumers can easily observe prices and brand reputation, which reduces 
information costs. This cost reduction is an improvement over the non trademark scenario. 
Trade marks reduce information costs from experience to search. Consequently, the 
information asymmetries are smaller in a market where brand-reputation is observable.    
Trade marks and certification marks are designed to shorten the lag (between investment 
and recoupment) and make it easier for consumers to learn quality. Reducing the lag by 
means of a trademark or certification, indeed elicits a higher investment cost, but the time 
between investment expenditures and premium profits will be shorter. Consequently, the 
producer can enjoy profits sooner than it would without them. In the case of  eco-labels, if a 
firm invests in some sort of pro-environmental behaviour, searching to obtain an eco-label 
will be the shortest way for him to recoup its environmental investments. As it will brand the 
product with an already known brand, in this case the eco-label, which already has an 
established reputation among consumers.
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Figure 1. Difference in lags in presence of a trademark or certification mark.
3.4.2 Certification to lower costs of reputation building
Certification marks require that certain criteria be met for the firm to be allowed to use them. 
Therefore certification allows for costs to be reduced more than they are with trademarks. 
Shapiro pointed out that when a minimum41  quality standard is high, the price-quality ratio 
shifts. Because the price for the new  minimum quality product is higher, it reduces the 
investment necessary to build up a reputation, and hence reduces the premiums for high 
quality products. Stringent quality standards raise the entrance price, so they reduce the 
cost of  building up a reputation and hence reduce the value of a given reputation. This 
reduction of the value of  reputation would be translated into lower prices for high quality 
products. Evidently, consumers who use high quality items benefit from an increase in the 
minimum quality standard. There is a positive ‘informational externality’ associated with 
raising the quality standard. Increases in minimum quality reduce the equilibrium price of 
high quality products, and hence increase consumer surplus for those using high quality 
products.42 Minimum quality standards are expected to face opposition from firms. It would 
be expected that the opposition would be by those firms whose quality is in the lower 
spectrum, but this is not so. Opposition comes especially from those that are already high-
quality producers with established reputation. As they have already made the investments in 
reputation, and with a high quality minimum standard they will lose that investment and just 
seem over-priced as other products would now  be similar in quality. Contrarily, competitors 
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mechanism would apply to a voluntary high quality environmental standard set by an eco-labelling organisation. 
42 Shapiro, Op. cit., p. 674.
from the lower quality spectrum have not made any investment; therefore they have nothing 
to lose.
In comparison to the simple trade-mark reputation scenario certification “improves the ability 
of reputation to operate as a mechanism for assuring quality” because it reduces the 
divergence between the reputation equilibrium and the equilibrium under perfect 
information.43  The gap between both equilibriums is represented by the premium, which is 
reduced with certification. Nevertheless, even if  the price is reduced, this will not reflect on 
product quality. On the contrary, certification constrains the actions of the producers to the 
criteria. As long as certifiers duly verify  that firms actions (such as production processes) 
follow  the criteria, firms cannot deviate easily. When information asymmetries, are due to 
unverifiable actions, moral hazard problems are likely to follow. This is because it would be 
very easy for producers to act opportunistically once they obtain the mark. Certification 
constrains sellers moral hazard behaviour.44 The moment the firm ceases to certify the good, 
consumers will notice and anticipate that the producer is cheating. Furthermore the 
certification mark’s proprietor has an interest to avoid opportunistic behaviour as the loss of 
good reputation falls on him, not the producer. In other words, “the presence of  certification 
limits the cheating options for producers”.45  It constrains the behaviour of the firms to their 
criteria. 
Figure 2. Cost Reduction with certification
The Law and Economics of Eco-labels
89
43 Luisa Menapace and Giancarlo Moschino, Op. cit.,p. 4.
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3.4.3 Certification marks and their collective reputation
In the model presented by Menapace and Moschino, it is assumed that certification has no 
cost. However, eco-labels (as well as other certification schemes) imply a considerable cost. 
This cost, might even be comparable to pursuing earning a pro-environmental reputation 
with full investment costs. Regardless of the previous reasoning, some firms still pay the 
certification cost. This is because eco-labels (or other collective marks) have a pre-
established reputation. Therefore, the firm merely adheres to the eco-label’s reputation. Here 
the only lag is the one considered between the certification process and the time the eco-
labelled products are placed in the market. This benefit, has to be sufficient to outweigh the 
option of pursuing pro-environmental premiums individually, through a trademark.46  This is 
probably why salient brands, which already have invested in their reputations, opt for 
sustainable re-branding or use other corporate sustainability instruments. Salient brands, 
might not wish to share their reputation with other firms that might harm them. They have 
enough market presence to do so. However, smaller firms, with not so salient brands can 
achieve more salience by adhering to a salient eco-label. In this sense, they would brand 
their brand. Their individual brand will be tied to the eco-label’s reputation, hence improving 
its own reputation. 
3.4.3.1 The reputation commons problem
Eco-labels share their reputation among all the eco-label licensees. Their reputations 
become interdependent. Therefore any misconduct from any licensee will lead the others to 
be “tarred by the same brush”. In sociology, this is known as “reputation commons problem”. 
Just as any other shared resource, reputation can be prone to over-exploitation. Without a 
certification scheme, firms can free ride from the positive collective reputation. They would 
enjoy the benefits even while taking individual actions that may harm the reputation. It is a 
‘tragedy of the commons’ as it happens with other common pool resources. Collectively firms 
want to maintain the positive reputation, privately they have incentives to overexploit it. Eco-
labels have akey role of managing the reputation commons and certification is its best tool. 
Certification can assure that all the licensees’ private actions will not harm the eco-label’s 
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reputation. The cost of  harming a collective reputation can be very high and all the firms that 
use the eco-labelled will be harmed. 
3.4.3.2 Adverse selection problems
Adverse selection is also a common problem in the presence of a collective reputation. It 
may happen that the only firms interested in adhering to an eco-label are those firms who 
have the worst environmental performance. Paradoxically, these are the firms who are most 
likely to be attracted to programmes for improving their reputation. Certification is an 
institutional design that can overcome these problems, because it can distinguish the good 
apples from the bad.47 
In theory, a high entrance cost should deter the worst firms from entering the eco-label. 
Stringent criteria (high costs of complying plus certification costs) might not have the power 
to sort out good and bad firms. Firms that have already above minimum quality 
environmental practices might not go the extra mile to pursue an eco-label with a higher 
standard because the marginal costs would be too high. This is considering that they already 
have invested in their individual reputation. For firms in the lower range, the cost of  adhering 
to a high environmental standard to obtain an eco-label are expected to be high. However if 
the minimum quality is also costly, then it might be worth to invest a little more and get the 
benefits of the shared reputation. 
In this diagram, Firm A has a low  environmental standard, compared to Firm B (X1<X3). 
Additionally it is expected that the eco-labels standard is higher than the mandated minimum 
quality standard (X2<X4). The eco-label would like that his members were all in the Firm B 
quality range, as they are already likely to have positive environmental reputation. However, 
for these firms going the extra mile (from X3 to X4) is very costly and the benefits are only 
marginal. Contrarily, firms in the lower quality range, that want a boost in reputation might be 
the ones seeking to adhere to the eco-labels standards. However, if the standards are too 
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high they might be demotivated to even try. It might seem then that eco-labels are doomed 
to suffer from adverse selection problems. It may be that firms with good environmental 
reputation manage to reap the benefits with trademarks. Smaller firms might face difficulties 
signalling their quality, consequently delaying the reputation adjustment. Smaller firms risk 
incurring in extended investment (in reputation) costs as they cannot charge the high quality 
prices until their reputation is set. This is due to the credence nature of environmental 
attributes, which impedes consumers to learn product-quality. If  a firm has made the 
investments and has not managed to establish a reputation, certification and adherence to 
an eco-label can do so. This is because the moment it adheres to the eco-label, quality is 
revealed, making quality signalling easy, thus reputation would be established almost 
immediately. Once the smaller firms are certified they can charge high-quality prices and 
recoup their investments. In conclusion, if credence attributes need certification for quality to 
be known, and environmental attributes are credence goods, therefore environmental 
attributes need certification too. 
4. The Eco-label Market: Competition matters
Eco-labelling literature normally focuses on the possible market reactions in presence of an 
eco-labelling scheme. It is normally assumed that there is a single eco-label in the market. 
While this might be true in some markets, it cannot be generalised. Contrarily, it is expected 
that markets simultaneously host various eco-labels which compete with each other. They 
concur both in the geographical and product dimensions of markets. Eco-labels interact with 
other eco-labels as well as with other brands and trademarks. This concurrency could have 
indirect effects on competition and trade. Up to the present, eco-labels do not have the 
power to negatively distort the market and the changes (even if small) they trigger are 
normally desirable. However, taken to extremes eco-labels may have the potential to hinder 
competition. Single eco-label markets will share the same burden as those markets with 
monopolies. Eco-labels may also have certain market power and even a large market share 
in their relevant market. This does not mean that they will abuse or misuse their market 
power, but it is a possibility. Contrarily, eco-labels with high market presence, could also be 
positive for society. More eco-labelled goods, would imply that the market for 
‘environmental’ goods is larger, initiating innovation and the rising the bar of  government 
mandated minimum quality standards. For the environment this is expected to be good, as 
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firms would be constrained to act pro-environmentally and there would be a general 
awareness of their actions and products’ life cycles. 
4.1 Eco-labels and their vertical and horizontal restraints
Environmental certification systems may be constructed in a manner that secures the 
competitive advantages of its members and manage competition. In this case, if  a firm has 
engaged in pro-environmental behaviour it holds as strong position in the market, however if 
it stands alone the signal to the market might not be strong enough, thus it might not 
succeed in the market. Such firm  has an interest in constructing credible signals of  its 
position. Joining an eco-label would make distinguishing the firm’s brand and securing its 
position easier. Hence, there is an incentive for firms to cooperate with the eco-label. 
However, under certain market conditions the agreements between the eco-label and the 
members could indeed limit competition. Therefore, vertical and horizontal agreements, such 
as the ones created by eco-labelling mechanisms, are carefully monitored specially if  they 
have the potential for ‘cartelization’.   
4.1.1 Vertical restraints, franchises and eco-labels
The eco-label has a licensing agreement with each member, which stipulates the use of the 
mark, the duration, monitoring and sanctions, as well as the fee structure. As the owner of 
the mark, the eco-label is likely to have the upper-hand in the relationship, making it a 
vertical relationship. In contrast, a franchising agreement, according to the European 
Commission is “A special type of agreement whereby one undertaking (the franchisor) 
grants to the other (the franchisee), in exchange for direct or indirect financial consideration, 
the right to exploit a package of industrial or intellectual property rights (franchise) for the 
purposes of producing and/or marketing specified types of goods and/or services. This 
package typically relates to trade marks, trade names, shop signs, utility models, designs, 
copyrights, know-how or patents. A franchise agreement usually contains obligations relating 
to (1) the use of a common name/shop sign and a uniform presentation of contract premises 
and/or means of transport, (2) the communication by the franchisor to the franchisee of 
know-how, (3) the continuing provision by the franchisor to the franchisee of commercial and 
technical assistance during the life of the agreement.” 48  Even though franchises are much 
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more complex than licensing agreements, there are still certain common elements with the 
license agreements signed in eco-labelling. The similarities are namely the use of the logo, 
conformity and standardisation of products according to pre-established criteria, as well as 
the continuous monitoring and assistance during the life of the contract. Moreover, 
franchises have the effect of  creating a vertical structure between the parties and aids in the 
coordination of certain decisions which otherwise would be independent. Hence the name: 
vertical coordination. Nonetheless, there are important differences between the eco-label 
licensing and the franchise. Specifically, contrarily to the franchisee, an eco-label member is 
free, within the limits of the criteria, to produce, price and distribute their eco-labelled goods. 
Notwithstanding the above, close attention should be drawn to these agreements, as it may 
happen that under certain market circumstances these can lead to undesirable effects.
The greatest challenge for vertical relations is the problems that may arise with ‘co-
ordination’. Independence in the decision processes of the eco-label and its members is 
crucial, as it will determine quality, production costs, and prices. In other words, these 
decisions determine the economic efficiency with which the product is supplied. Therefore, if 
this independence is compromised economic efficiency would be too. The problem arises 
when members of the eco-label compete with each other. Brand competition can be either 
intra-brand competition49  and inter-brand competition.50  However, in eco-labels it has 
characteristics of both types of  brand competition, it is a hybrid. It is deemed as a hybrid 
simply because even when the eco-label uniformly brands the members’ products, each 
member still conserves and uses its own brand, therefore it is remains distinct from the 
others. When the decisions of one member directly affects the profits of another member, 
the eco-label might be pressured to take action and coordinate certain decisions to alleviate 
these issues among its members. To lessen this type of  intra-brand competition, eco-labels 
might grant exclusive geographic areas or specify minimum retail prices, practices which 
hinder competition and are generally not well regarded. However, coordination is tolerated 
as long as there is no ‘control’ over basic decisions inherent to each eco-label member and 
competition is not severely impaired.
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4.1.2 Horizontal cooperation, cartelization and eco-labels
Members of the eco-label are likely to be competitors, and when competitors get together 
there is a risk that they might cooperate and collude. Under the eco-label structure, 
members only have an indirect relation with each other, they are linked by the eco-label. The 
eco-label in theory should not facilitate direct cooperation between its members. However, 
precisely due to its particular structure it may lead to cartelization if the market conditions are 
susceptible.
In simple terms, a cartel is an agreement between firms to not compete with each other. 
Cartels are not well regarded as they limit or restrict competition in the entire market. Cartels 
are normally forbidden, therefore it is common for them to be implicit (verbal and/or informal, 
known as soft-cartels), though they can be explicit (an actual written agreement, known as 
hard-core cartels) as well. The agreements may consist on price-fixing, bid-rigging, output 
quotas or restrictions and/or market sharing. Instead of  competing with each other, cartel 
members rely on each others' agreed course of  action, which reduces their incentives to 
provide new  or better products and services at competitive prices. As a consequence, 
consumers end up paying more for less quality, in addition to having less options or variety 
to select from.51  However, cartel management is not simple and not all cartels are 
successful, certain sectors and markets are more susceptible of cartelization than others 
because of  their structure or the way they operate. Cartels are more likely to succeed   in 
markets where:
- There are few competitors (oligopolistic markets), 
- Products have similar characteristics or are standardised, which leaves little scope for 
competition in quality, 
- Communication channels or some sort of  organization between competitors already 
exists , which would facilitate cartel management, and 
- Inelastic demand, which allows cartels to set higher prices.  
Notwithstanding the anticompetitive concerns of horizontal cooperation among competitors, 
it may also generate efficiencies. For example, horizontal cooperation often covers areas 
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such as research and development, common schemes of production, purchasing, marketing 
or expanding. Cooperation thereto can offer a means of sharing risks, saving costs, pooling 
know-how  and stepping up innovative activity. 52  In this sense, eco-labels might fall into a 
type of horizontal cooperation scheme, not necessarily a cartel. Specifically, eco-labels 
mainly present advantages in marketing and distribution. In a lesser degree they can also 
pool resources for research and development, in eco-labels this would consist in evaluating 
the effectiveness of the criteria as well as creating new  criteria to better suit the needs. In 
addition, the eco-label is a stable organization which gives it the possibility to learn. The eco-
label learns which will make it more efficient, its criteria would be more suitable to their 
purpose which may lower the costs for its members. Notwithstanding that consumers would 
also learn about the eco-label’s quality and reputation, making it easier for members to reap 
the benefits faster.   
4.2 Eco-label’s market segmentation and product differentiation
In the marketing and economics literature there has been discussion regarding product 
differentiation and market segmentation. In economics demand is usually aggregated from 
the individual to a market level, therefore there is always one demand for each market. 
Other disciplines, such as marketing, do exactly the opposite, they separate demand and 
identify groups within the demand which are called segments. Thus, product differentiation 
and market segmentation are consequences of the existence of  market segments. They are 
regarded as management or marketing strategies designed to handle market segments.
4.2.1 Product differentiation
Under the perfect competition model firms sell homogeneous goods. Therefore, there are no 
incentives to differentiate to increase sales since they are able to sell as much as they want 
without the extra effort.53  However, in imperfect markets demand is heterogeneous. 
“Heterogeneity in demand functions exists such that market demand can be disaggregated 
into segments with distinct demand functions.”54 In this sense, each segment has a distinct 
demand function. Consequently, differentiating goods is necessary to satisfy those different 
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demands. Product differentiation can be seen as a marketplace condition in which all 
products are not perceived as equal on each of  the products characteristics, including 
price.55 The essence of product differentiation lies in the variety in the characteristics offered 
by alternative goods. Differentiation can be both real, the product’s characteristics can be 
distinguished, and perceived, which is the subjective appreciation of  the product.56  In this 
sense, consumers might find distinctiveness in aspects such as packaging or trademarks, as 
well as in prices. 
Firms may also use ‘product differentiation’ as a business strategy. Such strategy consists in 
creating a state of product differentiation by offering a product that is perceived to differ from 
the competing products on at least one characteristic.57 How  each firm defines, frames and 
characterises the market segments, is likely to be unique and will form the basis of its 
marketing strategy. Consequently the accuracy of the firm’s perception of market 
segmentation often is a critical determinant of competitive advantage.”58  If the product is 
perceived as to satisfy consumer needs more accurately, the consumer’s price elasticity will 
diminish. Because the product is a better match to consumer’s needs he will perceive the 
product as of higher quality, therefore he will not have any incentive to continue looking for 
an alternative. Therefore, even if  firms eventually raise prices, consumers will still buy the 
product. Sellers differentiate their products to increase their appeal to consumers and such 
differentiation is only profitable if  consumers value it. Hence, successful product 
differentiation must be classified as a form of efficiency. Its aim is to create value for the 
brand. However, this has troubled economists because it is unclear whether market 
segments are a natural market phenomena or whether they are artificially segmented by 
firms who want to appropriate consumer surplus. 
4.2.2 Market segmentation
Market segmentation is a state of  demand heterogeneity such that the total market demand 
can be separated into segments with distinct demand functions. Market segmentation thus is 
seen as a way of  viewing the market rather than defined as a market strategy. In marketing a 
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‘market segmentation strategy’ usually refers to the use of information about market 
segments to design a programme that appeals to a specific existing segment.59  By 
segmenting the market, firms are able to identify and target consumers more specifically, 
tailoring their product to consumer’s needs. This will render the firms a competitive 
advantage in the market and consumers will pay with their loyalty.
Market segmentation and product differentiation are closely connected. Markets need 
product differentiation precisely because there is market segmentation. However, a “product 
differentiation strategy can be pursued with or without a market segmentation strategy, but a 
market segmentation strategy can be pursued only when product differentiation already 
exists or when accompanied by a complementary product differentiation strategy.”60 In this 
sense, firms can differentiate their products from their competitors for reasons other than 
market segmentation. However, to engage in a market segmentation strategy product 
differentiation is necessary for it to succeed. Additionally, if  segmentation does not pre-exist, 
firms can create and develop market segments by differentiating their products. In other 
words, firms can actively alter or modify demand, so consumer needs adjusts to the product 
they offer and not the other way around.  
One of the main concerns with market segmentation is that is can lead to demand alteration 
or modification.61 Theoretically, the objective of a segmentation strategy would be to identify 
and cater to the existing market segments rather than to alter or enhance differences in their 
demand functions. However, precisely because segmenting the market can be profitable 
firms have the incentive to artificially enhance and modify demand. Therefore, when product 
differentiation strategy is combined with a demand modification strategy, it is deemed 
‘unnecessary’ and has been targeted by social welfare economists. Though the marketplace 
clearly likes the choice that product differentiation provides, among many economists 
‘product differentiation’ has become a derogatory term used to describe what is ‘judged’ to 
be manipulative and/or wasteful competitive strategy.62
4.2.3 Anticompetitive effects of product differentiation and market segmentation
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Advertising, plays a key role in product differentiation. Advertising may be used either to 
increase the objective knowledge of products or to create consumers’ preferences for a 
particular brand, thereby making the demand for those products less elastic and market 
entry by newcomers more difficult. If  the advertisement is successful in persuading 
consumer’s into believing than one brand is better than the other, then demand will be 
altered. Even if advertising may artificially alter demand, it is not the biggest concern with 
product differentiation and market segmentation. The main concern is that these strategies 
can hinder competition by foreclosing entry and they may aid firms in gaining market power. 
In a market in which product differentiation and market segmentation is large, consumers will 
eventually develop brand loyalty. This of  course is firm’s expected outcome, as it means that 
they are reaping the benefits of  their marketing strategies. However, this consumer loyalty 
makes entry more difficult for new  firms. In economic terms, differentiating products provide 
firm’s with a first mover’s advantage. Consequently, rival firms would have to either follow 
suit by offering similar products or coming up with a different strategy to make their good 
different. Both options are costly for competitors. Furthermore, in markets with strong brands 
(high consumer loyalty), new  firms might never be able to position themselves and might be 
condemned to charge lower prices and invest more in establishing reputation. “If the 
presence of  the incumbent raises the marketing entry costs of  the second firm, then the first 
firm has a permanent advantage (a long-run barrier to entry) and can maintain high prices.”63 
Even if  consumers prefer established products to new  rival products, entrants remain free to 
design their products as they wish. It all comes down to consumers’ preferences.64  In 
conclusion, product differentiation and market segmentation does impose extra costs on 
entry. However, to qualify as an entry barrier and not just as an impediment, the effects of 
advertising must last sufficiently long to enable incumbent firms to earn super-normal profits 
persistently.65  
4.2.4 Differentiating Eco-labelled goods
Eco-labels are used to differentiate environmentally superior goods from ‘normal’ goods and 
even other eco-labelled goods. Normally eco-labels have been determined to be vertically 
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differentiated versions of  ‘normal‘ goods. This means, it is the same good but with higher 
quality. In this case, vertical differentiated goods, would depend on pricing and trademarks 
(reputation tools) to secure its market segment. Under this scenario, eco-labelled apples 
would be considered higher in quality than average apples. In consumer’s perspective, they 
merit a higher price because its characteristics imply improved performance. The playing 
field of  vertically differentiated goods is not the same, the players are not the same as in the 
normal markets, neither are the goods.
It can also be contended that eco-labelled goods are not vertically differentiated goods, but a 
different variety of  the good altogether. This would mean that the eco-labelled goods are 
horizontally differentiated from ‘normal‘ goods. For example, a multi-product firm may launch 
an eco-labelled variety of  its product. In this case it would alter its production from the 
normal version, to adhere to the eco-label’s criteria. The good would not be deemed as 
better as the others, it would simply be different. Under this scenario, the consumer will 
regard the eco-labelled apple as another option of  apples as their traits would satisfy 
different needs than those a normal apple would. In the consumer eyes, the eco-labelled 
apple is different from a normal apple. In this case it competes in the same playing field as 
normal apples.
It is to notice that if a firm decides to create an ‘environmental-friendly’ line or to differentiate 
the high-environmental quality version, the firm’s brand will be enhanced as a whole. The 
effort to join the eco-label will perm to its other ‘normal‘ varieties. Therefore, it can cross-
subsidise the investments on the eco-label with its other ‘normal‘ lines and reap the benefits 
of an enhanced ‘sustainable’ brand for all the varieties. 
4.2.5 Identifying the Eco-label’s market segments
Numerous reports have attempted to identify the market segments by studying consumers 
attitudes and preferences regarding ‘environmentally friendly’ products (not specifically eco-
labelled goods).66 To identify market segments effectively, firms have to find the variable, or 
variables that split the market into actionable segments.  Actionable segments are those that 
are measurable, substantial (segments must be large or profitable enough to serve), 
accessible and distinct from other segments. There are two segmentation variables named 
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needs and profilers. Needs, as in consumer needs, is the basic criteria for segmenting a 
market. Consumer needs are paired with profilers, which are the descriptive, measurable 
consumer characteristics that can be used for segmentation.67 The most common profiler 
variables are consumer behaviour, demographics, psychograpics68  and geography. A well 
defined market segment will allow  firms to better match their products with the targeted 
consumers. Consequently, firms will strive to identify market segments individually, as this 
market research will give them an advantage over their competitors.
4.2.5.1 Eco-label market segmentation based on behaviour
Behavioural market segmentation is based on the way consumers respond to, use or know  a 
good.  It can be seen as the consumer’s status regarding the good. This analysis will 
determine how  the consumer uses the good (light or heavy user), if  he has a preference for 
a specific brand (brand loyalty) and what type of  user he is. It is based on consumers 
actions. Notwithstanding the preceding, some consultancies such as the Boston 
Consultancy Group (BCG) have prepared open reports which can shed some information 
about the state of  the market. Specifically the BCG report is based on a survey conducted in 
2008 to over 9000 adults over 9 countries. They divide consumers in 4 types. The first are 
consumers who systematically buy ‘green’, which comprise 14.66% of respondents. Next, 
there are the consumers who sometimes buy green, these are 33.33% of respondents. The 
smallest group are consumers who have bought green products in the past, but do not 
currently buy green, these are 11.6% of  respondents. Finally, the largest group is formed by 
consumers who have never bought any green products, which are 40.8% of respondents.69 
This shows some light in how consumers are divided and distributed in the market.  
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People within the same demographic group can exhibit very different psychographic profiles.
69 The percentages are averages taken from Boston Consultancy Group: Capturing the Green Advantage for 
Consumer Companies, page 13. Their numbers are specific to 15 different product groups, these averages are of  
those product groups they analyse.
Figure 3. BCG Consumer Segmentation
4.2.5.2 Eco-label market segmentation based on psychographics   
Psychographic segmentation70  divides the market according to consumer’s lifestyle. This 
segmentation considers a number of  potential influences on buying behaviour such as 
attitudes, expectations, interests, opinions, as well at the consumers’ activities.71  When it 
comes to eco-labels psychographic segmentation is the method of choice of  the majority of 
research groups. Therefore, segmenting the ‘green market’ can be done in as many ways as 
there are research groups.72  In 2007, Yankelovich’s report ‘GOING GREEN’ spurred 
attention in the ‘sustainability’ arena. The report was based on a survey of  over 2,500 US 
adults ages 16+ and concluded that even if consumers are “aware of environmental issues 
due to the glut of  media attention, the simple fact is that ‘going green’ in their everyday life is 
simply not a big concern or a high priority”.  At the most, there is a niche market for green 
products. Yankelovich illustrates the degree to which all consumers - from “Green-less” to 
“Green-Enthusiasts” - are likely to buy a product based on its green features. It is to note 
that attitudes do not always match behaviour, therefore analysing the characteristics of  each 
group can lead interesting results, specially if consumer behaviour is to be  modified.
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70 According to wikipedia psychographic variables are any attributes relating to personality, values, attitudes, 
interests, or lifestyles. They are also called IAO variables (for Interests, Activities, and Opinions).
71 http://tutor2u.net/business/marketing/segmentation-psychographic.html
72 For a brief summary of the 6 dominating ‘green market’ segmentation see: http://makower.typepad.com/
joel_makower/2007/05/the_many_shades.html
Figure 4. Yankelovich’s consumer segmentation 2007
Another common segmentation is that done by the LOHAS market. The LOHAS is an 
acronym for Lifestyles of  Health and Sustainability, a market segment focused on health and 
fitness, the environment, personal development, sustainable living, and social justice. Their 
classification is evidently oriented to serve their purpose, however it is a good example of a 
psychographics analysis that encompasses beliefs, values and actual purchasing criteria.73 
Their segmentation is based on research from the Natural Marketing Institute. The LOHAS 
segmentation consists of lohas, naturalites, drifters, conventionals and unconcerned.  
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73 Precisely this point is what helps illustrate the complexity of  segmentation.
Figure 5. The LOHAS market segmentation
Lohas consumers in 2006 counted up to 16% of  US adults. These consumers are very 
active and demanding. They are influential over friends and family, less price sensitive and 
more brand loyal. They have internalized the ‘sustainable’ values, and they are the target for 
many of the ‘green’ marketing strategies.  The naturalites segment, is the largest, 1 out of 
every 4 US adults are in this group. They take care about their health, therefore they use 
many healthy and natural consumer goods. Their beliefs are matched by the consumption of 
ethical consumables. However, they are not committed to the notions of  ‘holistic 
sustainability’.  Conventionals comprise 23% of the US population. These are attracted by 
‘fiscally-responsible’ products such like energy efficient electronics, appliances, even 
sustainable construction. They occasionally use LOHAS products, as long as they are 
‘practical’. Behaviourally they might be more engaged than naturalites. Additionally, this 
group are more likely to donate money to environmental groups, get involved politically and 
recycle. Drifters are also 23% of  the US population. Their beliefs are somewhat aligned to 
those of  the DOHA market, though their behaviour lags behind. They are a younger 
segment, therefore they have more financial constraints and their value set is still under 
development. Almost half  wish they could do more for the environment, but they are not 
convinced that their actions have an impact on the environment. Almost 50 million people 
are in this category, therefore this is the segment that represents the bigger opportunity for 
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‘green’ marketing. Finally, there are the unconcerned, which accounts for 14% of the 
population.74
4.3 Eco-labels and tying
Some have identified eco-labels as ‘clubs’. Clubs are characterised by their excludability. 
Excludability is the capacity to exclude people from using and enjoying the benefits of  a 
good, in this case, the eco-label. The eco-label’s right to exclude others or non-members 
from using the mark is a form of monopoly. However, having a monopoly over an eco-label 
does not restrict trade, as long as it does not unjustifiably discriminate to whom it awards the 
eco-label. If  a firm has complied with the standards, and has obtained the certification, the 
eco-label has to review the case.   
Eco-labels use their criteria to sort out which are the desirable members. Criteria have the 
potential to condition the certification to the use of specific brands, materials or technologies. 
This could be considered ‘tying’. Tying occurs when the supplier makes the sale of one 
product (the tying product) conditional upon the purchase of  another distinct product (the tied 
product) from the supplier or someone designated by the latter.75  Therefore, if in order to 
obtain the eco-label firms are obliged to use specific technology or buy materials from 
specified providers or brands, it is plausible that the eco-label would be tying. 
Tying may have both pro-competitive and anticompetitive effects. One of the anti-competitive 
effects is that tying enables price discrimination. For example, the specified brands or 
providers could raise their prices or force firms into taking unnecessary actions to obtain the 
certification. This type of  phenomena is already happening with some eco-labels, for 
example in Mexico the LEED (Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design) eco-label 
has been introduced. This eco-label applies to the construction industry. However, obtaining 
this particular eco-label has become burdensome and expensive, even for committed 
environmental engineers and architects. This is because in its criteria it conditions or limits 
the type of  materials as well as its providers. Therefore, these materials even if  they are less 
toxic and are locally sourced (they make environmental sense) they have now  become much 
more expensive than their ‘unsustainable‘ counterparts. Furthermore, the fact that only a 
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74 http://www.lohas.com/Lohas-Consumer as seen on November 10, 2011
75 DG Competition Discussion Paper on the Application of Article 82 of the Treaty to Exclusionary Abuses, 
p. 54
handful of suppliers are accredited or approved allow  them to impose higher prices or 
restrict supply in some other manner. On the other hand, tying can have important pro-
competitive effects. In the same construction arena, eco-labels endorse local brands and 
materials, by recognising the superior environmental quality of their goods. Consequently, 
other providers may want to be endorsed by the eco-label so they may adapt their 
processes to obtain such endorsement. Additionally, the final eco-labelled buildings would be 
environmentally sound. 
The scenario of the construction eco-label, could be worsened if such eco-label were the 
only one in the (geographical) area. In Mexico for example, there most salient construction 
related eco-label is LEED, if  there are other options they do not play a significant role in the 
market. It can be argued that if  there were other construction eco-labels, other criteria sets 
would be established giving opportunity to more firms to engage in environmentally sound 
construction. Thus, committed environmentally-aware architects and engineers could seek 
other eco-labels to recognise and amplify their efforts.
4.4 Eco-labels and Bundling
Bundling refers to the practice of  selling two or more products together for a single price.76 
Tying and bundling are frequently used interchangeably. However, there is a slight 
difference. In bundling, the two or more products can be purchased separately or jointly (in a 
bundle), whereas in tying there is no such option. Eco-labels could be regarded as joint 
goods or bundled goods in the sense that they sell two goods: one private good and one 
public good. Contrarily to tying, both the private and public good can be acquired separately 
if desired. For example, shade-grown coffee, which is a coffee grown under the shelter of  the 
tropical forests rather than in the open (growing in the open leads to deforestation), provides 
important refuge for tropical biodiversity. Thus, the production of  shade-grown coffee has a 
joint product: the coffee and the conservation of biodiversity.77 The environmental benefits of 
eco-labels, such as biodiversity conservation, will be considered as an independent good: an 
environmental good.78 Consumers have the alternative of buying normal coffee and giving a 
donation to an environmental organisation that preserves wildlife in tropical countries. In this 
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76 Van den Bergh, Op. cit. p. 264
77 Mattew J. Kotchen. Green Markets and the Private Provision of Public Goods, p. 817
78 From this point of view, the environmental characteristic is a good by itself. In the previous analysis, the 
environmental benefit was not considered an independent good. 
sense, consumers can chose whether to consume the bundled good or to buy the two goods 
separately.
Among the pro-competitive effects of  bundling is that it reduces costs and/or increases the 
value of  the products by producing them together. For example, an NGO might not have the 
resources to produce environmental goods independently. Thus if  such good is incorporated 
into a firms production process it will make it easier and probably cheaper to produce. In 
addition, by bundling the environmental good with another good, it would allow  the latter to 
enter the market, as it will piggy-back from the other good until it is noticed and manages to 
create its own demand. These bundled or joint products need to be differentiated from the 
normal goods to create awareness. Eco-labels are used as the link between the normal 
good and the environmental good. 
The sort of  environmental goods that will likely to be provided by means of  a bundle are 
going to be biased to those environmental goods that consumers value the most (probably 
due to their popularity), and therefore will be more profitable for the seller. In addition, 
producers might only produce the environmental goods that are ‘easier’ to provide 
considering the accessibility and costs of production. This indicates that the environmental 
good that will be provided will not necessarily be the most socially valuable environmental 
good.79  In other words, the popular environmental problems will have more attention 
whereas other environmental problems, which are maybe even more critical will not have as 
much attention. 
4.4.1 Eco-labels as Impure Public goods
The aforementioned environmental good is essentially a public good. Public goods are non-
rival and non-excludable.80  Private goods (which are both rival and excludable) can be 
produced and exchanged through markets. Individual utility is maximized with the exchange 
and consumption of  these goods. For public goods the market mechanism does not operate 
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79 Mark Bagnoli and Susan G. Watts. Selling to Socially Responsible consumers: Competition and the 
Private Provision of Public Goods, MIT 2003, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Volume 12, 
Number 3, Fall 2003, 234-235
80 Excludability means that it is technologically feasible and economical for one person to exclude another from 
appropriating the benefits of a good once it has been produced. Contrarily, non-excludability implies an 
impossibility (physical or economical) to prevent other individuals from consuming the good. Rivalry implies that if  
one person consumes a particular unit of good it is no longer available for another person to consume. When the 
goods are non-excludable it implies that anyone the consumption of the good by one person does not limit the 
other’s consumption of such good. 
as smoothly as with private goods. Individuals are not willing to incur private costs to 
produce a non-excludable benefit. However, excludability may be achieved through legal 
and political instruments. Thus goods can stop being purely public and become a hybrid: an 
impure public good. Cornes and Sandler’s model impure public goods and they define it as a 
“commodity that generates both a public characteristic –a public good– and a private 
characteristic”. Taking the same shade grown coffee example, the consumer who buys the 
coffee enjoys the private benefits of  coffee but by consuming such coffee will jointly have a 
non-exclusive utility from the environmental improvements of the coffee’s production 
process. Eco-labelled products are a case of  impure public goods, as they bundle public 
attributes to private ones, thus creating excludability. With impure public goods, due to their 
excludability, the market switches to a quasi-conventional one as with private goods where 
environmental attributes (public goods) are provided as joint benefits. The purchase driver 
remains conventional private benefits and environmental attributes are bundled in the 
product. People purchase eco-friendly products because they enjoy the private attributes 
resulting from an environmentally friendly production. This works because consumers focus 
their attention on conventional and well known dimensions of the products attributes such as 
taste or performance. The environmental attributes will be credible because consumers use 
the verifiable attribute as an indicator of truthfulness.81
4.4.2 Eco-labels as impure public goods: effects
By analyzing eco-labels as a bundle that creates an impure public good, certain effects, that 
would otherwise go unnoticed, become evident. The most obvious effect is that costs and 
prices of  a product will increase. The most expected effect of eco-labelling is that it produces 
an environmental good (which is a public good). An eco-label would be considered effective 
as long as it produces more environmental good (less damage or no damage to the 
environment) than its competitors. Therefore, as long as eco-labels increase such 
production, it would be considered a positive outcome. On the other hand, when considering 
eco-labels as bundle a private and a public good there is also the risk that the failures that 
accompany public goods follow their fate. 
4.4.2.1  Prices and costs 
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81 Douadia Bougherara and Gilles Grolleau, Op. cit., p. 422
The most obvious effect of  bundling private and public goods is that they increase the costs 
of the provision of the private good. Bagnoli and Watts observe, that “when firms implicitly 
link provision of the public good to sales of the private good they offer, they voluntarily 
increase their fixed costs of providing the private good.” The costs of  producing the public 
good would be incorporated into the firms’ fixed costs, in other words it becomes more 
expensive to produce. Therefore it is crucial for the firm to use eco-labels to link the public 
and private goods; otherwise the cost of providing the public good, will simply reflect in a 
higher price. To be competitive, firms seek to lower production costs not to increase them, if 
they do increase the costs it is only if  it is believed that it will be profitable. Therefore, 
bundling must at least promise some profitable outcome if  firms are to engage in such 
strategies. Bagnoli and Watts overlooked that if  the eco-label is considered a bundle then 
there are two goods not one. It is true that the consumer will see a price higher than the 
private good alone, but this price is for both the private and the public good. It is not a mere 
increase in the private good’s fixed costs. There are two goods.
Bundling strategies are normally used as an effective way to implement price discrimination, 
as it attracts more consumers than the two goods sold separately. As a bundle, eco-labels 
have the potential to reach consumers that would be willing to buy both goods separately, 
but also those whose willingness to pay for the private good is relatively high, and therefore 
do not mind if the good comes with another good (the environmental benefit). Contrarily, 
other consumers who are willing to pay for an environmental good will do so, for a lower 
price and will additionally enjoy the private benefits of the product it was bundled with. 
Bundling, therefore targets consumers who are willing to pay for both goods separately, for 
those who are willing to pay more for a private good and those who are willing to participate 
in the provision of the public good. Bundling works precisely because consumers have 
different valuations on the goods, therefore, if the valuations are very different or even 
opposite, the consumer can always buy the individual good. Thus producers can reach all 
consumers making this strategy profitable, as long as the valuations among consumers are 
sufficiently different. 
Since consumer’s purchase of the private good increases the amount of  public good 
provided only marginally, this increased willingness to pay82 (hereinafter as WTP) must arise 
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82 In industrial organisation willingness to pay is understood as the reservation price. The reservation price is the 
highest price a consumer willing to pay for a good or service. 
from the consumer’s desire to participate in the provision of  a public good. Through the sale 
of the private good the firm can, at most capture only that part of a consumer’s willingness to 
pay for the public good that is associated with the consumer’s value of participating in the 
provision of the public good, and not the value of  the public good itself.”83 In other words, the 
price consumers pay for the provision of the public good is only a fraction of what the public 
good actually costs. The more bundled goods sold, the more public good can be provided.
4.4.2.2 Provision of the Public Good
One of the main purposes of  eco-labelling is to increase the provision of  the public good, i.e. 
improve environmental quality and promote sustainable development.84  Economists have 
done their part by showing under which market settings the provision of the public good is 
increased and how  it may be influenced. Bagnoli and Watts show  that it is possible to 
provide too much of the public good. They find that firms that offer an eco-labelled good face 
a trade-off between a more efficient provision of the private good and more efficient of  the 
public good. Specifically, they show  that in a fairly competitive market (Bertrand or price 
competition) it is more efficient to offer a private good and the public good separately. This is 
because the prices of the private good are sufficiently low, therefore if a producer were to 
offer a bundle with an environmental good, the price would go up. Consumers would 
presumably not buy the more expensive product, thus there would be undersupply of the 
environmental good. Contrarily, in a less competitive environment (Cournot or output 
competition) the provision of the public good would be higher. This is is because prices of 
the private good in this setting are already high, therefore introducing a bundle will 
encourage consumers to buy the bundle, which would lead to an increase supply of  the 
environmental good.85  Bagnoli and Watts clearly mention that there is an efficient level of 
public good that should be supplied and that it is possible that too much of  the public good is 
supplied. However, this can be easily contended in a practical setting in the sense, that 
many times the eco-labels pay back the producers with the ‘profits’ that are obtained. 
Furthermore, in the environmental and social settings, limiting the amount of  profits to an 
efficient level might be ‘efficient’ but not effective. On the other hand Kotchen calls these joint 
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83 Mark Bagnoli and Susan G. Watts. Op. cit.,p 428
84 It has been discussed in previous chapters that more empirical evidence is needed to determine whether eco-
labels do in fact improve the environment.
85 Mark Bagnoli and Susan G. Watts. Op. cit.
goods ‘green markets’, and shows that if  it is a simple bundle with no technological 
advantage it will lead to no difference of  public good output. Contrarily, if the joint product is 
achieved by using a green technology that compliments the private good, there will always 
be an increase in the supply of  the public good. Additionally, he suggests that “individuals in 
larger economies are less likely to make direct donations, choosing instead to provide 
environmental quality through consumption of the green good”. In other words in large 
economies, green markets crowd-out all direct donations, especially if the joint product is a 
substitute for the public good. In other words, if the joint good’s public good is a donation to 
an NGO, consumers will buy the joint product and stop making direct donations to the NGO. 
Therefore, the NGO’s actions are conditioned to the amount of people that buy the joint 
good. 
4.4.2.3 Public goods problems and eco-labels
When it comes to public goods, low  levels of  contributions are expected. This is mainly due 
to free-riding and the ‘sucker’s payoff’. The problem lies in the public’s (both consumers and 
producers) desire to participate in the provision of  the public good. It is simple to see that an 
increase in the number of individuals who are willing to contribute by buying or producing the 
joint product will increase aggregate provision of the public good. In other words, the more 
eco-labelled products are sold the more public good will be provided. However, at the same 
time, each contributor has a greater incentive to free-ride and therefore contributes less. 
Free-riding is an opportunistic behaviour where the individual seeks to consume more than 
its fair share of the public good. Since public goods are non-excludable and non-rival, the 
individual will enjoy the good regardless of  his contribution. Consequently, it is expected that 
individuals will not voluntary cooperate to the provision of  the public good. On the other 
hand, low  contribution to public goods can also be due to sucker’s payoff86  or outcome 
aversion. The sucker’s payoff  occurs when the individual contributes while the others defect. 
Therefore, individuals do not want to participate because they fear that they will be the only 
ones participating, making their contribution insufficient to provide the public good altogether. 
Contrarily to free-riding, sucker’s payoff  aversion is a priori and results from considering peer 
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86 The ‘strong [emphasis added] desire to avoid being a sucker’ is supported by an empirical regularity that ‘when 
a manipulation (…) has the effect of increasing the likelihood that the group’s goal will be achieved, subjects are 
more likely to cooperate’, See Douadia bougherara et al. (note below)
behaviour. In the end both free-riding and sucker’s payoff aversion have similar results: low 
contributions to the public good. 
The sucker’s payoff can be attenuated when there is an assurance mechanism that affects 
the individual’s expectations regarding the contributions of others.87  Therefore, if an 
individual can be assured that others will cooperate and that the risk of him being a ‘sucker’ 
is low  he will be more willing to cooperate. Following this idea it can be inferred that eco-
labels could be regarded as this assurance mechanism. It has already been determined that 
eco-labels are not empty environmental claims, they are complex environmental certification 
schemes. Additionally, if  we consider eco-labels as brands they would also depend on their 
reputation and salience. Therefore, if  the brand is salient and holds a good reputation within 
a market, it could be assumed that a significant number of consumers are buying the 
product, consequently the risk of  being a sucker is low. In essence, the eco-label’s salience 
assures the individual that he is not the only one contributing, hence consumers are unlikely 
to face a sucker’s payoff. The same applies to producers, in the sense that if  only one 
producer joins the eco-label, even if it has good intentions the environmental goal might not 
be met. However, if  there is more than one producer that complies with the eco-label the 
more likely the goal will be met. 
5. Eco-label pricing and price premiums
Eco-labels allow  concerned consumers to identify and reward firms for improving their 
environmental impact by paying higher prices for their goods. Under this premise, it is very 
attractive for producers to differentiate their goods with eco-labels because consumers are 
expected to pay a higher price for their good. Conversely, consumers are willing to pay a 
higher price because the eco-labelled good satisfies their environmental needs. In essence 
the eco-labelling mechanism is anchored on these ‘high’ prices or premiums88  that 
accompany the eco-label. Additionally, one of the most important incentives for firms to 
engage in eco-labelling is precisely the significant price premium, which would consequently 
render higher profits. However,  price premiums are not the same as profit premiums. A high 
price in a market does not necessarily signify that the firm is receiving ‘premium’ profits. To 
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87 Douadia Bougherara,et al,. Dealing with aversion to the sucker’s payoff in public good games.
88 The premium is the gap between a benchmark price (normally it is the average market price) and the actual 
price (price it is sold) of a given good.
obtain high profits a ‘sustainable’ firm has to observe prices, production costs, market size 
and long-term supply, like every other firm. 
It has been constantly pointed out, that not only consumers’ willingness to pay is modest 
(compared to premiums in other markets such as the organic foods market)89 but also the 
actual premium is quite small. “Some economists even deny that consumers are willing to 
pay any additional amount for a product that has general environmental benefits when 
compared with its competitor.”90 It is estimated that price premiums for eco-labelled goods 
are between 1 and 4%.91 This is a low  premium, especially when compared to the 15% that 
organic goods can be able to claim.92 On the other hand, some recent experiments have 
shown that if  the label does not come with a higher price, consumers will not buy the labelled 
good. In conclusion, the “circumstances under which eco-labels can command price-
premiums are not fully understood.”93  In order to understand and determine said 
circumstances, it is necessary to look what justifies the higher price and the effects it has on 
the market (supply and demand of the normal good). Prices influence consumers 
perceptions of the eco-labelled goods. In markets with information asymmetries and 
uncertainty, such as green-good markets, prices are used to communicate to consumers 
product quality, status or even market dynamics (such as product shortages or excess 
inventories). 
Eco-labels and certification have an effect on prices. There is no discussion regarding 
whether eco-labels should be able to hold a higher price than the normal products. There 
are several explanations to why this may be the case. What is concerning is that the 
literature talks about premiums and premium pricing strategies without justifying it over other 
pricing strategies. An explanation could be that managers normally use general rules of 
thumb when it comes to pricing; thus there is no clear data for academics to formulate a 
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89 As pointed out by Vangelis Vitalis (note below), ‘organic foods are perceived to have direct health benefits for 
the consumer, as well as having positive environmental impacts. These perceived health benefits may help 
explain the more substantial premiums the organic labelling industry attracts, when compered to other sectors”. 
90 Vangelis Vitalis, OECD. Round table on Sustainable Development. Private Voluntary Eco-labels: Trade 
Distorting, Discriminatory and Environmentally Disappointing, p. 7.
91 Vangelis Vitalis, OECD. Op. cit., p. 8.
92 Nonetheless, in strong competitive markets, this small premium might be enough to give eco-labelled goods an 
edge or sales advantage. Furthermore, even if small, there is some value for eco-labelled goods in the market 
and therefore there is potential interest from producers.
93 Magali Delmas and Neil Lessem, Eco-Premium or Eco-Penalty? Eco-labels, quality and knowledge in the 
organic wine market.
sound pricing theory. Specifically, the eco-label literature focuses on experiments that 
attempt to measure consumers’ willingness to pay to see whether there is a viable market for 
eco-labels or if  such premiums match the proposed willingness to pay. Therefore there is 
some anecdotal information collected but none of it is useful for managers that have to 
decide their pricing strategies. There is a large gap in the analysis of how  eco-labelled goods 
are priced and the effects of such prices. In order to fill this gap, industrial organisation and 
marketing might shed some light.
5.1 Pricing strategies for eco-labelled goods
Pricing is a challenge for any brand and its managers. There are no clear-cut guidelines for 
pricing, normally managers use general rules of  thumb that help them solve immediate 
issues without much theory behind their decisions. Managers are taught to deal with pricing 
in a linear manner, by isolating separate portions of  the pricing decision without looking into 
their interrelations. Because these modules or ‘steps’ are not deemed as interactive, they do 
not take into account specific market circumstances. This leads to a mismatch between 
consumers and producers, which in the end can lead to an inefficiency.94 Products can be 
over or under-priced which sends mixed signals into the market. In eco-label markets, the 
labels work with the prices to send the correct signals, therefore if  the signal is confusing, 
consumers will not trust the label. Consequently, they will not buy the good and the eco-label 
mechanism will fail. 
In theory market information should be correct, complete and accessible for all market 
actors. With this information firms could calculate prices based on their costs and the 
demand, so the price would reflect a market equilibrium. However, having complete, reliable 
and up-to-date internal information to calculate sophisticated pricing schemes is not realistic, 
considering many firms do not even compute basic break-even analysis. Larger firms might 
collect their own data and make sound pricing policies, whereas other smaller firms use 
rules of thumb to decide the price of their eco-labelled product. 
5.1.1 Mark-up Pricing and other strategies used in practice
Ideally, firms would use a market oriented pricing strategy, in which a price is based upon 
analysis and research compiled from the target market. In practice the most common 
II. Eco-labels’ place in the market
114
94 Charles R. Duke. Matching Appropriate Pricing Strategy with Markets and Objectives.
strategy is mark-up95  pricing. This method uses average costs as a base to then use the 
mark-up. This system has the reputation of  enhancing profitability and encouraging sales of 
volume products. However, this standard mark-up does not take into account demand, so it 
may penalize some products by putting too high a price on them and discourage sales. In 
addition average costing, which is the basis for a standard mark-up, can be misleading as 
costs (both fixed and variable) may change when demand is altered. Other methods such as 
target return pricing96  and simple break-even97  analysis are also flawed, as they are also 
based on total costs. If  costs was the decisive factor for setting prices, it is true that eco-
labels might enjoy higher prices. However, if the eco-label enjoys a higher price it is unlikely 
it is due to a standard mark-up.
5.1.2 Competitive and Product Line Pricing
It has been claimed earlier that eco-labels differentiate a product from other similar products. 
Because the eco-labelled good is a differentiated product it would be assumed that it would 
be reflected on the price. This is competitive pricing not differential pricing. Competitive 
pricing uses product prices to take advantage of  a competitive position that exists with 
respect to similar products. Conversely, differential pricing consists of  selling one product to 
different consumer segments at different prices. In essence the main difference is that 
differential pricing is with respect to the same product and competitive pricing is with respect 
to other similar, not identical, brands. On the other hand, product line pricing refers to the 
decisions single firms have to make regarding their sets of  similar products, i.e. the product 
lines. Larger multi-product firms might share product lines, therefore they enjoy economies 
of scale. In this case the average costs might be significantly reduced. The different products 
can target different consumers and prices will help consumers identify the rank of  the 
product, within the other products under the same brand. It is  an instance of intra-brand 
competition.  
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95 Mark-up is a sum of money (either a percentage or a fixed amount) added to the average cost of the product to 
create a profit.
96 This method identifies the price at which a product will be competitive in the market, the producer has to define 
the desired profit, and then they compute the target cost for the product by subtracting the expected profit from 
the competitive price. The product will be manufactured under this cost limit. 
97 Break-even, is the point at which cost or expenses and revenue are equal: there is no net loss or gain. Break-
even analysis, inserts different prices to obtain a number of breaking even points, one for each possible price. 
This alters the quantity of the good a firm has to sell to break even. Of course, the purpose is to profit, not to 
break-even, therefore the faster the company reaches a break-even point the more profits it can enjoy. 
5.1.2.1 Competitive Pricing Strategies: price signalling and reference pricing
Both price signalling and reference pricing relate to price-quality issues. Consumers value 
quality, even though information about information quality might be difficult or expensive to 
obtain. On the other hand, information about price is much simpler to acquire. If the only 
information about a product were its price, all goods would be search goods. Thus, 
consumer’s only indicator of quality would be prices. Although the previous statement is 
mere conjecture, in the consumers mind the relation is quite real: the higher the price, the 
better the product. Due to this belief, consumers often overpay to get the high quality they 
prefer. Reference pricing is a variant of price signalling, by which consumers compare prices 
between brands of the same product and uses them as a reference to determine the quality. 
Both the lower and the higher end of  the price scale might be left out of the market and a 
medium price will prevail, as it will be deemed the customary price.98  Reference pricing 
depends on consumers perceptions or the brand’s salience, therefore if a product is so 
widely distributed and easily available it may develop a customary price, which will become 
an absolute reference point. 
5.1.2.2 Product Line Pricing: Image pricing and premium pricing
In product line pricing, a firm must make decisions across a set of its own related products. 
By using prices firms can differentiate among their products according to their image or 
position. Firms take advantage of  market segments by pricing according to preferences, for 
example higher prices position the product as ‘high-end’ whereas lower prices give the 
image that the product is ‘generic’. Similarly, premium pricing addresses price-sensitive 
consumer demand differences by pricing substitutes at different levels (good, better, best). 
This premium price is artificial as it does not reflect the production costs, it is kept high to 
influence consumer perceptions. 
The eco-label literature does not go in depth with respect to pricing strategies. Though it is 
clear  after the brief  overview  of the relevant strategies, that the eco-label premium refers to 
a different, more general type of premium. Specifically, the premium is applied to all eco-
labelled products, not only those from firms that have a product line in which the eco-labelled 
good is just another version of the normal good. In fact, eco-label premiums are a 
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competitive price strategy, that signal that the good has an environmental quality that 
distinguishes it from the rest. Therefore, this eco-label premium is closer to a price signal 
than a position price. 
5.2 The Eco-Premium and the price-quality relation
Eco-labels are associated with changes in the production processes that result in superior 
environmental goods. It is accepted to pay a higher price for a high quality product. What is 
not clear is whether this high price is due to increased production costs or if it is a ‘premium’ 
per se.  In a broad sense a premium is the gap between a benchmark price (normally it is 
the average market price) and the actual price (price it is sold) of a given good. Premiums 
are usually higher than the average market price, though they can be negative too. In a strict 
sense, the premium is the sum added to certain goods to modify the consumer’s view  of the 
good, regardless of the quality or production costs. 
The premium in eco-labels serves two purposes: to provide information about the quality of 
the good as well as signalling its position. A higher price aids the eco-label (the mark) to 
signal that the good is superior to its competitors. At the same time, it reflects the higher 
production costs of  the eco-labelled good. For example, the Fairtrade Labelling Organization 
(FLO) divides the ‘sustainable production costs’ reflected in a ‘Fairtrade minimum price’ from 
the ‘Fairtrade Premium’. This Fairtrade minimum price “is the minimum price that a buyer of 
Fairtrade products has to pay to a producer’s organisation99 for their product. It is not a fixed 
price, but should be seen as the lowest possible starting point for price negotiations between 
producer and purchaser.”100 It is set following research into producers’ costs of sustainable 
production.101  The sustainable cost of production is based on information from the different 
production stages related to the establishment, operations, harvest and post harvest, 
transformation and/or processing, product preparation and/or packaging, central structure 
activities and export costs. The labour, inputs and investments from each stage are taken 
into account, and the average yield, representative of the producers organisation of that 
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99 It is easier and better for communities to certify as a whole rather than independently. Therefore, they form 
geographical organisations that ease costs and procedures.
100 http://www.fairtrade.org.uk/what_is_fairtrade/fairtrade_certification_and_the_fairtrade_mark/
the_fairtrade_minimum_price.aspx
101 When the market price is higher than the Fairtrade minimum,the buyer must pay the market price.
particular region (which is important as it provides a baseline).102  It is a thorough cost 
assessment, that aims at internalising costs that would normally be left outside the average 
cost function, and that would otherwise be considered as externalities. The minimum 
fairtrade price would therefore be the ‘real’ price, or at least close to it. This minimum price 
that is paid to the producer is also a safeguard in case of  scarcity. In addition to this fairtrade 
minimum price, there is the Fairtrade Premium. “The Fairtrade premium is a sum of money 
paid on top of the agreed Fairtrade price for investment in social, environmental or economic 
development projects.”103 The premium is established in the same way as the minimum price 
and remains unchanged, even if the producer is paid above the minimum price.104  By 
separating and clarifying the nature of  the fairtrade prices, consumers know  the price is 
going back to the producer.105  However, not all eco-labels have this clear definition, and 
many times it is unclear who keeps the premiums. 
5.2.1 Eco-premiums and production costs. 
Firms constantly seek to improve their bottom line106, that is to increase their net income. 
This can  be done by simultaneously growing revenues (by increasing gross sales) and 
increasing efficiency (or cutting costs). However, sustainable-oriented firms also consider 
environmental and social matters as they would economic ones. This is known as the triple 
bottom line or the three P’s that stand for ‘People - Planet - Profit’. When environmental and 
social matters are taken into consideration, keeping production costs low  stops being the 
priority. In other words, firms are expected to operate “in ways that secure long-term 
economic performance by avoiding short-term behaviour that is socially detrimental or 
environmentally wasteful.”107 Furthermore, it has constantly been argued that ‘sustainable’ 
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102 Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International (FLO), Guideline for Estimating Costs of Production 
(COSP), p. 7-8.
103 http:/livepage.apple.com/www.fairtrade.org.uk/what_is_fairtrade/
fairtrade_certification_and_the_fairtrade_mark/the_fairtrade_premium.aspx
104 The premium fund is typically invested in education and healthcare, farm improvements to increase yield and 
quality, or processing facilities to increase income.
105 A UN Food and Agriculture Organization report on the banana market shows that a premium can reach 
anywhere between 50% and 200%, however the premium paid to the farmer is only 37,5%. The greater part of 
the premium is kept by the retailer and other middle-persons, even if it is the farmer who takes on the cost of 
switching to the organic production. For complete report see: http://www.fao.org/docrep/meeting/x1149e.htm
106 Bottom line is a reference to the line at the bottom of a financial statement that shows the profit or balance. It 
is the ultimate or underlying criterion. In business it refers to the profit. 
107 Michael E. Porter and Mark R. Kramer. Strategy and Society: The Link Between Competitive Advantage 
and Corporate Social Responsibility,  p. 3. 
behaviour will increase production costs and that it would place them in a disadvantage in 
the marketplace. In essence it is expected that firms voluntarily increase the production 
costs, while their competitors lower them. However proponents of corporate responsibility 
claim that in the long haul, being sustainable is a better bet than keeping business as it is (or 
business as usual as the CSR literature calls it). However, a firm deciding whether to enter 
an eco-label (or any other sustainable endeavour) has to consider overall its profitability. The 
factors that directly determine profitability are yield, price and variable costs. In other words, 
premium prices alone are not always translated into positive profits.  
5.2.1.1 Production Costs
A company that is committed to improve their environmental bottom line, strives to reduce its 
ecological footprint by, carefully managing its consumption of  energy and non-renewables 
(such as water) and reducing waste. This might mean that firms will require new  ‘cleaner’ 
technology, which represents large investments, practice older more ‘traditional’ methods 
that are less harmful but more expensive and risky (think agriculture without pesticides, 
which is what organic agriculture is doing) or reduce the scale of  production to become more 
self-sustainable, in other words voluntarily reducing the yield. Other firms, that are in the 
extraction fields (such as fishing or logging) might do their part by harvesting only the 
necessary amount to avoid depleting the resource and reducing waste. By reducing the 
harvest, firms have less output, therefore the price has to be higher, otherwise it will have a 
loss. Furthermore, waste-management can be very costly, specially for certain sectors 
(chemicals, pharmaceuticals, oil), however they improve their impact by financing and 
handling their own waste, rather than leaving it to the government (which in the end is 
society through taxes) to take care of  it. It is expected that firms internalize all these 
environmental costs which clearly affects their production costs. All the reductions, 
constraints and investments will be reflected on the production costs. Consequently, firms 
pass-on these costs on to the price, so in the end consumers pay for these endeavours and 
the firm would somehow  recoup. However, recouping is not the same as earning ‘premium’ 
profits, it is a mere recovery of their investments. 
For example, in the early 1990s the United States, introduced the ‘doplhin safe’ policy, which 
increased the costs costs from $905 to $1,153 per ton, which represents a 30 percent 
increase. Heinz, one of the companies who promoted this policy, spent approximately 9.2 
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million dollars for the implementation of the ‘dolphin safe’ tuna eco-label. Additionally, after 
the policy was introduced the small private firms had to leave the market, most of  them at a 
loss, because they could not absorb the high costs of the environmental measure. Other 
larger firms had the capacity to find other less regulated oceans to fish. This investment was 
reflected in a higher price per can, which in hindsight proved that consumers were not that 
willing to pay for dolphin safety. 
5.2.1.2 Certification costs
Eco-labelled goods additionally face certification costs. These costs are different to the costs 
incurred in complying with the criteria, which would be part of the production costs. These 
are very real costs for both suppliers and producers: fees associated with auditing, 
certification and licensing, disregarding the time it takes to compile and report data. They are 
such large costs that it has been speculated that they deter small producers from joining the 
eco-labels.108  This is why eco-labels promote producer organisations in cooperatives or 
other forms so that they can cope with the costs collectively. 
The Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) has an annual fee for those producers (supply 
chain, retailers and food-services companies) who use the MSC eco-label. The fee is 
calculated on the total value of the MSC certified products sold during a financial year. 
Additionally, if  the product uses an eco-label on consumer facing products (packaging or 
menus) it would have to pay a royalty. The royalty is the .5% of the value of  the seafood 
sold.109  The MSC and other larger eco-labels have the resources to offer grants and other 
type of  support to those producers that are interested in certification but do not have the 
financial means to do so. Nevertheless, there are other eco-labels that face even harsher 
costs. For example, the U.S. Green Building Council’s Leadership in Energy and 
Environmental Design (LEED) programme has been in the spotlight due its high costs. 
LEED certification costs include the project registration fee: $450 for members and $600 for 
non-members. In addition there is the certification fee based on the size of the project and 
square footage: $1,750 to $17,500 for members to $2,250 to $22,500 for non-members. Not 
to mention the fees of the commissioning agent, which starts at about $15,000. All these 
without including extra costs such as consultants that help applicants through the whole 
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109 http://www.msc.org/get-certified/use-the-msc-ecolabel/costs#annual-fee
process and of  course the cost of sustainable materials and construction methods.110 These 
high costs may be useful in deterring the non-compliant producers, however it has also been 
argued that they deter the smaller producers, who are in many cases the same ones the 
eco-labels aim to address. 
5.2.1.3 Environmental Advantage. 
According to Porter and Kramer, sustainability can work in favour of a firm when its 
principles coincide with its economic or regulatory interests. They present the example of 
DuPont, who saved over $2 billion from reductions in energy use since 1990. McDonalds’s is 
another example, just by changing the materials they use to wrap their food, they reduced 
their solid waste by 30%. Columbia Credit Union in Vancouver, Washington, has the LEED 
Gold Certification for one of  its branches. According to the bank, the branch has used about 
half  the gas and electricity and 40 percent less water on average than comparable branches 
in the first year. As Porter and Kramer express, “these were smart business decisions 
entirely apart from their environmental benefits.”111  However, if  these results are 
representative of all the pro-environmental firms it is difficult to determine. However, what is 
true is that certain resources, such as oil and water, are becoming scarce and consequently 
expensive, therefore the firms who have invested in alternative energy sources will have 
lower costs, compared to the ‘traditional’ firms. Sustainable firms are likely to have an 
advantageous position in a near future, as other firms might be forced to switch technologies 
and make the investments the pro-environmental firms have done previously. 
5.2.2 Quality-Informational Premiums
As it was suggested earlier, with certain goods it is difficult to determine quality. This causes 
informational problems that could in turn lead to market failures. It has been suggested by 
Shapiro,  and others following his ideas, that high prices or premiums can be used to resolve 
informational matters. Specifically, “the size of  the premium increased with the degree of the 
informational problem, which in turn depends upon the frequency of  purchase, the delay and 
difficulty in detecting quality and the speed at which reputations are updated.”112  In 
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112 Luisa Menapace and Giancarlo Moschino, Op. cit., p. 1
equilibrium, quality exceeding the minimum commands a premium above marginal costs, 
which Shapiro represents as a fair return on the private investment in reputation.  
According to Shapiro, this premium can be viewed either as a return to reputation or as an 
incentive payment to induce quality maintenance. He notes that premiums for high quality 
products are like a taxes in that they open the gap between marginal production cost and 
price. This gap causes welfare losses relative to the full information outcome. However, the 
gap reflects the (information) costs associated with establishing reputation. Information costs 
are as real as production costs, therefore this gap is a cost due to imperfect information.113 
The premiums have the crucial role of inducing sellers to maintain the reputations, and the 
high-quality products. “Without premiums for high quality items, sellers would find that a fly-
by-night strategy of quality reduction would be profit maximizing." This strategy increases 
profits in the short run by reducing the quality of the products but maintaining the high-quality 
prices. This would yield immediate cost savings, and the reputation will not be harmed until 
later periods. Premiums in this case, induce firms to forego the opportunity to earn profits 
through quality reductions.
5.3 Effects of Eco-Premiums on the Market
In a market high prices can mean anything from high production costs, the presence of 
monopolies or other less-competitive market arrangements, low  supply and/or high demand, 
the presence of  patents, increasing input costs over the industry, or simply that the market 
has a high return on financial investments. To give an accurate picture of how  markets react 
to the introduction and interaction of  eco-labelled goods among other eco-labelled or normal 
goods would require targeted research. However, by taking into account simple 
microeconomic analysis some of the effects can be explained. For instance, it could explain 
why the presence of  premiums is not evident in the market or if  it is, why it is so small. In 
addition, empirical research can aid to obtain clearer (or murkier) picture of  what goes on in 
the market. For example, experiments have shown that high prices are crucial for 
consumers to identify the good as ‘better’, and consequently decide to purchase the good. It 
is a paradox, because theoretic economic analysis suggest that premiums are not 
sustainable in the long run, if they exist at all. At the same time, if  there is no price premium 
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consumers do not believe the eco-label and prefer not to buy. What’s more, is that for both 
arguments there is also empirical evidence to support it. To make the analysis complete, 
time lags have to be included, since markets are dynamic. Recently introduced eco-labelled 
products might enjoy a premium, but for a limited time. In the long run prices will stabilize, 
brand recognition and loyalty would have developed, and the newcomers will have a difficult 
time because the premiums might not be available anymore. However if  there is no price 
differential consumers, counter-intuitively, will stop buying the product. 
High prices (premiums) are a key for eco-labelled goods’ profitability. Nevertheless, 
premiums “...should always be considered in the context of long-term production costs and 
long-term prices. The evidence suggests that both short-term transition costs and short-term 
prices are higher than long-term averages.”114 However, even if  premiums are not sustained 
in the long-run they do exist in the short-term which maybe enough to recoup the 
investments and gain a competitive advantage, in addition to reputation and brand loyalty, 
which are valuable assets in the market. 
5.3.1 Prices in a segmented market. 
In markets where consumer segments already exist, price segmentation can be optimal. The 
difference between price discrimination and price segmentation, is that in the latter products 
differ in quality as well as in price. Theoretically, the production costs will differ among the 
segments, as the cheaper products will have lower quality and the high end products will 
have better quality. Nonetheless, environmental quality does not necessarily follow  this 
convention. For example, Skin Deep®, evaluates the relative safety of  personal care 
products, such as shampoos. The very worst, is also the most expensive of  the list.115 
Cosmetics are essentially chemicals, chemicals that might not only threaten health, but very 
likely to damage the environment. Therefore, high-end products are not necessarily the most 
environmental friendly. Consequently, eco-labelled goods premium prices do not signal high-
end quality, just different attributes that cater to a specific segment. It is very likely that for 
the consumers in the segment, such eco-labelled products have the high quality, 
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performance and status they seek. Keeping prices differentiated for each segment is key for 
consumers to identify the segment. 
The eco-labelled segment and the normal segment are all part of  the same market. The 
amount of  consumers in the market is a constant, what differs is their preferences. 
Therefore, if there is a change in demand in one segment, other segments will face the 
consequences. An increase in demand in the eco-labelled market, may lead to a) an over-
supply in the ‘normal’ good segment, which will make prices of normal goods to go down; 
and/or b) a temporary shortage of the eco-labelled good, which will temporarily rise prices. In 
the long run however, this shift will require producers from other segments to change to the 
eco-labelled segment or that the incumbent eco-label producers increase their output. 
Increasing the amount of output to satisfy demand will lead to lower prices, in the long-run. 
This might explain why real market data shows that if  differentiated products (such as eco-
labelled goods) do receive a differentiated price, it will still tend to be clustered around the 
average market price, i.e. the deviation will be quite small. Furthermore, if  the remaining 
normal market is small, prices might even increase due to the shortage. Therefore, overall 
prices might be higher in a market with an eco-label segment.116
5.3.2 Excessive demand for eco-labels and the effects in prices.
If there were an increase of demand for an eco-labelled good, it would immediately make 
prices go up. This is because even though supply has not changed, the good is now 
relatively scarce. As mentioned above, to satisfy demand eco-labelled goods must increase, 
either eco-labelled firms increase their output or normal firms can try obtain the eco-label.117 
This increase in output will place pressure on the prices which would eventually go down. 
However, if  prices go down then the price differential might not be large enough. As seen 
previously, without the price differential consumers might not identify the good as being 
environmentally superior. Therefore it might be worth considering not increasing the output 
and take advantage of the high demand by charging high prices. Eco-labelled producers 
would have an advantageous position, as they will enjoy high prices and have secure sales, 
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117 Changes in demand and supply are not immediate. If there is an increase in demand for eco-labelled goods, 
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as long as the conditions remain unchanged. This might mean that some consumers might 
be left out of the segment, but the environmental quality would be maintained. 
From a practical perspective, increasing supply of  the product might not always be possible. 
For example, the Forest Stewardship Council, which is one of  the oldest certification 
schemes, thus one of  the most recognized eco-labels. FSC has faced the dilemma that it 
cannot cover global demand for certified wood.118  FSC has received criticism precisely 
because it is one of the few  industries in which ‘large scale’ sustainability is expected. This 
pressure has led FSC to create new  labels such as the FSC Mixed Sources  label which 
indicates that the product is made from a mix of  FSC certified and non-certified (but 
controlled) sources. By mixing certified wood with other wood, the amount of eco-labelled 
good increases. While some environmentalists might find this deceiving, as not all the 
product is sources from certified wood, the main concern is that FSC is forced to lower its 
standards. By lowering its standards, more producers can become certified. However, these 
practices hinder the environmental objectives of  the eco-label. In addition, it can spur many 
‘empty’ environmental claims that would trick consumers into buying a non-certified good. 
Overall this leads to an increase in consumption, which even for sustainable goods should 
be limited. Academics have argued that the environmental improvement per unit of product 
is cancelled by a consumption increase. Consumers care about the environmental impact of 
their per unit consumption; therefore they do not compute the overall impact of their 
consumption.119,120  Not only do they not estimate their overall consumption, evidently they 
do not consider the impact of society. At some point even sustainable processes can 
become harmful to the environment.  
5.3.3 Over supply of eco-labels
Firms that decide to enter the eco-label market have to be aware that premiums might not 
always be available in all eco-labelled markets. Even if there is scope for premium pricing, 
there is a limited demand for these products, it is still a market segment, therefore new 
entrants might not be able to reap the benefits of  adopting the eco-label. If  the size of the 
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segment is overestimated, producers either lower prices or sell in the normal market. In 
2002-3 the median market price for Brazilian organic coffee was about three times higher 
than for conventional coffee. Many organic coffee growers could not place the coffee in the 
organic market and had to sell in the conventional market. In this case, the premiums 
existed, what happened is that there was an oversupply of the good. Therefore, it is not true 
that all certified products will have a price premium. It would be particularly difficult for new 
entrants, who will have to establish their reputation and make new  relations within the new 
market segment they entered. Only established eco-labels may have the capability of 
allocating their products, leaving excess to be sold in other markets. This solution might 
seem harsh for the producer who has to sell his good in the normal good market. The 
alternative is to lower the price of  ALL the eco-labelled goods, which would place all the 
segment at a loss. Furthermore, if  there are many producers, prices might be pushed below 
the market price, which would be detrimental for all. Therefore, if  faced with this particular 
situation, selling in the normal market is a reasonable solution, because even if  they cannot 
sell with a premium, they can still try to obtain a fair price and other eco-labels would not be 
affected. For consumers this scenario is no problem, as consumers that do not care for the 
environment would still buy the product as long as the price is within the normal range. 
If the situation ever arises, in which high demand were satisfied by many producers, 
eventually the high eco-label criteria would become the norm. At this point the bar should be 
raised as necessary to maintain the differential (of quality and prices). This might explain 
why eco-labels where envisioned as only 15% of the market. If  there are too many, the 
prices cannot be sustained.  
5.3.4 No price differential due to high prices for the normal goods 
Since the origins of eco-labels surveys constantly point out that the majority of consumers 
would prefer an eco-labelled good over a normal one, other things being equal. Other things 
being equal, normally refers to availability, quality (performance) and prices. It has been 
suggested that if the price differential is not significant, eco-labelled goods would be 
preferred over the similar ‘normal’ good. In 2002 a group of sociologists from the University 
of Michigan set an experiment with athletic socks, one labelled and one unlabelled 
(otherwise the socks were identical). The initial cost of  the socks was $1, just like the 
unlabelled socks (which served as the control group). The cost of  the labelled socks was to 
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be incremented by $.5 until it reached $1.40 and the researchers would measure the sales 
to spot consumers willingness to pay for the labelled good. One of  the most surprising 
results was that when prices of both types of socks were equal only 43 percent of 
consumers bought the labelled socks.121 This was a shock because it has been reported that 
at 75 percent of consumers are willing to buy ‘sustainable’ products if  they cost the same.122 
The price differential tells the consumer that the product is different and reinforces the 
credibility of the eco-label. In brief, high prices cannot be sustained in the long run and if 
there are no high prices consumers will not buy the product. 
Sedjo and Swallow  point out that if  there is no price differential, there is no incentive for the 
normal good producer to switch to the eco-label segment and face higher production costs 
and certification costs, when at least in the short run he can forgo those expenditures and 
sell at the same price. In the same line, marginal eco-label producers might return to the 
normal market and avoid the higher expenses of having the eco-label. Sedjo and Swallow 
suggest that same price scenario might be due to similar certification costs or production 
costs among the segments. Specifically, if  the regulatory environmental standard is high, it is 
not costly for firms to obtain the certification. Prices could be considerably high for both 
products. Consequently the prices between segments will not be very different.
It has to be clear to producers that premium prices do not equal premium profits. However, 
there needs to be a price differential for the differentiation of the segments. If  the price were 
similar in both segments, even by including all the production and certification costs the 
mechanism might not work. To solve this problem an artificial premium can be set, to 
distinguish the eco-labelled which would have the effects of a tax. Taxes will shift supply, 
making the product more expensive and it would reduce output. Alternately, certification 
costs can be increased, to deter opportunistic producers to change segments at their 
convenience. Furthermore, in the case of high regulatory standards, eco-labels should make 
their criteria even higher for their members. If adhering to the eco-label criteria were 
sufficiently costly, firms would not go back to the ‘normal’ segment. In an industry with high 
regulatory compliance costs, that has reasonably high environmental controls, voluntary 
The Law and Economics of Eco-labels
127
121 Hiscox and Smyth, Is there Consumer Demand for Improved Labor Standards? Evidence from Field 
Experiments in Social Product Labeling, p. 6-7
122 Other experiments have different results, Oregon State University researchers set an experiment at a Home 
Depot, eco-labelled items outsold the non-labelled goods two to one when prices where the same, but diminished 
when the prices increased. Example from Daniel Goleman, Op. cit., p 118.
eco-labels might not be appropriate, as producers will not seek to join the eco-label. 
However, if  the eco-label offered other non-financial incentives firms might still seek 
certification. These controls, might force to keep supply steady, even if some 
environmentally aware consumers are left out of the segment and forced to buy the normal 
good. Meanwhile in the normal good segment, the remaining producers might face losses as 
they face over-supply. However, if  there are enough consumers in the normal good market, 
and only a few  producers to cover the whole segment, prices might actually go up.123 This 
might mean that overall prices will be higher in markets with an eco-label segment.
5.4 Effects of eco-premiums on consumers
Consumers are an essential part of  the eco-labelling mechanism. At least some consumers 
must be willing to pay for eco-labelled goods. If  this is not the case, environmental 
improvements would go un-rewarded, and probably only happen if  required by law. At the 
core of the eco-labelling mechanism (or any other market transaction for that matter) is a 
willingness to pay124 (WTP) computation. Consumers calculate “the maximum amount of 
resources that they are willing to give up in exchange for the object being sold. The WTP 
computation is used to evaluate whether a proposed trade is beneficial.” Consumers have to 
be able to assign a WTP to the eco-labelled good that is proportionate to the benefits that it 
will give them. Otherwise they would end up paying a higher price than what it is actually 
worth to them.125Therefore, it is not how  much they are actually spending on the product, it 
measures the value of the eco-label in the consumers eyes. If consumers value the the pro-
environmental actions of firms, it will affect how  consumers make their purchasing decisions. 
It will determine and shape their behaviour. 
5.4.1 Effects of the eco-label on consumers beliefs
When a product holds an eco-label, consumer’s perception of the good is altered. The eco-
label shifts consumers beliefs of the product. The consumer believes that the eco-labelled 
good has more or less environmental attributes than it has in reality. Normally consumers 
think in absolute terms. Thus, if  the good has a positive trait the product as a whole is 
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perceived as good, and vice-versa, if  the good has even a single negative trait the entire 
product is bad. It is easier for consumers to equate small attributes to overall quality. 
Consumers use shortcuts or rules of thumb to make decisions, therefore they use simple 
and available cues to make decisions. If  information is too complicated the consumer will 
find a way to make it simple. For example, many consumers expect eco-labelled products to 
taste better than their normal versions. Taste in this case is observable; it is the private 
benefit of  the product, whereas the environmental benefit is not. Therefore taste becomes a 
proxy for the environmental benefit. Consumers, are more familiar with information about 
taste than they are about environmental characteristics. By translating the environmental 
characteristics into a familiar attribute, consumers are able to process the information 
easier.126 
Figure 6. Consumer perception of eco-labelled goods.127
In this figure C is the conventional product and E is the eco-labelled product. The eco-
labelled product E does have an environmental improvement, however the consumer 
perceives such improvement far bigger than it actually is. This phenomena also occurs with 
private benefits. Therefore from the consumers perspective he is actually consuming product 
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P rather than E.128  The eco-label influences consumers perception of the product. Hence, if 
the consumption experience is positive (or negative), the consumer’s beliefs about the 
product will be distorted in favour of  (or against) the eco-label. The experienced 
pleasantness (private benefit of consuming the good or experienced utility) should only 
depend on its intrinsic properties of the product. Intrinsic properties involve the physical 
composition of the product. Therefore, the pleasure of  consuming a good, such as a 
chocolate would depend only on its composition, therefore consuming any chocolate would 
be equally pleasurable (as long as the composition is the same). However, consumers’ 
experienced pleasantness is also influenced by extrinsic information about the good, i.e. the 
brand, knowledge about the product (such as its environmentally friendly attributes) and/or 
price. Personal factors such as the information or involvement consumers have about the 
product can further influence consumers perceived quality. There is behavioural evidence 
suggesting that manipulating knowledge about the good can affect experienced 
pleasantness. For example, knowledge of a beer’s ingredients and brand can affect reported 
taste quality and the reported enjoyment of a film is influenced about expectations about its 
quality (reviews or reputation of  its participants). Notwithstanding the previous, neuroscience 
has demonstrated that knowledge of a particular brand does increase activities in parts of 
the brain that suggest retrieval of  brand information during consumption experience.129 
Therefore, consumers’ expectations about a products quality make the products better or 
worse. These processes are important because they become an element of the consumers’ 
preferences. 
People tend to gather small pieces of  information (not all information) to make decisions. 
Eco-labels aid in this process as they reduce environmental information to a label. Even a 
single note of  positivity or negativity can bias the consumers decision process.130 Therefore 
marketing efforts all strive to make the consumer build expectations and have positive 
experiences of their products. Current experiences are registered by the brain and become 
available when faced with future similar decisions. Therefore to make good decisions in the 
future the brain has to carry out good measurements of the quality of  previous experiences. 
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The prior knowledge about quality of an experience becomes key information.131 Eco-label 
existence depends on a delicate equilibrium, one negative trait and the credibility of the label 
could be shattered, unless consumers have already developed strong beliefs about the eco-
label. New  information about the eco-label will be credited or discredited, contingent upon 
consumers’ previous beliefs or experience. If  the consumers beliefs are positive, based on 
their own experience, negative information will be ignored or discredited. This behaviour aids 
eco-labels persist even when negative information (rumours or facts) is available to 
consumers.  
5.4.2 Effects of prices on consumers beliefs
In an experiment set up by Hiscox and Smyth, they found that the effect of  the eco-label is 
magnified when it is accompanied by an increase in price. The experiment was located in an 
upscale Manhattan retail store132  which is known for supporting ‘ethical’ or sustainable 
causes. One British brand and one Italian brand of  towels were selected for the experiment. 
The British brand was selected to carry the ‘social’ label, whereas the Italian would remain 
equal, at a later stage of the experiment the roles were inverted. The prices of  the towels 
from both brands varied from $7 for a hand towel to $60 for a bath towel.133  A label was 
designed that read ‘Fair and Square’ in a rainbow  background with a lotus flower (which was 
normally used in the store to identify ‘sustainable’ products). In addition a small text was 
added to the sign that explained the meaning of the label. Besides the label, the prices of  the 
labelled towels were raised up to 20 percent, at different schedules. The experiment ran for 
five months divided in to phases with different experimental treatments. In the end, the data 
of the sales revealed that, in the second phase, when the towels were labelled the sales 
increased by 11.5 percent. In the following phases, when the prices where increased by 10% 
and then by 20% the effect “appears to have accentuated”, as it generated further increases 
of 20.6% and 4.3% respectively, in terms of  units sold. Besides, the 20 percent increase in 
sales when the price increase yielded a 62% sales jump.134,135 It has already been discussed 
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that external factors such as brand and knowledge influence consumers perceptions. What 
this experiment suggests is that the higher price on the eco-labelled product alters 
perception of the eco-label by making it more credible. 
The argument that consumers equate price and quality is not new. Consistently, empirical 
models have shown a positive correlation between prices and quality. The early conclusions 
were that this happened because consumers trusted that the forces of supply and demand 
would lead to a natural ‘ranking‘ of products on a price scale (Scitovsky, 1945). Other 
statistical evidence showed that there is a general strong positive correlation between prices 
and quality, that is statistically significant. However, it was noticed early-on that consumers 
have more information available about the product than just the price. Therefore, prices are 
only a part of the equation and studies then introduced other extrinsic or intrinsic cues such 
as brand or store name to their experiments. However, if  prices were the only information, 
without a doubt prices would be equated to quality. Nowadays, the price-quality argument 
has found new  support. By using neuro-imaging techniques  scientists now  can literally see 
how  people make decisions. Neuroeconomist Hilke Plassmann  suggests that that “prices 
shape an expectation, which then biases our experience and our purchasing decisions.”136 
In other words our brain, in a way to simplify complex informational processes simply 
equates price with quality. “A lower price lowers our expectations of a product and a higher 
one raises them.”137 Plassmann has carried out experiments on consumer decision making 
by wine tasting (because there is a wide range of prices and quality and is easy to give the 
sample while in the imaging machines). Subjects in the experiments are given different 
samples of wine. Much of the wine is identical, however the information the subjects receive 
about the price is modified. For example, subjects taste a wine thinking it is discount wine 
while in fact it is expensive, or vice-versa. The results show  a clear tendency of subjects 
disliking what they think is discount wine and liking the expensive one more, even if  it was 
the same wine. By using neuro-imaging Plassmann identified the parts of the brain that are 
activated when consumers have knowledge about the prices of  the wines. This particular 
experiment showed that after tasting the wine information is not processed in the part of the 
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brain where tastes are processed138  but in an area that is known for processing hedonic 
experiences.139  Plassmann concludes that “Price makes us feel a wine tastes better...but 
that is just a cognitive bias that arises from computations in the brain that tell me to expect it 
to be better, and then shape my experience so that it does, indeed, taste better.”140 Further 
research in this area could show  if  environmental attributes might have the same impact on 
the brain into making favourable decisions. 
6. Negative effects of Eco-labels
Eco-labelling is an environmental and market tool whose purpose is to incentivise markets to 
become more sustainable. The premise is that pro-environmental behaviour is going to be 
rewarded by the market. Consequently, firms that change their attitudes by becoming 
sustainable will reap the rewards. Consumers will fuel the mechanism because of their 
willingness to pay for such ‘green’ products. Consumers will be in charge of  rewarding or 
punishing the firms behaviour. As a result green markets have rapidly expanded over the last 
years. The value of these markets is estimated at $230 billion and is predicted to grow  to 
$845 billion by 2015.141 It comes with no surprise that along with the ‘greening’ of  markets 
came ‘green’ advertising. ‘Green’ advertising has increased almost tenfold in the last 20 
years and nearly tripled since 2006. Thus it is no surprise that greenwashing has grown 
simultaneously with the green markets. TerraChoice142 defines greenwashing as the “act of 
misleading consumers regarding the environmental practices of a company or the 
environmental benefits of a product or service”.143  In economic terms, greenwash are 
opportunistic behaviours firms undertake due to the informational failures144  in the 
environmental-good market.145  Greenwashers are the free-riders of the environmental 
market, as they reap the benefits without incurring any of  the costs. More informal 
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interpretations of greenwash add that such disinformation “is perceived as being unfounded 
or intentionally misleading”. In this sense, misleading is intentional, producers know  that the 
information is distorted, incomplete or simply false and they still disseminate it. Which is a 
different context from ‘unknown’ information, in which the information simply does not exist. 
Since 2007 TerraChoice has made annual reports on greenwash in the US and Canada. 
Their 2010 report found 79 percent more ‘green’146  products than in 2009. For their study 
4,744 products were registered as ‘green’, of which only 4.5 percent came through with their 
claims. In other terms 95 percent of the claims were misleading. Producers have incentives 
to misrepresent their processes if they can get away with it. If they can maintain minimum (or 
current) environmental performance but increase the prices anyway, they will do it. The more 
popular eco-labels become, more misleading claims will arise.147  This is quite a riddle, as 
eco-labels (seen as sustainable certification schemes) and other forms of corporate 
environmentalism are considered the root of  greenwashing whilst simultaneously being its 
solution.
6.1 Types of greenwashing
TerraChoice has identified the most common greenwashing strategies and has called them 
“the sins of greenwashing”. These ‘sins’ represent the most common ways that firms distort 
information. 
Sin of  hidden trade-off. These claims suggest that a product is green based on a 
narrow  set of attributes without attention to other environmental issues. In this case 
single-attribute environmental claims are constantly on the watch, especially if  they 
offer no proof. Eco-labels could help support the claim. 
Sin of no proof. These are claims that cannot be substantiated by easily accessible 
supporting information or by reliable third party certification. The proof does not need 
to be on the product, however the information should be available to the public. 
Sin of vagueness. This claim is so poorly defined or broad that its real meaning is 
likely to be misunderstood by the consumer. The use of fluffy language or 
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complicated scientific terms is no mistake, it is intended to confuse consumers. For 
example, the ‘all natural’ or ‘eco-friendly’ claims have no clear meanings. 
Sin of Worshipping false labels. This refers to fake labels. Products place a label that 
gives the impression of  third-party endorsement, where such endorsement does not 
exist. This ‘sin’ is currently on the rise according to the TerraChoice 2010 report.148
Sin of irrelevance. Claims that even if true are not important or are unhelpful for 
consumers. For example, the claim ‘CFC-free’149  might have been important in the 
1980s but today CFC’s are banned by law, therefore no product in the market 
contains it.
Sin of  Lesser of Two Evils. These claims might be true within a certain product 
category, however they distract consumers from the greater environmental impacts of 
the category as a whole. Organic cigarretes or fuel efficient sports cars, might be 
good examples of this sin. 
Sin of fibbing. False environmental claims. Products that falsely claim to be in a 
programme when they are not or simply make up attributes. This could extend to 
products that have lost their license (either it expired or bad conduct) and still use the 
labels.150 
The most common problems are ‘vagueness’ and ‘no proof’. In this aspect countries (in 
particular those with common-law  traditions) have responded with a wave of ‘green 
marketing’ regulations.151  However, eco-labels go beyond marketing since they are 
environmental certification schemes. While they might be a type of brand, their role in the 
market is much more transcendent. Because environmental claims (as in words, phrases or 
prefixes) are being slowly identified and regulated, firms have switched to the use of labels 
(logos, signs or images). More than 32% of products in  the TerraChoice’s report carried a 
fake label. These ‘green’-labels (made up, imitation or look-a- like labels) can be bought 
easily over the internet and printed on the product’s packaging. This increase in labels, 
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regardless if they are real or false can lead to a label overload, which leads to consumer 
indifference. 
6.2 Motivations for greenwashing
One of the reasons firms consider greenwashing is because there is external pressure on 
the firm to disclose its environmental information. It is deemed that firms have knowledge 
about their environmental impacts. They have first-hand information regarding their 
production processes and products. Therefore it is up to them to communicate such 
information. The generation of information can be costly for firms. However, once the 
information is produced, disseminating it is quite easy. If the environmental information about 
a firms performance is positive, the firm should have no problem making it public. However 
disclosing private information to the public (not governments), such as environmental 
performance (even if it is positive) is left to the firm’s discretion. However, if  the results of the 
environmental impact are uncertain or negative, firms would not like to disclose them to the 
public (competitors, consumers, investors, NGOs). Disclosing negative impacts would be 
very costly for firms, as they would earn a bad reputation. Notwithstanding the previous, in 
today’s market there is pressure to disclose environmental information. Governments, 
NGO’s, investors, consumers and industry pressure firms into disclosing their environmental 
information. Faced with this pressure producers have to decide weather to keep silent or 
disclose the information that is ‘not that bad’ and hide the rest. Lyon and Maxwell, conclude 
that “greenwash can be charachterized as the selective disclosure of  positive information 
about a company’s environmental or social performance, while withholding negative 
information on these dimensions.”152 This strategy can be very rewarding, especially if the 
information that is being disclosed is true and verifiable. Furthermore, as long as the firm 
does not draw  negative attention to itself by blending in the array of  environmental claims, it 
can safely navigate in the ‘green’ market.
The biggest motivation for greenwashing is that it is easy to get away with it. Because eco-
labels are currently considered ‘advertising’ and not certification schemes, their regulation 
remains uncertain153 and consequently lax. This “lax and uncertain regulatory environment is 
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both a direct and indirect driver of  greenwashing”.154  Not only there is limited (or no) 
regulation about green washing but its enforcement is extremely uncertain. Because it is a 
market mechanism, it is thought that the market will ‘punish’ the wrongdoers; therefore there 
is no need for regulation. This punishment would be in the form of reputational damage, 
such as boycotts or negative advertising campaign, or any other activity that damages the 
firm’s or brand’s value. A negative corporate image can be very damaging, however it is not 
enough to deter this behaviour. Moreover, firms are allowed to manipulate information not 
only to consumers, but also to the government. For example the US the Department of 
Energy’s Voluntary Greenhouse Reporting programme allows participants to choose to 
report emissions reductions at the ‘project’ level or the ‘entity’ level. The former allows firms 
to report only the outcomes of successful projects, while remaining silent about  its overall 
performance. It is not surprising that the data of  such programme shows that from 
1995-2003 the reported reductions of greenhouse gases of the participants was significantly 
reduced, but their actual emissions rose.155  This is precisely what makes environmental 
disclosure and eco-certification different from mere advertising. The distortion created by 
greenwashing has serious environmental externalities. The environmental effects will go 
unnoticed, precisely because the information is supposed to reflect the actions made to 
lessen such effects. 
6.3 Economics of Greenwashing
In the literature there are conflicting results regarding the relationship between voluntary 
disclosure and environmental performance. On the one side, some studies show  that firms 
with the worst environmental performance are those that also have the highest levels of 
disclosure. On the other side, there are studies that show  that firms with better 
environmental records have the highest environmental disclosure levels. In general firms’ 
environmental performance would fall along a spectrum that goes from low  environmental 
impact, which is considered to be ‘good’ or green. On the other side of  the spectrum are 
firms with high environmental impact which are considered ‘bad’ or brown. Firms know  at 
which point they stand within such spectrum. However, firms will have to decide whether to 
disclose their position and make the information public or to simply remain silent. This will 
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lead to four types of firms: greenwashing firms, silent brown firms, publicly green firms and 
silent green firms.  
                             Environmental Performance
Disclosure of 
Environmental
Performance
BAD GOOD
DISCLOSE i. 
Green washing 
firms
ii.
Publicly green 
firms
SILENT iii.
Silent brown firms
iv.
Silent green firms
Figure 7. Typology of Firms based on Environmental Disclosure156
In this case, silent firms have no problem. Since their activities are not ‘actively’ deceiving 
anyone.  Silent brown firms might face penalties before authorities for their bad 
performance, but the public will not condemn them for that. The attention will be on the firms 
that disclose their information. Because it is highly unlikely that brown firms voluntarily and 
publicly disclose their position, all the information is going to be positive. Therefore, all the 
environmental claims are expected to be positive claims. It is not to say that the claims are 
false, they might actually be true. The problem is that firms have selected what information 
to disclose, therefore they can mimic the green firms and obtain the benefits of such. By 
mimicking the green firms, these greenwashers will try to charge  the premiums and 
compete with the green firms. However, with so many green claims on the products, it would 
appear that there is sufficient supply (or maybe even over-supply) which will draw  prices 
down for all the ‘green’ products. If  the prices are too low, the real ‘green’ firms will loose 
their premiums, and might have to charge the normal prices. Making the ‘green’ strategy not 
very profitable for the truly green firm. Therefore the firm might leave the market or not join in 
the first place.  
6.3.1  The green washing model
Lyon and Maxwell have built an economic model for greenwashing.157  They suggest that 
before engaging in a greenwashing strategy firms will conduct a cost-benefit analysis of 
such strategy. The cost benefit ratio of greenwashing will be the result of dividing the 
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expected penalty of greenwash between the maximum value the firm could possibly obtain 
from a successful greenwashing strategy. When the expected penalty for greenwash is zero 
the cost-benefit ratio is also zero. In other words if there is no penalty for greenwashing the 
brown firm will always engage in greenwash. Contrarily, when the expected penalty rises to 
the amount that equals or exceeds the maximum value the firm could possibly obtain from 
greenwash, the cost-benefit ratio is then equal to one. In this case, because the firm is likely 
to get caught and penalised, the firm is likely to avoid greenwashing. Therefore, to deter 
greenwashing the probability of being caught and successfully punished must increase. It 
has been proposed that the role of  the ‘auditor’ who will catch and punish the greenwashing 
firm is an activist. According to this analysis, activist attacks always reduce greenwashing. 
However, increasing the probability of  getting caught and punished might lead to less 
disclosure. “There is a real possibility that the threat of public backlash for greenwash will 
cause some firms to ‘clam up’ rather than become more open and transparent.”  In addition, 
not all firms have a perfect environmental record; it is likely that their environmental 
performance is mixed. Therefore, firms might opt for withholding all information to avoid 
being punished for disclosing only positive results.158 
Many firms that engage in a form of  corporate environmentalism join a programme or adopt 
an Environmental Management System (EMS). Even though eco-labels are not an EMS per 
se, firms that have an eco-label must have a management system that allows them to track 
their environmental impacts. This is brought up because Lyon and Maxwell’s analysis leads 
to a new  rationale for encouraging firms to adopt EMSs. They acknowledge that EMS are 
unlikely to make a difference in the actual environmental performance. Nonetheless, EMS 
do improve internal information about the firm’s environmental performance. Therefore EMS 
complements the activities of the activists. Where strong EMS’s are in place the signals are 
very clear: if there is no disclosed information, the firm is hiding something. EMS produces 
information, therefore there is no excuse for not disclosing as the information is there. 
Consequently, activists could accurately target firms that have not disclosed their 
information.159 Eco-labels also require firms to have complete and current environmental and 
managerial information. Therefore, if firms do not provide this information the eco-label 
organisation can directly punish the noncompliant firm. Eco-labels would additionally act as 
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the ‘activist’ that audits and punished noncompliant firms. On the negative side, if being part 
of an eco-label or EMS will place a firm on the spotlight because the information is easily 
accessible, firms might prefer not to join the programmes and remain ‘ignorant’ about their 
performance. 
6.3.2 Game-theoretic approach to greenwashing
It has been suggested earlier that “a fly-by-night strategy of quality reduction would be profit 
maximising" if premiums do not compensate firm’s investments in quality.160 Premiums are 
supposed to be an incentive to maintain high quality. Therefore if  there are no premiums 
firms would reduce the quality and maintain the high quality price. This would be very 
profitable in the short-run and can be sustained as long as consumers do not detect it. 
However, in an environmental good market quality cannot be observed. If  the firm stops 
producing the environmental attributes, the market will take a long time to notice it, if  it does 
at all. Therefore, fly-by-night in an environmental good market would be very likely. However, 
pro-environmental firms have to invest many resources in becoming green. As seen earlier, 
becoming green is a long-term strategy. Consequently, the more investments a firm has 
undertaken to become green the less likely it will leave the environmental good market, at 
least not in the short run. Once again pro-environmental firms are not the problem, the 
problem are the greenwashing firms. 
Brown firms have not made any investments in ‘green’ production methods, therefore their 
costs are lower than their ‘green’ counterparts. However, because ‘green’ attributes are 
credence attributes there is no way consumers can verify if the attributes are present or not. 
The greenwashing firm would forego the costs altogether and by mimicking its green 
counterparts they will enter the ‘premium’ market. The greenwashing firm might reap the 
benefits of  being in this segment as long as it is not caught. This greenwashing strategy is 
even more profitable than fly-by-night as the firm does not spend anything in quality. It 
simply allocates itself  in the premium market and blends in. In a very simple example, period 
1 represents the normal quality. In period 2 the firm decides to engage in greenwashing 
which comes at no cost therefore the profits are enjoyed almost immediately. The firm will 
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continue to enjoy the profits until a period n when he gets caught and probably will be 
punished and maybe even have to leave the market. 
Period 1 Period 2 Period n
Cost 80 80 80
Price 90 100 100
Profit 10 20 0
Figure 8. Profits of greenwashing 
The longer firms extend the greenwashing strategy the higher the profits they can obtain. 
Simultaneously, the longer they maintain the greenwashing, the probabilities of been caught 
also increase. However, by mixing periods of  high quality with periods of low  quality the 
likelihood of being caught is diminished. This of course means that the investments in quality 
must be made every time the firm decides to increase quality. However, in practice that 
might not be feasible, as investments in ‘green’ technology for example are quite significant 
and once the firm has the technology, there is no sense for greenwashing. Still, instead of 
alternating periods of  increasing quality, firms could just invest the minimum they need to 
reap the benefits. In this sense, by mixing environmentally sound inputs with normal inputs 
of a product will allow it to ‘legitimately’ make the environmental claim, without all the costs. 
Brown
firm
Green firm Greenwashing 
Firm
Cost 
‘green’ input -- 80 40
Normal input 60 -- 30
Price 70 100 100
Profit 10 20 30
Figure 9. Compared profits of different types of firms
This has already been tried by firms such as Cadbury’s 161 in the ‘green palm oil’ incident.162 
Both firms have been heavily criticised for these strategies. The problem is that consumers 
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162 FSC mixed sources uses a similar strategy, but in their case it is not done for profits, it is done because there 
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because consumers do not see the difference. 
normally do not see the difference between a normal eco-label and a ‘mixed source’ eco-
label. Therefore consumers believe that they are consuming an ‘environmentally friendly’ 
product as a whole. Consumers do not like to find out ex-post that the product was actually 
just ‘half’ environmentally friendly. In any case, this shortcut can also be considered 
greenwash and will suffer from consumer backlash if it were uncovered.
6.4 The Harm of Greenwash
Eco-labels might be effective market and environmental tools. However, they stand on a 
delicate equilibrium as they are highly vulnerable to market failures. Consumers need to 
trust the eco-labels in order for them to pay a higher price their products. Greenwashing 
erodes consumer confidence on the eco-labelled products. Without consumer confidence 
the market for green products is greatly threatened. Additionally, greenwashing can also 
affect investor confidence, therefore eroding the entire socially responsible investing capital 
market. Firms might be able to fool consumers and investors. However, if  consumers and 
investors are aware of  the ongoing greenwashing they will be “discouraged to the point of 
indifference” towards eco-labelling. As long as there are no salient eco-labels that 
consumers can clearly distinguish and trust (brand-loyalty is developed), all labels will be 
tarred by the same brush as the fake ones. In this sense, if  one eco-label is deemed false 
consumers will stop trusting ALL unknown eco-labels. Surveys in both sides of the Atlantic 
share the concern that greenwash might destroy the green market. “Nine out of ten UK 
consumers are sceptical about green claims from Government or business.”163 Consumers 
do not know  what to believe and they want claims to be ‘backed up by verifiable proof’. “The 
situation is similar in the USA as seven in ten Americans either ‘strongly’ or ‘somewhat’ 
agree that ‘green’ is essentially a marketing tactic and therefore should not be trusted.”164 
This is serious, as the green markets (consequently ‘the’ green economy) depends on 
demand, but “greenwash leads consumers to distrust all green claims no matter how well 
justified they may be”.165
7. Conclusions
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This chapter has provided a thorough analysis of eco-labelling viewed from the perspective 
of the market as a whole. Other chapters will be focused on eco-labels from the supply and 
demand side specifically. Nonetheless, by analysing eco-labels from a market perspective it 
was shown that eco-label’s role is much more complex and important than simple 
information dissemination tools as they were once considered. First certification is crucial for 
the existence of markets of credence goods. Environmental attributes have a credence 
nature. Hence the only way they can have a market is if there is a certification mechanism 
that tells the market that such attributes are real. Moreover, environmental information is 
also uncertain, as it is possible that still there are many things that are not known about the 
environmental effects of goods. Hence, until such information becomes known the market 
for environmental goods will also be characterised by a high degree of  uncertainty. One of 
the largest implications of uncertain information is that it will make the ‘available’ information 
prone to interpretation (or misinterpretation). Hence the credence and uncertain nature of 
environmental goods leave them in a very delicate position. However, certification can solve 
this dilemma by providing a degree of  certainty in the market. Furthermore, it was shown 
that certification marks share some characteristics with trademarks. Hence, eco-labels may 
have a branding effect on the product. This branding effect, will allow  the use of  reputation to 
enhance the eco-label’s position in the market. 
The second finding, is that eco-labels are in fact certification marks from an IP perspective. 
This finding makes a big difference in the analysis as will be demonstrated in Chapters V 
and VI. What is interesting is that not many authors consider eco-labels as certification 
marks and those that do, are not lawyers hence they are not interested in how  they are 
regulated. On the other hand, legal scholars who analyse certification marks are not 
necessarily interested in the environmental arena. Therefore, this opens the possibility to 
address eco-labels as certification marks from an IP law  point of view. This will be the central 
subject of Chapter V.
The third finding is that there might not really be a ‘eco-premium’ for eco-labels; even though 
theoretically there should be. Pricing in eco-labelling is a puzzle. On the one hand, it was 
thought that one of  the main drivers for firms to engage in eco-labelling is that they will be 
able to charge a premium. However, data shows that such premium might not exist or it is 
too small. On the other hand, it has also been assumed that consumers will always prefer 
lower prices. Again, recent experiments show  that the opposite is true for eco-labelled 
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goods. If  a good has an eco-label the consumer will believe it more if  it has a higher price. 
This is because consumers relate price with quality (at a neurological level!). In addition, the 
underlying problem with environmental-good pricing, is that if it is true that pro-environmental 
behaviour will reduce costs (because resource allocation is more efficient) then the goods 
would be cheaper not more expensive. But if  they are priced cheaper then they are not 
believable. The pricing puzzle is still not solved, hence there is still room for further research 
from a variety of disciplines. 
Above all what this analysis has brought to the table is the analysis of  greenwashing. 
Greenwashing can be considered the greatest side-effect of  eco-labelling. Firms will want to 
obtain the benefits of eco-labels without committing to pro-environmental behaviours, hence 
they will cheat the market. It is extremely easy to cheat the eco-label market because it is a 
credence good market. However, with the presence of greenwashing the eco-labelled 
market are doomed to an adverse selection scenario, which may ultimately drive eco-labels 
out of  the market. This matter will be re-addressed in Chapter VI with the aim to find a 
solution.  
At this moment though, the analysis will shift to the supply side of  the market. Eco-labels are 
voluntary, hence it is intriguing to see that some firms go beyond their legal environmental 
obligations. Corporate Social Responsibility or Corporate Environmentalism have been 
widely used to describe an array of  pro-sustainability actions by firms. Pro-environmental 
activities are puzzling because it might not be true that they are profitable. This idea comes 
up precisely because price-premiums are thought to be the source of such profits, however it 
has been pointed out that such premiums might not really exist. Hence, it is not clear why 
being pro-environmental is profitable. In addition, if  it were true that pro-environmental 
actions were profitable the rational thing to do for all firms would be to become pro-
environmental. However, this is not the case. Hence the following chapter will try to discover 
what motivates firms to engage in this type of activities. 
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CHAPTER III
Eco-labels and Business
1. Introduction
The aim of  this chapter is to look into the firms’ motivation to join an eco-labelling scheme. 
To do this it is necessary to look into the firms motivations. In essence there are two main 
reasons a firm would do anything, either it is mandated by the law  or there is an economic 
benefit. If  the environmental actions are mandated by law, then the motives of  a firm are not 
really in question; it is obliged to follow. If it does not comply with regulations, it may receive 
a sanction by the authorities. The focus of this chapter is on the economic motivations or 
incentives firms have to undertake actions that could allow  them to join an eco-label (or 
engage in other forms of corporate environmentalism). Specifically, when these actions go 
above and beyond what is required by the law. The implementation of pro-environmental 
processes and methods, the certification and license to use an eco-label can be rather 
costly. Therefore, the firm must have very strong beliefs that such strategies will be 
beneficial in some way before committing to them. These ‘benefits’ are the ones that will be 
analysed in this chapter.
Pro-environmental (as well as pro-social behaviour) has been dealt with by the literature in 
Corporate Social Responsibility and that of  Sustainability. These two strands of literature, 
overlap in some points. However, there is a difference in the origin and the type of 
discussions they face. Sustainability literature is much more recent; it was spurred by the 
environmental movements of  the 1970s and then adopted as a global policy from the United 
Nations. In sustainability, when referring to actions undertaken by firms regarding the 
environment, it is known as corporate environmentalism. The main difference between CSR 
and corporate environmentalism is that the latter is regarded as a business strategy and not 
as ‘philanthropic‘ gesture such as CSR. Furthermore, corporate environmentalism, in this 
sense, is focused on environmentally beneficial actions whereas CSR actions’ range from 
human-rights, transparency (financial), conformity to legislation, taxes, product safety, social, 
labour and environmental matters. When a firm pursues any action beyond and above the 
legal requirements it can chose to communicate it or keep silent. If the firm decides to 
communicate its pro-environmental actions, it can use different tools, such as eco-labels. In 
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short, eco-labels are a tool of  both CSR and corporate environmentalism, it is just a matter 
of the context. 
This chapter analysis will be complemented by other disciplines. Pro-social and 
environmental behaviours have also been studied in psychology and other social and natural 
sciences. These other disciplines highlight different aspects of pro-environmental behaviour 
that can potentially be applied to firms. This interdisciplinary approach hopefully will lead to a 
better understanding of the incentives as well as the disincentives firms have to engage in 
eco-labelling. The chapter is divided in two main sections, the first will address Corporate 
Social Responsibility and corporate sustainability. The second part focuses on the 
corporation’s motivations for eco-labelling. 
2. The relation between Eco-labels and Corporate Social Responsibility
Traditional economics relies on the market to make use of  the individual’s pursuit of  self-
interest to the pursuit of efficiency. When the invisible hand leads to market failures the State 
would step in to correct them and redirect them to efficiency. Furthermore, markets will not 
distribute wealth and income accordingly to society’s needs. Therefore, the State should 
take these tasks into its hands and it does so by means of redistributive and environmental 
taxation as well as anti-trust or prudential regulation. “In a nutshell, following Pigou (1920), 
the state and not the citizens or firms, is in charge of correcting market failures and income 
or wealth inequality.”1 Nevertheless, the State can fail to redistribute the wealth in society. 
These market and redistributive failures have led society to pressure firms to undertake 
these activities that were supposed to be fulfilled by the state. Corporate Responsibility or 
CR is generally understood as firms taking on environmental and other social 
responsibilities, that would otherwise be in hands of the  State.
Corporate Responsibility has become somewhat of a ‘catch-all’ phrase from a variety of 
concepts. It embraces a wide range of  behaviour from being employee friendly, respectful of 
communities where firm’s plants are located, giving to charity (arts, universities and other 
causes), having good internal practices (audits, transparency, accessibility to information, 
taxes) and of course being environment-friendly. For all these activities to qualify as CR they 
have to go beyond the corporation’s immediate legal and contractual obligations. These 
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activities are costly and are borne (financially) entirely by the firm. Precisely because there is 
no obligation to make these expenses CR has been regarded as a sacrifice of profits in the 
social interest. 
2.1 The Different Views on Corporate Responsibility 
The concept of CR is not new. However, over time different it has been viewed and analysed 
from different stand-points. These views, do not contradict each other, therefore they can be 
regarded as layers, that have been formed over time, the first layer being the oldest view. 
The first view  or layer of  CR is closely related to corporate philanthropy, it is about giving 
back to the community because it is “the right thing to do”. This is the classic approach that 
has been severely criticised by people such as Milton Friedman.2 Despite those criticisms, 
today corporations allocate about 1% of pre-tax profits to ‘worthy causes’. 
In the 1980s there were several environmental disasters that left corporations’ behaviour 
exposed to the world. When bad behaviour is under scrutiny signing checks is no longer 
enough. Hence the second tier of CR became popular, which is related to risk management. 
With each disaster corporations’ reputation was negatively affected. Oil and other chemical 
companies were on the spotlight, but other sectors were also tarred with the same brush. 
Pharmaceutical companies were hit by refusing to make drugs available for developing 
countries, in particular with the costly HIV/AIDS medications. Clothing corporations were 
criticised due to their over-seas labour practices (child labour, under-payment, bad working 
conditions). Food companies were being held responsible for the world-wide obesity crisis. 
Corporations evidently tried (and still try) to manage the risks by talking to governments and 
NGOs. They created codes of conduct and other common rules designed to spread risk and 
shape opinion. It is in this stage that the original eco-labels appeared. 
While the previous views of CR prevail, the third, most recent, layer is the most common 
one: CR is just good business. It has been suggested that there is a business case for good 
corporate behaviour as it creates value. CR is viewed as a ‘Win-Win’ strategy or ‘doing well 
by doing good.’ Since the introduction of  this ‘strategic’ motivation for CR more companies 
are investing in CR strategies.3 This approach is very appealing to executives because CR is 
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Profits” which will be highlighted below.
3 The Economist, Special Report: Corporate Social Responsibility. Just Good Business, January 17th 2008. 
the smart thing to do as well as the right thing to do. However, if  CR were indeed profitable, 
all firms would engage in CR and there would be no need for discussion. The fact is that 
there is up to date no proof that engaging in CR leads to higher profits. 
A newer, and not very widespread view  is that CR “is an aspect of taking care of  a 
company’s reputation, managing its risks and gaining a competitive edge. This is what good 
managers ought to do anyway.”4  However, if  CR was boiled down to good management 
there would be no need for discussion. Furthermore, sustainable practices are slowly 
becoming part of  business as usual. Corporations that voluntarily adopt sustainability 
measures are considered “a distinct type of  modern corporation.” These new  corporations 
do not really care for CR because their governance structure already takes into account the 
environmental and social performance of the company, in addition to its financial 
performance.5  In the end this is the purpose of  CR, that it is so embedded in the 
corporation’s culture that it is not necessary to have ‘specific‘ discussions about it. For these 
companies what matters is their sustainable measures.     
2.2 Criticisms to CSR
As noted before corporate responsibility can be seen as a sacrifice of profits in the social 
interest.  It is precisely this view, that has spurred heated debates since the concept of 
Corporate Responsibility gained popularity. The most notorious critic was Milton Friedman.6 
Friedman explains that the only social responsibility of  business is to increase its profits. 
Profits are the purpose of businesses in society and those should be their sole responsibility. 
Just as schools and hospitals have a clear cut role in society, business should not confuse 
theirs. Business decisions are taken by corporate executives, who are agents to the 
corporation who is the principal. Therefore, corporate executives should act in the interests 
of the corporation, not society. Managers (especially in public firms) are not the owners of 
the firms they work for, they are mere agents. They are the agents to a principal, which in 
this case is the firm. They are entrusted with the care of assets belonging to others, the 
firm’s shareholders. Whatever these businessmen, as Friedman calls them, do in their 
private life, with their own resources, it is up to them. If  they decide to support good causes 
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with their own resources it would be admirable.7   However, supporting good causes with 
someone else’s money is not. Friedman relates this activity with theft; corporate executives 
that spend the corporations’ money on social causes are stealing from the shareholders. On 
the other hand if these actions are a reflection of the managerial or shareholder preferences 
and attitudes then this would not be a problem.8  Therefore, as long as shareholders are 
mandating these actions, and the by-laws allow it, managers are still within their obligations. 
This counter argument has spurred another line of  criticisms. Specifically, the claim that 
sustainability incentives distract managers to issues that are not core to the company’s 
overall strategy and business model. In addition, these companies might experience higher 
costs (by paying above minimum wages to workers or mitigating environmental externalities 
beyond the limits of  the law). These self-imposed values might also lead them to lower 
profits as they pass-on investment opportunities or other options that could be profitable. 
Furthermore, they might lose costumers to competitors due to their high prices. “In other 
words, companies with a culture of sustainability face tighter constraints in how  they behave. 
Since firms are trying to maximise profits subject to capacity constraints, tightening those 
constraints can lead to lower profits.”9 In the end  “a truly responsible business never loses 
sight of the commercial imperative. It is after all, by staying in business and providing 
products and services people want that firms do most good. If  ignoring CSR is risky, ignoring 
what makes business sense is a certain route to failure.”10  In short, when businesses 
constrain themselves they are in a disadvantage with respect to their competitors, just like a 
handicap. 
2.3 The Profitability of CR
The claim that companies can ‘do well by doing good’ has been more of a “management 
consultants’ promise of a ‘free lunch’” as it has not been elaborated and lacks supporting 
evidence.11  The claim has been based on the belief  that meeting the needs of  other 
stakeholders directly creates value for shareholders. In addition to the belief  that not meeting 
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the needs of other shareholders can destroy shareholder value due to boycotts, attracting 
less talented employees or be subject of government fines or other legal actions. 
The term CR has been traditionally linked to a sacrifice, as companies would give their 
money away without any reward. In 2001, David Baron introduced the term ‘stratigic CSR’. 
Strategic CSR “consists in taking a socially responsible stance in order to strengthen one’s 
market position and thereby increase long-term profits.”12 In other words, it allows CR to be 
profitable, thus eliminating the ‘sacrifice’ aspect. It is true that no corporation wants to be 
less profitable while simultaneously destroying the environment, however not destroying the 
environment while being profitable, is largely discussed. Exhaustive academic reviews over 
the last decades have concluded that there is “in fact a positive link between companies’ 
social and financial performance- but only a weak one. Firms are not richly rewarded for 
CSR, it seems, but nor does it typically destroy shareholder value.”13  In an interview  with 
analysts from Goldman Sachs they admit that they use CSR as a “proxy for the 
management of  companies relative to their peers.” In addition, they claim CR is a good 
indicator of long-term success.14 In concrete, firms that engage in CR activities might profit, 
but only in the long-run. 
In a recent study from the Harvard Business School analysed 180 US firms to measure 
whether if  being a ‘good corporate citizen’ had any impact on the firms’ bottom line. These 
180 firms were analysed over the course of 20 years to capture the ‘long-term’ effect. They 
compared the financial performance of firms that exhibited high sustainability behaviour 
against firms with low  sustainability behaviours (or simply traditional firms). The two groups 
at the time of  the matching (early or mid 1990s) were operating in exactly the same sectors, 
were almost identical in size, capital structure and operating performance. The high 
sustainability firms were first selected based on the environmental and social policies they 
implemented since the 1990s. Subsequently, they were matched with traditional or Low 
Sustainability firms, which have almost no sustainable policy in motion. The data shows that 
Sustainable firms, are fundamentally different from the traditional firms “with respect to their 
governance structure, the extent of stakeholder engagement, the extent of  long term 
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14  The Economist, Special Report: Corporate Social Responsibility. The next question: Does CSR work?. 
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orientation in corporate communications and investor base, and the measurement and 
disclosure of  non-financial information and metrics.”15 The main finding of  the study is that 
after tracking the corporate performance for 18 years “sustainable firms outperform 
traditional firms in terms of both stock market and accounting performance.”16  Moreover, 
“this out-performance is more pronounced for firms that sell products to individuals (i.e. 
Business-to-customer, or B2C companies), /probably because they/ compete on the basis of 
brands and reputation, and make substantial use of  natural resources.”17  However, this 
study only finds a correlation between sustainable firms and financial performance, it did not 
find causality. This means that it could be that these sustainable policies implemented 
almost 20 years ago, have made firms more profitable in the long run. Alternatively, it could 
mean that the firm that is more likely to adopt sustainable policies is also the firm that is 
more likely to be profitable in the first place. Which is also what the people at Goldman 
Sachs believe. Nonetheless, this analysis is one of the first reliable studies in the matter as it 
covers a long-term period. Hence it is safe to say that the saying that firms can do well by 
doing good is true.  
2.4 Corporate Responsibility and Eco-labels
It is expected that firms that seek to eco-label their goods do so because they have pro-
environmental activities in place. These pro-environmental or sustainable activities entitle 
them to seek certification to obtain such eco-label. Thus the eco-label simply communicates 
such pro-environmental behaviour to the market. It is expected that sustainable firms would 
enhance reliability and credibility of  their non-financial information to some form of objective, 
third-party audit or assurance. This is normal for financial reports; however, sustainable firms 
give greater importance to non-financial metrics. Accordingly, sustainable firms would be 
committed to having third-party verification of  their non-financial information. Nonetheless, 
according to the Harvard Business School study this is not the case. The data from such 
study suggests that only very few  sustainable firms have implemented the practice of 
measuring their performance on relevant external standards and programmes (only 16.3% 
of high sustainability firms do so, compared to the 2.7% of normal firms). The explanation 
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could be that there is not yet the technology to measure environmental impacts and other 
non-financial information. In addition, environmental reporting and auditing are still in the 
early stages and have only recently gained force. Furthermore, the eco-label criteria are still 
in the learning stage. Hence, it is unclear whether these criteria will be effective to face the 
environmental adversities, or if  it will just be good will.18 Despite the results of the Harvard 
Business School study regarding sustainable third-party verification, the numbers are not 
surprising. It has been estimated that only 15% of products in the market carry some type of 
eco-label, the study in question suggests that 16.2% of sustainable firms comply and 
measure according to relevant external standards and programmes. Therefore, it is not 
surprising, especially because not all firms will choose to communicate their pro-
environmental actions via eco-labelling.19
Eco-labelling is one of many communication tools firms use to signal their pro-environmental 
behaviour. There are other communication tools: they can invest in their own sustainable 
branding, they can commit to environmental reporting or the can choose to keep silence and 
not communicate their actions at all. In theory, all eco-labels will be on products that 
emanate from sustainable businesses. Furthermore, not all sustainable firms have products 
that go directly to the consumer. Eco-labels work best in consumer products as they are the 
targets of  this tool. Firms that do not sell to consumers directly, use other tools to 
communicate their sustainability. For example, it is shown that sustainable firms do use 
standards and certification when it comes to selecting and monitoring suppliers.20 
Corporate Responsibility and sustainability are not synonyms, as it has been established. 
However, a small part of  CR is focused on pro-environmental behaviour. Similarly, 
businesses have an important role in sustainability matters, which also focuses on 
environmental issues. Sustainability policies can be both mandatory and voluntary. 
Therefore, eco-labels are a tool that communicate the voluntary pro-environmental 
behaviours that firms are pursuing, whether they are doing it under the CR or Sustainability 
flag.
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 Figure 1. Overlap between Corporate Responsibility and Sustainability.21 
3. Corporations Motivations for Eco-labelling
At a very basic level there are two main reasons a firm does anything, either it is mandatory 
or there is an economic benefit to do it.22 If  there is an economic justification, there will be an 
incentive or motive for firms to voluntarily join an eco-label. Joining an eco-label is regarded 
as a pro-environmental action because it goes beyond the legal requirements. Pro-
environmental behaviour is achieved by improving the firm’s sustainability of operations and 
products or services. If  such improvements are in line with an eco-labelling scheme’s criteria, 
the firm could attempt to obtain such eco-label. The motivations firms have to engage in pro-
environmental behaviour have been divided into intrinsic, extrinsic and image rewards. Each 
of these motivations could independently explain why a firm would engage in costly pro-
environmental activity. At the same, time these three motivations also interact with one 
another, which may lead to unintended consequences. For example, when observing a pro-
environmental activity, the addition of extrinsic incentives makes it more difficult to see 
whether it is being done to do good or to do well. In other words, if  it is done to benefit the 
environment or oneself. Consequently, the reputation of the individual behaving pro-
environmentally can be damaged as he will be seen as greedy rather than good. 
3.1 Intrinsic Motivations
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“Intrinsic motivation is the value of giving per se, represented by private preferences for 
others’ well-being, such as pure altruism or other form of pro-social preferences.”23 In strict 
sense CR is driven by altruistic motives and is always unprofitable, therefore it is deemed as 
a profit sacrifice. Altruism is also considered a sacrifice, by benefiting others at one’s own 
expense. Therefore it is easy to relate CR with altruism. Being altruistic and behaving pro-
socially (or pro-environmentally) is often seen as “good”, whereas being selfish or greedy is 
not. However, behaving pro-environmentally does not necessarily mean that the individual is 
altruistic. Behaving in a pro-environmental manner implies acting in a way that benefits (or 
harms less) the environment, whereas being altruistic implies benefiting others at one’s own 
expense. Therefore, pro-environmental behaviour could be considered a type of  altruistic 
behaviour. However, in pure altruism the act is performed without expecting any 
compensation in return. Contrary to altruism, pro-environmentalism does pay-off (in theory), 
even if  it is at a later stage. Nonetheless, if altruism is taken in a broad sense, as just 
benefiting others at ones own expense, then pro-environmental behaviour is an altruistic-
type of act. 
3.1.1 Altruism and Corporations
From a rational economics perspective altruism is a theoretical ‘anomaly’ as it is not rational 
for the individual to sacrifice itself to benefit others. Altruism contradicts the basic 
assumption of traditional economics: economic actors are selfish and are motivated by 
greed. Altruism has been amply studied in biology and psychology, where though intriguing it 
is not abnormal. It is only until the recent development of the behavioural economics 
discipline that these traditional views have been questioned and tested. 
True altruistic acts are actually quite rare (for example, someone giving his life to save a 
stranger). However, altruistic-type behaviours are easily observed in organisms (both 
humans and animals and even corporations). Altruism by definition benefits others at the 
cost of depleting the giver’s resources needed for survival, reproduction or kin care.”24 This 
need to survive and reproduce is known in biology as fitness. Fitness is the base of 
evolutionary sciences (as in survival of the fittest). Therefore, when an animal sacrifices its 
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fitness to increase that of a peer, it is expected that in a future moment other peers would 
sacrifice fitness for it too. This is called reciprocal altruism, which may explain altruistic 
behaviours between kin and social allies. However, it does not explain altruistic acts 
between strangers or towards individuals that cannot reciprocate.25  Taking out the biological 
factor, it is still a fact that non-biological entities, such as corporations, do engage in pro-
environmental behaviour and spend considerable amount of resources in doing so.   
Corporations are the only non-human entities that have been granted legal person-hood. 
Due to this legal fiction corporations can enter contracts or own properties. The benefits of 
this person-hood extend even to basic legal and human rights. However, corporations are 
non-human entities, they are institutions not people. Corporations were created as a vehicle 
for building large pools of  capital to finance enterprises. The enterprise is financed by 
shareholders. Therefore corporations place the interests of the shareholders above all other 
interests. This obligation is mandated by law. Corporations are created to serve their 
shareholders. It is true that it can include other interests, as long as they do not go against 
the shareholders will.26 In other words, because Corporations are not human, they cannot be 
either rational or irrational. Furthermore, corporations do not have feelings, therefore they do 
not feel remorse, guilt or fear, consequently their decisions are not affected by emotions, as 
with humans. There are no psychologists for the corporation as it does not have a psyche. If 
a psychiatrist were to evaluate a corporation it would be diagnosed as a psychopath, as 
suggested by Joel Bakan. “The corporation is constituted to be profoundly self-interested, 
unconcerned with others, incapable of feeling guilt and remorse, criminal if  it can get away 
with it, disdainful of social conventions - the very definition of a psychopath. Another 
characteristic of human psychopaths is their ability to portray themselves as benevolent and 
charming”.27 Corporations need to be regarded as part of society, and they will spend money 
to polish their image and become compatible with social interests. I If  a firm where to show 
its true face in society it would be a scary beast. “A lot of money has been spent on 
generating an image of  the corporation as fundamentally benevolent and as capable of 
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actually caring about others.”28 It is no mistake that people place a ‘personality’ to brands; 
corporations invest money to appeal to the consumer. Nonetheless, this is part of  the 
corporation’s nature; it is their purpose. It is the society that feels deceived when it realises 
that the friendly corporation is taking away their income to make profits. Therefore, it needs 
portray itself as friendly, so it can continue with its activities. 
Corporations are not people. Milton Friedman made a clear point “A corporation is an 
artificial person and in this sense may have artificial responsibilities, but "business" as a 
whole cannot be said to have responsibilities, even in this vague sense.”29  A corporations’ 
sole responsibility is to make profits. Keeping in business and doing well is how  corporations 
fulfil their social role. A firm’s survival rate depends on its profitability. A fit firm is a profitable 
one. Therefore, considering corporations as altruistic in strict sense would be wrong, as it is 
against the firm’s nature to sacrifice profits on purpose, especially to benefit someone else. 
By describing the situation of  a cruise ship that could get out of its route to rescue a stranded 
boat, Landes and Posner argue that it is highly unlikely the cruise would stop. Altruistic acts 
by firms are normally “undertaken in a competitive market (...) the costs of altruism to the 
rescuer tend to be very great; the firms very survival may be at stake because altruism 
implies the bearing of uncompensated costs that a non-altruistic competitor would avoid. A 
closely related point is that altruism is not a trait with a positive survival value in a 
competitive market. On the contrary, competition will tend to weed out the altruistic seller, 
just as it tends out to weed out any other type of high-cost seller.”30 Therefore, firms cannot 
be altruistic in a strict sense. In a broad sense, it could be that corporations present 
altruistic-type behaviours, which are selfish by nature. These altruistic-type behaviours have 
different characteristics than pure altruism and they do not imply a ‘sacrifice’ in profits. On 
the contrary, if a firm does engage in a pro-environmental activity it is surely because it sees 
a profit opportunity. If  in the end the firm lost money to this pro-environmental endeavour it is 
more likely it was due to a mistake or miscalculation rather than a selfless act.  
3.1.2 Internal motivations for eco-labelling: profits
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Economic incentives associated with eco-labelling refer to the impact of eco-labels on profit 
margins and the predictability of  future revenues. The firms’ decision to obtain the eco-label 
should be regarded as an investment decision. As with any investment there is always a 
trade-off  between its rate of return and the predictability of profit. Therefore, a firm will 
always calculate its profit expectations before making an investment such as shifting 
production to obtain an eco-label. The impact of eco-labels on profit margins depends on the 
firm’s production costs and its prices. Eco-labels are supposed to enjoy a price premiums, 
which is arguably the main economic incentive for eco-labelling. Nonetheless, the availability 
of price premiums is not enough for a firm to base its decision to eco-label as it should also 
consider the predictability of future revenues. Future revenues are also related with 
production costs and prices, but it includes the characteristics of  future markets, specifically 
consumer’s willingness to pay in the future and the size and entry conditions of the 
environmental-good market.  
3.1.3 Long run profitability
Sustainable firms may outperform their traditional counterparts, as discussed previously, 
however “this outperformance occurs only on the long-term. Managers that are hoping to 
gain a competitive advantage in the short-term are unlikely to succeed by embedding 
sustainability in the organization’s strategy. Similarly, investors in High Sustainability firms 
must be patient ones.”31   This presents an issue, especially because businesses (and 
businessmen) in general do not think in the long-term. Businesses today are run based on 
short-termism. In essence, short-termism refers to an excessive focus on short-term results 
at the expense of long-term interests. 
Sustainability requires the adoption of a longer-term time horizon. However, short-termism is 
very well rooted in the business culture. First, monetary incentives often place more weight 
on short-term than on long-term performance. Second, decisions by boards and 
shareholders about whether to keep current management, change it or alter the scope of its 
activities are also necessarily based in part on recent observation. If manager’s rewards and 
even their jobs depend on their short-term performance, it is evident that managers will 
focus on the short-term. Furthermore, by pushing managers to make decisions that deliver 
short-term performance it is also likely that it comes at the expense of long-term value 
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creation. In this sense, focusing on the short-term may result in a failure to make the 
necessary strategic investments to ensure future profitability.32  In practice, short-termism 
often implies both an inter-temporal loss of  profit and an externality on stakeholders. That is, 
managers make decisions that increase short-term profit, but reduce shareholder value and 
hurt workers and other stakeholders.33 Short-termism is a vicious cycle. 
3.2 Extrinsic Motivations
Extrinsic motivations are another type of motivations firms may have to engage in pro-
environmental behaviour. “Extrinsic motivation is any material reward or benefit associated 
with giving, such as thank you gestures and tax breaks.”34 Receiving material rewards for 
pro-environmental behaviours is a sound motivation for firms. Governments, for instance, 
may use ‘incentive-based” regulations, in the form of  tax breaks or other material benefit, to 
achieve certain behaviours from individuals. These instruments are very popular as they are 
less restrictive than command and control regimes. “The State can impose either negative or 
positive taxes, or deploy grants and subsidies from the public purse. Thus not only can taxes 
be used to penalize polluters but rewards can be given for reductions in pollution or financial 
assistance can be given to those who build pollution-reducing mechanisms into their 
production or operational processes.”35  In this sense, if  firms received some type of  tax-
break or even financial aid due to its adhesion to the eco-label it would be a clear motivator. 
Extrinsic rewards can also be provided by private parties or even the market. For example a 
large multinational can include smaller cooperatives that have high pro-environmental 
standards into their supply chain or sign a long-term contract with them. These are also 
material rewards that can motivate firms to behave pro-environmentally. 
3.2.1 A Pigouvian tax or subsidy for eco-labels
Pro-environmental behaviour is considered a positive externality or an external benefit. 
Firms will at their own expense internalize the costs of their negative externalities until 
(eventually) they create positive externalities. From a piguovian perspective, taxes on 
pollution or other socially harmful behaviours should equal at least their net social cost; and 
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subsidies for pro-environmental behaviours should be set at their net social benefit.36 In this 
sense, eco-labelled products benefit the environment therefore firms should be 
compensated because it is doing a good thing for society, on the other hand if a firm pollutes 
it should be punished  (either through a tax or a fine). In theory, eco-labelled goods do 
receive a financial reward for their positive externalities: the price premium. This premium is 
paid by consumers at the time of purchase. One of  the functions of this premium is to 
compensate the firm for whatever pro-environmental action the producer of such good 
undertook. Therefore there is no need for an additional tax-break or subsidy from the 
government. If there were such governmental compensation in addition to the price-premium 
the firm would be doubly compensated for the same action. This would be a waste of 
resources. Furthermore, this government expenditure could be avoided altogether if  the 
price premium mechanism were strong, in the sense that it (as suggested by Pigou) at least 
equals the social benefit. Therefore, the firm could choose between an eco-label with a 
price-premium which would make it’s product more expensive or it could choose the eco-
label with a positive tax or a subsidy, with no price premium. Though it must be clear that the 
second option would come from public funds, which would make it an expensive alternative 
for the government, though the product would be cheaper in the market.
3.2.2 Intangible benefits
Sustainable firms have a long-term perspective which allows them to engage in certain 
practices that other firms cannot afford. They are willing to invest more time and resources in 
screening their suppliers and commercial partners. “Some producers have expressed a 
willingness to sacrifice a price premium for a longer-term supply contract. In some sectors 
such as coffee, a long term supply contract can greatly improve the lot of  the producer and 
therefore provide a powerful incentive to adopt an eco-label.”37 Unilever for example will not 
commit to a price-premium but will give a preference to suppliers of eco-labelled fish 
(specifically the Marine Stewardship Council eco-label). “This is also the concept behind the 
FSC Buyers Group. FSC certification helps a timber products company gain access to a 
‘members only’ procurement club.”38  For some producers, market access is much more 
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important than a price-premium. Eco-labels provide a structure under which these type of 
long-term commitments are assured. 
The downside of these intangible benefits is that the claims are purely anecdotal. “While 
there is a significant amount of  anecdotal evidence suggesting the increasing importance of 
procurement policies and preferred supplier contacts, and the theoretical underpinnings are 
sound, the data on which to base a more comprehensive policy analysis is inadequate.”39 In 
essence larger companies do receive certain intangible benefits by using eco-labels. 
Nonetheless, it is true that these firms’ influence through-out the supply networks are crucial. 
Their CR commitments motivate up-stream producers to change their practices and obtain 
certifications. By creating long-term contracts and preferential dealing they create external 
benefits for producers who would otherwise face tremendous uncertainty. Whether these 
benefits could actually motivate a firm or a producer to join in an eco-label might be feasible. 
However, it still needs to be documented and confirmed.
3.3 Reputation or image motivations for eco-labelling
Image or signalling motivations refer to an individual’s tendency to be motivated partly by 
others’ perceptions. Image motivation therefore captions the rule of opinion utility, i.e., the 
more the individual is liked and accepted the higher its utility. When individuals seek to gain 
social approval of their behaviour, they invest in actions that signal traits defined as “good” 
based on the community’s norms and values.40  There is no doubt that firms invest many 
resources in image management. How  the public perceives a corporation can increase or 
decrease a company’s value. Therefore, if  the environment is part of the community’s 
values, then engaging in pro-environmental behaviour signals to others that one is good. 
Furthermore, the eco-label serves as the signal that implies that the brand/firm behind the 
eco-labelled product is pro-environmental. However, if the community does not show  this 
environmental preference, the reception of  the signal would be quite low, and probably will 
not create as much value as in a pro-environmental community. 
There is ample evidence suggesting that individuals are more likely to behave in a pro-social 
manner when the act is public than when it is private. “The fact that most charitable 
donations are not anonymous and, indeed, that many donors seem quite avid to obtain 
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publicity for their gifts suggests that the desire for publicity or recognition is an important 
factor in charitable giving.”41  In fact only 1% of  the total number of donations are 
anonymous. Furthermore, contributions in philanthropy in the arts and education are 
normally ‘bunched’ above the cut-offs for each category. In this sense, if to obtain a 
recognition the minimum amount is ‘x’ the contributions are normally x or a little above, just 
enough to get the recognition. In the experimental field, for example, subjects in a standard 
dictator game42  are normally willing to sacrifice at least a small amount to benefit others, 
proving their altruistic traits. However, when the subjects are given the option to not know 
whether their actions affect others, they normally take advantage and behave more 
selfishly.43  In a laboratory setting  Griskevicious, Tybur and Van den Bergh show  that it is 
imperative to have an audience for the signals to work. When people are buying in a public 
setting they are more likely to buy a pro-environmental product over a luxury product. 
Whereas in a private setting, subjects preferred the luxury product. This shows that when 
actions go unobserved people behave more selfishly.44 Changing the visibility of the actions, 
changes the levels of pro-social behaviour. Image depends on visibility, and image is a 
consequence of what others think. For the signal to work there needs to be an audience for 
it who interprets the act (or the intention behind it) as altruistic, and uses this information to 
form a judgement about the giver. Ideally, they would pass on this information to multiple 
others in the form of  reputation.45  Therefore if  the image value from a pro-environmental 
behaviour is positive, increasing the number of  observers (by making it even more public) 
would lead to higher efforts and a higher value.46 
3.3.1 Reputation and Status
Reputation and status are not entirely economical by nature. Both reputation and status 
depend on what others believe about an individual. Believing is involuntary, therefore it 
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cannot be purchased.47 Status and reputation cannot be traded there is no market for them, 
however their presence affects markets. This is because they are forms of capital that are 
acquired indirectly (not purchased) and give the ‘holder’ certain advantages in different 
markets.48  The fact that they are capital goods, suggests that a change in them can alter 
subjective utility, even if though, objectively nothing changed.49 The main difference between 
status and reputation is that the status is hierarchical (it can be higher or lower); whereas 
reputation is good or bad, bigger or smaller, it is not a rank. Furthermore, reputation is a way 
to obtain status.50  In this sense, there is value in obtaining and maintaining a good 
reputation. The value of reputation could be a good motivator for firms to engage in pro-
environmental activities. 
Firms might seek to join an eco-label to increase their reputation and create a ‘green halo‘ 
for themselves. The halo effect or the halo error is “the idea that global evaluations about a 
person (e.g. she is likeable) bleed over into judgements about their specific traits (e.g. she is 
intelligent).”51 In other words, people’s general impressions or judgements about someone or 
something are likely to “spill over” to its specific traits. Hence, a green halo would be formed 
when pro-environmental behaviour spills over and creates the impression that such 
individual is ‘completely’ pro-environmental. Eco-labels, reinforce this halo effect by 
portraying the brands (or the firms) that carry eco-labels as entirely green. This is a cognitive 
bias because it is an illusion. This illusion, however, is valuable as it is how  the market 
portrays the eco-label that is going to give it value. In short, the green halo aids in building a 
green reputation. Firms with a green reputation, therefore, have a certain status within the 
market, that again could be of value for the firms. 
3.3.2 Status and Stigma
Stigma is the opposite of status. In the study of  social norms, there has been a large focus 
on stigma. Stigma is understood as the ‘negative’ label upon a perpetrator of a given social 
norm. In a way it can be understood as a ‘negative’ reputation. The importance of stigma is 
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that it has been proven that it can provide incentives for compliance. In criminal law, for 
instance, by stigmatising the offender it is possible to stigmatise the actual behaviour, hence 
it would have a deterrent effect. Faure and Escresa point out that “stigma could impose 
additional costs on the perpetrator which could hence amount to an additional penalty, in 
addition to the sanction which is formally imposed through the criminal legal system.”52 
Hence, if  stigma is the opposite of  status it can be inferred that status provides an additional 
reward for the ‘right-doer’. In other words having a positive environmental reputation such as 
a ‘green-halo’ or will create value.  There is plenty of  evidence suggesting that corporate 
misbehaviour in environmental arena or other arenas will lead to a decrease in market value. 
Hence the ‘reputation effect’ can be traced for negative acts, hence the ‘stigmatization’ is 
clear. However, the opposite effect, which would be named the ‘status effect’ has not been 
found (due to inconclusiveness). Again, this opens the scope for further research on the 
matter. Specifically, this effect has been studied in different disciplines, which will be 
addressed below. However, law  and economics have not yet focused  on the possible 
effects of ‘over-compliance’ on social norms. This means that just like stigma can aid in the 
shaping of  social norms by deterring wrong-doings, status can do the same. With the 
difference that instead of  having a deterring effect, they might provide a compliance-type 
incentive. 
3.3.3 Competitive altruism and costly signalling
It has been previously discussed that firms are not altruistic. If  altruism were considered a 
sacrifice in profits to benefit others, as it has traditionally been considered, discussions 
would tend to be very short. However, firms do engage in pro-environmental behaviour 
which is an altruistic-type of behaviour. In this sense, firms invest in acts that benefit the 
public good at their own expense. By equalising pro-environmental behaviour with altruism, 
it can explain why firms act like they sometimes do.  
Being regarded as altruistic can lead to status. Status is in other terms a rank that confers 
certain benefits to those that have it. Therefore individuals will compete with each other to 
obtain such status. When individuals “compete for status by trying to be seen as relatively 
more altruistic”53  it is deemed competitive altruism. Competitive altruism is different from 
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standard notions of altruism as it is self-interested in the traditional sense. A competitive 
altruist contributes to the public good in order to attain status that can generate economic 
rewards and intrinsic value. It is a practice that occurs both in the animal world and in the 
human world. 
When these ‘altruistic’ actions are executed to seek a higher ranking within the group, the 
quality of  the signal becomes important. For the signal to be valuable it should be costly. 
“Because altruism is by definition costly, altruism is particularly likely to have evolved into an 
honest signal.”54  Altruism just like pro-environmental behaviour signals resources. By 
engaging in costly altruism, people signal that they can afford to help others rather than 
themselves. In the same sense firms signal that they can afford to increase their costs, while 
still remaining profitable. This signals that the individual has sufficient time, energy, money 
and resources to manage to give away such resources without negative impact on its fitness 
(profitability, in the case of firms). In Biology incurring in costly behaviour or even developing 
physical features is called “the handicap principle”. These behaviours or attributes develop 
because they are naturally reliable signals. Zahavi & Zahavi named it after observing how 
“organisms sometimes engage in self-handicapping acts as a way of signalling honest 
information about themselves. The peacock’s tail is often cited as an example, because 
having a long and colourful tail is extremely costly for the animal as it makes it difficult to 
move around and escape predation.”55 In addition these features are very difficult to imitate if 
they do not have the good genes to grow  such an ornament. The reward of course is that 
they will have more opportunities to be selected as a mate from their female counterparts. If 
this example is translated to eco-labelling, eco-labelling should be costly enough to show  the 
commitment to pro-environmental behaviour. Therefore eco-labels are costly signals that 
allow  the holders to access markets or form alliances that would strengthen their position 
within the market.  
Having an altruistic or pro-environmental behaviour has to have long-term benefits for the 
individual otherwise it would not be worth it. It has been suggested that access to coalitions 
could be one such benefit. In Biology it has been observed that “while cheaters and non-
reciprocators are at risk of being increasingly ostracised from groups, altruists are in huge 
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demand as coalition partners in future social exchanges like sharing food. Some altruists 
recoup their actions by increasing their attractiveness as a mate, thus being able to attract 
more and better sexual partners.”56 As the case of the peacock. Furthermore it has been 
suggested that groups with altruists perform better in competitions than groups with less 
altruists.57 
3.3.4 Conspicuous conservation
Conspicuous conservation is a term taken from “conspicuous” acts and conservation as in 
the pro-environmental attitudes. In economics, conspicuous behaviour has been studied in 
the terms of consumption. Veblen explained how  consumption in excess of the subsistence 
minimum is characteristic of  high-class. However, when consuming in excess became 
common (as the industrial revolution made consumables more accessible to all the 
population) consuming expensive or exotic food or wine was not enough. As wealth 
accumulated, people started to show-off their wealth and power by consuming goods that 
were costly and unproductive (or unnecessary, such as the peacock tail).58  “In order to 
effectually mend the consumer's good fame it must be an expenditure of superfluities. In 
order to be reputable it must be wasteful. No merit would accrue from the consumption of 
the bare necessaries of  life.”59 With no doubt certain conspicuous behaviour can be socially 
wasteful. However, if the object of the behaviour were to have social or environmental 
benefits, then even conspicuous behaviour would be positive and it would not be wasteful.60 
Today’s heightened concern about environmental damage and climate change has led to 
costly private contributions (both from corporations and individuals) to environmental 
conservation. Sexton and Sexton suggest that environmental conservation acts confer 
status to the ‘right-doers’ that was once afforded only through ostentatious displays of 
wastefulness (or conspicuousness).61 It is their hypothesis that individuals undertake costly 
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actions in order to signal their type as environmentally friendly or ‘green’. This leads to 
actions that while still being good for the environment (such as installing solar panels), are 
not used as effectively, as they are used strategically so that their peers can observe and not 
in the way the environment would be most benefited (for example, installing such panels 
facing the streets or where the others can see, which is not were the sun shines the most). 
The difference with conspicuous conservation compared to other conspicuous acts is that 
these acts are not wasteful as they do create environmental benefits.
In their paper, the Sextons analyse the case of the Prius (from Toyota) which is a hybrid car 
with a very particular design. The US market of hybrid cars is composed of 24 models and 
the Prius has 48% of the market. The main difference between the different hybrids is not 
the environmental performance, but the fact that the other cars look like an average car; it is 
only possible to tell they are hybrids because of a small badge that says so. The Prius 
design makes it very easy to identify, therefore it is “the most powerful signal of the owner’s 
affinity for the environment of any vehicle in the U.S.”62  Their results show  that “private 
provision of environmental preservation need not rely on altruism in the traditional sense, but 
can be achieved by those with traditional neo-classical utility functions who seek economic 
and non-economic returns from status achieved by signalling “green” type.”63 In other words, 
conspicuous conservation is rewarded in the reputation and status gained among peers. The 
‘green’ signal is only valuable when peers are also concerned about the environment. 
Therefore it is expected to find more Prius’ in areas where environmental concern is high, 
and other type of cars such as Hummers in other areas where the environment is not part of 
the values. The Sextons use political ideology as a proxy for environmental concerns as 
these two are highly correlated. In the U.S. Republicans are less concerned with the 
environment than Democrats. For example, communities with more registered Democrat 
party members are home to more Priuses., whereas communities with more Republicans 
have more Hummers.64 This clustering of Priuses, increases the halo effect, not only of  the 
owner of  the Prius but also of all the community. Therefore, these signals are very valuable 
in communities that care about their ‘green’ reputation. 
III. Eco-labels and Business
166
62 Idem, p, 2.
63 Idem, p, 3.
64 Idem, p, 7.
3.4 Interaction between the incentives
Individually intrinsic, extrinsic and image incentives could be enough to trigger pro-
environmental behaviour. Eco-labels could potentially aid firms reap the benefits of  pro-
environmental behaviour by allowing the product to have a price-premium, which 
theoretically can lead to increased profits. Furthermore, by joining an eco-label there is the 
possibility of creating a green-halo to the firm’s image, which in turn benefits the firm’s 
reputation and increases its status. These firms will have access to niches and will have 
preferential treatment that normal firms do not have. It is intuitive to believe that if intrinsic 
and extrinsic incentives work well separately, together they might potentialize the incentives. 
However, it has been shown that this might not occur. On the contrary, the interaction of 
these incentives might have undesirable consequences. 
3.4.1. Crowding out effects of material incentives
By following  one of the most fundamental economic principles it can be assumed that 
raising monetary incentives will increase supply. However, this is not always the case, under 
some circumstances the contrary occurs: by using material incentives supply shrinks. This is 
known as the crowding out effect. Crowding theory suggests that when there is a systematic 
interaction of  extrinsic and intrinsic motivation it is possible that the latter is altered. 
Economic theory usually only considers extrinsic motivations (monetary incentives such as 
tax benefits or subsidies). Psychology on the other hand emphasizes the internal 
motivations. If external motivation raises intrinsic motivation, then the benefit will be 
increased; this would lead to a crowding-in effect.  In contrast when the external motivation 
undermines intrinsic motivations it affects the agents’ marginal benefit from performing, thus 
it reduces the performance level. External interventions crowd-out intrinsic motivation if  the 
individuals affected perceive them to be controlling. In that case, both self-determination and 
self-esteem suffer, and the individuals react by reducing their intrinsic motivation in the 
activity controlled. External interventions crowd-in intrinsic motivation if the individuals 
perceive it as supportive. In that case self-esteem is fostered, and individuals feel that they 
are given more freedom, thus enlarging self-determination.65 
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Notwithstanding the above explanation, it is incomplete as it does not consider image or 
reputation concerns. As seen above, how  others perceive the individual alters its value as 
well as its motivations. With this third element, the crowding effects do not necessarily 
correspond to the previous predictions. Tirole and Benabou point out that when image 
concerns are high, “an unusual phenomenon occurs over some interval, the supply 
response to incentives flattens out, and eventually becomes downward-sloping.” This 
violation of  basic price theory results from what psychologists call the over justification effect, 
and economists call a signal extraction problem. When there is little to no reward, a pro-
social act is interpreted as genuine altruism. In the same manner firms that voluntarily 
engage in eco-labelling create a ‘green halo’ for themselves which is interpreted as ‘good’. 
By introducing substantial material incentives it becomes difficult to interpret or extract the 
signal of  the pro-environmental act. This changes the ‘meaning’ or intention of  the act. 
Therefore the value of the signal (of the pro-environmental attitude) is weakened, offsetting 
or even reversing the direct effect of  the material incentive. This means that instead of 
looking pro-environmental the individual might just look greedy as he wants to take 
advantage of the material rewards. 
3.4.2 Interaction of Private incentives with Image rewards.
Individuals value the ‘green halo’, the more the others think of him as a pro-environmentalist, 
the greater is the image value of the pro-environmental acts or signals (such as the eco-
label). However, it has been observed that when private monetary incentives are introduced 
instead of observing an increase in pro-environmental (pro-social) acts there is actually a 
decrease. Private monetary incentives partially crowd-out image motivations. In other words, 
when the image of being pro-environmental is valuable already, individuals will make an 
effort to be perceived as pro-environmental. When monetary incentives are introduced, the 
pro-environmental acts will be publicly rewarded, not with reputation but with money. 
Therefore the intentions of the pro-environmental will be blurred: is he pro-environmental 
because he is committed to the environment or is he just looking for the monetary rewards? 
Engaging in pro-environmental acts to receive extrinsic rewards lowers the image value of 
the activity.66 Therefore there will be less effort in engaging in pro-environmental activities in 
the presence of extrinsic rewards. However, the interaction only occurs when the extrinsic 
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reward is made public. Publicity of these rewards reduces the image motivation. Hence the 
more publicity the less effective is the reward. For example, if  a firm where to engage in pro-
environmental activities but does not communicate them to the rest of the market, i.e., it 
keeps them private, and there is a tax-break for doing so, it would not matter because the 
pro-environmental act is private. However, if the firm engaged in those pro-environmental 
acts made them public by means of an eco-label, and additionally received tax breaks, the 
value of the eco-label as a signal would be diminished. Ariely et al, to explain this behaviour 
suggest that “extrinsic rewards are less effective the greater the visibility of  the pro-social 
act.” This implies that the detrimental effect of  extrinsic incentives is more likely to occur for a 
visible pro-environmental effort than for a private one.”67 Eco-labels give publicity or visibility 
to the firm’s pro-environmental acts. Therefore, granting additional rewards for eco-labelled 
goods might not be a good strategy as the eco-label’s benefit is mainly reputational. 
Taking into account this phenomena, it is plausible that this is the reason public eco-labels 
are not as welcome in the market as private eco-labels. Government sponsored eco-labels 
are basically the same as private ones, with the difference that the organization behind it is 
the government, not an NGO or other private entity. Many countries, and even the European 
Union have their own eco-label, however, these are not very popular (at least not for 
consumer goods). Consumers when they observe these ‘official’ logos do not know  if it 
represents a regulation that all products have to observe or if  it is voluntary. Therefore, when 
there is an information gap the signal will be interpreted by the receiver.68 The most sensible 
interpretation is that if  it is a government seal, the firm is probably just complying with 
regulation. Hence, the green halo is not created as the signal would be weak. However; this 
is a conjecture; proper research could be done on the matter. 
3.4.3 Price dilemma
In some circumstances, some conservation acts might be regarded as ‘lower status’, not 
higher (this might be the case for recycling or using public transport). In this scenario status 
may distort environmental acts that do not seem of ‘high status’. Griskevicious, et al., 
suggest that in order to increase the status of the pro-environmental act, it is necessary to 
increase the price or make it more costly in general. Because if it is the same price there will 
The Law and Economics of Eco-labels
169
67 Dan Ariely, et al., Op. cit., p. 547-549.
68 Sylvie Lupton, Shared quality uncertainty and the introduction of indeterminate goods, p. 414.
be no status benefit. Costly signalling theory suggests that lowering the price of green 
products creates an important reputational dilemma: buying a cheaper (green) product might 
explicitly signal that a person cannot afford the more expensive product. “If altruism 
functions as a costly signal in part because it signals ones wealth, then increasing the price 
of a green product might actually lead that product to be more attractive for individuals 
motivated to gain status. Indeed consider that economic experts predicted that abolishing 
tax credits for hybrid cars in the U.S. would decrease their sales because of  the increase in 
cost of  the car. Yet after tax credits for Prius expired in late 2006, sales actually went up 
68.9%.”69 The same phenomenon happened to the luxury Lexus hybrid, which was launched 
at a price of $100,000. The sales of this Lexus exceeded expectations by over 300%. Even 
though affordable green products can be equally or even more efficient at helping the 
environment, the purchase of such inexpensive green products might undermine a person’s 
ability to signal his or her wealth via pro-environmental acts.70 
3.4.4 The Distortions created by social signalling
Energy economists have suggested that inconspicuous investments (those that cannot be 
observed) are generally more cost-effective than other energy producing or conservation 
acts that are more conspicuous. Conspicuous conservation acts are those that are meant a) 
to benefit the environment, but more importantly to b) signal to others your environmental 
preferences. These social signals distort private incentives and generate conservation 
investment that is wasteful or at least not as effective as it could be. For instance, 
economists have begun to question whether home-owners over invest in residential solar 
power because of  its conspicuousness and under invest in home insulation improvements, 
energy efficient heating and cooling systems, and window  sealing because of the relative 
inconspicuousness of these investments (they cannot be observed) This distortion is 
precisely what the Sextons refer to as ‘conspicuous conservation’. Instead of motivating 
firms to engage in meaningful or useful pro-environmental behaviour, it biases their 
decisions towards those behaviours that can be shown-off. 
3.5 Policy implications
III. Eco-labels and Business
170
69 Vladas Griskevicius, et al., Op. cit., p. 398
70 Ibidem
Conspicuous conservation is still conservation. The environment is benefited by these acts, 
even though they might not be as cost-effective as they could be. This reputation 
mechanism allows firms and consumers to engage in pro-environmental activity voluntarily. 
They will recoup their investments by increasing their reputation. In that sense, it has 
previously been noted that when a product holds an eco-label there is no need for a tax 
break or subsidy as it would be a double reward for the firm. In the same sense, it has been 
amply suggested that “if a government confers a tax benefit policy to facilitate the adoption 
of a new  environmentally friendly technology, it should expect the policy to be more 
successful for promoting a non-visible technology, such as environmentally friendly water 
heaters, relative to a visible technology such as hybrid cars.”71 In this case water heaters or 
window  insulation are not visible therefore they do not create any signal, i.e., they are 
inconspicuous. “Subsidies should be targeted toward inconspicuous conservation in order to 
achieve an optimal mix of conservation effort.”72 The government could create a tax break 
policy for pro-environmental behaviour that is private and simultaneously let individuals 
invest in the pro-environmental acts that improve their reputation. By doing this, more areas 
of conservation will be targeted. With the market biased towards those acts that serve as 
signals and government focusing on private efforts, the range of activities will increase. 
“However, policy makers should be mindful of the potential to crowd-out intrinsic motivation 
with extrinsic rewards like taxes and subsidies. Because conspicuous conservation goods 
enable their purchasers to signal their willingness to sacrifice to enhance the environment, 
the public subsidy of such goods diminishes the value of such goods as social signals. 
Subsidies may, therefore, have the perverse effect of reducing demand for conspicuous 
conservation.”73 
4. Conclusions
This chapter provides a different approach to CSR and corporate sustainability. Corporate 
practices are key to eco-labels as it is the firms who engage in pro-environmental activities, 
hence it is them who ultimately impact the environment. The reason why CSR and its 
literature is only limited to this chapter is because pro-environmental behaviour is a small 
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part of  CSR. Furthermore, the focus of  this chapter was the pro-environmental behaviour of 
firms. It was clearly pointed out that pro-environmental behaviour should not be considered 
pure altruism. However it can be considered as an altruistic-type behaviour. This is because 
while pure altruism acts without expecting anything in return, altruistic-type behaviours do. 
While it is not a finding per se, it is worth reminding that when a firm engages in a pro-
environmental activity it is surely because it sees a profit opportunity. If in the end the firm 
lost money to this pro-environmental endeavour it is more likely it was due to a mistake or 
miscalculation rather than a selfless act. It is just how  firms are created. This leads to the 
second point, that is worth reminding: firms are not humans. Firms were created by humans 
to aid them in their economic activities. However, because firms interact in society, along 
with humans and governments they are subject to certain social norms. Furthermore, in 
order to keep their place in society firms have to be particularly careful with their image. 
Hence, firms have huge image motivations. 
The literature from other disciplines also provides great insights on what happens when 
different motivations interact with each other. This can become very relevant as ‘external 
motivations’, such as the ones that governments use to incentivise certain behaviours, can 
have the opposite effect when it interacts with internal or image motivations. Therefore, this 
chapter can serve as a word of  caution to governments that wish to intervene in a market. If 
it is deemed necessary, the motivation behind the specific behaviour has to be properly 
understood. 
Many of the insights regarding internal, external and image motivations, are borrowed from 
other disciplines that normally focus on humans. Therefore this analysis (section 3 in 
particular) can also be applied to the ‘human’ side of eco-labelling: the consumers. The 
following chapter will shift the focus to the demand side of eco-labels. Consumers are the 
trigger of the eco-labelling mechanism. Hence there is an interest to understand what makes 
consumers buy eco-labelled products. Just like firms, consumers have different motivations 
to buy eco-labels. Buying eco-labels, is considered a pro-environmental activity for 
consumers. The interest in understanding consumers is crucial for firms, for the certification 
entities as well as for the governments. As once they manage to harness consumer interest 
they will be able to increase the interest in eco-labels, thereby increasing their overall 
impact.
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CHAPTER IV
Eco-labels and Consumers
1. Introduction
The eco-labelling mechanism can only be triggered if  there is a demand for environmentally-
sound products. Therefore, the key for the functioning of  the mechanism is the consumer. 
Consumers have to be motivated to buy the eco-labelled goods. Just like corporations1 
people can have intrinsic, extrinsic and reputational motivations to consume eco-labelled 
goods. In addition, there are some that suggest that consumers may even be a-motivated, 
that is that the person does not receive any satisfaction from the behaviour and is unsure 
why s/he is performing it.2  However, there is a big difference with businesses. Businesses 
have profits in mind, that is their main motivator. Therefore a business engaging in 
sustainable behaviour is doing so because it believes that indirectly it will increase its profits. 
It is true that economists have simplified consumers’ motives to “utility maximisation” in 
which case they are no different than businesses. However, consumers are not so “simple”. 
Consumers internal motivations are complex, to say the least. Their beliefs and their 
behaviour do not necessarily match. If  a consumer has pro-environmental preferences or 
intent it does not imply that s/he will act on those beliefs. Specifically, buying eco-labelled 
products would be a type of  pro-environmental behaviour regardless of the consumers’ 
intent. 
Eco-labels, as environmental tools have the potential to improve the environment 
significantly. However, they depend on consumers for them to work. A single sale of an eco-
labelled good will not spur great change, however in the aggregate consumers can pressure 
industry to become more sustainable. Therefore, it is imperative to understand how 
consumers make their choices at the point of sales both at an individual and at group levels. 
Eco-labels can aid consumers in matching their intent with their behaviour. To make eco-
labels reach their potential it is important to know  consumers’ limitations as well as their 
strengths. Precisely because consumers are the core of this chapter, it is important to know 
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their behaviour in “large worlds”, not just in the artificial “small worlds”3  that are normally 
used in economics. This can only be achieved by integrating knowledge from other 
disciplines such as psychology, marketing, sociology and even neurosciences. Nonetheless, 
this chapter is a specialised summary. This is because its whole purpose is to collect 
information from other disciplines to obtain a clear understanding of consumer behaviour. 
The purpose of this is to be able to draw  insights for the subsequent chapters in which 
policies have to be drawn with this information. Furthermore, because of  the discipline  and 
methodology that this work follows, it cannot be expected to have original findings or 
insights. 
This chapter will first start with the difference between homo-economicus and homo-sapiens. 
Subsequently, it will build on the literature on bounded rationality, where it is pointed out that 
additional to bounded rationality, humans have bounded self-interest and limited information-
processing capabilities. Therefore under this light it will be seen how  eco-labels affect 
consumers decision making processes by simplifying it. Hence, eco-labels reduce the 
‘cognitive’ costs at the point of purchase making it easier for the consumer to make a 
decision. 
2. Understanding the Consumer
Dan Ariely, uses the term “human-incompatible technologies” to describe systems such as 
health-care, stock markets, education or environmental incentives that are not in line with 
human fallibility.  “As a consequence, we inevitably end up making mistakes and sometimes 
fail magnificently.”4  Therefore, when analysing a policy tool such as eco-labelling it is 
important to verify if  it is consumer-compatible in order for it to function. By understanding 
how  consumers really operate, their biases can be more easily observed as well as how 
they influence their decisions. Only then can policy makers make consumer-compatible 
policy tools. Otherwise, the tools would not work due to “behavioural failures.” Consumers 
would “fail” to behave like  they were expected, namely because the expectations of their 
behaviour was inaccurate or even unrealistic. 
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It is inevitable at this point to make a distinction between Neoclassical Economics and 
Behavioural Economics. “Behavioural economics is the sub-field of  economics that borrows 
from psychology, empirically tests assumptions used elsewhere in economics, and provides 
theories that aim to be more realistic and closely tied to experimental and field data.”5 The 
separation between neoclassical economics and psychology was intentional and prominent 
in the twentieth century. Milton Friedman argued that “unrealistic or even obviously untrue 
assumptions (like all behaviour can be modelled as resulting from decision makers solving 
constrained problems) are perfectly legitimate, so long as they produce accurate 
predictions.”6  Therefore, using the same example as Friedman, when a billiard player is 
selecting shots, he is doing so as if he were solving a set of  equations using Newtonian 
physics. Evidently, most billiard players do not have enough knowledge of Newtonian 
physics to actually apply it on each shot (if  they have any knowledge at all). From 
Friedman’s perspective, this model, though based on wrong assumptions, should be judged 
based on its predictions, not on the realism of its assumptions. Behavioural economics on 
the other hand tries to find the realism of assumptions, by testing them empirically and 
adjusting the theory to the observed results. In this sense, behavioural economics tries to 
model the process that leads to the eventual outcome (the behaviour). Therefore, if the 
billiard player did not use equations to solve his problem he must have used a different set 
of tools or capacities that allowed him to solve the problem. These cognitive tools, when 
identified, can also predict human behaviour in a more “realistic” approach. Law  and 
economics traditionally follows the neoclassical assumptions of human behaviour. If we 
regard the law  as a social institution and the assumptions of the subjects’ behaviour are 
incorrect, it is likely that the law  will be flawed. Therefore, understanding and predicting 
behaviour in a realistic way will allow us to make better institutions, policies and laws. 
2.1 Rational Behaviour and the Homo Economicus
The neoclassical model assumes an economic man, or homo economicus. The main 
assumptions are that this man is “infinitely self  interested, infinitely capable of processing 
information and solving optimisation problems, and infinitely self-disciplined or consistent 
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when it comes to having the willpower to execute one’s plans.”7  Hence, the homo 
economicus is “rational”. The laws of logic and probability theory are the same criteria that 
determine the rationality of  judgements and decisions. “These laws of logic and probability 
are called coherence criteria because they are primarily concerned with the internal logical 
coherence of  judgements.”8  These coherence criteria, suggest that people have rational 
preferences; meaning that they order and rank things. Ordering and ranking is known as 
transitivity.  Hence  if all the outcomes were in a list ordered by preference from high to low, 
the outcomes from the top will always be preferred to the lower ones. In other words, if  an 
individual prefers A to B and B to C, then he will prefer A to C. People are assumed to have 
rational inter-temporal choices. A person can be infinitely patient or infinitely impatient, but 
never the two of them. Finally, people are expected to have rational risk preferences. In 
economics people can be completely risk adverse or risk loving, but not both. In addition, 
probabilities should always sum 1 as the probability laws dictate. In this sense a person can 
believe with a probability of  90% that Climate Change is a myth and 10% that it is a real 
environmental threat. In this case the beliefs of this person are coherent, as they add up to 
100% as the laws of probability dictate.  
By following these coherence criteria to determine rationality, people could claim (and they 
have done so) things like: “Monkeys are rational!” following the observation that squirrel 
monkeys make choices that conform to transitivity.9  Not only monkeys, but Artificial 
Intelligence technology is basically based on these laws of  logic and probability. 
Furthermore, everything can be rationalized as long as it consistent. Consistently strange 
behaviour can be rational as long as it is consistent. Spending ones pay-check in one day 
and struggle until the next one can be strange. However it is rational, as long as every time 
the person receives a pay-check he does the same thing. On the other hand, inconsistent or 
random behaviour is irrational even if such behaviour is a positive step in the persons’ well-
being. Furthermore, there is no proof that people following these rules (“rational” people) are 
wealthier, happier, healthier or more successful than people who are “irrational”.10
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People are constantly faced with trade-offs. However the process of how  such trade-offs are 
solved is still a mystery. What can be observed is the outcome of the trade-off, not the 
reasoning itself. How  people processed the information, what cues they used, how  they 
made the calculations is subject of many studies in different scientific fields. Rationality can 
be seen from different perspectives. From the neoclassical perspective rationality can either 
be unbounded or it can have some limitations, which lead to optimisation under constraints. 
These limits to rationality could be interpreted as bounded rationality. However bounded 
rationality and optimisation under constraints are not the same. Bounded rationality in 
behavioural sciences does not use “rationality” (as understood in neoclassic economics) as 
a threshold whereas optimisation under constraints does. Behavioural economics uses other 
tools to understand the process behind the trade-offs.  
2.1.1 Unbounded Rationality
In the world of  homo economicus, rationality is unbounded. It is assumed that people have 
unrealistic mental abilities such as boundless knowledge, infinite access to information and 
infinite time. While acknowledging that these assumptions can be far-fetched, the 
proponents argue that humans act as if they were unboundedly rational.11 In this sense it 
becomes an aspiration or an ideal. However it makes real human (homo sapiens) look 
flawed and irrational in comparison. In order to execute or calculate optimisation without 
constraints would imply infinite calculations and information gathering. Every single 
consequence of  choosing one option has to be computed as well as all the consequences of 
the alternative (or alternatives). It would be close to impossible to make any decision. 
Furthermore, to maximize subjective expected utility, all the variables would need to be in 
the same currency. All beliefs and desires would have to be valued in quantitative 
probabilities and utilities. For economists that defend this view  “this theory exhibits 
mathematical beauty and convenience.”12  In other words, it makes modelling easier. 
However, the world does not always conform to this. Sometimes reasons cannot be 
converted to a single currency, as there are something’s that are considered 
incommensurable. “The greatest weakness of  unbounded rationality is that it does not 
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describe the way real people think.”13 Specifically, it does not say anything about the process 
of decision making, which is what interests policies that depend on people’s free-will. Of 
course, the outcome of  the policy is important, but with instruments such as eco-labels the 
decision process the consumer undergoes is crucial. Understanding the consumers’ 
processes and preferences, as well as their limitations can make any tool effective. 
2.1.2 Optimisation Under Constraints
People make inferences from the information they have. This information could be internal, 
as in our memory or our feelings, or the information could be external. This information can 
be either available for the consumer or it has to be discovered. Searching for information can 
be a costly process; nonetheless it is what allows people to form their judgements and make 
decisions. In optimisation, a person should calculate the costs and benefits of searching for 
more information, until the costs outweigh the benefit. Only at that point should the person 
stop searching for more information and make a decision. The problem is that it requires as 
much computation as unbounded rationality. Furthermore, nothing is optimal per se. To 
optimise, the maximum and the minimum have to be calculated under specific 
circumstances or conditions. If the conditions are changed so does the optimal. This means 
that every new  cue leads to a change of circumstances, which will require starting the 
computation all over again. It is true, that optimisation can be accurate, in a world with 
controlled variables (small worlds). However, as more variables are introduced, the more 
complex the world becomes. 
2.2 Bounded Rationality and the Homo Sapiens
Sapiens, is the Latin word for wise, sensible or judicious, therefore the species homo 
sapiens is literally the wise man not the ‘rational man’. Humans are capable of learning and 
adapting.  Herbert Simon, is the “father” of bounded rationality. His views are based on the 
idea that behaviour should be based on what is known about the human mind, not fictitious 
and convenient assumptions. Optimal strategies are unknown or unknowable, because of 
the minds limitations. Hence, humans need to use approximate methods to handle most 
tasks. These approximations or shortcuts are called heuristics. The human mind has a 
repertoire of  strategies (the ABC research group for example describes it as a tool-box) that 
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a person can select according to their situation. The more refined the cue selection is the 
better he will be able to adapt his strategies. For instance consumers have to select cues to 
determine a purchase. They can search for information in their memory, if  they recognize the 
brand they have bought before; alternatively they can see what other people (friends, family 
and/or neighbours) are doing; finally they can search for objective cues like price or 
contents. The key is the moment the consumer stops looking for more cues and decides. 
This is called the stopping rule. As seen in optimisation, the stopping rule is when the costs 
outweigh the benefits. Whereas in bounded rationality the stopping cue can be as simple as 
a “hunch” (of course the trick is understanding that “hunch”). In the end, “cognition is the art 
of focusing on the relevant information and deliberately ignoring the rest.”14
2.2.1 Automatic and Reflective systems 
There is no definitive conclusion on how  people think; it is still work in progress. However, it 
is possible to make a distinction between two kinds of  thinking, “one that is intuitive and 
automatic, and another that is reflective and rational.”15  The first one is known as the 
Automatic System. This system is rapid and is or feels instinctive, and it does not involve 
what we usually associate with thinking. It is associated with older parts of  the brain (i.e. the 
repertoire of  strategies we have stored), the parts we share with other animals. The second 
is the Reflective System, which is more deliberate and self-conscious. Sometimes it is not 
easy to distinguish which system is active while thinking. People many times get ideas while 
in the shower or while biking, but not when they are actively thinking about the idea. In this 
case, the automatic system would be responsible for these random outbursts. Sometimes 
people follow  their “hunches” which are also reflections from the automatic system, and then 
try to rationalize them with the reflective system. People that are learning use their reflective 
system (sports, languages, math), after some-time and repeated exercises, the automatic 
system starts to kick-in. Therefore, simple actions like turning off  lights or unplugging electric 
appliances can become an effortless habit. Traditional economics suggests that decisions 
are made with the ‘reflective’ system, people are supposed to think, weigh their alternatives, 
calculate costs and benefits and then make a decision. While this process might be optimal 
it is still not accurate. Many times, both the reflective and the automatic system intervene in 
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making decisions.16 The interaction of these two systems is what creates people’s heuristics 
and biases. 
2.2.2 Heuristics and biases
Another way behavioural economists explain how  people think and make decisions, is by 
heuristics and biases. Heuristics are simple, general, efficient rules that develop through 
experiences and are hard-coded via evolution.17 Heuristics use simple search-stopping rules 
to find useful cues to make ‘fast and frugal’ decisions. Therefore, “when we face a 
complicated decision, our minds make what seems like a good enough choice, given the 
options at hand.”18 This is known as satisficing, a term coined by Herbert Simon, which is a 
combination of “satisfy” and “suffice”. This is the kind of mental short cut people go through 
in the supermarket aisle.19 Heuristics generally lead to good decision outcomes, but they can 
also lead to irrational and/or erroneous judgements and decisions. Heuristics are associated 
with biases. These are mental mechanisms that deviate from the laws of  probability, hence 
they are little signs of “irrationality”. Hence they have a negative connotation. However it is 
the interaction of heuristics and biases that can predict how  people will react in a situation, 
where the reflective system might take too long or does not know  what to do. Consumers in 
a grocery store are more likely to use biases and heuristics at the point of purchase than if 
they are deciding which university to attend. 
Erin McDonald, from Iowa State University, points out that heuristics are not well-calibrated 
for sustainability matters.20  The concerns for the environment are recent and people still 
have not incorporated sustainability or environmentalism in their automatic systems. Some 
heuristics may have negative implications for sustainable product purchase decisions. The 
public’s concern for specific environment threats is not aligned with the actual risk posed by 
these environmental threats. In this case, she illustrates how  people misjudge the risk of 
getting sick by drinking tap water,21  so the drink bottled water. By doing this they shift the 
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attention away from the real environmental threat: the waste produced from the bottles. “One 
explanation is the availability bias and heuristic: people assess the likelihood of a given 
event occurring based on the ease of  recollection of similar events.” Environmental disasters 
such as oil spills, nuclear plant accidents or poisoned drinking water receive a lot of media 
attention. Therefore, it is easy to recall these environmental disasters. “Thus people assess 
the resultant threat to the environment as more likely and possibly more severe than less 
exposed environmental problems.”22   However, eco-labels might not be the right tool for 
solving large environmental problems such as oil spills or poisoned drinking water. 
Nonetheless they are well equipped to deal with other long-term problems such as raising 
awareness about the plastic waste of bottled water, which  might not need such immediate 
attention. 
2.2.3 Bounded rationality, behavioural economics and Irrationality
Behavioural economics studies bounded rationality. However, “behavioural economics is 
often portrayed as a branch of economics that points out to systematic irrationality in human 
populations and in markets in particular. Indeed, many behavioural economists in their 
writing, especially when discussing their results verbally, use ‘rational’ as a synonym for 
behaviour that conforms to standard economic theory and irrational as a catch-all label for 
behaviour that deviates from standard neoclassical assumptions.”23 Behavioural economics 
studies the limits of rationality, not irrationality. In neoclassic economics people are rational 
and are assumed to have infinite self-interest, information processing capabilities and 
willpower. In behavioural economics, rationality is limited and people have bounded self-
interest, bounded information-processing capacity and bounded willpower.24 
3. Bounded Self Interest and Pro-environmental Preferences
Pro-environmental preferences are a type of  social preferences. It has been observed that 
people care about the well-being of  others (material and immaterial) as well as about their 
own. People care about utility of others. Therefore, the assumption that people are infinitely 
self-interested is incorrect. This is what is understood as bounded self-interest. The degree 
of concern varies from individual to individual, but it is there. Feelings such as spite (feeling 
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happy when others are worse off), altruism (being happy when other people are better off), 
inequality aversion and preferences for social welfare (happiness when the group is better 
off) are all forms of  bounded self-interest. In essence, it means that people are not indifferent 
between different payoff allocations for all members in a group, even if  their own payoff  is 
unchanged.25  Therefore, if  people care about the well-being of others it could well be that 
people could also develop a preference for the environment. There is evidence suggesting 
that it is more likely to find environmental concern among individuals with “pro-social” social-
value orientations rather than in people with individualistic or competitive orientations.26 
Nonetheless, as seen in the previous chapter, people also have image motivations. These 
motivations will move people to act in certain ways in order to be approved or increase the 
standing within a group.   
3.1 The dilemma of environmental preferences and attitudes. 
Caring for the environment is not something that comes “natural” to humans. It is true that if 
your neighbours are littering or the river that used to flow  by your town becomes polluted you 
will be concerned and be very motivated to do something about it. It is not the same when 
the problem is half  way across the world and it does not really affect you directly, people are 
not really going to care. It is just not how  people work. “Joseph Stalin once said, One man’s 
death is a tragedy, but a million deaths is a statistic. Stalin’s polar opposite, Mother Teresa, 
expressed the same sentiment when she said, If I look at the mass, I will never act. If I look 
at one, I will.” 27 For some reason people are very sensitive to the suffering of one individual, 
but when it comes to higher numbers they become indifferent.”28 Therefore, if there is an 
environmental problem such as an oil-spill, it is going to get attention. “This is known as “The 
identifiable victim effect: once we have a face, a picture, and details about a person, we feel 
for them, and our actions - and money - follow. However, when the information is not 
individualised, we simply don’t feel as much empathy and, as consequence, fail to act.”29 
This effect is due to three psychological factors: closeness (not just physical but a feeling of 
kinship with the victim); vividness (the problem needs to be vivid, clear or descriptive so the 
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person can relate emotionally);30 and the third is called drop in the bucket effect, (it has to do 
with your faith in your ability to single-handedly and completely help the victims of the 
tragedy). If the problem is too big, such as climate change, there is only so much a person 
can individually solve. Consequently, people likely to shut down emotionally to it, as there is 
no point in worrying. “Saving hypothetical people from potential future disease is too abstract 
and distant goal for our emotions to take hold and motivate us to open our wallets.”31 
However, if  we consider the oil-spill example, with today’s technology and information flows, 
people can identify the problem and relate to it, the images of these disasters move people 
to act because it targets these three factors. Thanks to the media these events are made 
very vivid for the spectator, furthermore, by showing images of  the victims, the towns and 
animals, people will feel close to the victims and finally, it is an oil-spill the actions to solve 
the problem are clear. 
According to Ariely, the global warming problem is the toughest kind to get people to care 
about. “First of all, the effects of  climate change are not yet close to those living in the 
Western world: rising sea levels and pollution may affect people in Bangladesh, but not yet 
those living in the heartland of America or Europe. Second, the problem is not vivid or even 
observable - we generally cannot see the CO2 emissions around us or feel that the 
temperature is changing. Third, the relatively slow, un-dramatic changes brought by global 
warming make it hard for us to see or feel the problem. Fourth, any negative outcome will 
arrive at most at people’s doorsteps in the very distant future (or, as climate-change sceptics 
think, never).”32  Therefore environmental policies should be individualised and separated 
into smaller more manageable problems that people can feel they make a significant 
change. In spite of  this gloomy outlook, a few  percentage of consumers still care to some 
degree about the environmental issues that surround them.
3.2 Pro-environmental preferences and behaviour 
There is not a given definition of pro-environmental preferences or behaviour. Pro-
environmental intent is a persons’ desire to change the environment. In behavioural 
sciences, intent would be more accurate than preferences, as environmental preferences 
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could be interpreted (in economics at least) as a utility derived from the environment’s ‘well-
being’. Similarly, environmental psychologists refer to environmentalism, to describe the 
attitudes or actions that are undertaken with pro-environmental intent.33  For these 
psychologists, environmentalism is an independent cause of  behaviour (it is not pro-social or 
altruism attitudes). They also highlight the possibility that environmental intent may fail to 
result in environmental impact. Pro-environmental behaviour (or PEB), on the other hand, 
can be defined as a behaviour that is undertaken with the intention to change (normally, to 
benefit) the environment.34  PEB are actions taken to internalize some of the negative 
externalities of consumption. These actions can be either curtailing actions, by which a 
person reduces his impact by reducing or eliminating polluting behaviours (biking or walking, 
instead of driving). It can be political behaviour, which is demonstrated by protesting, voting 
or boycotting the product/producer. Alternatively it can also be by being a good 
environmental citizen who supports policies that increase environmental taxes or prices for 
environmental products. Finally, there is efficiency behaviour, by which a person substitutes 
the product with a pro-environmental one.35 Stern classifies this efficiency behaviour simply 
as consumer behaviour. 36
3.2.1 Norms and pro-environmental preferences
Since Roman times, Customary Law  was considered as a source of law  (when no specific 
law  was available local-customs could be used as a substitute). Customs were composed by 
two elements: inveterata consuetudo and opnio iuris seu necessitatis (roughly translated as 
old habits that are believed to be Law  or that should be Law). In this sense, what Romans 
(and legal systems with Roman background) considered Customary Law  is very similar to 
what social scientists consider social norms. In simple terms, a “social norm is an obligation 
backed by social sanction.” And an “obligation is a statement about what people ought to 
do.”37  In a more formal approach, Bicchieri suggests that a “system of  norms specifies what 
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is acceptable and what is not in a society or group.”38 She further explains that norms are 
based on conditional preferences and two types of  expectations: empirical and normative. 
“By empirical expectations I mean the belief that enough other people in a similar situation 
obey the norm (or have done so in the past). By normative expectations I mean the belief 
that enough other people think we ought to obey the norm in that situation, and may even be 
willing to sanction us in a positive or negative way depending on our choice to obey or 
contravene the norm.”39  Therefore it is important to notice that the notion of ‘norm’ will 
always be accompanied by a sanction. However, because social norms do not follow  a 
definite or formal process to be created (as opposed to a Law) people might tend to disagree 
about its existence.40 Furthermore, this means that many times social norms are not clear or 
they are in conflict with other social norms. In these scenarios, people will conform to the 
norm in a manner that better suits them (according to their preferences). Social norms 
influence the perception of  what is good, fair, immoral, antisocial and other social values. 
Moreover, social norms alter the costs of behaviour. This is because complying with an 
obligation is costly, it might be unpleasant, risky or require effort. Hence, a person who has 
internalised a norm is one who is willing to sacrifice something to obey it.41 Since a person is 
introduced to society, the repeated and long-term interactions with others lead to learning 
and internalisation of the norms of  the group.42 “Internalisation is conceived as the process 
by which people develop a psychological need or motive to conform to a set of shared 
norms.” Internal norms will place a weight on our actions (moral cost or benefit of actions). 
Therefore norm-abiding behaviour will be perceived as good or appropriate (a benefit), and 
people will typically feel guilt or shame at the prospect of  behaving in a deviant way (a 
cost).43
Preferences are normally influenced and shaped by social expectations and individual’s 
psychological dispositions. The difference between a preference and an internal norm is that 
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preferences are conditional to different factors, which makes them flexible. For example, a 
person has an environmental preference and wants to buy an eco-labelled good. If there is 
no competing or no stronger preference, then the person is likely to buy the eco-labelled 
good. However, if  the person has reasonable belief  that other people are not buying eco-
labelled goods because they are a new  way of corporate manipulation, he will doubt his 
preference, and other preferences will start to compete. In the end the person could follow 
his preference or follow  a different preference. If  such person had environmentalism as an 
internal norm, he would have not hesitated in buying the eco-labelled good, regardless of 
other people’s behaviour or rumours.
The global sustainability agenda would be much easier to implement if  environmentalism 
were a social norm. The environmental impact of an individual’s behaviour is very small. 
“Individual behaviours have environmentally significant impact only in the aggregate, when 
many people independently do the same things.”44 Hence if  environmentalism were a social 
norm, more people would behave in a pro-environmental manner. Then the question that 
would be raised would be, why not create a social norm to achieve pro-environmental 
behaviour? The creation process of a social norm is not definite, which makes it rather 
unreliable if certain goal needs to be met in a short period of time (such case a law  might be 
better option). Nonetheless, governments and other parties can accelerate the social-norm 
assimilation and internalisation process to have a more permanent behaviour change. For 
example, in big cities such as Mexico City, access to clean water can be a serious issue. 
Therefore, since several years ago the government has had ‘intense’ water-scarcity 
awareness campaigns. People have understood that wasting water is bad not only for the 
environment but also for the city. Today, neighbours will point out and correct when a person 
is misusing or wasting water. Furthermore, many people feel guilty if they waste water in 
small tasks like washing the car or brushing teeth. This has been possible due to 
awareness, information and first-hand experience of population (for example, water 
shortages over periods of  time). They believe the environmental threat is real, and that its 
consequences affect their well-being. Therefore, they adapt their behaviour. Again the key is 
breaking down the environmental problems into smaller more limited issues and start by 
creating awareness in small groups, preferably those that are closer to that problem. 
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3.2.2 Other people’s behaviour and Pro-environmental behaviour.
Robert Cialdini, claims that “If  we’re uncertain about what we should do in a situation, one 
shortcut way of  knowing what’s probably the right thing for us to do here is to look at what 
our peers are doing.”45 The behaviour of  others is not only a fundamental guidance tool, it is 
also an important motivator. It is simple to think that if  others are doing it, it must be right. 
Experimental evidence suggests that other people’s behaviour is a crucial factor in pro-
environmental behaviour. For example, in hotels where they want to implement a re-use 
towel system, the most significant motivator were descriptive norms “the majority of  guests 
reuse their towels” rather than general environmental or conservation appeals.46 Similarly, a 
recent experiment showed that making individual consumption information “public” was the 
best motivator to induce reduction. This experiment was set in the residence halls of  the 
University of  California Los Angeles, which was convenient because students in the 
residence halls do not pay for electricity. Hence they had to rely alternative motivators to 
prices. The purpose was to see which strategy would make students reduce their individual 
electricity consumption. Over a nine-month period students were given real-time feedback 
on their consumption as well as social norms (what is expected of  them and why) over 
room’s electricity usage. A subset of  students also had their energy usage made public in the 
form of posters that described their room as being an above/below  average energy 
conserver. The results showed that the private feedback alone did not have a significant 
impact on conservation. Whereas the students who had their information made public (in 
addition to private) had reductions of up-to 20%, especially from the high users.47  In this 
sense, shaming taps into a person’s reputation. This in turn sanctions the individual for not 
complying with the social norms. Not only will a person ‘feel bad’ but also it would 
additionally make the other members of  the group know  he is a non-complier, which will 
have a ‘stigmatizing’ effect.48  Individuals have reputation-motivations (as seen in the 
previous Chapter) which are social by nature. People may conform to the pro-environmental 
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behaviour, not because of the sanction but because other people are doing it (or it is 
expected that they do it). In reference to social norms, for some people the presence of 
sanctions is not enough to motivate actions; however, the belief  that a “significant amount” of 
other people are acting, is. Therefore as long as the belief that other people are acting the 
person will act, the moment the belief ceases, so will the behaviour.49 
3.3 Altruism and environmentalism
Altruistic behaviour has also been used to explain environmentalism. This approach, 
“presumes that because environmental quality is a public good, altruistic motives are a 
necessary for an individual to contribute to it in a significant way.” Thus, like altruistic 
behaviour, PEB occurs in response to personal moral norms. People with environmental 
preferences will react when the individual believes that certain environmental problems pose 
threats to others and that their actions could avoid the consequences. 50  In this case the 
value is in other’s well-being, therefore it would make sense if  the person bought eco-
labelled coffee that benefits people in another part of the world. 
Even though pro-environmental attitudes do not imply an altruistic preference as such 
“researchers have found a relationship between willingness to pay for sustainability and 
altruism”.51 Altruism, as seen previously, implies a ‘sacrifice’. Therefore, if environmentalism 
is regarded as a type of  altruism it would bring the idea of  sacrifice. PEB would have “the 
implicit message that living with less will result in an impoverished and joyless future.”52 This 
idea hinders with the purpose of eco-labels, as eco-labels depend on consumption. Eco-
labelled goods as other sustainable products have to be seen to serve both a self-interested 
and an altruistic purpose. In western society, there is a perceived link, between higher levels 
of consumption and greater happiness. “A sustainable product reduces consumption: people 
may believe this implies a reduction in product performance.”53 In the 1990s when eco-labels 
spurred eco-friendly or green products were in-fact inferior in quality and higher in prices. 
Therefore, it is imperative that if  eco-labelled goods are to compete with other goods in the 
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market they have to be regarded as a joint product. The eco-labelled goods offers something 
more not something less. Eco-labels should not be linked with a sacrifice, as that deters 
consumption. 
3.4 From pro-environmental intent to Pro-environmental Behaviour
“One may think that positive feelings for the environment would be an indicator of likelihood 
to perform PEB; however, environmental attitude alone is not a good predictor of  PEB.”54 It 
has been suggested that environmental concerns and PEB are only weakly correlated. To 
increase the purchase of  eco-labels it is suggested that incentives should be short-term and 
small in size.  Rewards for PEB have to be just sufficient to initiate a long-term behavioural 
change. Bigger and more powerful rewards cause a person to concentrate on the reward, 
not on the behaviour.55  This is what happens with extrinsic motivations, the motivation is the 
external reward not the behaviour. On the other hand, if  a person can accredit the behaviour 
as his own free will, the motivation can change from external to internal, thus reducing the 
costs of the action. This is possible with small repetitive incentives that would be immediate 
to the consumption (or the consumption it-self) so consumers can identify the link. This 
transition is important for achieving repeat sustainable product purchase and effective use.56 
From the impure public-good model for eco-labelled goods it could be inferred that the 
private benefit of the good could be the small, immediate reward. For example, the Honda 
Insight (which is also an hybrid) is fitted with a smaller gas tank. It is very fuel efficient (high 
MPG).  However because of  the small tank it is likely it would need to be filled as much as 
the normal cars, with the difference that the owner will pay much less, as the car only has 
capacity for 10 gallons. Every time, the owner goes to fill-up the tank, he will be rewarded for 
his environmental action.57 This is a small, repetitive reward which is likely to alter behaviour 
in the long-run
4. Bounded information-processing capacities and eco-labels
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Bounded information-processing capacity is another large area of behavioural economics. 
People have limited attention, limited memory, limited perception capacity and distorted 
beliefs, among other things. Additionally, decision and inferences processes do not follow 
many principles of logic and probability theory. Moreover, information is likely to be 
incomplete, uncertain and asymmetric. These are external factors that individuals have to 
face, while expected to make “optimal” decisions. Informational failures are a characteristic 
of the environmental arena. Therefore informational instruments and policies such as eco-
labels and environmental reporting are designed to provide more accurate information to the 
individuals, so that their decisions can be better based. However, “the average American 
citizen has limited understanding of environmental problems and risks. They also have 
limited understanding of the tools engineers use to try to explain relevant information, 
including eco-labels and Life-Cycle Analysis.”58 When it comes to environmental decisions, 
even sensible and reasonable people can feel overwhelmed by their complexity. Professor 
Stephen Kaplan “asserts that, because of the way humans evolved, we gravitate towards 
situations where our information processing capabilities are useful and avoid situations in 
which they are not useful. Too much environmental information led to anxiety and 
confusion.”59 In other words if  the decision is too complicated, the person might avoid such 
decision altogether. People might shift responsibility to other people or to the community 
(drop in the bucket effect), or they could simplify the decision by restructuring the problem. 
However, for the producer of eco-labelled goods and other sustainable products, 
restructuring is not desirable as it may remove the environmental concerns from the 
decision.
Barry Schwartz’s warns that giving consumers more product choices actually lowers their 
purchase satisfaction. Schwartz reasons that having too many options makes people fear 
they missing out, which causes anxiety, analysis paralysis and regret. On the one hand, 
consumers might not see this as a problem. When surveyed consumers claim that they have 
“just the right amount of information” and “just the right amount of  choice.” Yet when their 
actions are analysed their actions suggest otherwise. For example, consumers spend far 
longer researching products today than they did in the past. Even after making the purchase, 
one fifth of  consumers continue to research the product to check if they made the right 
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choice. Forty percent, meanwhile, admit to feeling anxious about the purchase decision they 
made. From this information Freeman, et al, interpret that consumers are actually 
overwhelmed, unable to effectively process the flood of product information and choices. 
The problem is cognitive overload -the result of excess demands on our cognitive powers 
that lead to poor decision-making.60
4.1 Information and consumption. 
The standard model of  consumer consumption is called the purchase funnel. It was invented 
by St. Elmo Lewis in 1898. He proposed that consumers go from awareness to interest to 
desire to action, gradually reducing the number of  options or brands they consider along the 
way.61  While this model has been the standard across industries and over time, it is now 
fading. Today’s consumers are flooded by information, and have to adapt their shopping 
habits to cope with the noise.  “A recent survey shows that the funnel is no longer the most 
common purchase path. In fact, only one third of  consumers now  use the funnel approach 
when they shop. The decline, according to research is cognitive overload.”62  Consumers 
have responded, according to the survey,63  by anxiously embarking on an open-end 
purchase path, where they add and drop brands, continuously looking for alternatives. 
Another, response was by abandoning the search altogether and simply zero in on a single 
brand. This last response is called the tunnel. “The tunnel is not an expression of brand 
loyalty, rather it was a response to overload, a way to simplify what’s become a frustratingly 
complicated process.”64  In other words, much of what is known in marketing circles as 
“brand loyalty” is really just a peculiarity of cognitive inertia. Consumers have simplified the 
decision process to a point where they are making poor decisions (randomly picking up 
brands) or not making any decision at all (selecting a single-brand). This is bad news for all 
brands, including eco-labels: consumers are not looking for alternatives, they are not paying 
attention to the information.  
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It has been empirically tested, that excess information impairs decision-making. The classic 
response to overload is forgoing the purchase altogether. This is supported by experimental 
evidence, being the most notorious by Sheen Iyengar. She set out pots of  jam on 
supermarket tables in groups of either six or twenty-four. The results where that the people 
who were given six choices bought ten to one times more jam than those who were 
presented with twenty-four choices. Therefore it has been concluded and supported that “an 
excess of input leads to angst, indecision, regret and ultimately lowered satisfaction with 
both the purchase process and the products themselves.”65  Therefore, maybe more 
information is not necessarily better for the consumer. Consumers need simple, clear 
information so that they can use it to make a decision. Once consumers pay attention to the 
information, their purchasing experience becomes satisfactory. Therefore, it might be 
important to know  whether eco-labels simplify consumers’ decisions or they complicate it 
even more. 
4.1.1 Filling the informational gaps
The available environmental information is uncertain, incomplete, sometimes asymmetric 
(someone has more and better information) and potentially incorrect (either involuntarily or 
on purpose). However, when people do not have direct personal knowledge they make 
inferences such as where there is smoke, there is fire.66 When people do not have first hand 
evidence to support a claim, they might end up believing such claim when other people also 
believe it. This is problematic because it happens with both true and untrue claims. People 
will accept and support claims depending on their prior convictions, or because it confirms 
people’s own fears or hopes.67  With uncertain information, or if the accuracy of the 
information is uncertain people will fill the gaps with their own inferences and opinions. In 
addition, people might also interpret the information when the information is not understood 
properly. Therefore a simple opinion, could be regarded by others as a truthful claim and 
they might spread this information as if it were true (because they believed it). The spreading 
of positive and truthful information, such as positive reputation for an eco-label or 
sustainable efforts of a big corporation might be very beneficial. The problem is when the 
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information circulating is not positive, it is inaccurate or false, because this information 
makes individuals lose faith in the eco-label or brand and it might hinder overall pro-
environmental behaviour. 
4.1.2 How information spreads
According to Cass Sunstein, rumours spread through two different but overlapping 
processes: social cascades and group polarisation. “Cascades occur because each of  us 
tends to rely on what other people think and do. If most of  the people we know  believe that 
Nike uses children to sow  the footballs because their small hands are more precise, we tend 
to believe it too. If  a person lacks information, he will accept the views of  others.68  “A 
cascade occurs when a group of early movers, sometimes called bellwethers, say or do 
something and other people follow  their signal.” It only takes a few  people to spread a 
rumour. Propagators might be spreading information on purpose or with a specific intention 
or they could just do it inadvertently, in good faith. In the end, a person with pro-social 
preferences (altruistic even) might feel the responsibility of  communicating the information 
he believes, so others can take it into account. Rumours such as the Nike one will tend to 
spread faster because they are likely to trigger emotions such as fear and disgust. And if  a 
person believes this information about Nike it will affect its purchasing decisions. In a sense, 
bad news does travel fast. Information that triggers strong negative feelings will spread 
faster than positive information. In addition, when like-minded people get together, they will 
end-up taking an extreme view  from what they originally had. This is called group 
polarisation. Groups will tend to think alike, but when the information is incomplete, they will 
aggregate other people’s opinions and start filling in the gaps. Therefore the claim they 
originally believed will be reinforced (regardless if the information is true or not).69 
4.1.3 Assimilation of information
While today people are faced with an informational overload, they are very capable of 
discerning information and forming their opinions and beliefs. Information assimilation and 
processing is subjective. People do not process information in a neutral way. This is called 
biased assimilation.70 The simple idea is that people process information in a way that fits 
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their own preferences.71 Whether people believe certain information depends on what they 
thought before they had access to it. “In this sense our beliefs are motivated. Accepting 
certain propositions makes us feel good or better, and rejecting them would make us feel 
bad or even miserable.”72 On the other hand accepting a claim that contradicts our beliefs 
would cause a sense of unrest, which is known as cognitive dissonance. A person’s previous 
knowledge and predilections will influence the processing and acceptance of new 
information.73  Therefore if a person is aware of fishing techniques or even is aware of the 
problems with dolphins and tuna, when he sees that there is an eco-label that tackles that 
problem, he will happily accept the eco-label, as it is in line with what he previously knew. 
Another important factor is what the people surrounding the individual believe. Once a 
certain number of  people believe a claim, others will believe it too. Unless they have 
stronger information sources that proves the claim is wrong. People are affected by the 
visible choices of  others. This was tested in a sociological study in which an artificial music 
market was created. The study had over 14,000 participants. A list of unknown songs was 
created, and the control group was able to listen to the songs, rate and download the songs 
they liked the most. The control group made these decisions independently. The others were 
assigned one of the eight possible worlds. Within these worlds participants could see how 
many times the songs had been downloaded. The hypothesis was that different music would 
become popular in different worlds because of the information that was given to the 
participants. It turned out that people were dramatically influenced by the choices of their 
predecessors. In every one of the eight worlds, people were far more likely to download 
songs that had been previously downloaded in significant numbers - and far less likely to 
download songs that had not been so popular. “When people think that songs are popular, 
songs actually become popular, at least in the short run.”74 This type of cascades could be 
beneficial for eco-labels and other PEB. If people suddenly make certain environmental 
behaviours “cool”, “trendy” or “popular” people will follow  because they do not want to feel 
left out. This is closely linked to the last factor for people accepting new  information: 
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reputational concerns. People not only want to be part of the group, they like to blend in.75 
Therefore extreme views or strong commitments could make them stand-out and maybe 
even isolated from the group (stigmatized). 
Another part of  biased assimilation is the fact that an individual’s emotions can alter their 
perceptions, which in turn can alter their reactions. The most illuminating studies here 
demonstrate that the emotion of disgust helps to ensure that rumours spread. New 
information is selected and retained in the social environment in part based on their ability to 
tap emotions that are common across individuals.76 For example when information is given 
in a way that produce strong emotions -disgust, anger, outrage- people are far more likely to 
believe. For example, that is why Al Gore’s movie an inconvenient truth had so many images 
of “likeable” (polar bears) animals suffering because of  climate change. Emotional selection 
helps to explain why some information is accepted and other discarded (not because it is 
wrong, simply it does not receive attention). However, many times the information that 
survives emotional selection may not always be the most correct one. 
4.1.4 Framing the information
How  information is presented to individuals can have a great influence on how  he 
assimilates such information. How  information may influence a persons’ behaviour depends 
on how  such information is presented or ‘framed’. If  people thought in mathematical logic, 
the order of  the factors would not alter the outcome. A + B + C = D is the same as B + C + A 
= D. However, it is not accurate. It is not the same to say that “Molly fell down the stairs and 
died” than to say “Molly died and fell down the stairs”. The content of the information does 
matter in how  people assimilate it. Precisely because people have biased assimilation it is 
crucial to understand how  information interacts with emotions and limitations so people can 
make accurate or better choices.  
4.1.4.1 Affect heuristic. 
Information can tap into certain emotions. Therefore how  information is presented can 
trigger different emotions and have different impact on the individual. It is not new  that 
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different emotions can influence people’s behaviour. However, the affect heuristic uses the 
affective response as a cue to take action. In people’s minds risk and benefits are two 
different concepts. When a person makes a decision that will have a high reward (benefit) 
people do not associate it with high risk. This means they might be negatively correlated. 
This happens because of  the person’s feelings that intervene in the judgement of  a hazard. 
Therefore if the person likes (has a positive feeling about it) an activity, it will not be regarded 
as risky; while if said activity is disliked (it is associated with a negative feeling), it is likely to 
be associated with high risks.77 Therefore, when a person has to evaluate the likelihood of a 
decision outcome, if  the outcome is described or framed in a positive way (focusing on the 
benefits) the person will tend to think of it as low  risk. Therefore, framing of  the outcome of 
the decision is crucial. In the sustainability arena information is normally framed negatively. 
They focus how  products and consumption degrade the environment, which leads to people 
to see all the risks. This will deter consumption, as people do not see a benefit from the 
activity. Such doomsday approaches to environmental problems will lead to a drop in the 
bucket effect.
4.1.4.2 Environmental Information and Statistical Illiteracy
Numeracy is the ability people have to reason and apply numerical concepts. It is expected 
that people know  how  to count, add, subtract, multiply and divide. It is a basic ability to 
survive in the modern world. However, numeracy might not be enough. H.G. Wells predicted 
statistical thinking would be just as important for modern democratic societies as counting or 
reading and writing. Today most of  the information presented to the people (by governments, 
media, corporations) is normally in statistical (proportions, probabilities, percentages and 
other ratio expressions) terms. Statistical reasoning is the ability to understand information 
about risks and uncertainties. By understanding is meant the ability to draw  accurate 
conclusions and interpretations of the information. Hence, risk literacy, is the ability to 
accurately interpret and act on information about risk. All people have the potential to 
develop these abilities; the problem is that not many people are trained to do so. It is 
different than illiteracy in that it is not a matter of the general uneducated people, statistical 
and risk illiteracy happens at all educational levels. People have an emotional need for 
certainty when none exists. When people believe something is certain even if  it is not, it is 
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called the “illusion of certainty”. The problem with this illusion is that it oversimplifies causes 
and consequences, and leaves no room for considering alternative possibilities.78  This can 
all be solved by framing information in a way that is ‘user friendly’.  
One of the most representative examples of the perils of  statistical and risk illiteracy was the 
1995 Contraceptive Pill Scare. “In October 1995, the U.K. Committee on Safety of Medicines 
issued a warning that third-generation oral contraceptive pills increased the risk of potentially 
life-threatening blood-clots in the legs and lungs twofold- that is, by 100%.”79 The information 
was passed on to general practitioners and other healthcare providers. However it was also 
presented as an emergency announcement to the media. The news evidently caused great 
anxiety and many distressed women stopped taking the pill. The average woman thought 
100% is the same as certain, therefore ‘if I take the pill I will get blood clots’. The studies on 
which the warning was based on showed that for every 7000 women on the pill, about 1 
presented thrombosis. With women who took the third generation pill, this number increased 
to 2 (one more). “Therefore the absolute risk increase was 1 in 7000, whereas the relative 
increase was indeed 100%. Absolute risks are typically small numbers while the 
corresponding relative changes tend to look big.”80  The toll of this pill scare led to an 
estimated 13,000 additional abortions in the following year in England and Wales. Evidently, 
as women lost faith in the pill, their sales fell sharply. And for every additional abortion, there 
was also an extra birth. The increase of both abortions and pregnancies was in teenage 
girls. The cost of this scare has been estimated in about 46 million pounds. This was all due 
to the fact that the average citizen does not know  the difference between a relative increase 
(100% higher) and an absolute increase (1 in 7,000). 
This is relevant in the environmental arena because much of the information that is handled 
is uncertain. This uncertainty is two fold. First, regarding the information about the 
environmental threats. The problem is that environmental problems are hard to predict. 
Therefore, whether climate change will be a problem in 10 years or a 100 is just an 
estimation. It does not mean that scientists know  nothing about it. It means that it is 
impossible to foresee with precision what is going to happen. The second source of 
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uncertainty, is that many environmental programmes and policies (both private and public) 
have uncertain effects. In this sense there is no proof that can assure that eco-labelling 
decreases environmental impact. If  there were data that supported the effectiveness of eco-
labels, it would probably in relative terms. The environmental information needs to be framed 
in such a way that the data is understood properly. Using absolute terms when possible, and 
aiming to create a sense of certainty and predictability. Consumers will feel comfort in 
knowing that their actions will have an impact on the environment. Because they know  what 
are the risks of not doing anything. Of  course, some might suggest that it is manipulating 
information, however, framing and manipulating are not the same. In framing, the information 
is just set so it can be assimilated correctly. Manipulating, on the other hand, is aimed at 
influencing the assimilation. 
4.2 Cognitive Dissonance and Guilt to change behaviour.
Whenever there is an inconsistency between attitudes (preferences, beliefs or norms) it may 
result in an uncomfortable psychological state, which is known as cognitive dissonance. The 
individual will be motivated to resolve such state. In theory, cognitive dissonance can be 
relieved by (i) changing the behaviour so it is becomes consistent with his attitudes; (ii) 
changing his attitudes; or (iii) change the perception of the action. This last option is 
achieved by rationalising the dissonant act by taking into account new  information that will 
make the behaviour more compatible.81  However, this can also lead to people ignoring 
information, to avoid cognitive dissonance altogether. For example, Frank (2006) shows with 
a simple model that people can increase their net utility by ignoring information about 
process attributes.82 In this case, the ‘bliss of  ignorance’ state might be preferred because, it 
is in-fact a bliss. For example, once consumers were aware that tuna fishing killed dolphins, 
or that their favourite chocolate-bar kills orangutans, regardless of their final decision, the 
utility they receive through the consumption is necessarily less than when they remain 
ignorant. If  they buy the eco-labelled chocolate, because of their pro-environmental 
attitudes, they will feel bad for the tuna or orangutans. On the other hand, if  they don’t buy 
the normal version, they will also feel bad because they did not do anything for the tuna or 
orangutans. A consumer can be better off  by ignoring information to avoid a cognitive 
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dissonance state.83  In this sense, eco-labels can be used to induce cognitive-dissonance 
and induce pro-environmental behaviour. People would buy eco-labelled goods to reduce 
the cognitive dissonance or avoid it. Eco-labels remind them of the environmental problems, 
and for a person with environmental preferences the moral cost of not buying such good will 
be too high. However, inducing cognitive-dissonance can back-fire as people seek out and 
believe information that they find pleasant to learn, and avoid and dismiss information that 
they find disturbing.
4.2.1 The power of guilt
Guilt is a powerful feeling. Its purpose can be both as a self-regulatory emotion, but it can 
also serve as a motivator to correct behaviour. For Freud guilt functioned to keep in line with 
moral standards and punish impulsive transgressions. Therefore if a person goes against his 
internal norms he will feel guilty, and be motivated not to transgress them again. On a social 
level, guilt is a negative affective experience evoked when one’s behaviour for falls short of 
societal standards, and motivates reparatory behaviour.84 These two purposes make guilt a 
complex and dynamic feeling, because it triggers different behaviours. Normally, feelings 
have one purpose or effect. Happiness, for instance, motivates people to approach others 
while sadness causes people to retract. Guilt motivates withdraw  (due to the negative 
affective experience) and then at a second stage, approach. This second stage is what 
induces behaviour. Cognitive dissonance and guilt are very similar, and some even use them 
as synonyms, and they are even used to explain one-another. However, cognitive-
dissonance can be triggered by transgression of preferences, beliefs or social norms. For 
example, littering for someone with environmental preferences, can cause a negative 
feeling, but if  the person is an environmentalist, he would not litter and if he did, he would 
repair his wrong-doing. In guilt, the action that triggers guilt can be identified as it goes 
against the person’s internal norms. Therefore, guilt is a stronger feeling that could change 
behaviour. 
4.2.2 Offsetting eco-guilt
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Firms could (and probably do) encourage people to relieve guilt through the purchase of  a 
given eco-labelled good. Eco-labels can induce a state of cognitive dissonance by reminding 
the consumer at the point of  purchase that certain products have negative effects on the 
environment, and that there are products that make it better. Therefore every time a 
consumer sees the ‘dolphin-safe’ label, he is reminded that tuna fishing kills dolphins. 
Michael Kotchen, analyses off-setting eco-guilt by purchasing carbon off-sets. He suggests 
that carbon offsets would be like indulgences in the Middle Ages. Christians would buy 
indulgences, to secure their place in heaven, but kept on acting normally (sinning like 
always). This means that if people were allowed to buy their way out of eco-guilt (knowing 
that they have to reduce emissions but don’t do anything about it) it may lead people to 
pollute even more.85 He suggests that guilt alleviation is not necessarily a bad thing. Mathew 
Kotchen is one of  the proponents of considering eco-labelled goods as impure public-goods. 
Therefore guilt alleviation could be the “private benefit” of  such impure public good. In 
general, people that will buy eco-labelled goods are those people that care about the 
environment. Thus, it is likely they are already polluting less. Therefore if they buy eco-
labelled goods and carbon offsets, then the reduction will be real and there will really be a 
benefit in the environment. However, there could also be a ‘rebound effect’, because they 
know  they are buying eco-labelled goods and carbon offsets, they lower their guard on other 
behaviours. Offsetting via eco-labels is much easier than restraining consumption. People 
could travel more by plane or use the care more or they can buy a bigger house. Paying to 
alleviate guilt did lead to worse behaviour in one well-known study of parents of children in 
day care. Uri Gneezy and Aldo Rustichini experimented with charging parents a fee when 
they were late picking up their children. The surprising result was that the number of  late 
pickups increased -more than doubling, when parents could pay a fine for being late.86 This 
was because the external motivation (the fine) crowded out the intrinsic motivation (picking 
up the kids). In a same way, paying to compensate bad environmental behaviour might 
crowd out the pro-environmental behaviour. A negative consequence of eco-guilt and 
cognitive dissonance is that people might choose to ignore all the information. In this case, 
eco-labels would not work. Furthermore if greenwashing were also to be taken into account, 
the effects are far worse. This is mainly because not only there would be loss of interest, 
IV. Eco-labels and Consumers
200
85 Matthew J. Kotchen. Offsetting green guilt, p. 26
86 Idem.
crowding-out and eventually anger (because of  the deception if  greenwashing is revealed) 
from the consumers; but also, there would be no positive environmental impact at all. With 
eco-labels at least there is some pro-environmental behaviour which will benefit the 
environment, but with greenwash not even that. 
5. The Role of Eco-labels in Consumers Decisions.  
From a theoretical point of view, how  a consumer chooses one product over another must 
be a very complex process. Therefore it comes with no surprise that marketers strive to find 
ways of simplifying this process. Eco-labels are expected to simplify this decision process. 
However here is one of the big dilemmas of eco-labels and consumption. Theoretically, eco-
labels should provide to consumers sufficient, standardised and simple environmental 
information about the product, so consumers can be informed and make better decisions. 
On the other hand consumers are already facing information over-load, which leads them to 
stop making optimal decisions because they cannot process all the information. Therefore, 
eco-labels become one more variable that consumers will have to consider for their decision. 
It is easy to assume, that as well as other information and other labels, eco-labels will be 
ignored and consumers will make their purchase decisions guided by other variables. For 
eco-labels this is not the ideal outcome. 
Baba Shiv, a neuro-marketing researcher at Stanford Business School, points out, that 
consumers have been given information about calories, nutrition, allergens, trans-fats, 
sodium or what ever they consider relevant. Despite these efforts, sales have not changed 
on the basis of  the information alone. Information alone does not change consumption 
habits. Label-induced market changes can take months or years, because it takes many 
shoppers that long to notice the change in the first place, let alone to do anything about it.87 
Eco-labels need to be noticed before they can create any change. In other words, they need 
to sell. If consumers see eco-labels as a brand, then they should be treated like a brand in 
all senses.
5.1 Consumers decision processes
The modern shopping experience for the consumer is a sensory clutter and a cognitive fog 
that hinders their ability to take notice of  little details. They browse around shops and 
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supermarkets in an automatic state, that can be described as a shoppers trance. Purchases 
are based on prices, packaging and habit. In other words shopping is done by inertia, there 
is no active decision making. “The moment a customer pauses, exits the shopper’s trance, 
and pays full attention to some attribute of a product, the mental ground shifts significantly.” 
Only when a consumer pays full attention he can notice new  things.88  At that moment, the 
consumer will start making real decisions. The key is getting noticed. 
5.1.1 Classic Consumption Models
According to the funnel89 once the consumer is aware of the product or brand, the consumer 
will be interested, and then they will act. There needs to be a trigger that makes the 
consumer decide to buy. However, even this simple model might not work due to all the 
cognitive-overload consumers face. Hence it is suggested that consumers are currently 
using a purchase tunnel. This implies that consumers ignore all the options and zero in to 
one brand. Not because of  brand-loyalty but because of an overload. The tunnel scenario 
will leave consumers dissatisfied because they did not make a decision. Though it might 
describe what consumers actually face. 
Satisficing has also been suggested as process consumers undergo to make a decision. In 
this model a consumer has several alternatives encountered sequentially. From such 
alternatives the expectation is adjusted (to what is available) and the individual will choose 
the one that is above the expectation. Therefore, consumers settle for something that is the 
best among the available options, even if it does not meet the consumer’s original 
expectations. Another popular model is Multiple Criteria Decision Making.90  This model 
basically assumes consumers consider the attributes (or criteria) of the product/brand, and 
assigns them different weights. Eventually, the weights assigned will be added up, and the 
highest one will be the one the consumer buys. Nonetheless, for most of consumer 
decisions there is no clear decision matrix. Even following these models, in the end the 
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consumer might end up with a tie between product A and B. These models still do not 
explain how the consumer determines whether  A is better than B or vice versa. 
5.1.2 Emotionally charged decisions.
Normally, all products have some good and bad features. People might like the sustainability 
attribute, but dislike the design or the performance. “In a trade-off  decision like that, our 
emotions settle it. The option that will win or lose is the one associated with the stronger 
emotion, negative or positive.”91 In this sense, emotions have a very important role, as they 
create emotionally loaded thoughts, which can drive consumer decisions.92  Moreover, 
emotions are more likely to out-rule cognition when they are involved in a decision. It is the 
Automatic response, the ‘gut’ feeling that is likely to direct purchasing decisions.93 Not the 
reflexive response. This implies that all the information a person has about a brand (or eco-
label) as well as personal and social beliefs will influence these emotions. Therefore, it is 
crucial that eco-labels preserve a good reputation to avoid negative emotions in consumers. 
5.1.3 The neuro-science behind brand recognition
This emotional response has already been studied by neuroeconomists. In their 
experiments, they identified a part of  the brain that connects our thoughts with our feelings.94 
“When a product brand fails to impress or repels us, our brain shows a lessening of activity” 
in a particular part of the brain. This lowering of activity is a “distinctive neural brain signature 
seen also when people feel disinterest, boredom or disgust.” Furthermore, if the feeling of 
disappointment is very large, then other parts of the brain come into play, registering the 
feelings of fear and aversion (in a very automatic level). “On the other hand, simply seeing 
the logo of  a brand we like creates the opposite pattern, with the key orbitofrontal strip 
becoming more active in the brain reaction that promotes sales.” In the words of Hilke 
Plassman, “this boost indicates the ‘neural signal for brand preference. It creates the 
experience ‘this is the brand I like’.”95  With this information it can be speculated that if 
negative information about a product, such as the tuna-dolphin unfortunate relation, a similar 
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neural signal of  disinterest or disgust would appear.96 If  negative information triggers strong 
negative feelings such as disgust, the reaction goes beyond psychological uneasiness, it is 
an actual neurological reaction. “Getting distasteful information about an item elicits the 
brains response for disgust.”97  Furthermore, if there are other products, there could be a 
contrast effect. If  there is a product that causes a negative feeling to the consumer, and he 
has the option to buy one with a better profile, because of  this contrast effect, he will have an 
even stronger preference for the better one (even if it is slightly better) because the other 
one seems so bad. The value is shifted because of  the contrast.98  In this sense, when 
consumers are sensible to the issues the eco-label targets, placing eco-labelled goods next 
to normal goods, will increase the consumers value of the eco-label. . However, if 
consumers do not know the eco-labels or understand them, none of these effects will occur.  
5.1.4 Simplification of Information: The Halo Effect 
Consumers, when evaluating a product or brand, are very likely to fail to discriminate among 
its distinct and independent attributes. The result is that individual attributes will be rated in a 
very similar way.99 Consumers will unconsciously cluster all attributes in a small range. This 
is known as the Halo effect (as seen in Chapter III). “It is important to note that consumers 
often avoid active processing of  product information. These “cognitive misers” eschew  the 
intellectual effort of  making attribute-by-attribute evaluations and instead form overall 
affective impressions.”100  This effect might be unwanted in some fields such as professor 
evaluations by students (or student evaluations by professors). Students (unknowingly) allow 
general attributes of a professor (such as accents or image) spill over to his particular 
attributes such as teaching skills and even his appearance101  Politicians, movie stars and 
marketers, on the other hand,take advantage of it. 
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Eco-labels signal that a product is eco-friendly or sustainable. This signal is valuable, 
because of the effect it has on consumers. Eco-labels create a green-halo to the product 
that carries it. Therefore the whole product is branded as green. The few  pro-environmental 
qualities spill-over to the other qualities and as a result the whole product is considered 
green, regardless if it is organic, fairtrade or bio-diversity friendly. Consumers simplify the 
information as a single cue: greenness. For example, a person can buy an ice-cream that is 
vegan and organic. Those are the salient attributes of the product. However in the persons 
mind, that ice-cream is also going to be tastier and healthier as well. This is the effect that 
eco-labels (and other brands) want to achieve in consumers mind. When a person recalls 
the eco-label he will see it as sustainable, healthy, above all a good product. Creating a 
positive feeling for the brand, which might lead to repeat purchasing. 
5.2 Simplifying the Decisions
It has been found that ‘decision simplicity’ might be one of the biggest drivers of 
consumption. Decision simplicity, is understood as the ease with which consumers can 
gather trustworthy information about a product and confidently and efficiently navigate their 
purchase options.102  If a consumer has too many options, with too much information 
(especially if its contradicting), the consumer will shut it out and decide without taking such 
information into account. However, if consumers have simple credible cues, they will be able 
to make better choices. In theory eco-labels have that potential. Nonetheless, there is a 
concurrence of information on the product package that may complicate the decision 
process. 
5.2.1 Concurring eco-labels
Concurrence of  eco-labels in markets, to some degree is expected. Each eco-label has a 
specific focus with its own set of  criteria. Therefore it makes sense that producers can 
choose which eco-label with their pre-set criteria they want to conform to. In theory, 
consumers know  that eco-labels are synonyms to third-party multi-criteria environmental 
certification schemes. Hence, they would understand that such labels are reliable signals of 
sustainability and should be credible. However, there are a variety of labels that compete for 
the consumer’s attention. This competition can happen both at market and product level. 
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On a product’s package consumers can find anything from mandatory health and safety 
labels, to nutrition and allergen labels, to those that indicate recyclability, plus all the 
environmental claims, declarations and any other voluntary standard the product might 
comply to. In addition to the product’s brand and the information about the products 
attributes. The average consumer does not distinguish between all these labels. When a 
consumer looks at the environmental credentials of a product he might encounter several 
small symbols that even if they look familiar do not have any value. When the consumer is 
faced with so many symbols, it is unlikely he will be able to interpret the signal of the eco-
label. 
One of the reasons this happens is because products are destined to go to several markets. 
If each market has its own eco-labelling schemes, which the product can obtain (due to its 
environmentally friendly process), the producer might as well seek all the certifications. 
Consumers in each market will receive the signal, when they identify the eco-label they 
know. However, this means that a single product will have to have all the eco-labels 
concurring on the product’s package. This may, in the best-case scenario, lead the 
consumer to think that the product has many credentials therefore it must be good. On the 
other hand, people will not understand why there are so many symbols and get confused. 
However, this is also deceiving because more is not necessarily better. In this case, the eco-
labels are very likely to have similar (if  not identical) criteria. This would be as if  a product 
said it was vegan, vegetarian, as well as dairy and egg free. This type of  concurrence is not 
useful for consumers. It is a waste of resources, in the sense that producers have to spend 
money in each certification or licensing process. Plus they diminish the value of all labels, as 
consumers will not understand them and are likely to get confused. If  there were a system of 
eco-label recognition or homogenisation between different markets, much of  this futile 
concurrence will be avoided. 
Eco-label competition in a market, however would be desirable. Producers and consumers 
could decide which eco-label they prefer and “stick” to it.103  Ideally, each eco-label would 
have their own criteria, therefore they would be actually be complements, as they would 
focus on different aspects. For example, FSC focuses on forests and the MSC on fisheries, 
while the Rainforest Alliance focuses on agricultural products and Fair Trade focuses on the 
IV. Eco-labels and Consumers
206
103 “stickiness” is the customers’ likelihood of following through on a purchase, buying the product again, and 
recommending it
human factor. It is true that in their criteria, they have general elements of sustainability. Still, 
they are clearly distinct. They are expected to have different results. In this sense, eco-labels 
really do function as brands, and should be able to be protected as such. 
5.2.2 A single environmental score or rating
Many  consumers would be happy to buy an eco-friendly product, if they knew  which product 
to buy they would. Nothing would be simpler than a label that read, “this product is 
environmentally friendly.”104 Consumers would not need to worry about anything. Simple and 
straightforward information does not need to be interpreted or inferred, no signals would 
need to be extracted. However, not only does that label not exist, environmental information 
is not that simple and straight forward (at least not for now). However, what has been 
considered is giving products a score or rating to indicate their sustainability. In this case, the 
score or ratings would be derived from a complex logarithm which would incorporate the 
products environmental impact at different stages, it would attach some weights and process 
everything into a single score that would indicate aggregate environmental value. This score 
or rating would be communicated to consumers, and consumers would know  how  eco-
friendly the product really is. 
The Carbon Reduction Label indicates on the label the volume of  all greenhouse gasses 
emitted during a products life-cycle. It is expressed in grams, kilograms or tonnes per 
serving and for simplicity it just uses the CO2 nomenclature while it refers to all greenhouse 
gases. Furthermore a company or product could eventually become carbon-neutral (there is 
a label for it too). The appeal of  this label is that it is very simple to understand and it can be 
used among a variety of products and services. The problem however is that only 600 
companies have been certified since 2007 (when it started) and it has been heavily criticised 
as it does not include other environmental factors such as water or waste management. 
However, retailers such as Tesco in the UK, have reported that it is too time consuming. 
Tesco, was on board with the Carbon Reduction Label, since the beginning. However after 
four years, it decided to stop as it did not gain ‘critical mass’. For the label to work properly, 
the majority of products would have had to be certified so consumers could compare the 
labels at a level playing field. The process for each product took several months and a lot of 
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resources. In the end, for Tesco it was not worth it. Nonetheless, other large corporations are 
still committed to pursuing carbon labels for their products.105 
Another supermarket (Hannaford, in the US) created a three-star ratings nutrition guide. 
Products would earn points for vitamins, whole grains, fibre, and the like; they lost points for 
ingredients like bad fats, sugars and salt. It evaluated 25,500 products based on the food’s 
ingredients lists and their nutrition panels. Many products that the food companies promoted 
as “healthy choices” in fact received no stars, the worst rating, mainly because they were too 
high in sugar and salt. “Only 28 percent of items on the store’s shelves earned any stars; the 
rest got no rating at all.” In this case customers paid attention. “In the first year the three-star 
system was deployed, the stores saw  marked sales gains for the most nutritious foods, 
those with three stars, and losses for those with two, one, or none.” 106  For example, lean 
meat cuts with three-stars increased sales in 7%, while ground beef  with no stars dropped 
5%.107 These types of numbers say a lot of what type of systems consumers understand. 
In both the Carbon Reduction Label and the Nutritional Star-rating system the retailer (the 
supermarket) was framing the information for the consumers. That allowed consumers to 
have a better shopping experience. However, by delegating the effort and the costs of 
certification and rating to retailers will leave producers with no incentive to incur the costs 
themselves. Retailers that have an interest in selling pro-environmental products should 
seek suppliers with optimal environmental credentials, such as certification or verification 
with certain eco-labels to begin with. This is precisely the point Coase made in the The 
nature of the firm. In essence, tasks should performed by those who are more efficient. If the 
external agent can do it more efficiently then the firm should allow  them to perform the task 
instead of doing it itself. In the present example while the carbon initiative had good 
intentions, it might have been worth to consider that maybe the retailers are not the most 
efficient certifiers. At first glance it might have made sense, as they are they have the largest 
reputation incentive as well as they are likely to be in a good position to obtain information 
from producers. However, the costs of  certifying were too high and the consequences are 
that retailers are leaving the programme (like Tesco). Based on Coase, the solution would 
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have been simple: outsource certification to the most efficient agent. In simple terms, the 
retailer could simply buy the pre-certified and eco-labelled goods.   
6. Conclusions
The insights that can be drawn from this chapter can be extremely useful for designing an 
environmental policy as well as for eco-labelling organisations that wish to improve their 
performance. This concluding section will serve to point out what things can be taken from 
this chapter as policy recommendations, as well as future research.
6.1 Policy Recommendations
It is true that consumers do not always make the rational choices the regulator expects them 
to. Occasionally these deviations cause economic or regulatory tools to fail. However in the 
case of eco-labels, consumer behaviour does not head to an unexpected or undesired 
outcome. On the contrary, eco-labels are designed to communicate to consumers in simple 
terms. While the terms are simple they aren’t too simple as to undermine the consumers 
capacities. They aid consumers in providing credible signals in a very noisy environment. 
The inefficiency of  the environmental information market is not due to consumers decision 
making, it is due to the nature of the information. Nonetheless, consumers awareness about 
the existence of  eco-labels could be enhanced. This can be done via education, which has 
been done for some time now. Specifically the consumer should understand the impact of  its 
actions, as an individual and as part of  a community, on the environment. Consumers need 
to be aware of  product’s life cycles so they can discern what eco-labels or claims are more 
appropriate from their point of view. In addition to environmental education, consumers need 
to be media literate. This means that they need to understand that corporations and 
advertising are not always truthful in their claims. Furthermore, consumers need to know 
how to spot true eco-labels and other claims from false ones. 
To complement the educational efforts of  individuals, governments need to aid consumers 
by reducing the noise in the market. Eco-labels are clear signals that can aid in deterring 
greenwashing, but as long as there is more greenwashing than true eco-labels in the 
market, consumers will have a hard time differentiating between them. To achieve a critical 
mass of consumers that will tip the balance in favour of eco-labelling there are two options. 
The first option is via choice editing. Not necessarily by the government, but by retailers. 
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Some supermarkets already specialise in ‘sustainable’ products. In this scenario, the 
retailers pre-select the products they put on their shelves so no matter what the consumer 
choses it will be sustainable. This chapter did not look deeply into choice editing by 
intermediaries even though there is a large debate on the matter (in the UK for instance). 
This work considers these intermediaries as consumers (because they buy from the 
producers). The motivations these retailers may have are probably more akin to ‘corporate 
social responsibility’ as seen in Chapter III. Nonetheless, these ‘sustainable’ intermediaries 
create proper environments for a market for environmental or sustainable information. It is 
appropriate because this type of private choice editing helps to align consumers preferences 
with the goods that meet them. The consumer’s decision will be between different 
sustainable characteristics, prices and eco-labels (which will act as brands) which is exactly 
like a normal market. The second complement to education, could be a legal mechanism to 
accuse false environmental labels or claims, or in other words enforcement. However, the 
type of enforcement (public or private) that is required is not a matter of this research. 
6.2 Future Research
This chapter is built on research from many fields. However, one of  the points that would be 
very useful to develop is regarding neuro-science. It was discussed that through neuro-
imaging, scientists have already been able to establish that both the price-quality ratio and 
brand-recognition have neurological responses. Hence, this field could be extremely useful 
in other consumer matters. Hilke Plassman even suggested that it is possible that negative 
or positive environmental information may have a neurological reaction that shapes 
decisions. Furthermore, it would be extremely interesting, though maybe far-fetched, to 
attempt to map social and internal norms on a neurological level. However, these topics are 
not only out of the scope of this work but also out of our field of study.   
6.3 Final Remarks
Overall the central message of this chapter is that policies (public or private) and policy 
instruments such as eco-labels cannot assume that the consumer is rational. Specially if 
such policy depends on consumer behaviour for it to work. Designing a policy instrument or 
strategy assuming that consumers are rational, homo-economicus type beings will not be 
recommendable. It is not to say that such strategy will fail, however it might limit the tool’s 
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performance. For example, it has been pointed out that consumers will pay more attention to 
a problem that they have experienced first hand; hence, an eco-label can adapt its criteria 
and focus on that specific problem. While this chapter is not meant to be a ‘does and don’ts’ 
guideline for designing an eco-label, it does provide several useful insights. It is worth taking 
these behavioural peculiarities into account because they will allow  for eco-labels (or other 
instruments) to perform better. For example, how  the information is framed on the eco-label 
can make a huge difference on how consumers perceive the information. 
From this chapter it can also be inferred that behavioural failures might be contributing to the 
sub-optimal performance of  eco-labelling. Eco-labels provide consumers with accurate, 
verifiable and simple information, hence they have the potential to crowd out greenwash. 
However, this has not been the case. Whether this is because the environmental-good 
market is still too noisy due to too many labels, uncertainty regarding results and other 
greenwashing. All of which undermine the whole eco-labelling system by making it less 
credible. Or whether such sub-optimal performance is due to behavioural failures is not 
clear. It is possible that even when eco-labels provide credible signals consumers are unable 
to identify them due to the large amount of information they has to process.  
This chapter does not suggest that because of  the behavioural ‘peculiarities’ of consumers 
states should intervene to protect them. Consumers have the capacity to learn and to 
overcome obstacles and interventions might alter this process. There will an adjustment or 
learning period after which the market will reach a stable point or equilibrium. If  the mistakes 
are systematic and do not disappear, it might be a sign that some behavioural matter was 
overseen in the design of the instrument. It does not mean that the State has to intervene. 
Furthermore, as seen in this chapter education and information play a key role in forming 
consumer preferences and social norms. Hence, if  there were to be any normative 
prescription derived from this chapter, it would be that consumers should be kept informed 
and educated in environmental matters. 
Up to now  this work has been in essence a positive analyses of eco-labels from a market or 
economic perspective. First, in Chapter II it saw  eco-labels role in the market as a whole. 
Chapter III focused on the supply of eco-labels by focusing on businesses. This Chapter, on 
the other hand, analysed consumers, as the demand side of the eco-label market. However, 
to complete the story of eco-labels the focus will shift to a more normative side. Hence, the 
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following chapters will focus on determining the role of law  in eco-labelling. The next chapter 
will analyse what the current role of  law  in eco-labelling is. This will aid in answering the 
underlying questions of this work. As it will determine whether the current role of law  is 
appropriate or if it needs to be modified.  
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CHAPTER V
Eco-labels and Law
1. Introduction
Ideally, all environmental information would be certified and easily available for consumers 
by means of a mark or eco-label. It is a way to guarantee that the environmental information 
on a product is true. In addition, it would level the playing field as all producers would bare 
similar costs; therefore, it would enhance competition and free-trade. As seen in Chapter II, 
almost all environmental attributes have a credence nature; thus they require certification for 
their market to function. Nonetheless, some environmental goods might have search or 
experience characteristics. These do not need certification to communicate their attributes, 
since advertising, in theory, covers the function of providing information. This implies that 
there are two ways of communicating environmental attributes: advertising and certification. 
Advertising, will work specifically for those goods with environmental qualities that have a 
search or experience nature. On the other hand, certification is needed for products with 
environmental attributes of a credence nature. This means that there is a duality in the 
market for environmental goods which will have to be treated in different manner as they 
represent different issues. Some legal systems, such as the Anglo-American or Common-
Law  system this duality can be observed. Regulations for environmental information take the 
form of guidelines or voluntary standards for marketers (producers or sellers) that use 
environmental claims. These are generally issued by the advertising, standards or trade 
authority. In other words, they are dealt with by public laws and authorities. On the other 
hand, certification marks, are regulated by trademark laws. In previous chapters it has been 
detailed that eco-labels are considered certification marks; therefore the laws applicable to 
certification marks can be applicable to them too. The core of  the matter is that certification 
is a private institution not public like advertising. Hence as long as the good is certified it 
remains within the private sphere without public intervention. Hence the role of the law  and 
of the government are distinct in each case. However, the current legal structure has a major 
drawback: there is no process for eliminating false claims. As seen in Chapter II, false and 
misleading claims are deemed greenwashing. Greenwashing is a problem that weakens the 
whole environmental information market and stopping it should be a priority. Nonetheless, 
the regulations that are in place have not prevented or deterred greenwashing.
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The chapter will first focus on environmental self-declarations, as how  ever they are 
regulated will indirectly affect eco-labels. The second part of  the chapter will deal with the 
laws applicable to eco-labels. At this point, the EU Eco-label and the US Organic food label 
will be briefly reviewed as examples of labelling laws. In addition, the different ownership 
structures of  eco-labels will be pointed out as well as their benefits and pitfalls. The fourth 
part of this chapter will be a brief discussion of eco-labels within the WTO. Finally, the last 
section will develop the legal aspects of certification marks. Many jurisdictions do not have a 
specific eco-label regulation, however some do regulate certification marks. Hence it will be 
argued that certification mark laws could potentially be applicable to eco-labels too.
2. Dealing with Type II eco-labels or environmental self-declarations. 
According to the ISO-14021 environmental claims are statements, symbols or graphics on 
product package labels or in other forms such as product literature, advertising, technical 
bulletins or other sources of product information regarding the environmental friendliness of 
the product. These claims are made directly by manufacturers, importers, distributors, 
retailers or other stakeholders without third-party certification.1 Due to their characteristics, 
these environmental claims are considered advertising. While this type of  claims is not the 
specific topic of this analysis, how  they are regulated affects the eco-labelling sphere, 
because they share the same market. Therefore, if there were mistrust in environmental 
claims, eco-labels will also be mistrusted. In addition, if there were mechanisms to ensure 
that eco-labels functioned properly and were credible to consumers, they would be 
undermined if environmental claims were left unattended, and vice-versa. 
2.1 Rationale for regulating environmental advertising.
Advertising is not explicitly the topic of this analysis. However, because greenwashing 
comprises all environmental information that is available to the consumer it is important to 
know  how  it is regulated. Furthermore, eco-labels could potentially be considered as 
environmental advertising too. Hence, a brief review  of  why and how  environmental 
advertising is dealt with is appropriate. 
Advertising is a very powerful instrument as it literally has the capability of  modelling 
(manipulating) consumer preferences and values. Therefore it can be concluded that such 
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power over consumers should not be left unregulated (controlled, limited or even banned). 
However, advertising, specifically environmental advertising, is still desirable and beneficial. 
First of  all, as long as environmental advertising is focused on providing information about 
the environmental attributes, consumers will maximise their utility as they will purchase 
products with their preferred characteristics. Furthermore, there are benefits from the free-
flow  of  ideas, even if  the ideas are from advertising. This is because consumers are exposed 
to environmental issues and the ‘real’ costs of their consumption (even if  information is 
contradicting it can gain consumer’s interest). In this sense, even if consumers do not buy 
the product and push producers to alter their production methods into more friendly ones, 
they will become aware of the issues.2  Because of  the overall benefits and the need the 
market has for advertising (lowering information costs), advertisements are normally 
protected or shielded from ordinary suits or claims, both from consumers and competitors. 
Different jurisdictions address advertisement in different manners (either by precedent 
doctrines or statutes), but in general they all agree that it is illegal to deceive consumers into 
buying a product. Deceptive advertising laws are available in most jurisdictions and their aim 
is to protect consumers and to limit sellers. 
2.2 Environmental claim guides or standards
Environmental claims are normally regulated by standards. Specifically, voluntary standards 
are regarded as guidelines. This means that it is not mandatory to have environmental 
claims on the product, but if there is an environmental claim on the product, the standards 
should be observed. Among the countries that have environmental claim guides are the 
United States, United Kingdom, New  Zealand and Australia.3  These guide-lines have a 
public nature, as it is the trade or environmental authority who enacts and enforces them. 
However, some guide-lines, such as the ISO 14021,4  have a private nature. The ISO 
standards are enacted by a non-governmental international organisation,5  which is what 
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makes them private. Nonetheless, other private entities such as industry associations may 
also have their set of guidelines which are to be followed by the members of such 
association. This type of standards fall within the definition of self-regulation.6  The strength 
of the Standards varies dependent on whether the standards are enacted and/or enforced 
internally or if they have the backing of  an authority. When the guidelines or standards have 
the backing of  the authority, then it becomes co-regulation rather than mere self-regulation 
(though in practice the difference is dim). This is the case of the United Kingdom’s 
Advertising Standards Authority (ASA), who has enacted, within its advertising codes, 
specific standards for environmental claims. These are supposed to be met by the 
advertising industry and can be sanctioned if  not followed. This allows the authority to keep 
a closer eye on their members. 
These guidelines, usually provide key principles marketers should observe when making an 
environmental claim. Specifically, any environmental claim that is on the product has to be 
backed or supported with sufficient and adequate documentary evidence. Furthermore, if the 
science is inconclusive, the claims should not imply that they are facts. Absolute claims or 
wide-range claims, such as “environmentally-friendly” or “100% recyclable” are considered 
deceptive per-se, hence they should not be used. Finally, many of  these guides or standards 
provide a wide variety of definitions such as “local”, “biodegradable” and “recyclable” which 
are common terms used in the claims. The definitions in this type of  guides are non 
scientific. They are based on what consumers are likely to understand from the term. They 
do not define the terms in scientific or technical terms because doing so would risk creating 
environmental policy rather than advertising policy. In essence they are ‘safe harbours’ for 
marketers who want certainty on how  to make environmental claims.7 It is worth mentioning 
that once there is third-party certification (an eco-label), this type of regulation would no 
longer be a problem. This issue only concerns self-declarations or industry/supply-chain 
declarations.
2.3 Environmental Claims and Trademarks
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One of the most important tools of  advertising is the use of  trademarks. As seen in Chapter II 
trademarks serve to identify and distinguish competitors within a market. Moreover they are 
the direct link between consumers and producers. Thus if  the producer were to change 
consumer perception of its brand it would do so through its advertising and trademarks. In 
simple words, if producers want to appear ‘green’ or ‘sustainable’ they would communicate it 
in their trademarks and advertisement. This type of behaviour can be observed in the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office (USTPO); where in recent years there has been an 
increase of trademark filings for environmental claims. “By the end of the third quarter of 
2011, the USTPO search system database contained over 2000 pending applications and 
registrations that contain the term ‘organic’, over 4000 pending applications and registrations 
that contain the term ‘natural’ and over 500 pending applications and registrations that 
contain the term ‘sustainable.’”8 The terms organic, natural and sustainable were left out of 
the US’s Green Guides (the environmental claims standards mentioned in the previous 
section) definitions. “Organic” products have their own regulation, however it is independent 
from a trademark. Trademarks obtain their protection by distinctiveness, not by their 
characteristics. Therefore, a product can obtain the organic certification, in accordance to 
the law  and additionally ask for trademark protection. The USTPO does not check whether 
the product is in fact organic or not. At most it can refuse granting the trademark if it is not 
distinct enough. However, there is not much it can do to prevent greenwash. 
The USTPO is not the competent authority to deal with environmental claims. However, in 
order to prevent potential greenwashing, if  an application contains any of these ‘green’ terms 
and it is used for food products, cosmetics, cleaning preparations or pharmaceuticals, the 
USTPO will increase the reviewing standard. Specifically, it seeks to scrutinise these marks 
under the scope of false and deceptive trademark applications. However, false and 
deceptive trademarks9 are not the same as false and deceptive advertising. The USTPO can 
refuse granting trademark protection if the mark misdescribes the character, quality, function, 
composition or use of the goods; if  such misdescription misleads prospective purchasers 
and the misdescription affects the consumer decision to purchase significantly. However, 
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trademark applicants can overcome deceptiveness refusal by amending the identification of 
goods or services. Therefore, in the application when the applicant has to indicate what 
goods or services his mark will cover, instead of using the general term he has to use the 
‘relevant’ term. For example, “in the trademark application for a mark that includes the term 
organic, specify the application covers ‘organic coffee’ rather than just ‘coffee’.”10  The 
USTPO will not verify the percentage or if  the feature is present in the goods or services. 
Therefore, a greenwasher can obtain a trademark for organic coffee, when his product is 
normal coffee. There is not much the USTPO can do to address this problem, unless it is 
required to ask for verification prior to registration. However, when there is verification from a 
third-party it stops being a trademark and it is a certification trademark. However, 
certification trademarks are not for individual use and are an entirely different tool.11  A 
possible solution to this, is that third parties “question or challenge the use of a mark by 
another party that includes the term organic, natural or sustainable where the product is not 
as defined by the particular industry, or is only marginally so.”12 In other words, an industry 
or even an eco-label organisation could challenge a trademark if the term is already defined 
and the trademarked product does not adhere. A final concern regarding the use of 
trademarks, is that environmental claims describe attributes or characteristics, whereas, 
trademarks protect distinctiveness; therefore, it is not good to have many trademarks that 
say the same things as they will lose distinctiveness. 
3. Laws applicable to Eco-labels
In conveying environmental information certification outperforms advertising. This statement 
is true when the environmental characteristics have a credence nature (as the majority of 
them do). As seen in Chapter II certification is crucial for the existence of credence goods 
markets as they are the only way to provide unobservable information. Thus environmental 
certification schemes have to be able to ensure that their programmes are credible and 
rigourous. 13 To do so, the first challenge is to select a proper ownership and organisational 
structure. This structure should allow  an inclusive process for selecting the criteria and 
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guaranteeing independent certification of  the products. Furthermore, it should have the 
capacity to manage and monitor the use of  their certification mark. The second challenge is 
protecting the certification mark. Certification schemes are valuable precisely because of 
their function in information markets. Consequently, there is an incentive to forge and 
counterfeit these marks (as seen in Chapter II, false labels are increasing in the market). 
Certification marks need to be protected because counterfeit and fake eco-labels reduce 
their credibility. 
3.1 Organisational matters of eco-labels. 
Certification schemes14 in their simplest form, would consist of  a firm with a product it wants 
to certify and an independent certifier who evaluates the product. Once the product is 
approved the certifier can give the firm either a) its mark (the right to use it), or b) a 
certificate to prove to others that the products/services are certified. In the case of eco-
labels, the firms would go to the eco-labelling scheme, only after their product is certified by 
the independent certifier. At that point the eco-labelling scheme will authorise the firm to use 
the eco-label. Under this structure, the eco-labelling scheme establishes the criteria, grants 
the eco-label, monitors its use and sanctions in case of transgression. However, today’s 
large eco-labelling schemes also “accredit the certifiers.” In this sense, eco-labelling 
schemes control all the process: the establishment of standards, the assessment for 
compliance with the standards, the certification mark (the eco-label), the accreditation of the 
certifiers and the compliance monitoring. The eco-labelling scheme is the certification body. 
While it does not necessarily perform the certification assessment it-self, it is in charge of 
appointing and authorising/accrediting certifiers. The certification body and the certifier are 
independent entities. It is the eco-labelling schemes’ responsibility, via accreditation, to 
ensure and guarantee that these independent certifiers are competent, independent and 
impartial.
Eco-labelling schemes or environmental certification schemes own and control the 
environmental certification mark or eco-label. All certification schemes (not only sustainable 
ones) need to have certain characteristics (both legal and practical) to work properly. 
Regardless of  the legal form the environmental certification entity takes (profit, non-profit, 
governmental or hybrid), because it is the owner of  the certification mark or the eco-label, it 
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needs to comply with certain conditions dictated by the law. At a very basic level, the 
certification scheme needs to be incorporated. It has to be incorporated so that it has the 
legal capacity to own. In other words it needs to be able to own the certification mark or eco-
label. It can take any legal form it deems convenient. However, it has to take into 
consideration that owners of certification marks or certification trademarks15 have certain 
legal limitations. 
(a) The first limitation is that the owner of the certification mark is precluded from using 
the mark for the certified good, or services it covers. Therefore, it has to be independent 
of manufacturers, retailers and any other organisations involved in the trade of the 
certified goods and services.16 This principle is derived from the notion that it would not 
be in the public interest (or it would not be fair) for a person carrying on a trade in the 
goods or services certified, to act as a certifier.17 18 
(b) The second limitation is that the owner must have ‘authority to certify.’19 However, not 
all  the legislation explain what ‘authority’ or ‘competence’  to certify means. It can either 
imply that the scheme is competent to manage the certification mark or/and it can 
suggest that the scheme is competent due to its technical expertise on the field of 
certification. New  Zealand, for example, calls it ‘competency’, and it refers to the 
applicant’s competence to certify the goods and services and to operate the certification 
regime. “Competency is a question of the applicant’s ability to monitor and control the 
users of the certification mark.”20 The owner should have mechanisms to ensure that the 
certification mark will be properly used and safeguard the reputation of  the mark. It 
further defines internal and external competence. Internal competency refers to the ability 
to control the use of the mark and that is has the skills and resources to ensure 
certification is authoritative. External competency, refers to “the confidence of  the wider 
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section of the relevant trade in the owners ability to certify the particular goods or 
services.” 21  Therefore he has to prove his good reputation within the trade.  Due to the 
legal differences among countries, competence, authority or expertise does not mean the 
same, therefore certification entities should prepare a document “summarising the 
certifying body’s history, size, experience, special knowledge, and equipment, in hope 
that the information will satisfy the authority/expertise requirement.”22 
3.2 Ownership structure of eco-labels
The ownership structure of an eco-label does not really have a substantial impact on the 
eco-label itself. The process for setting the criteria, when done properly, is very similar in the 
different regimes. In very simple terms, the main difference between private and public eco-
labels “consists in the absence or presence of public intervention for the definition, the 
certification/or the monitoring process.”23  However, this ‘simple’ difference makes a large 
difference, specially in the legal and regulatory arenas. “Strictly private eco-labelling... will by 
its nature remain a market phenomenon.”24 Whereas in public-eco-labelling “the system is 
defined and/or organised by some regulatory authority.”25  The fact that there is a 
government body involved in the eco-labelling transforms it from a market phenomenon into 
a policy tool. Nonetheless the reality is that there is no clear cut distinction between private 
and public eco-labels. Collaboration between public and private entities is likely to happen at 
some point. 
The institutional design of the eco-label impacts the brand-reputation or the perception of  the 
label. Firms looking to apply for an eco-label should place more weight on complying with 
the criteria, and less on the ownership structure of  the eco-label owner. Nonetheless, many 
times the opposite is true. This might be because firms believe that their stake-holders will 
regard public eco-labels as “mechanisms to reduce the costs of monitoring and enforcing 
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23 Nicole Darnall, Matthew Protoski and Aseem Prakash. Sponsorship matters: assessing business 
participation in government- and Industry- Sponsored Voluntary Environmental Programs., p. 7.
24 John M. Crespi and Stephan Marette. Eco-labelling economics: is public involvement necessary?, p. 93.
25 Ibidem.
environmental regulations.”26 This can be seen as an advantage in certain industries that are 
prone to close governmental supervision (chemical, oil or hazardous waste). On the other 
hand, government-led eco-labels could be mistrusted due to their credibility. Governments 
are susceptible to be captured by the industry which would bias the criteria and might be 
undesirable for some firms. Private or non-profit eco-labels could be regarded as 
mechanisms to enhance environmental reputation, which would be desirable. However 
some firms believe that NGO sponsored eco-labels “are populated by environmentalists who 
lack concern about how  their environmental goals affect the regulated community’s profit 
seeking objectives.”27 On the other hand, the fact that environmentalists endorse the eco-
label could be advantageous from a reputation perspective.28 The ownership structure can 
have other consequences independently of what the prospective firms might think. The 
following figure illustrates how  eco-labels are going to be divided for the purpose of  this 
analysis. 
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Figure 1. Eco-label Ownership Structures
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28 Industry eco-labels, while considered popular in the 1990s create skepticism because their role is to protect 
and benefit the economic well-being of its members. Furthermore, they cannot own a certification mark. Industry 
marks are protected as ‘collective’ marks, which follow a different set of rules that certification marks, hence they 
are not part of this analysis.
3.2.1 Private eco-labels
Private eco-labels can either have a non-profit or for-profit status. The for-profit eco-labels 
are basically businesses that certify products for a price. Whereas non-profit eco-labels do 
not. The main advantage of private eco-labels is that they are capable of  maintaining 
autonomy. Their structure will allow  them to support industry or other stakeholder opposition. 
This is a benefit, as it allows the eco-label to be strict with the application of the criteria 
without secondary consequences. In short, a private certification firm is a business, which 
has the purpose to manage the eco-labels’ reputation. 
3.2.1.1 Eco-label schemes as Non-profit entities 
According to the Global Eco-label Monitor 2010 fifty-three percent of  eco-label schemes are 
non-profits. Grodsky explains that the non-profit structure is advantageous for certifiers as 
the trade authority (she refers to the FTC in the United States) does not have clear authority 
over them. Adopting a non-profit status can be advantageous over other forms. As seen 
above, a requisite to register a certification mark is that private environmental certifiers 
cannot participate in the production or sale of  the certified goods. Because non-profits, by 
definition, do not engage in commerce it will be easier for them to qualify for registration. 
Furthermore, to obtain non-profit corporate status and tax exempt status it is required to 
disclose financial relationships and other documentation for public inspection. Therefore, any 
potential or actual conflict of interest will be made evident which in turn will enhance 
credibility. Finally, the fact that the FTC does not have jurisdiction over non-profits can be 
relevant. It could imply that non-profits are likely to be less monitored by the FTC than 
private firms. However, courts could determine on a case-by-case basis that some non-
profits are de facto corporations subject to the FTC Act. 
3.2.1.2 Advantages of Private Eco-labels
Competition of eco-labels can only arise in a market where there are private eco-labels. 
Government eco-labels, because of their regulatory nature are likely to monopolise the 
market. However, the multiplicity of  eco-labels will allow  for the market to select what are the 
environmental matters they care about the most. As said in previous chapters, not all 
environmental problems are suitable to be addressed via eco-labels. The government 
should focus on the issues that go beyond eco-label’s scope by creating command-and-
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control or minimum standard regulations. It is true that too many eco-labels will also 
exacerbate consumer confusion. Nonetheless, eco-labels could specialise on different 
niches to avoid overlapping of criteria. Furthermore, dominant or salient eco-labels will 
eventually arise allowing consumers to focus on them.29 Alternatively, cooperation among 
eco-labels could occur, sharing know-how  or even creating ‘franchise’ type arrangements. 
Specialisation and dominance could control the quantity of eco-labels in the market. 
Furthermore, as seen further below, certification is extremely costly. Therefore, certification 
bodies can benefit from economies of scale in the certification ‘business’. They are likely to 
have better criteria implementation strategies as well as monitoring and compliance. This 
specialisation and economies of scale translate into lower costs for consumers. On the other 
hand, these high costs can also lead to a concentration of certification bodies. Hence, entry 
costs can also prevent the proliferation of eco-labels. 
3.2.1.3 Difficulties for Private Eco-labels
Certification is “characterised by high start-up and monitoring costs.”30 However, one of  the 
most costly parts of the eco-labelling scheme is the actual ‘certification’ (the evaluation or 
verification of the criteria). The actual evaluation of  products is done by the “appointed” 
certifiers. Thus, eco-labels have the responsibility to verify that such certifiers are 
independent and impartial. Furthermore, large eco-labels are likely to have more than one 
accredited certifier, which creates a type of ‘intra-brand‘ competition. Certification is a highly 
lucrative business, therefore there are strong financial incentives to certify as many products 
as possible. However, the business depends on the marketers decision to obtain the eco-
label. Therefore, “in order to attract more customers, certifiers impose the least stringent 
standards they can, and often ignore failings and defects that would prohibit certification.”31 
This is a potential conflict of  interest that hinders the certifiers independence and impartiality. 
Furthermore, it could impair the reputation of  the eco-label. In theory, these practices could 
make the certifier lose its accreditation with the eco-label. However, it would have to get 
caught first. The eco-label not only has to monitor the users of the eco-label, it also has to 
monitor and sanction the certifiers. 
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30 Ibidem.
31 Environmental Law Institute (ELI), Harnessing Consumer Power: using Certification systems to Promote 
Good Governance, p. 19. 
This potential conflict of interest can lead to another problem private eco-labels face: 
credibility. As it has been argued along this work, specifically in Chapter II, eco-labels 
depend on their reputation. In this case credibility and reputation go hand by hand. Just like 
firms will make investments for their reputation, they also make them to strengthen their 
credibility. Once these investments have been made it becomes too costly for firms to cheat 
the market, thus making them more credible. It is no coincidence that the most salient eco-
labels (at a global scale) are part of meta-standardisation organisations such as the 
International Social and Environmental Labelling Alliance (currently known as ISEAL 
Alliance). In other words these well-known certification schemes as well as accreditation 
bodies, are certified as certification schemes by a private meta-regulator. This ‘meta-
regulator’ sets the ‘standard for standards’ by developing codes of good practice for these 
certification and accreditation schemes. This type of  organisations have self-regulated, 
which has allowed them to reach a good credibility level. As mentioned before, the type of 
eco-labels that are part of this ISEAL Alliance are coincidentally those most that have the 
most representativeness in the global market. Such labels include the UTZ certified, 
Fairtrade International, Marine Stewardship Council, as well as the Forest Stewardship 
Council, among others which are less known32 but also equally important.33  Investments to 
be an accredited certifier or accreditation entity are quite costly and signal commitment and 
credibility. However, these type of  investments might not be suitable for smaller certification 
schemes from a national or regional level. Finally, these meta-regulators can only enforce 
the credibility of those that seek it, but do little in preventing greenwash which is what 
undermines the simple reputation mechanism in the first place. 
3.2.1.4 Private eco-labelling scheme’s liability
Eco-labelling schemes are complex certification schemes. From a broad point of view, they 
are considered certifiers. It is possible for them to certify directly or to appoint and accredit 
an independent certifier or certifiers. Therefore, eco-labelling schemes, just as any other 
certifier, can be held liable for the representations they make about a product’s attributes.34 
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certifiers or other accreditation bodies, therefore their mark is not seen on the end product. 
33 Fabrizio Cafaggi and Andrea Renda. Public and Private Regulation: Mapping the Labyrinth, p. 28; and for 
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34 Product liability and the liability of certifiers is a very large and interesting topic on its own, however it is not 
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Eco-labels and other certification marks convey the message that the product has been 
examined and that it complies with certain criteria. Therefore, “consumers and other parties 
could challenge environmental certifiers for misrepresenting product performance and 
competitors or public interest groups could challenge certifiers for making endorsements 
based on incomplete or inappropriate testing procedures.”35  These actions are based on 
negligent representation.36  In these cases, normally plaintiffs have to prove that the 
misrepresentation caused a harm or physical injury. “Parties raising negligent 
misrepresentation claims against environmental certifiers would face the same causation, 
damages and reliance problems plaintiffs face in misrepresentation suits against 
advertisers.” 37 However, it will be difficult to prove that the harm or physical injury was due 
to false environmental attributes. This might explain why cases against certifiers are 
normally in the safety and quality arena, not environmental. Consequently, plaintiffs could 
attempt “to prove that the representation was general enough to constitute a broad 
affirmation of quality, rather than a more limited environmental endorsement.”38 By arguing 
that the affirmation was a broad affirmation of quality, it is easier to  prove reliance. In other 
words, the decision of  buying depended on such representation. Nonetheless, even if the 
plaintiffs were able to prove negligent misrepresentation, recovery of damages would be 
extremely difficult because, “in most cases, damages from misleading advertising are non-
physical and minor.” Furthermore, proving economic losses is much more complicated than 
proving physical injury. This is because plaintiffs need to show  that the certifier had a 
pecuniary interest in the transaction.39  However, the most difficult part is that “the injured 
party must prove that reliance on the advertisement caused the damage.”40  Normally, this 
type of high cost involving minor damages are better solved through a class action remedy.41 
This is because for the individual, private enforcement mechanisms are too burdensome and 
might not outweigh the individual benefits.  However, pursuing the action might benefit the 
public at large, especially if  it is translated into the environmental arena. Therefore, it would 
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37 Jamie A. Grodsky. Certified Green: Op. cit., p. 202-203
38 Ibidem
39 Non-profits would have an advantage over for-profits in this case
40 Jamie A. Grodsky. Op. cit., p. 161-162
41 Idem, p. 162
make sense to use these type of private enforcement mechanisms to correct this type of 
behaviour.42 Regardless of the potential complications for suing a private eco-label it is still 
preferable to not having any recourse  against deceptive eco-labels. Specifically, it is not 
clear what type of recourse would an individual have if a public eco-label were deceptive. 
3.2.2 Public eco-labels
Public eco-labels are those eco-labelling schemes in which the government assumes an 
active role. “The scope and type of  government involvement, however, varies among 
programmes. In the Japanese program, for example, the government provides all technical, 
research and administrative support. In the German and Canadian programs, the 
government personnel and certification authorities share responsibilities. In Sweden, Finland 
and France, standardisation institutes oversee the process from developing product 
categories and criteria to executing contracts with manufacturers who seek to use the label. 
The Austrian and Canadian programs require that the environmental label jury submit 
recommendations on product categories and criteria to the minister of  environment for final 
approval.”43 It is easy for governments to find technical expertise at the time of creating and 
evaluating the standards. It has more resources (financial and human) to access current 
technologies and environmental information. In addition it is a good forum for the democratic 
and inclusive process of setting the standards, as it has the capacity to bring the relevant 
stakeholders to the discussions. 
3.2.2.1 Advantages of a public-eco-label
Overall the biggest advantage is the government’s capacity to endure high expenditures. As 
mentioned before certification can be very costly. However, governments use public funds, 
therefore they might have to justify such expenditures. Although public eco-labels offer other 
advantages over private eco-labels in terms of credibility, accountability, and some times, 
technical expertise. 
Firms may also find the advantages in public eco-labels. Their voluntary nature presumes 
good will from the firm and the intention to be compliant. The relation between firms and 
governments can be complicated and firms might not want to willingly entangle themselves 
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even more with regulatory matters. “Nevertheless, under some conditions, organisations 
may believe that the benefits derived from increased goodwill with regulatory stakeholders 
exceed the costs of additional oversight.”44 If firms are in good terms with the government, 
the latter might be inclined to monitor less frequently, or if there were a small compliance 
problem they might consider it a mistake. This type of  reasoning is part of what is known as 
cooperative enforcement. With this type of  approach (which can take several forms) 
compliance is  achieved  through cooperation between regulators and regulatees. 
Regulatees will cooperate with the authority, as opposed to being its adversary, which may 
result in higher compliance levels in comparison to other enforcement mechanisms.45 Thus 
participating in a public eco-label might be interpreted as a sign that the firm is willing to 
cooperate. 
It is suggested that eco-labels and other similar programmes can preempt more stringent 
regulations. In theory, firms signal that they are already doing more than the minimum, 
therefore there is no need to create more stringent rules. In the same sense, firms that join 
public eco-labels may want to convey the image that they do not pose a major threat to the 
environment.46 Finally, adhering to a public eco-label is a strong commitment (stronger than 
with private-led eco-labels) for two reasons:first, it can be held accountable to the new 
criteria he is committing to; secondly, exiting the eco-label might be a problem as they will 
invite unwanted attention from the government.47  Not being able to comply with standards 
once the eco-label is awarded will not be well seen.48 On the other hand, to avoid this moral-
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46 Nicole Darnall, Matthew Protoski and Aseem Prakash. Op. cit., p. 8290
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48 This unwanted attention brought upon leaving an eco-label is not exclusive to government eco-labels. In 
summer 2012 L’Occitane and Yves Rocher (among others) lost the Leaping Bunny mark, which recognises that 
cosmetics are free from animal testing. These brands lost the mark for non-compliance to the criteria (which was 
recently updated). This led to a large amount of negative publicity. It would be interesting to measure if this led to 
any tangible losses, which can be an interesting case to study in further research. 
hazard type behaviours public eco-labels would have to invest in monitoring and 
compliance.49
3.2.2.2 Difficulties of public eco-labels
Certification is meant to be a ‘reward’ for firms or brands that have high environmental 
performance. Their purpose is to distinguish high performance firms from their competitors. 
Hence, they are not meant to be granted to all firms within an industry or sector. 
Consequently, “it would be extremely difficult for a governmental program, bound by formal 
review  and comment procedures, to withstand industry opposition to selection criteria that 
could deny certification to a high percentage of products in a given industry.” 50 This is due to 
the voluntary nature of eco-labelling. Nonetheless, governments have other tools at their 
hands such as mandatory minimum standards and other command-and-control 
approaches.51  In the environmental arena “command and control-regulations have led to 
impressive reductions in pollution levels.”52  Governments have the resources and the 
information to tackle many imminent environmental threats and have many times succeeded 
at abating environmental threats altogether.    The eco-labelling mechanism is not immediate 
and depends entirely on consumer interest. Hence, if  the environmental problem is critical or 
significant other approaches might be called for. Some industries will benefit more from an 
alternative mechanism, such as eco-labels, than others. This means that the type of 
environmental threats, industries and markets involved will all have to be taken into 
consideration when determining if an eco-label is appropriate.  For example, in the Dolphin-
Tuna situation discussed in Chapter VII, it can be observed that the United States opted for 
a voluntary measure while Mexico opted for a mandatory minimum standard. The result is 
that by volume of tuna fished, Mexico has almost zero dolphin by-catch while in the United 
States those numbers cannot be attained because the measure is voluntary. 
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3.2.3 Public-private or hybrid eco-labelling scheme
There are no limits in how  an eco-label can be organised as long as it is considered capable 
of owning a certification mark. From the previous sections it can be inferred that private eco-
labels are better at managing the eco-label, while governments are better in providing 
resources. Moreover, government endorsement gives eco-labels an additional measure of 
credibility and public visibility.53  Government participation could also take the form of 
approving and registering the existing eco-labels, so it can have control over their criteria 
(avoid overlapping criteria) and also to control quality of the eco-labels. In Australia, for 
example, the application of the certification mark has to be reviewed and approved by the 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission. This example shows that governments 
could enact a type of mandatory reviews to back or endorse eco-labels. In addition, during 
the negotiation of  criteria it is possible to seek support of the governmental agency on the 
specific topic. For example, if  the eco-label is concerning fish the competent fisheries 
authority should be included. What’s more, these agencies could have some sort of 
participation in the eco-label board, to make the link even stronger. Governments as well as 
public academic institutions could provide valuable technical expertise for eco-labelling 
schemes. Furthermore, these arrangements prove that governments do not have to invest 
so many resources in creating an institutional structure to manage eco-labels. Managing and 
other tasks can be easily delegated to private entities, while the government participation is 
limited to certain decision-making aspects. Hybrid eco-labels would be a desirable design for 
eco-labelling as they take advantage of the public and private capabilities. 
3.3 Other labelling models
There are other certification and labelling regimes that due to their peculiarities provide 
insights on how  eco-labels could be designed or even regulated. It is important to notice that 
the United States and Europe have had different approaches in these matters. In the United 
States eco-labels are normally private, whereas Europe has a tradition of  governmental 
certifications (though there are private eco-labels in the market). This is probably due to the 
need to create uniformity of  standards that would allow  market access within the European 
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markets (specially in its earlier stages). A clear example is the CE mark.54 The CE mark is a 
mandatory conformity mark.55 It is a declaration by the manufacturer that his product meets 
all relevant European safety, health and environmental protection requirements. Its purpose 
is to enable free movement of products within the European market. Following similar 
motivations as the CE,  public-eco-labels are dominant in the European market, starting with 
the German ‘Blue Angel’. The Blue Angel has served as a guide for other governmental eco-
labels including the EU Eco-label or flower, which will be briefly analysed below. This clearly 
shows a tendency and the weight that European countries give to harmonisation of criteria. 
The United States does have labelling laws in place. For example, the Nutrition Labelling 
and Education Act, along with the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act) and 
the Fair Packaging and Labelling Act are all Federal laws governing labelling and packaging 
for food products under FDA's jurisdiction. These regulations are not voluntary, every food, 
drug and cosmetic sold in the US has to follow  its provisions.56 It is an example of a labelling 
law. Nonetheless, the US provides a good example of a regulation of a voluntary certification 
scheme, which is the Organic Foods Production Act of 1990 (hereinafter OFPA). The OFPA 
creates the USDA Organic label, which is the sole organic label in the United States. This 
USDA organic label will also be briefly analysed below. 
3.3.1 The USDA Organic Label
Organic products share many similarities with eco-labels, so much that they could be 
considered an eco-label. The main difference is that their purpose is to appeal to health and 
wellness benefits of a product rather than to its environmental benefits. The products might 
have environmental benefits, but they are secondary. Nonetheless, the average consumer’s 
“willingness to pay a premium for products bearing the ‘organic’ label is based, in significant 
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that have not been defined by the FDA and bars any health claims unless pre-approved by the agency. 
part, on the perception that s/he will receive a product with special attributes.”57  These 
special attributes create a brand image that justifies the increased cost. In this sense, the 
mechanism is exactly the same as eco-labels (the difference is in the consumer’s 
preferences and motivations). Organic products are much more popular and can command 
a higher price than eco-labels. However, this was not always the case. “Prior to 1990, there 
were no regulations governing organic standards or product labelling; instead, private 
companies created their own standards and certifications.” At some point, there was an 
immense proliferation of  organic  products that confused consumers and retailers to a point 
that they became reluctant to purchase organic products. “Consumers were unable to find 
organic food in major supermarkets because of  ‘large food distributors’ skepticism regarding 
organic claims and their inability to work directly with growers on certification.”58 
Consequently, the United States Congress enacted the Organic Foods Production Act of 
1990 to solve this confusion. In essence the OFPA establishes standards governing the 
marketing of agricultural products as organically produced; it assures that organic products 
are consistent with the standard; and it facilitates interstate trade. These national standards 
allow  that “farmers know  the rules, so that consumers are sure to get what they pay for, and 
so national and international trade in organic foods may prosper.”59 This standard does not 
promote “the healthiness or nutritional quality of organic products;”60 it is simply a marketing 
oriented statute designed to reduce consumer confusion. 
The responsibility of  the establishment of  the standards was delegated by the OFPA to the 
US Department of  Agriculture (USDA). The Act also created the National Organic Program. 
“The NOP created standards with the input of the National Organics Standards Board, which 
was composed of farmers, handlers, retailers, consumers, environmentalists, and scientists 
appointed by the Secretary of Agriculture.”61  It was only until December 2000 that the 
standards were made available. “These Standards replaced a jumble of  state rules and 
varying private certification standards, providing a national definition of the term ‘organic’ by 
detailing the methods, practices, and substances that can be used in producing and 
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handling organic crops, livestock, and processed products.”62  The criteria also include 
prohibitions, therefore if a product is to be considered organic it cannot use genetic 
engineering, antibiotics, ionising radiation, and/or sewage sludge during production.63  For 
example, the criteria do not allow  the use of petroleum based fertilisers or other common 
fertilisers (even if  they are biodegradable or compostable). To protect their plants from 
diseases, farmers are allowed to use copper (to treat fungal diseases). However, copper is 
toxic and stays in the soil forever, unlike biodegradable pesticides. Therefore, there is no 
guarantee that the organic product is safer or healthier.64 Furthermore, not all pesticides are 
bad and the risks the farmers take for not using pesticides can be quite high, which is also 
reflected in the prices.
To complement the standards, the USDA can accredit state or private entities, the USDA-
accredited agents, to certify farms or handling operations that produce organic products. 
“Only products that originate from USDA certified farms or handling operations can be 
labelled as ‘organic.’”65  Therefore, the organic producers are able to select their own 
‘accrediting agent’ to obtain the organic certification.66  The USDA accredited certifiers or 
agents can suspend and revoke certifications. Additionally, they have to “conduct annual on-
site inspections of  each certified operation, and may conduct unannounced inspections and 
residue tests of  organically grown produce at any time.” Nonetheless, once the product has 
the certification, it is allowed to use the USDA Organic Seal. The statute provides for civil 
penalties up to $10,000 for  fraudulent labelling.67  An important criticism of  the USDA 
accredited certifiers, is that like any other private certifier they may have a conflict of  interest. 
To solve this problem a “fourth-party” certification model has been proposed. In this model 
“manufacturers seeking certification pay into a general fund administered by the government 
or a third-party partner of the government, which then randomly assigns a certifier to a 
project and pays the certifier from the general fund.”53 This simple mechanism would ensure 
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the impartiality of  the certifier. Furthermore, as the government is already managing the 
programme it might as well manage it financially. 
The statutes have created controversy within the organic farming community. “In particular 
some farmers, whose standards from organic production exceed that of the USDA’s, worry 
that the national uniform standards will compromise their ability to differentiate their products 
in the marketplace and therefore eliminate their competitive edge over other organic 
producers.”68 These producers claim that the mandatory standards are not stringent enough. 
Furthermore many argue that the main problem is that they eliminated competition among 
the certification systems, thereby eliminating “market based incentives for more progressive 
and cutting edge standards for organic farming.”69 This is precisely the risk of creating a 
universal eco-label. That by tying it to governmental mandate, the review  and actualisation 
of standards can become increasingly complicated and eco-labels with more stringent or 
higher quality criteria will not be able to differentiate themselves from others who ‘barely’ 
meet the standards. Finally, the widespread use of  the organic mark can dilute its 
‘distinctive’ effect.  “Thus, brand owners should think twice about the merits of  adopting 
these types of marks going forward.”70 Specially if the product has a higher quality than that 
mandated by the law. 
3.3.2 The EU Eco-label
In 1992, the EU launched its EU "Flower" eco-label to serve as a uniform certification 
scheme for "green" products and services.71  In 2008 it underwent a thorough impact 
assessment or review  which has led to several important modifications. The assessment 
concluded that the EU eco-label was ‘unable to achieve its objectives’ because it suffered 
from low   awareness (consumers and industry alike), low  industry uptake, uneven 
geographic coverage and ‘excessively bureaucratic processes and management.’ In 2008 
only 754 licences had been issued72  and it had even lower consumer acceptance (or 
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69 Idem, p.7-8
70 Julia Anne Matheson and Anna Balishina Naydonov. The greenwashing effect: Americans are Becoming 
Eco-cynical. E-commerce Times, January 29, 2009. http://www.finnegan.com/resources/articles/
articlesdetail.aspx?news=f20457ef-4912-41c4-9427-54af06aacbb3
71 The scheme constructed under regulation 1980/2000.
72 http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ecolabel/facts-and-figures.html
awareness). “The EC noted that the strongest economic benefit arising from an eco-labelling 
scheme is the ‘promotion of  innovation in both process design and production techniques’ 
that arises when consumers demand green products.”73 Therefore, it was decided to review 
and modify the eco-label to increase both its supply and demand. The numbers indicate that 
the changes have had a positive outcome, as the number of licenses to use the eco-label in 
January of 2012 had increased to 1,300.
EU’s regulation basically focuses on setting processes and procedures in place rather than 
legislating specific standards for firms to obey. The measures adopted in 2008 to increase 
the market uptake of the EU eco-label include: 
• Increasing the label’s scope and the number of product groups;74 
• Encouraging harmonisation of the scheme with other national, regional and even private or 
industry (such as ISO) eco-labelling schemes, speeding up the criteria development 
process;75 
• Simplifying assessment and verification schemes;76
• Lowering annual fees; 
• Increasing eco-label marketing efforts and funding; and,
• Modification of the logo.77 
Among the biggest changes is that member states have to designate a Competent Body. 
These competent bodies are regulated by Article 4 of the EU Eco-label Regulation and its 
Annex V.78  In essence competent bodies can be public or private but they must be 
independent of  the organisation or product it assesses.79 Competent bodies must have the 
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73 Jeffrey J. Minneti. Op. cit., p. 1358
74 There are currently 12 product categories under development, including food and beverage, and cosmetics. 
75 The criteria for the product categories can be proposed and developed by different stakeholders, including 
private firms. This reduces the bureaucratic process of developing standards and brings it closer to the market.
76 Delegating to Competent Bodies, which are certification bodies appointed by each member state 
77 Rugile Balzekaite, European Commission. “The New EU Eco-label Regulation” Global Eco-labelling Network, 
Presentation prepared for annual meeting, November 19, 2009, Kobe Japan. 
78 Regulation (EC) No 66/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25November 2009 on the EU 
Ecolabel.
79 Number 1, Annex V, EU Ecolabel Regulation. 
necessary technical expertise, experience, and means to perform conformity assessments 
or certification. However they must be independent from the trade of products or services it 
certifies. In other words, they are not allowed to design, manufacture, supply, install, 
purchase, own, use or give maintenance to the products they assess.80  Competent bodies 
including their top management and personnel have to guarantee their impartiality. To 
ensure this impartiality the Regulation states that “The remuneration of  the top-level 
management and assessment personnel of  a competent body shall not depend on the 
number of  assessments carried out or on the results of those assessments.”81 By creating 
this rule, the Regulation attempts to reduce potential conflict of  interests that are due to arise 
in normal certification processes. By delegating all these responsibilities to the competent 
bodies, the European Commission has no direct “enforcement mechanism to ensure that 
parties charged with responsibilities under the regulation... conform their actions to the 
Regulation.”82  In other words it cannot inspect, monitor or sue the member states.83  In 
essence, the role of  the Commission has been reduced to reviewing and assessing the 
criteria for each product category.
4. Possible Legal Issues with Public Eco-labels within the WTO 84
Since the apparition of the first eco-labels many commentators immediately had 
international-trade concerns. It has been continuously argued that eco-labels could impair 
market access and impose an unnecessary burden on manufacturers, especially on those 
from developing countries.85 International trade is governed by the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO), which has a set of treaties and rules that control the trade-flow  among its members. 
“The WTO’s stated objective is to prevent impediments to free-trade, and because 
certification systems often have the effect of restricting trade based on how  a product was 
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81 Number 6, Annex V, EU Ecolabel Regulation.
82 Jeffrey J. Minneti. Op. cit., p. 1362
83 Similarly, citizens do not have a mechanism to bring suit against non-compliant regulated entities (competent 
bodies) and can only bring suit against governing bodies in limited circumstances.
84 While the WTO issues are not a topic of this thesis, they are worth a minimum review to understand the 
possible issues that might arise with government-based programmes on an international level. The main reason 
they are not going to be fully reviewed is that there is a vast literature and specialized terminology. Furthermore, 
it can be argued that the WTO solely applies to public policies and many eco-labels have a private nature. 
85 Specifically, developing countries have resisted Process and Production Methods or PPM-based labelling 
because they claim they limit their market access based on environmental and social standards of developed 
countries, making it impractical for them to comply. 
made, they can give rise to claims that a specific system or regulation poses a barrier to free 
trade.” 86  Whether certification goes against the principles and rules of the WTO is still of 
major concern and there is no definitive standing on the matter.87 The most relevant WTO 
Treaties for certification matters are the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). The GATT is more general and it 
contains the basic rules and principles of  the international trade system. These principles 
are: 
- Most Favoured Nation (contained in Article I), which prohibits any measures that 
discriminate between like products from different member countries. In simple terms, what 
ever benefits you grant to a member country should be extended to the other members (of 
course there are exceptions that allow  the creation of  Free Trade Agreements/Zones 
between limited members, Art XXIV). 
- National Treatment (Article III), prohibits measures that discriminate between foreign and 
domestic “like products”. 
- Article XI prohibits quantitative restrictions, such as bans, quotas, or import licenses, on the 
import or export of  ‘like products’. In essence, only taxes and duties (other charges that 
arise from import or export of goods) are allowed to ‘control’ international trade flows. 
The GATT  also provides an ‘umbrella’ or ‘chapeau’ of  exceptions to the general rules, 
including the three main principles (Article XX).88 Specifically, it permits measures to protect 
human, animal or plant life or health.89  It also allows the use of  measures relating to the 
conservation of exhaustible natural resources, aimed at preserving such natural resources.90 
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87 In the latest case on the subject, United States - Measures concerning the importation, marketing and sale of 
tuna and tuna products,  it was found that the criteria of the US ‘dolphin-safe’ labelling is considered a Technical 
Barrier to Trade. In addition the programme was found to be more trade restrictive than necessary to fulfil the 
legitimate objectives of avoiding consumers deception and dolphin protection. The issue remains because it is 
not clear that all eco-labels’ criteria are a technical Barrier to trade. The Dolphin policy in the US is, but that eco-
label in particular is not a common type of eco-label, hence it would be incorrect to apply such analysis to other 
programmes. For further discussion see Chapter VII.
88 With the condition that they are not applied in an arbitrary or unjustifiable way, or as a disguise for a restriction 
to trade.
89 Article XX(b), GATT
90 Article XX (g), GATT
The TBT further regulates the use of non-tariff barriers to trade. This treaty specifically 
regulates both mandatory technical regulations and voluntary standards, even if they are 
imposed by non-governmental organisations. Measures restricting non-product related 
PPM’s have often raised controversy over their WTO-consistency. “Although government 
eco-labelling requirements are generally considered legitimate’ technical regulations’ under 
the TBT Agreement, potential trade disputes can arise with respect to eco-labelling 
requirements based on on-product related PPMs.”91  In essence ‘technical regulations’ are 
mandatory standards enacted by the government, whereas ‘standards’ are defined as 
voluntary, approved by a recognised body and intended for common and repeated use. The 
TBT allows the use of  non-governmental certification systems. These certification systems 
are unlikely to raise any WTO concerns, because they are voluntary and they are developed 
by non-governmental actors and they do not depend on government participation. Moreover, 
“only governments are required to comply with GATT.”92  Government or public 
certification systems are more susceptible to WTO conflicts. However, if there were a conflict 
there is still room for arguments and interpretation. In addition, the WTO is much more 
cautious with measures such as bans or embargoes  than  with less restricting measures 
such as eco-labelling requirements. Labelling requirements, in general, are much easier to 
justify under the article XX ‘chapeau’ than a ban. “However, government eco-labelling 
requirements are certainly not immune from claims of  WTO inconsistency.” The criteria 
would have to be properly defined to avoid being bluntly discriminatory or protectionist.93 In 
addition, hybrid eco-labelling schemes, would also have to consider carefully how  the 
government intervenes and to what degree. In the tuna-dolphin case,  which is described in 
Chapter VII, originally the US supported a private labelling programme by backing it up with 
a public law. This action, in addition to other measures managed to create a de facto ban on 
Mexican Tuna in the US. Not all co-regulation will lead to the Tuna-Dolphin scenario, 
nonetheless it is important for governments to foresee the impacts of  its interventions. 
Governments need to understand their obligations before these international entities before 
committing to support, participate or create voluntary certification schemes. In other words, 
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co-regulation or hybrid schemes have to be carefully analysed to determine whether they 
comply with WTO or other applicable laws.
The recent dispute regarding the Tuna-Dolphin conflict is regarding eco-labels. However, as 
it will be seen in Chapter VII it is not possible to draw  general conclusions from it, as it is a 
very peculiar situation. This is because the eco-labels involved are public and single-criteria 
eco-labels. Specifically, both the Inter-American Dolphin Conservation Programme and the 
United State’s Dolphin Consumer Information Act eco-labels are created and managed by 
governmental bodies. Therefore, it is not possible to compare these two very specific 
programmes to eco-labels such as the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) eco-label. The 
MSC (as many others) is a private certification body administered by an NGO. Furthermore, 
the ‘dolphin-safe’ eco-label is a single-attribute eco-label. Single attribute eco-labels are not 
very common, as they are very limited in their scope (one industry, one product). All this 
makes ‘dolphin-safe’ labels very specific and different from commonly used eco-labels. 
Consequently it is not possible to derive the WTO’s standing on eco-labels with this case. 
Nonetheless, eco-labels have been in the WTO’s agenda for quite some time. However, the 
recent negotiations have had more urgent difficulties to solve and there is still no final 
‘official’ stand on eco-labelling. 
5. Eco-labels as Certification Marks
In Chapter II it was concluded that eco-labels are environmental certification marks.94  In this 
Section we will recall and build on the findings of Chapter II regarding certification marks 
from a legal perspective. Furthermore, a brief analysis of the current legislation will be 
presented with the purpose to possibly build-in or modify it in light of the specific needs of 
eco-labels. 
5.1 Legal Rationale for Certification Mark Regulations
The rationale for protecting certification marks is that their registration and protection is in 
the public interest. This is because eco-labels (as well as other certification marks) provide a 
type of proof  or guarantee that the good has the attributes it claims it has. This proof can 
become very valuable, specially when consumers are faced with so much environmental 
information. Eco-labels have an important function in the environmental information market. 
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Hence, they “must be protected from counterfeiting and infringement through the world’s 
existing trademark law  systems.”95 Eco-labels are very easy to imitate, and as mentioned 
before, there is a large incentive to do so. Counterfeiting and other illicit use96 of eco-labels 
damages eco-labels credibility compromising the effectiveness of the entire system. 
Notwithstanding the above, some argue that eco-labels and certification marks promote a 
more substantial public interest: “it promotes ‘free and open competition’ amongst the 
producers and distributors of  certified products. Based on simple economic principles, such 
competition in turn results in the best price and quality for consumers.”97 Therefore it is not 
only a matter of protecting certification marks, but it is also important to give them a 
regulatory environment that ensures a maximum competitive advantage for the certification 
bodies. Eco-labels would benefit from this type of environment as they would be able to 
manage the eco-labels properly, thereby strengthening their credibility and their 
informational function as well. 
With the increasing popularity of eco-labels and the demand for ‘proof’ of  environmental 
quality, eco-labels (as well as other certifying entities) “are finding that the growing market 
for new  certification marks has outpaced the ability of  many countries’ legal systems to 
effectively protect certification marks.”98  It is precisely this increase in the interest in 
certification marks that has shifted the focus of  many firms to Intellectual Property protection. 
However, the use of certification marks is not as widespread as other industrial property 
tools such as trademarks or geographical indications. It has been pointed out that many 
firms are attempting to register their environmental logos (both claims or eco-labels) as 
trademarks. This means, that they understand that IP protection is  the adequate type of 
protection, what they do not consider is that trademarks are not the right tools.  Certification 
marks, which are the right instrument, are considerably unknown. Not all countries 
contemplate them in their legislation; and, even countries, such as the United States, that do 
contemplate certification marks still face a large number for trademark applications. While 
ignorance is a good explanation, it might not be the only one. It is possible that marketers 
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96 Use in the course of trade a sign identical or similar to the registered certification mark in relation to similar 
goods or services, that is likely to confuse or create an association with the registered mark. 
97 B. Brett Heavner and Naresh Kilaru. Small Potatoes: Resolving Conflicting Trademark Laws in the United 
States. Trademark World, October 2004.
98 B. Brett Heavner and Michael R. Justus, Op. cit.
know  the marketing impact of  an eco-label and try to reap its benefits without certifying (or 
changing anything). In other words they knowing and willingly greenwash. To finalise, they 
will register the slogan or mark they will use in their ‘green’ campaign as a trademark to 
legitimise it.  The problem is that the trademark authority cannot do much to prevent this 
type of scenarios, as it is completely out of its jurisdiction. 
5.2 Certification Marks: Legal Implications 
As mentioned earlier, the Common Law  legal systems have included certification marks in 
their legislation. They are normally, included in the Trade Mark Laws and share many of their 
procedures.99 On the one hand the analysis of certification marks from a legal perspective 
can lead to discussions regarding their liability, their contractual or quasi contractual nature 
and the role the proprietors play in the enforcement of greenwash. On the other hand, the 
actual Laws that govern certification marks are very pragmatic. As it will be reviewed ahead, 
the laws mainly deal with registration matters. 
5.2.1 Certification Marks’ guarantee function
Regarding eco-labels as certification marks makes them different than traditional information 
disseminating or marketing tools. Certification marks have a statutory function of a 
guarantee. Certification marks indicate that the goods have been certified to approved 
quality standards. Therefore, the criteria that have been certified become part of  the 
product’s characteristics (description and quality). This assurance of  quality is similar to the 
notion of  quality in a contractual setting. In other words, the certified criteria become part of 
the contract terms. “As a matter of  law  every item in a description which constitutes a 
substantial ingredient in the ‘identity’ of the thing sold is a condition.”100  For instance, 
biodiversity protection becomes a substantial ingredient in a specific product when there is a 
certification mark on it. However, if  the same product has some label suggesting it protects 
biodiversity (environmental marketing) but it is not certified, this characteristic does not 
become a substantial ingredient. This of  course has serious implications for the producer 
and the certifier. If  the certified characteristics are considered contractual terms and their 
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before other authorities. The reason why they are not processed in the same place is unclear. In some countries, 
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product does not meet the criteria it can be considered breach of contract or breach of 
warranty. Non-certified environmental labels do not grant this type of security (cause of 
action); hence, for certification marks the consequences for misrepresenting the mark are 
much more severe. Therefore it is an incentive for the mark to be truthful. Moreover, as the 
assurance goes beyond reputational matters, it gives certification marks credibility. 
To add to the credibility, at the time of registration the proprietor of  the mark has to deliver 
the criteria that will be subject to certification. By the mere registration process, the criteria 
and all the other regulations become available to the public. Therefore, the criteria are public 
and they can be considered part of  the product’s description and quality, as in any other 
contractual setting. 
5.2.2 Use of the certification mark: contract
In addition to the quasi contractual nature of the certified criteria, there is also an explicit 
contract between certifier and the manufacturer (or marketer). As it can be recalled from 
Chapter II, the eco-label organisation, which is the owner of the certification mark 
(certification mark proprietor) licences the use of the mark to the people that have obtained 
the certification by an accredited (or recognised) certifier. In this sense, the manufacturer or 
marketer of the certified product is obliged for the duration of  the contract to see that the 
criteria are met. If  the licensee is found at fault, it is simply considered breach of  contract. 
When breach or any other fault occurs, the eco-label will be entitled to sanction the 
wrongdoer as it was agreed beforehand.  
5.2.3 Responsibility of the certifier
It has been a common discussion that certifiers cannot vouch for the totality of  the goods the 
certifier sells. Therefore they cannot be held responsible when a particular product does not 
have the characteristics it is supposed to have (that is manufacturer’s responsibility). At most 
certifiers can be negligent for non-detection of the faults in the criteria or of the overall 
product design. While this might be true for certain products, with eco-labels this discussion 
is not very relevant. Eco-label criteria are normally process-based criteria or non-product-
related production methods, which do not reflect (as the name suggests) on the final 
product. Therefore, the eco-label and its accredited certifiers normally vouch for the process 
the product undergoes and/or the conditions under which it is produced. Therefore if the a 
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farm is certified under an eco-labelling coffee it is likely that all the coffee from that farm will 
conform to the standards. In the circumstance that the end product cannot guarantee that 
the 100% of the product is certified it normally says so, by stating that it contains a 
percentage of certified product or it comes from mixed sources.
5.2.4 Differences between certification marks as intellectual property and deceptive 
advertising
In the countries in which certification marks are regulated it is normally comprehended within 
trademark law. When considering eco-labels as certification marks under Intellectual 
Property Law, consumer welfare takes a secondary role. “The mainstream perception is that 
certification marks -like trade marks- exist primarily to protect traders or groups of traders 
from each other and have only an indirect bearing on consumer protection.”101  The main 
purpose of  Intellectual Property rights is to recognise and endow  the mark’s proprietor with 
actions to protect their interests against competitors. In this sense, the owner of a 
certification mark, “through his right to sue from infringement, is cast by trade mark law  in the 
putative role of guardian of the consumer’s interests as well as his own.”102 In deceptive 
marketing actions, which might not be clear cut, the government or some agency will have to 
represent consumers interest. With intellectual property rights, consumers interest is 
ensured indirectly through traders rights. This is an advantage over deceptive marketing 
actions as the burden of challenging false or deceptive marks is transferred to the owners of 
the certification marks and their licensees. Owners and users of  the certification marks have 
high incentives to avoid greenwashing (infringement of  their marks) and keep high 
competitiveness. Furthermore, by recognising intellectual property rights, the monitoring and 
enforcing costs of  faulty marks or greenwash is shared between governments and industry. 
Moreover, this monitoring will be done among peers or competitors, thus it is horizontal. 
Horizontal monitoring, is more spread out through the market than top-to-bottom monitoring 
from the government. Hence, detection of infringements is facilitated. The government’s role 
is to allow  the owners of  certification marks to bring suit to those who they believe are 
infringing their rights. If  these rights are strongly recognised and enforced by the owners of 
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certification marks and by the governments, competition will be enhanced as infringement of 
the marks will be deterred.
5.3 Application for a Certification Mark
The application for a certification mark is normally done by the certification body (who is the 
owner). As mentioned earlier, the certification body is normally the owner of  the certification 
mark. The certification body has to gather all the documentation and pay the fee to the 
trademark and patent office of  the country it attempts to register its mark in. Once all the 
documentation has been handed in and all the fees have been paid the trademark authority 
will examine the application. The objective of the examination, as with normal trademarks, is 
to ensure that the mark is sufficiently distinct from other trademarks (registered and priority 
rights).103 However, the distinctiveness of a certification mark is different from that of ordinary 
trademarks. The certification marks have to meet much more requirements than normal 
trademarks. Therefore, its examination is much more strict. The examination consists of two 
distinct phases. The first phase is just like the trademark evaluation, which consists in 
determining distinctiveness. The application is analysed under both absolute grounds (the 
marks’ distinctiveness and deceptiveness) and relative grounds (distinctiveness with respect 
to other marks or rights). The relative examination, is done by comparing the certification 
mark and logo with the rest of  registrations and applications to see that it has not already 
been used or whether it is similar to a pre-existing one to the degree that it can cause 
confusion. The second phase is regarding the examination of the regulations that govern the 
use of  the certification or collective mark.104 This phase is different from that of trademarks. 
Countries that regulate certification marks normally examine regulations. Some of those 
countries, additionally require that such regulations be approved by other authorities, before 
granting the registration.  
5.3.1 Absolute and relative grounds for refusal
As with trademarks, certification marks have to prove their distinctiveness. In essence a 
trademarks distinctiveness is its capability of distinguishing goods or services of  one 
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tempore potior est jure (he who is earlier in time is stronger in law) is applied. In other words, if there is a 
previous application, even if it is still in process, such application will have priority over the subsequent 
application(s).
104 Document from the UK Trademark Office that explains the procedures. 
undertaking from those of  other undertakings. In addition, certification marks have not only 
to be able to distinguish themselves from their competitors, but a certification mark also has 
to be able to distinguish goods and services which are certified from those who are not. 
Therefore, a trademark, as well as a certification mark, that is not capable of distinguishing 
itself  will be refused.105 In addition, certification marks can be refused if it is “of such a nature 
as to deceive the public.”106 Certification marks can be refused “if the public is liable to be 
misled as regards the character or significance of  the mark, in particular if  it is likely to be 
taken as something other than a certification mark.” Therefore it is recommended that the 
mark (the symbol or logo) states that it is a certification mark, to avoid this confusion. 
When applying for a trademark or even a patent, it is customary to do a search within the 
trademark or patent databases to make sure that the mark has not been previously been 
used. Authorities will be emphatic on similar marks within the same classification and 
secondarily on similar marks in other classifications. If  these type of objections arise, the 
applicant will have to prove to the authority that the mark is sufficiently distinct and does not 
cause confusion. Specifically in the case of certification marks, the authority will also verify 
the previous registrations or rights of the proprietor. This is done to confirm that the 
proprietor of  the mark is not in the trade of the goods and services that it pretends to 
certify.107  If the authority discovers that the applicant is in fact the proprietor of an earlier 
trade mark in the same classification of  the goods or services of those of the certification 
mark, it “will be taken as a prima facie indication that the proprietor of the certification mark 
also carries on a business in the supply of the goods certified.” If  this is the case, the 
authority will object the application. The applicant, in response has to submit a declaration in 
which it states that it does not carry on a business in the goods or services certified. 
Otherwise, the applicant would have to withdraw  or surrender the trademark in order to 
register the certification mark. Furthermore, even after the certification mark is granted, third 
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107 As noted before, certification mark proprietors are restricted from participating in the trade they pretend to 
certify. Therefore if the certification mark is for agricultural products, the owner of the certification mark cannot be 
a farmer, as it will be considered unfair and a potential conflict of interest could arise. 
parties can apply for a revocation or invalidation of the certification mark if they can prove 
that this statement is false or has become false.108 
5.3.2 The Certification Mark Regulations
Objectively, the certification mark regulations are a summary of  the criteria that the potential 
users have to meet, as well as other internal rules and procedures. However, they represent 
what a certification mark stands for or signifies. In most countries these regulations are 
subject to examination, therefore they have to comply to certain requisites. Furthermore, 
these examinations will be kept in public record, which implies that the general public, 
prospective users and even competitors will have access to them. Moreover, the applicant 
will be bound to these regulations, if it is found that the owner does not observe them 
properly, the certification mark can be revoked.109  The specific content of the regulations 
may vary from country to country, however in general they must have the following:
1) Details concerning the applicant. It has already been stated that the applicant cannot be 
engaged in the trade of the goods or services that he certifies. It is “the owners’ function is 
to control use of  the mark by those he authorises, thereby ensuring that their products 
meet his required standards.”110  Consequently it has to be ‘competent’ to manage the 
certification process as well as to control the use of the certification mark. Furthermore, 
the applicant has to have an authority or expertise to certify the goods and services for 
which the mark is to be registered. 
2) Persons authorised to use the mark. The regulations will have to enlist the requirements 
that an “approved user must meet to use the certification mark on its goods or in relation 
to the services it provides.” An important feature of  certification marks (at least in the 
Anglo-American system) is that “certification may not be refused to anybody who 
complies with the required standards.”111 This ‘open door’ policy is implemented to avoid 
that certification becomes a restrictive trade practice. Hence the importance of the pre-
established criteria. Pre-established (and registered) criteria is an anti-discrimination 
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measure, as the owner will be unable to use ‘non-objective or secret criteria’ to unfairly 
favour certain producers over others.112 
3) Characteristics to be certified by the mark. The regulations have to point out the specific 
qualities or characteristics of the goods or services that are certified under the mark. To 
understand what this means it is easier to see what it does not mean. It is not a list of the 
goods and services that are going to be certified. It is not a general statement that does 
not say anything in particular about the nature of the certification. It is not the list of  the 
specific criteria that have to be met to obtain the certification either. Therefore, this 
requisite should be a statement, that is clear and objective that allows  “anyone reading 
them to know  precisely what characteristic is being certified.” For example, in its 
regulations, the Australian certification mark “APIA Free Range Certification Program” 
complies with this point as following: “The Program covers the farming practices and 
related activities such as feed production, the slaughtering process, transport and 
traceability required to be implement for chicken or turkey meat to be allowed to be sold 
as APIA Free Range Accredited.”113 Without saying what the criteria are specifically, it 
does make clear that in order for the chicken and turkey meat to be considered free range 
several aspects of the production process will be taken into consideration. This simple 
statement limits the scope of  the programme, in a sufficient degree to understand what it 
does. 
4) Testing and supervision of the mark. The regulations include an explanation of how  the 
holder will test the presence of the characteristic. Testing does not need to be carried out 
by the holder itself. If  this were the case, an explanation of the characteristics and duties 
of the authorised certifiers will be needed. Including, how  the certification body can 
guarantee the independence and impartiality of these certifiers, as well as their technical 
expertise. In addition the owner has to explain the procedures for supervising the use of 
the mark. Including the procedures for non-compliance. 
5) Fees connected with the operation of the mark. The certification, license and/or royalties 
have to be disclosed (or at least how  they are calculated if  it is not a fixed sum). The fees 
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should be proportionate to the nature of the certification (even if it is a for-profit). 
Excessive fees could prevent potential users from accessing the scheme, which would 
restrict trade. Certification can is a costly process, therefore many NGO’s offer schemes 
for allowing communities (from developing countries) to obtain certification as a 
community, so they share the costs. Additionally, governments and other agencies could 
support certification with subsidies to make certification more accessible. 
6) Dispute settlement procedures. Certification schemes should all have a process that 
covers disputes about whether goods and/or services meet the criteria or any other 
dispute concerning the certification mark. Both potential and current users should have a 
clear appeal system. This appeal system can be either internal and/or external. For 
example, if the certification body does not perform the certification itself, it could 
potentially mediate between the potential user and the certifier. Nonetheless, if the dispute 
is regarding behaviour of the certification body, a third-party mechanism (such as 
mediation or arbitration) might be more appropriate. 
The certification marks’ rules can be amended after the certification mark has been awarded. 
Nonetheless, the amendments are also subject to evaluation, in the same manner as with 
registration. 
5.3.3  Invalidation and Revocation of certification marks
Once the certification mark is awarded the owner of the mark has the obligation not only to 
use the mark but also to make sure that it is used properly. Furthermore, regardless of  the 
credibility and reputation consequences of  mark misuse, the mark can also be revoked or 
invalidated. It can be invalidated if certain circumstances come to light (after the certification 
is granted) about the certification mark or the certifier that would have impeded the 
registration in the first place. This could be the case if  it was discovered that the owner 
carried the trade from before the certification mark was awarded and did not cease once the 
mark was registered. Revocation on the other hand, can occur when there is a change in 
circumstances such that it does not allow  the certification mark or certifier to continue to 
meet the conditions to keep the registration. The grounds for revocation are: 
(a) The owner begins to carry on the trade of the goods and services it certifies;
(b) The manner in which the mark is used is misleading the public on the nature of the mark;
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(c) The owner does not observe the regulations or it is not capable of  securing their 
observance; 
(d) If the owner is no longer competent to own a certification mark. 
In addition, just like trademarks, certification marks have to be ‘put in genuine use’ after a 
determinate period after the registration. If  a certification mark cannot prove this, it will lose 
the registration. The opposite occurs if the certification mark were to become too general, to 
the point that it loses its distinctiveness.   
5.3.4 Registration of Certification Marks in countries that do not contemplate them
In countries that do not provide a specific registration of certification marks, but that have a 
widespread use of  ‘collective marks’ it is possible that ‘collective marks can denote 
certification.’114 It can be noted that some legislations do not use the word ‘association’ or an 
equivalent when defining collective marks. Consequently, the owner of the ‘collective mark’ 
is not limited to associations, which as noted earlier is the main difference with certification 
marks. For example, Chapter 8 of the Benelux Convention in Intellectual Property Matters 
states “collective marks shall be considered all signs that are thus indicated upon their 
application and that serve to distinguish one or more characteristics of goods originating 
from different enterprises applying the mark under the supervision of the proprietor.”115 In no 
place is the proprietor restricted to an association nor are the applicants restricted to being 
part of such association. Therefore, it can be interpreted that in the Benelux Act collective 
marks indicate certification. 
There are some countries that do not contemplate collective marks at all (not even with room 
for interpretation as above). In such cases, mark owners “are forced to register the [trade] 
mark either for ‘quality-assurance services’, or for the goods or services being certified.”116 
As mentioned before trademark protection is not the appropriate tool for protecting 
certification marks and doing so might cause different problems. For instance, “the mark may 
not be enforceable in an infringement context because the actual use does not precisely 
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match the goods and services listed in the registration. Second, the owner may register the 
mark for ‘quality-assurance services’, only to have the application rejected because the 
marks are really used “on the certified goods” rather than for applicant’s certification 
services.” In the second example, the application would not even succeed because the mark 
is used on the certified goods by someone other than the certifier. The trademark in this 
case covers the certification services, but the mark is used on the certified goods, which is a 
completely different good.  In the first scenario even if  the trademark is granted it will be 
useless as it would be unenforceable. This is, precisely because the mark protects the 
certification services and not the goods. For clarity, lets consider an eco-label that certifies 
shade-grown coffee (as seen before this is good because it protects wild-life). If  the 
application were for the coffee (shade-grown, fair-trade, organic or any type of  coffee 
including substitutes), the registration of  the mark would be under Class 30 in conformance 
with the Nice Classification.117  However, the owner of  the eco-label does not sell coffee; it 
sells or provides certification services. This type of  services is Class 42 which is the one that 
corresponds to services of engineers (other professionals) who undertake evaluations. While 
it may sound like a game of words, this can represent a serious problem. If  the trademark is 
registered for Class 42 it cannot be used on the coffee. Or if it uses it, it will not be protected 
against infringement. Moreover, a third person could lawfully register the mark under Class 
30 (coffee). In this scenario the certification mark owner (and all the licencees) will be limited 
to use the mark on the coffee as trademark belongs to a third party. While this can be 
disputed, because of  the difference in classes, the certification mark owner’s case will be 
weak. 
5.3.5 Uniformisation of Laws
The use and legislation of certification marks is not widespread. This might be because, 
different from geographical indications, certification marks are not specifically regulated by 
the Paris Convention118  nor in its subsequent revisions (or any other similar international 
instrument). As a result, many countries do not include them in their laws. To complicate the 
scenario even more, the countries that do regulate them, do so in different ways. This 
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patchwork of regulatory differences can make it very difficult for eco-labels (and other 
certification systems) to expand to other jurisdictions. This is because their marks will not be 
protected,119 which will put the mark at risk in those countries which could potentially weaken 
their reputation and credibility. Thus the potential of  eco-labels as international 
environmental schemes would be significantly impaired. Because of this legal practitioners 
have called for law  harmonisation or centralisation. International conventions such as the 
Paris Convention, have the advantage that they are like a contract between all the 
signatories. Moreover, they create homogeneity among the different jurisdictions which can 
facilitate transboundary transactions. However, the desire to create homogeneity and 
practicality are not enough to advocate for law  harmonisation. In this particular matter, neo-
classic economics has had an ongoing discussion between competition and centralisation of 
laws. While there is no clear cut rule on when it is convenient to have competing or uniform 
laws there are certain criteria that can be considered. Centralisation would be welcome if 
there is a need to internalise externalities across jurisdictions. Another criteria would be if 
there is a danger of a “race to the bottom”. This type of  scenario happens when competition 
among laws force laws to lower standards in other to keep a competitive level. When there is 
a country with extremely lax regulations, it is possible that countries with stricter standards 
suffer losses. If  centralising the laws helps achieve scale economies and/or reduce of 
transaction costs it would also be beneficial.120  Homogenisation of certification mark laws 
would reduce transaction costs and create scale economies for those marks that wish to 
expand internationally. This is because they will be granted legal certainty, the risks will be 
lowered and they will be able to maintain their processes and organisation. In addition, while 
decentralisation does not create a ‘race to the bottom’ scenario it does make a difference in 
the jurisdictions the mark decides to expand to. It is logical that owners of  certification marks 
will prefer to operate in countries that recognise their rights; whereas, greenwashers will 
prefer to operate in places where there are no certification marks. This will hinder the 
expansion of  legitimate eco-labels or certification marks, not only from a practical 
perspective, but it will also be likely that those countries which are not used to certification 
marks will not take advantage of its benefits.  
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p. 436.
If certification mark laws were to be centralised or harmonised it can be done either by 
lobbying for changes on a country-by-country basis, or by holding a diplomatic conference 
with a goal of reaching an international agreement with respect to certification marks.121 An 
international agreement or convention with respect to certification marks would be to most 
effective way to address the problem. However,  this solution is also the most difficult one. 
Nonetheless, the rising concerns regarding certification marks has already spurred a series 
of seminars and workshops under the auspices of the WIPO. However, it might not be 
necessary to create a whole new  distinct Treaty for certification marks, but it might call for 
amendments of  the current ones. For instance, such amendments could be either in the 
geographical indications or trademark contexts. Nonetheless, compared to other intellectual 
property issues (such as trademarks) certification mark problems are relatively small. In the 
sense that very few  owners are affected by the problems with certification marks, therefore 
“it may be difficult to generate a critical mass of interested countries.”122 Precisely because 
only a handful of  countries contemplate certification marks, they are the only ones who see 
the benefits and the problems of the current system. It would take a lot of lobbying from their 
part to make this issue stand out in an international forum such as the WIPO. This same 
reasoning applies for the alternative solution of country-by-country lobbying. Nonetheless, 
certifiers should lobby in the countries where their products are being produced (developing/
tropical countries). In these countries, eco-labels and other certification marks have a clear 
interest in that their rights be recognised. First, because they are also the countries in which 
they are more likely to be counterfeited. Secondly, to give certainty to the producers/
communities that they are really what they claim they are. 
There is a strong case for the harmonisation of certification marks laws. However, at this 
stage it would be more valuable to create awareness of  the existence of  certification marks 
as legal tools. Notwithstanding the above, it is also true that the market is outpacing the law. 
The focus on sustainability and other environmental matters have accelerated markets and 
environmental marketing to a point that there is an imminent need for intervention. The fact 
that marketers are seeking trademark protection is a clear sign that there is a need for 
protection. However, it is imperative that they chose the right instruments so the protection is 
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complete. In addition, by doing it correctly it will aid combat greenwashing, specifically when 
it comes to false or look-a-like marks.  
As it has been, the laws governing certification marks are not uniform. Hence, only their 
common-rules have been discussed up to now. Nonetheless, some systems stand-out from 
the rest, such as the Australian system. Due to its peculiarities it will be discussed in depth in 
the following section. 
5.4 Certification Trademarks in Australia
 Australia’s legislation regarding certification trademarks is worth pointing out as it differs 
from other Anglo-American systems in very clever ways. There are minor differences such 
as the fact that in Australia the owner of the mark is allowed to use the certification mark or 
that the criteria of the certification are published along with the regulations. The real 
differences emerge from the fact that in Australia the application is not only reviewed by their 
Registrar of  Trade Mark but also by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
(ACCC). The ACCC has to make sure that the certification trade mark and its rules meet 
certain criteria before it is registered. The criteria are based on the principles relating to 
competition, unconscionable conduct and consumer protection.  
The owner of the mark should submit the application and the certification trademark rules to 
the Registrar of  Trade Marks. There the application will be reviewed as any other trade mark 
application. It the application has all the requirements, the Registrar will forward the 
application, including the certification mark rules, to the ACCC. Once the ACCC receives the 
application and the rules, it will write to the applicant to notify the reception of  the application, 
a time schedule (to set conference dates) and require additional information. The ACCC 
proceeds to do an initial assessment of the application which will be published in the Official 
Journal of  Trade Marks.123 Any interested party (the owner of the mark or any one else) can 
object the initial  assessment124 by written submission and they are entitled to request the 
ACCC to hold a conference to make an oral submission. Once all the parties have been 
heard (either in writing or in conference), the ACCC will emit its final assessment. If  it is 
satisfied with that the certification mark meets all the relevant criteria it would provide 
certificate stating that it is satisfied. If the ACCC is not satisfied that all the criteria have been 
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met it must notify the applicant and the Registrar of  Trade Marks. The refusal of  the ACCC to 
give a certificate can be reviewed by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. 
Since the initial application until before the initial assessment, there is an open consultation 
period for all interested parties to comment upon the certification mark applications. Since 
2007 all the applications and certification mark rules are available online from IP Australia’s 
website.125  Therefore, all interested parties can submit comments on the Certification Trade 
Mark, its criteria or its rules. However, it is not limited to parties that voluntary submit their 
opinions and comments. The ACCC can actively seek the “views of interested parties or 
parties that are considered likely to have expertise relevant to a CTM application.” This step 
makes a huge difference from the other certification mark applications. Because, the ACCC 
can call upon experts (relevant authorities) in the field to verify the criteria of the certification 
mark. In this sense, using the example of the “APIA Free Range Certification Program”, the 
ACCC can call upon the farming authority to verify that the criteria are indeed appropriate for 
the intended use of the mark. Furthermore, it can verify how  strict the criteria are (using the 
applicable laws as the baseline). It is not clear whether they compare the criteria of  the 
applicants with the criteria from the programmes that are already registered. If it is, then this 
mechanism could also avoid criteria overlapping. If two programmes share the same criteria, 
the authority could point this out and maybe suggest a merger or another type of 
arrangement between the programmes. 
6. Conclusions
The contribution of  this chapter can be seen from two aspects. First, it allocates eco-labels 
within a legal framework and it points out what is missing. This chapter only considered 
positive public law. This is law  that is contained within different statutes. While it is true that 
there is no specific law  for eco-labels, it was found that there are laws that could be 
applicable to them. However, as will be pointed out in the following chapter, there is still a 
very large gap to cover. Specifically, the current system has done very little to deal with 
false, misleading and deceptive environmental claims and labels. This does represent a real 
problem especially considering that greenwashing outnumbers true eco-labels 9 to 1. That is 
proof that something is wrong in the system. Eco-labels do have a positive role in the market 
V. Eco-labels and Law
254
125 http://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/get-the-right-ip/trade-marks/types-of-trade-marks/certification-trade-mark/
certification-rules/
for environmental goods, certification even with its inherent problems still plays a pivotal role. 
However, all of  this is undermined with the presence of  false labels and other forms of 
greenwashing. 
Notwithstanding the above, some countries do have statutory regulation of certification 
marks. These countries do not have salient or dominant public eco-labelling programmes in 
place, their eco-label industry is comprised of private parties and maybe some hybrids. In 
addition it can be observed that there is much more competition (more presence, variety and 
scope of products) than in countries that have large public eco-labels. Hence, Intellectual 
Property protection becomes pivotal to incentivise the industry. Without this protection 
industry will not invest in certification and there would be an underproduction of  eco-labels. 
On the other hand, countries with large public eco-labels, normally do not contemplate 
certification marks in their statutes. In this case governments do not need to worry about 
underproduction of  eco-labels as they have the control. By giving eco-labels (seen as 
environmental certification marks) statutory status governments recognise their property 
rights as well as the right to defend their rights in court. This system will prove much more 
effective than using the normal deceptive advertising route. Furthermore, eco-labels when 
seen as certification marks, have a different legal nature than other forms of  green 
marketing. Hence it would be wrong to try to address them as green marketing tools when 
they are not. If there is a specific rule this is the one that should be used. It is not to say that 
green advertising should be completely discarded. It is just a different matter. 
This chapter however has shown that there is not only scope for law  in eco-labels, there 
already is law  for eco-labels. At this moment however, it is time to take these findings as well 
as those from previous chapters and use them to answer the underlying questions of this 
research: Do eco-labels call for legal intervention? And if so what type of intervention would 
be the most appropriate? At this moment, the status quo of eco-labels is clear. Thus, the 
following chapter will determine whether given the current situation there is a need for legal 
intervention, and if so, how should the law look like to improve the current status.
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CHAPTER VI
The Law and Economics of Eco-labels
1. Introduction
Up to now  this work has focused on telling the story of  eco-labels from a descriptive, 
economic, business, behavioural and legal perspective. At this point all the relevant 
problems of  eco-labels have been determined. Therefore, it is time to answer the underlying 
questions of  this work: do eco-labels call for legal intervention? And if so, what type of 
intervention would be the most appropriate? This chapter will attempt to solve both 
questions. Hence, it is necessary to recall and point out the different market failures that 
follow  eco-labels. Eco-labels are meant to solve informational market failures, however in 
doing so they create new  failures. This has become evident recently, hence it is necessary to 
in favour or against regulation of eco-labels from a Law  and Economics perspective. Once 
this is done, the second question will be dealt with. To create an efficient regulatory design 
for eco-labelling different options have to be considered. Whether eco-labels can be 
regulated without government intervention or the degree of the intervention will also be 
determined. In addition, because eco-labels share their market with simple environmental 
claims (that are not certified, hence they are not eco-labels), their regulatory structures are 
bound to interact. Hence, this will also be considered, as regulating eco-labels alone is 
unlikely to achieve optimal results. Unregulated environmental claims or marketing will 
hinder their performance by creating noise in the market. 
This chapter will first address the law  and economics motivations for eco-labels. In other 
words, it will address why there is the need for eco-labels in the first place. It will be seen 
that the environmental good market has informational failures that cannot be corrected on 
their own. Hence, there is a need for eco-labels. Subsequently, a brief assessment on eco-
labels will be performed. It will be shown that eco-labels out-perform the price mechanism, 
because it provides better information. In addition, the pitfalls of  eco-labels will be pointed 
out. These pitfalls, are the main rationale that there is still a need for law  in eco-labelling. 
Section 3, will deal with the possible regulatory design for eco-labels and the definition of the 
role of the government. Finally a regulatory strategy for eco-labels will be proposed.  
2. Eco-labels and their Law and Economics Rationale
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As it can be recalled from Chapter I, in the 1970s governments came together and decided 
that environmental matters had to be incorporated into everyday life. They drew  up several 
strategies, among which was education and information of consumers. Shortly after, 
Germany came up with the Blue Angel eco-label. The purpose of the Blue Angel was to 
inform consumers that the product they were buying had different environmental attributes. 
These attributes were determined in a set of standards, based on a Life Cycle Analysis 
(LCA) of the product in question. The standards that were created were complementary to 
new  environmental regulations, hence there was an incentive for firms to join the programme 
and for consumers to acquire them. After this eco-label came into place many governments 
followed Germany’s model and created their own eco-labels. In conclusion, eco-labels were 
government tools with the purpose of informing and educating. However, eco-labels have an 
alternate origin, that is private politics. In the early 1990s environmentalists where 
disappointed with the fact that governments failed to reach an agreement regarding forestry. 
Consequently, large NGOs took on the task of  creating private certification schemes. These 
certification schemes, which are also eco-labels, would create standards that the 
stakeholders (NGOs, farmers, consumers, governments) deemed appropriate. Hence it can 
be said that eco-labels also cover for government failures. Eco-labels go a step further than 
the law, as their standards are stricter and broader than the government ones. It could be 
argued that they also have a broader scope than governments as they can create trans-
national standards or standards that influence the processes of private firms (a matter in 
which governments are not welcome).1 This brief  reminder shows two important matters that 
eco-labels try to solve: market failures and government failures.
2.1 Eco-labels and Market Failures
If markets were perfect eco-labels would not be necessary. This is because in perfect 
markets all information is available, there are no information asymmetries. In addition, all 
products are homogeneous and there are no transaction costs. In a perfect market, prices 
are set where marginal costs meet marginal revenue; therefore, there are no profits and 
prices are sufficient to communicate information. Also, all the participants in the markets are 
homo economicus, or rational utility maximisers. Hence, eco-labels (as well as other 
information tools) and other interventionist measures are useless as the market is capable of 
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correcting any fault. However, when the assumptions of  perfect markets are not met, the 
perfect market becomes imperfect. Imperfect markets are characterised by market failures. 
Tools such as eco-labels are created to aid to mitigate such imperfections. Specifically, eco-
labels help to reduce transaction costs, specifically information costs. Additionally, due to 
their ‘environmental’ nature they are also expected to internalise their negative 
environmental externalities; by doing so, they also contribute to the production of a public 
good.  
2.1.1 Information Failures
As seen in Chapter II, products can have a search, experience or credence nature. It was 
concluded that environmental attributes are considered credence goods, as it is unfeasible 
for consumers to assess the product’s environmental quality either before or after they 
purchase/consume the good. In addition, it was observed that the only mechanism that is 
effective for conveying information about credence attributes is certification. Therefore, 
taking from the analysis in Chapter II it can be deduced that one of the biggest obstacles of 
eco-labels is the nature of environmental information. 
2.1.1.1 Search and Experience environmental attributes.
Not all environmental attributes have a credence nature. For example, a product’s packaging 
or its recyclability, are attributes that can potentially be observed by the consumer either 
before, during or after consumption. In this sense, some environmental attributes can have 
search or experience attributes. While it is true that it would be costly to verify if  a product is 
in fact recyclable or compostable, it is not unfeasible for the consumer to find out. 
Furthermore, many of the environmental attributes (in white-wear, for instance) are designed 
specifically for the consumption phase (making them experience goods). Therefore, if  the 
appliance is used correctly, the true ‘environmental-friendliness’ could potentially be 
observed (reduced electricity bills or less gas). Therefore, advertising and branding can 
prove to be sufficient to provide this type of information.2  Advertising and branding of 
environmental attributes are considered environmental claims. Environmental claims, as 
seen in Chapter I, are normally self-declared as they do not use external parties to verify 
their claims. Then again, due to the nature of  the goods (search and experience) there is no 
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need for external verification or certification, as consumers can potentially figure out the 
veracity of the claim by experience.3 Nonetheless, if  there is no control over these claims it is 
possible that producers get away with claims that are exaggerated or untrue. As it was seen 
in Chapter V, these claims are normally controlled with “guidelines” that work as safe-
harbours not as standards. 
2.1.1.2 Credence environmental attributes
The majority of  environmental claims have a credence nature. Credence attributes normally 
arise due to the products’ process and production methods (or PPMs). PPMs can be product 
related or non-product related. When the PPM is product related the product itself can be 
discriminated due to is physical characteristics, if  a tomato is grown using pesticides, the 
pesticide can be traced; thus this tomato can be differentiated from one grown pesticide-
free. Product-related PPMs, will define a product and make it different than other products. 
A clear example of product-related PPMs are organic products. To a certain degree the 
nutritional content of a product (calories, fat, sugar, fibre) can also be considered a product-
related PPM. Firms can alter the PPM to differentiate it from other products in the same 
category, making “low-fat” or “sugar-free” varieties.  This type of PPMs are not precisely 
experience attributes but they do not fit clearly in the credence type either. This is because, 
even though it is difficult for the consumer to verify the attribute it is not physically unfeasible. 
Thus they can be considered credence goods in a broad sense. On the other hand, non-
product related PPMs are those that do not affect the product’s physical or other identifiable 
characteristics.4  These types of unverifiable characteristics are much more complicated to 
assess because they do not alter or leave traces on the product itself. This could be the 
case of fair-trade, biodiversity-friendly, cruelty-free or other ‘strictly’ environmental or 
sustainable labels. The issue is that the end product is no different than a normal product in 
its performance or appearance. The only thing that makes them different is the eco-label that 
‘claims’ they are in fact green and the price differential (if  there is one). Therefore, non-
product-related PPMs are credence goods in a strict sense. 
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The normal and eco-labelled goods are essentially the same in all their attributes, except for 
the alleged environmental criteria that they conform to. Consumers cannot verify the claims 
and they have to trust the information he can extract from the product. The only mechanism 
that can guarantee that products have the attributes they claim they have is certification. 
Without certification consumers will not believe any label and simply ignore it. As seen 
previously, (Chapter II and V) certification is essential for the existence of the credence good 
market. Without certification, the mark is just a claim. However, environmental claims are not 
appropriate to communicate credence goods, as the consumer will not be able to verify the 
claim. Certification provides the proof consumers need about a product’s attribute. Moreover, 
because certification schemes depend on their reputation to be credible, they have high 
incentives to keep information truthful. Furthermore, as seen in Chapter II, certification has a 
contractual nature, hence it falls within the private or self-regulatory sphere (as will be seen 
below).
2.1.2 Externalities and Public Goods
Both externalities and public goods are considered market failures. Eco-labels promote the 
production of positive environmental externalities5  or the reduction of the negative 
externalities (to be more precise). Environmental externalities, have the characteristics of 
public goods because they are non-rival and non-excludable. Hence, environmental 
externalities are also considered public goods. In Chapter II it was discussed that eco-labels 
have the purpose to increase the provision of public good. They do so by bundling the public 
good with a private good thereby creating an impure public good or a joint product. The 
more eco-labelled products are sold, the more public good is produced. When firms decide 
to voluntarily produce public goods or reduce their negative environmental externalities (or 
produce positive ones) it is considered pro-environmental behaviour.6  
2.2. Eco-labels and Government failure
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transaction differ from its private costs and benefits. See Paul R. Portney. Corporate Social Responsibility: An 
Economic and Public Policy Perspective, p. 110. 
6 Pro-environmental behaviour was analysed in Chapter III. 
The discussion between private or public ordering has been a popular topic in Law  and 
Economics. Some eco-labels are a vivid example of  spontaneous private regulation due to 
government’s failure to regulate. Specifically, the Forest Stewardship Council was created 
after the failure of the Earth Summit of 1992 held in Rio de Janeiro. It was considered a 
failure, because in the agenda of  such Summit a forestry agreement was to be formalised. At 
the time, the topic of  tropical timber was very heated; governments, industry and NGOs had 
strong interests on the matter. However, the Summit did not deliver the expected agreement. 
This led the World Wildlife Foundation (WWF), supported by some governments (such as 
Austria) and the industry to create a private set of standards to be followed on a voluntary 
basis. Today the FSC and other eco-labels7 create their own standards that the international 
community (governments) have not managed to reach an agreement on. This example 
shows that successful interventions have been made by entities other than governments. 
Ogus points out that “the consequences of government failure may be more severe than 
market failure.”8 This is because, it is a failure that no one is addressing and such a lack of 
attention could lead to terrible consequences.9  Therefore it is important to determine 
carefully what matters can be left to the market alone and which matters might need 
intervention. In the forestry case, a lack of clear international standards could have set off a 
race to the bottom. This would have led to the deforestation in parts of the world where the 
enforcement (or existence) of environmental regulation is too weak (or non-existent). 
The environmental goods market, as seen in the previous section, is afflicted by a 
systematic presence of  informational failures (the nature of  the information). With the 
credence nature of environmental information, a market for environmental goods would 
never arise without an external tool, such as certification. Therefore, an intervention, which 
in this case takes the form of eco-labels, is justified. Eco-labels, as seen in Chapter V, can 
be public, private or mixed. In other words, the intervention can come either by private 
parties, which are part of the market; public parties, which are normally external; or public 
and private entities can coordinate to create a mixed or hybrid model. Which party is the 
most efficient regulator can be easily answered within a Law and Economics framework. 
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7 Many eco-labels followed the system of private certification schemes that were created after the international 
community’s failure to regulate matters such as forestry, fisheries, labour and  agricultural products (tea, coffee, 
cacao, cotton and palm oil).
8 Anthony Ogus, Self Regulation, Encyclopedia of law and Economics, p. 590
9 This lesson can be learned from other markets such as the financial market and its crisis in 2008.
The Coase Theorem, basically states that “the ability of consensual bargaining to achieve 
efficient outcomes is a function of transaction costs.”10  Therefore it is as simple as 
determining which party has the lowest transaction costs. The party with the lowest 
transaction costs is the most likely to reach a consensual and efficient outcome. Specifically, 
governments’ ability to reach international consensus in the environmental or sustainability 
arena might too costly 11 to achieve efficient (or any) outcomes. Therefore, it might be worth 
considering to allow  private entities, such as certification entities, who have the bargaining 
power and the lowest costs12  to achieve efficient solutions. Therefore, private certification 
entities, as long as they are less costly, should continue to regulate where governments fail 
or are unable to do so. Many times governments are unable to tackle certain market failures 
or their scope of action is limited (jurisdiction, territory, topic). In these cases, private entities 
can step in to fill-in the gaps created by the government. For example, in the case of 
international supply chains it is easier for private entities to coordinate and achieve efficient 
solutions (for example, they can bargain directly with downstream suppliers from different 
countries and across a variety of sectors) than for governments.13 
2.3 Eco-labels: an Initial Assessment
At first glance eco-labels are a simple information tool that aim at reducing the information 
gap between producers and consumers, while simultaneously committing to producing 
public goods. In this sense, eco-labels reduce transaction costs. Transaction costs, as 
pointed out by Coase, produce inefficiencies which reduce social welfare. When transaction 
costs are low, parties are able to achieve efficient outcomes, regardless of  the property 
rights assigned to them. Therefore, any tool that is aiming at reducing transaction costs will 
lead to a more efficient outcome than without them. However, eco-labels also attempt to 
lower negative externalities or produce positive externalities, by providing incentives to firms 
to engage in pro-environmental activities. From this perspective, pro-environmental 
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10 Anthony Ogus, Op. cit.
11 Transaction costs of achieving international agreements can be very high. For example, the time and 
resources taken to bring the parties together,  finding and funding an adequate forum, but above all, reaching 
consensus might require a lot of effort because of the different interests the parties might represent.
12 It is assumed that transaction costs for the private regulators are lower because they have the ability to reach 
places and stakeholders, both legally and physically, that public regulators cannot. They can have presence in 
many countries and in several markets, without altering their processes. Furthermore they enjoy more flexibility, 
as they are not limited by “governmental powers”. 
13 Fabrizio Cafaggi and Andrea Renda, Public and Private Regulation: Mapping the Labyrinth, p. 17.
behaviour is the equivalent of internalising externalities. When the full costs of the 
transactions (production costs in this case) are considered within the price then the market is 
expected to be more efficient. In other words, when there are externalities prices are going 
to be lower because not all costs are included. Hence, it is expected that the goods will be 
over-supplied, creating an inefficiency (in the environmental case: too much pollution or 
resource depletion). However, when the costs are internalised, then the price reflects the 
real costs of the product. It can be assumed that the internalised price is higher than the 
externalities price scenario, precisely because all the costs are taken into account. 
Therefore, at least in theory, less product will be supplied. This is more efficient or less 
wasteful market outcome. 
2.3.1 The Price Mechanism
In theory, if  pro-environmental behaviour can be compared to internalising environmental 
costs, it is plausible for the price mechanism to be an efficient tool for communicating such 
behaviour. In other words, prices alone could be sufficient to reflect the pro-environmental 
behaviour of the firm. Hence, there would be no need for eco-labels. Eco-labels are a low-
cost policy tool because they are driven by consumer interest in reducing environmental 
impacts. However, the price mechanism has even lower costs than eco-labelling. The price 
mechanism is a market oriented approach, that can guide consumers to use prices as a 
reflection of total resource costs in the production of the product.14 Menell argues that prices 
are the most reliable market signal there is. Prices are very sensitive to the effects of 
pollution, as costs such as regulatory compliance are incorporated into them. In this sense, it 
is more expensive to operate a facility that is in a high pollution control or environmentally 
aware area (more taxes, fines and costs for waste, water and energy) than one with lax 
environmental regulations. These costs will be reflected in the price which will tell the 
consumer the overall environmental value of  the good.15  While prices do not focus 
exclusively on environmental considerations, they do provide ‘reasonable’ information on 
resource costs. For example, it has been claimed that being vegetarian is the most 
significant behaviour a person can do for the environment (individual pro-environmental 
behaviour). Considering the resources required for a meat-centred diet, it is expected that 
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14 Peter S, Menell, Educating Consumers about the Environment: Labels vs Prices, p. 183.
15 Idem, p. 187.
the prices will be higher than a vegetarian one (given that the vegetable is not expensive to 
produce or is imported from half  way across the world). Meat production requires water, food 
(vegetable protein obtained from grains, which also have to be produced and processed), 
time and other processing resources. Hence, meat and its derivatives are much more 
expensive to produce than vegetables and grains. In this case, the price mechanism truly 
reflects the resources that go into the food and is clear that vegetables are less resource-
costly than meat. While the price might reflect the resources-costs, it does not imply it 
reflects social costs as well. Nonetheless, for this specific case, there is in fact no need for 
an eco-label to communicate this, as the price is sufficient.16 However, when it comes to 
more processed goods the price signal is not so clear. Furthermore, whether the 
environmental good would be more expensive, because of the compliance costs or cheaper, 
due to the less resources used in processing, is also not clear. It could even be assumed 
that the savings in resources and the certification or compliance costs cancel each other 
leaving the price intact. However, these are mere conjectures that need to be proved. 
Supporters of  the price-mechanism, such as Menell, did not consider many of the 
behavioural ‘anomalies’ that might hinder the price mechanism. For example, it was 
discussed in Chapter II that even though a product might be cheaper to produce when it is 
produced in a pro-environmental manner. If it is priced ‘truthfully’ people will not buy it 
because lower prices are perceived as lower quality. Hence, many pro-environmental firms, 
who might have reduced their costs (energy, water and waste savings) might still want to 
mark-up the prices to signal that the good is of better quality. Furthermore, there is the case 
of conspicuous conservation (seen in Chapter III) that will push the price of  environmental 
goods up (like a Veblen good), as that would signal status. Notwithstanding the above, it is 
also pertinent to consider that market prices are not always set at the point where marginal 
cost meets marginal revenue. The truth of the matter is that market actors (specially firms) 
do seek profits and rents. Hence, the “market price” from a perfect market, which is the 
threshold to measure other prices does not really exist. Prices are normally marked up, 
hence they do not reflect the costs. In addition, contrary to a perfect market, prices are set to 
differentiate the products, making it difficult for consumers to assess the environmental 
quality of the product. In other words, high prices can be a reflection of  high regulatory 
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compliance, a fashionable trademark, high transportation costs (if the product is imported), 
taxes and many other issues that do not necessarily communicate a product’s resource use. 
On the other hand, prices can magnify the effect of an eco-label (or vice-versa). When eco-
labels and prices are strategically placed together, it can lead to increase sales, as both the 
high price and the eco-label signal that the good has high environmental quality. Hence they 
reassure the consumer that the environmental attributes are true (at least in the consumers 
mind). In an experiment, it was shown that sales of eco-labelled goods increased 
(dramatically) when the prices where significantly different than the normal product.17 
However, eco-labelled or environmentally friendly goods in theory should be cheaper to 
produce, as they are less resource intensive than normal products. Even with the 
certification costs (which can be high) the product might still be within the average market 
price. If  this is the case, the price will not really reflect anything and there will be a need of 
another information tool such as the eco-label. 
2.3.2 Eco-labels and the production of public goods. 
Evaluations about the environmental (and overall) impact of eco-labels has been limited. Up 
to date, some efforts have been made to collect empirical evidence regarding eco-labels 
environmental impacts.18 These reports have raised many discussions between academics, 
scientists and NGOs19, as the overall results of  the studies are inconclusive. Measuring the 
impacts of  environmental certification on the environment presents many difficulties. From 
an empirical perspective, many factors are still unknown and eco-labels vary immensely 
from one another. These unknown factors are present because eco-labelling is a relatively 
new  phenomenon and has had an exponential increase since the last decade. Furthermore, 
eco-labels are dynamic and are constantly evolving, hence it is not easy to measure the 
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17 This example was discussed in, Chapter II, section 4.4.2. 
18 For a summary on the empirical studies of see Allen Blackman and Jorge Rivera, The Evidence Base for 
Environmental and Socioeconomic Impacts of “Sustainable” Certification, Resources for the Future, 
Discussion Paper, March 2010
19 NGOs place in private certification and standard setting is complex. On the one hand there are organizations 
that are behind the programs, hence they have an interest to “push” the certification trend. On the other hand, 
they are also the experts on the criteria and they are also the “watchdogs” who oversee the effectiveness of the 
eco-labels and ensure there accountability. It is shown that, NGOs understand that they have different roles to 
fulfill in society and some focus on activism, whereas others offer technical support and guidance and others 
function as watchdogs or even metaregulators such as the ISEAL. NGOs and their roles in eco-labelling is 
subject of many recent studies, for a nice collection of these see: www.unpop.nl
effects of a single criterion over time.20 On the other hand, the circumstances behind eco-
labels vary across products (for example, it is not the same to talk about fish than to talk 
about diamonds or palm oil) and markets (for example, eco-labels impacts are not the same 
in the developing world, than in the developed world). From a methodological point of  view, 
studies follow  different methodologies and not all of them lead to credible results. Hence, the 
results of the already available empirical studies are still limited. Blackman and Rivera, find 
only 37 scientifically relevant studies,21  and of those only 14 follow  a methodology that is 
likely to generate credible results. And of those 14, only 6 find that certification has 
environmental or socio-economic benefits. Furthermore, even with the collection of case 
studies and comparisons, “the evidence base to judge whether certification systems 
achieved their claimed social, environmental, and economic benefits at the level where they 
work (i.e. The farm or enterprise) appears relatively robust, but it is difficult to draw 
conclusions with confidence given the variability in methodologies.”22  To this conclusion, 
Blackman and Rivera might add also the need for causal impacts studies (studies that 
construct a credible counterfactual). Furthermore, they also find that many sectors and eco-
labels have been completely ignored in the studies. Of the 14 cases that they deemed 
relevant for their review, twelve of them focus on bananas, coffee and tourism. Causal 
impacts studies are missing on fish, timber, cacao, bio-fuels and live-stock.23 Up-today it is 
not possible to know  whether the standards or criteria set by the eco-labelling organisations 
actually make a difference in the environment. While this is an important matter to consider 
for future evaluations of eco-labels, the available information is not of much use from a Law 
and Economics perspective. Currently, the environmental impacts of  eco-labels are better 
dealt with by other sciences such as engineering or natural and earth sciences. Therefore, 
this type of  analysis, while interesting and potentially useful, is currently out of  the scope of 
this analysis. 
2.3.3 Concurrence of eco-labels and claims: too much information
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20 Executive Summary, p. 6
21 As noted in the Executive Summary, the matter of eco-label performance has been found in a great variety of 
literature, “including hundreds of case studies and before/after or certified/non certified comparisons of varying 
quality, dozens of relatively large-sample-sample size quantitative and qualitative, and a few peer reviewed large-
scale outcomes evaluations.” see page 5-6
22Steering Committee of the State-of-Knowledge Assessment of Standards and Certification. Toward 
Sustainability: The Roles and Limitations of Certification, Executive Summary, p. 6
23 Allen Blackman and Jorge Rivera, The Evidence Base for Environmental and Socioeconomic Impacts of 
“Sustainable” Certification, p. 24. 
Many have argued that a multiplicity or concurrence of eco-labels would be a hindrance for 
the market. At this point, no clear reason has been set out explaining why there should be a 
monopoly on eco-labelling or why would competing eco-labels have negative impacts on the 
market. While it is true that too much information can be damaging (as seen in Chapter IV), 
having no alternatives or having information about a single attribute is not desirable either. 
Furthermore, when a policy is based on consumer choice, the proliferation of  labels is an 
inevitable risk.24 This is because consumer preferences are likely to differ from one another. 
Therefore, there will be a need to address these preferences, hence more than one eco-
label is likely to appear. This competition of eco-labels simply indicates market 
segmentation. In the end each certification has its own advantages, even if consumers do 
not know  each label “the mere existence of  the seal on the product conveys useful 
information, because it indicates that the product has been reviewed.” If a consumer 
distrusts the judgement of  one organisation there would always be an alternative option with 
a different approach.25
Another argument against multiplicity of eco-labels could be related to their costs. Creating 
an eco-label (specially a life-cycle eco-label) is not cheap. Therefore, it is understandable 
why original proponents of  eco-labels thought that only governments would have the 
resources to create and manage an eco-label.26  However, the high operation costs of 
certification schemes can and have been overcome by private parties. Environmental 
certification is a labour intensive task and requires know-how. Therefore, it is normal to see 
only a handful of reliable certifiers in the market as certification is the type of  industry that 
enjoys economies of  scale. However, if  the certification costs are borne by the certified party 
and the certifier can enjoy reputational benefits (by being accredited or partnered with an 
eco-label) it might be a profitable market (industry)27 to enter. Hence, the concurrence of 
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24 House of Commons. Environmental Audit Committee. Environmental Labelling, Second Report of Session 
2008-09. Report together with formal minutes, oral and written evidence. Ordered by the house of Commons to 
be printed 3 March 2009. P. 7-8
25 John M. Church. A market solution to Green Marketing: Some Lessons from the Economics of 
Information, p. 291
26 The starting costs of eco-labelling can be very expensive, the life-cycle analysis to determine where the 
production has its highest impact, negotiating with stakeholders (consumers, industry, government agencies) and 
managing the eco-label are all tasks that have to be undertaken by the certification body. It is unlikely to have 
high profits, therefore there are not many incentives to pursue this line of activity for a for-profit private entity.
27 Jane Harris and Anne Cole from the Australian government refer to eco-labels as an industry. An industry in its 
early development stages with private sector activity. See: Jane Harris and Anne Cole. The Role for 
Government in Eco-labelling - On the Scenes or Behind the Scenes? Paper for conference “the Future of 
Eco-labelling in Australia, 9-10-2003.
eco-labels is not the problem. The problem is the concurrence of eco-labels, environmental 
claims and environmental advertisement. This great variety of environment-oriented 
marketing strategies is what causes the confusion. While, the general terms of 
environmental claims and advertisement do include eco-labels, it also refers to all the other 
environmental information. Eco-labels convey information about the quality of  the 
information: it is third-party certified. Whereas simple environmental claims have an 
informational and/or persuasive motive. Claims that have information or persuasion motives 
are normally considered within the realm of advertisement, which is different from that of 
eco-labels. However, on the product, at the point of  purchase (where it matters) they all look 
the same in the eyes of  the average consumer. This creates the perfect conditions for 
greenwashing (as seen in Chapter II). The more information is in the market, the easier it will 
be to get away with greenwashing. 
It has also been argued that too much information (environmental or otherwise) creates a 
cognitive overload on consumers, which hinders their decision making abilities. The 
cognitive overload regarding eco-labels is due to all the environmental information on the 
product. On a product’s package a consumer can find everything from hazardous material 
contents, disposal instructions, recyclability, mandatory certification seals, eco-labels and 
environmental claims and advertisements, which are all environmental in nature. 
Furthermore, much of the multiplicity is due to overlapping criteria. This arises when a 
government programme of one country (or state) is not recognised in another, even if the 
criteria are identical. If  a producer wanted to cover several jurisdictions, it would simply 
obtain the certification and apply to all the programmes that this certification allows it to. This 
results in a multiplicity of eco-labels that are in essence the same, and do not mean anything 
to the consumer. This is another scenario in which multiplicity of eco-labels could be a 
problem, as consumers will either be a) fooled into thinking that the product is VERY eco-
friendly, or b) confused to the point of incredibility, where he will ignore the information. As 
already mentioned in Chapter IV, competing eco-labels should not have the same criteria 
(even if they cover similar territory), their criteria should be what makes them distinct from 
each other.
Proliferation of eco-labels is a real phenomenon. However, even if  they are confusing and 
create cognitive overload, some eco-labels “have become well known by consumers, who 
are able to differentiate between them in the same way as between the many different 
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brands and retailers...” 28  Therefore, reputational mechanisms have entered into action 
allowing some eco-labels to be recognised in the market. In addition to being recognised, 
consumers and competitors might even regard them as “first-rate” schemes. Being a ‘first-
rate- scheme is desirable as it implies a positive reputation as well as a strong position in the 
market. However, to become a first-rate eco-labelling scheme, certain investments in 
reputation have to be made. As seen in Chapter II, reputation does just not happen 
automatically, it is a costly strategy that signals the firm’s commitment to certain quality. 
Therefore, it is no surprise that first-rate eco-labels are those who have sought accreditation 
before a meta-regulator, such as the ISEAL Organisation. These programmes, to show  their 
commitment have chosen to invest in the compliance of ISEAL’s (or other meta-regulator) 
criteria which is costly. This will allow  the eco-label to enjoy a positive reputation and 
increased credibility. Hence their signal will be much stronger compared to other eco-labels 
without such accreditation. This matter as well as the one addressed immediately below 
show  that eco-labels, while solving a first layer of informational matters (the one related with 
the nature of the environmental attributes of the product), simultaneously create a new  layer 
of information asymmetries. 
In conclusion, by increasing the amount of eco-labels, it will be difficult to identify the type of 
eco-labels as information will be costlier to obtain. There can be good eco-labels (those that 
are accredited by a meta-regulator), normal eco-labels and bad eco-labels (those that are 
false). Hence, there are “new” informational asymmetries that are created by the eco-label 
market. This is accentuated with the amount of  eco-labels that are in the market, as it 
becomes harder to identify the eco-labels’ type.
2.3.4 Eco-labels and greenwashing: the informational conundrum
As it has been stated through-out this work, eco-labelled products can be rewarded with 
price premiums and/or positive environmental reputation. These rewards are interpreted as 
profits for the firms that produce such goods. While this incentive is the main driver for pro-
environmental firms to join eco-labels it is also the same driver for greenwashing. 
Greenwashing is the largest undesired outcome of  environmental marketing. Eco-labels 
(certification) are essential “to continuing progress in greener products. Ironically, the 
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2008-09. Report together with formal minutes, oral and written evidence. Ordered by the house of Commons to 
be printed 3 March 2009. P. 7-8
potential importance of eco-labels has led to a proliferation of them, and to a multitude of 
types and degrees of  meaningfulness and integrity.”29  This means that the mechanism 
attracts all types of eco-labels not just the “good” ones. In reality, the “good” type of eco-
labels are the minority compared to the other types. The conundrum lies in the fact that eco-
labels correct an informational failure whilst simultaneously  creating a new  one. The new 
informational failure lies in the fact that there are different types of eco-labels. As seen in the 
previous section, with the increase of environmental claims and labels, the probability of 
greenwashing also increases. 
2.3.4.1 Greenwashing as a long term strategy
Recalling from Chapter II,  it has been claimed that greenwashing is not a profitable strategy 
in the long-run. Over-time consumers are capable of learning true quality of  the claims, 
reputations will develop and the greenwashers will be forced to leave the market. 
Furthermore, it can be inferred from the TerraChoice survey, that the industry also is able to 
learn. Such survey shows a tendency of  ‘mature’ categories of green products to have much 
less incidence of greenwashing than ‘newer’ categories. Additionally, these ‘mature’ 
categories consistently use legitimate eco-labelling schemes to handle their certification. 
Notwithstanding all these strong arguments, greenwashing still hinders the effect of the eco-
labelling mechanism due to its magnitude and the harmful effects on consumer’s trust. 
Greenwashing outnumbers legitimate claims (roughly) 9 to 1. This evidently makes 
consumers extremely distrustful about environmental claims. In fact, it is possible that the 
reasonable strategy for the consumer (under these circumstances) would be to ignore such 
claims altogether. The problem with this of  course is that the eco-labelling mechanism 
depends on consumers. Without the consumer’s side of  the story, there would be no price 
incentive to commit to pro-environmental behaviour, hence eco-labels would not work. 
It is true that, greenwashing is a tempting strategy, as it is very easy and it is practically 
unpunished. It has to be clear that greenwashing does not mean that the producer pollutes 
more; it means that it lies, overstates or misrepresents his environmental qualities. In other 
words, if a product has no environmental claim, regardless of its environmental impact it will 
not greenwash. Greenwashing is a behaviour regarding environmental information not 
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environmental performance. Hence, proving greenwashing is extremely difficult. However, 
groups such as TerraChoice perform surveys that can show  some light in the reality of  the 
eco-label market. In its 2010 survey, TerraChoice found that out of  5,296 products only 265 
were really as green as they claimed this means that 95% of green products are being 
greenwashed.30 Nonetheless, the same report allows to infer that firms have learned (or will 
learn) that greenwashing is not a long-term strategy. If the producer has the intention to 
remain in the market it has to maintain a reputation. Therefore it has to invest in its 
relationships with its stakeholders. These investments are unlikely to be cheap, if  they are 
meaningful. After a certain point, these investments become valuable and engaging in 
greenwashing would considerably damage the firm’s image. Therefore, reputation is another 
important mechanism that constrains firms to be truthful. It is true that many firms will still 
take the opportunity to “cheat the market”; however, they will not survive. As seen in Chapter 
II, greenwashing is profitable as a “fly-by-night” strategy which is in essence short-term. 
Therefore, firms that cannot sustain the high costs of the eco-labelled market and will 
eventually leave it or not enter it in the first place. Following this reasoning, it is 
understandable why while firms have sought to improve their environmental practices, it is 
still not wide-spread. Eco-labelling, has still remained a niche precisely because its costs are 
a significant investment. Therefore, theoretically, only those that are truthful will seek 
certification. The problem lies in distinguishing truthful eco-labels from greenwash. 
2.3.4.2 Eco-labels a potential lemons market?
In economic terms there is an adverse selection problem that can potentially lead to a 
‘market for lemon’s’31  scenario.32  Akerlof, employed the used car market to exemplify the 
adverse selection problem created by information asymmetries. In Akerlof’s example, just as 
in eco-labels, the price mechanism is not a reliable signal for quality as all used cars will be 
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30 TerraChoice makes no distinction between certified and uncertified goods. From the 7 types of greenwashing 
seen in Chapter II, even certified goods can fall into greenwashing practices. Though it will be of  a lesser scale, 
compared to uncertified claims.
31 In the US, bad-quality used cars are known as lemons.   
32 Akerlof in 1970, through the used car market or ‘lemons market’, demonstrated that product quality 
continuously decreases if quality information is distributed asymmetrically between seller and buyer. Only the 
seller is exactly informed about the true product attributes. The buyer, having less information supposes an 
average product quality and is willing to pay only a corresponding market price which covers the costs of a 
product of average quality. In such situation, sellers of high-quality products will be driven out of the market 
because their production costs are above average cost level. Since the inferior quality product remains on the 
market, the supply of quality is selected adversely. See: George Akerlof. The Market for “Lemons”: Quality 
uncertainty and the market mechanism, The quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 84, No. 3, August 1970, p. 
488-500
priced in the same manner. Hence, buyers cannot tell the quality of the car ex ante, thus 
they assume the car is of medium quality (which overvalues the lemon). Consequently, good 
cars will be undervalued; owners of good cars will prefer not to sell, as they will not receive 
the true or expected value of their car. This will lead to a scenario in which “most cars traded 
will be the ‘lemons’, and good cars may not be traded at all. The ‘bad’ cars tend to drive out 
the good...”33  In other words, the cars will be adversely selected. In this sense the eco-label 
market can potentially become a lemon’s market. The big difference between lemon’s and 
greenwashing is that in the first situation the ‘true’ nature of  the lemon will eventually surface 
(through experience) whereas greenwashing can go practically undetected (because of  the 
credence nature of the environmental good). Again, Akerlof points out that the mere 
“presence of people in the market who are willing to offer inferior goods tends to drive the 
market out of  existence.”34  Following this idea, it is imperative to regulate greenwashing. 
This is because, it will drive ‘pro-environmental’ firms to invest even more resources in 
providing a credible claim, which may eventually become to burdensome and will force them 
to stop. Moreover, it will increase consumers mistrust to a point in which no environmental 
claim or label will be credible. 
2.4 Greenwashing: different problem, different law?
Greenwashing is a different problem from the information failure that eco-labels are meant to 
address. It is a problem created by the eco-labelling mechanism. In short, eco-labels are the 
root of greenwashing whilst simultaneously being its solution. This issue arises because 
firms will take the opportunity to make environmental claims without changing their 
behaviour. Firms will have no trouble doing this because the probabilities of  getting caught 
are slim. This is because of the credence nature of environmental attributes and the lax or 
non-existent regulation and monitoring. In 1992 Jamie Grodsky wrote “shortcomings in the 
current and regulatory system have allowed manufacturers to make misleading and 
unsubstantiated claims with virtual impunity.”35  Twenty years later, the legal situation has 
changed very little, but the scenario has only got worse. Recalling some numbers from 
TerraChoice’s latest report, from the 4744 green products on the market in 2010 only 4.5 
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percent of  them were true to their claims, the rest (95%) were guilty of greenwashing at 
some level.36  This means that the current regulatory system (including certification mark 
protection) has still come short in preventing greenwash.37  Even if firms and markets learn, 
grow  and mature, the problem of  greenwashing is that it has not been addressed by any 
law.38 It is out of the scope of the eco-label’s internal regulations and governments have not 
dealt with it because eco-labels are voluntary. Furthermore, at the time of  the creation of all 
the eco-labels it was not possible to foresee the magnitude of  the opportunistic behaviour 
that the eco-labelling mechanism was going to spur. Controlling greenwash is the only way 
to ensure that the eco-labelling mechanism runs smoothly. 
2.5 Scope for Law in Eco-labelling
When eco-labels first appeared most of  the discussions were focused on the need of eco-
labels as an instrument to tackle environmental information. Today the rationale for the 
existence of eco-labels (environmental certification marks) is clear: without certification there 
can be no market for environmental goods. This is because of the credence nature of 
environmental goods and attributes creates a market failure. However, the first boom of eco-
labels were all government or publicly issued (always voluntary). This meant that those 
countries that had an ‘official’ eco-labelling programme were not preoccupied with regulating 
them, as they were already public. In a way, the eco-label was already the governmental 
intervention or the solution. When the private eco-labels appeared, they practically remained 
unregulated because of their voluntary nature. Furthermore, they were run by international 
organisations and functioned more as roundtables (conferences and workshops) than a 
regulatory bodies (even though they are). While NGOs are closely monitored by 
governments (because of  the tax breaks and benefits) their programmes themselves are not 
monitored or regulated. After seeing this angle, it is easy to understand why there is such a 
legal gap. 
Notwithstanding the above, whether eco-labels are good or bad is not relevant anymore (it 
was 30 years ago). Today, the eco-label market is a different one from that twenty or thirty 
years ago. Many of the predictions that academics and politicians discussed vehemently 
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have already been proven. Greenwashing for example, was pointed as one of  eco-labels‘ 
pitfalls by Grodsky in 1992, when it was not a problem (at least not as big as it is today). 
Greenwashing is a market failure known as adverse selection. As seen in section 2.3.4.2 the 
adverse selection might lead to a market for lemons scenario in which only ‘bad’ products 
will remain on the market as all the ‘good’ products will be driven out. This is already the 
case, as ‘bad’ claims already outnumber the ‘truthful’ claims roughly 9 to 1. And yet nothing 
was done about it. Today, the discussion has turned to the effectiveness of  eco-labels: do 
they really have the environmental benefits they claim? As well as whether the information 
conveyed on the eco-label can be trusted? While this work cannot address the first question, 
the second one is clearly within its scope. The eco-label market creates greenwash. 
Greenwash is a market failure that needs to be regulated otherwise the whole eco-labelling 
mechanism will be completely undermined. 
TerraChoice has stated that eco-labelling is both the solution and the cause of 
greenwashing. Therefore the solution to greenwashing should be in the eco-labelling 
mechanism. Jeffrey Minneti in his ‘rational integrity regulation’ theory claims that eco-labels 
should be “able to nudge consumers toward certified product claims and away from self-
declared claims, the self declared claims would eventually leave the market.”39 This idea, 
however, represents Minneti’s first best or ideal situation as it is unlikely that self-declared 
claims leave the market with the simple presence of certification. Furthermore, if  the 
environmental attribute has an experience nature there is nothing wrong with a self-
declaration. Minneti, further acknowledges that such solution is not achievable in the short-
run; hence he proposes a hybrid scheme for the transition in which there is a “certification 
process to shape consumer preferences, but it would also provide standards for self-
declared claims and a process for removing false claims from the market.”40 This scheme 
seems more viable than the previous one. However, Minneti does not provide enough 
elements to see whether or how  this system would work. Neither does he provide elements 
for achieving these goals. What is true is that certification as it is today is not enough to 
deter greenwashing. Furthermore, there are countries (such as those with Common-Law 
traditions, as seen in Chapter V) that do regulate certification marks as well as green claims 
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(trade or consumer authority), such as Minneti suggests; still, that has not prevented or 
deterred greenwash. Certification alone, as it is understood today, is not capable of deterring 
greenwash. Hence, there is a need to improve certification. 
3. Possible Regulatory Designs for Eco-labels
Economic rationales and other scientific findings do not always make a clear transition into 
the laws that are meant to regulate them. This section has the purpose to take the findings 
from the previous section (and Chapters) and translate them into a sound regulatory 
strategy. The main objective of  this section is to see how  the law  should be designed to 
improve the performance of eco-labels as well as deterring greenwash. In order to design a 
sound regulatory strategy it will be necessary to review  different regulatory options that could 
potentially be used in the strategy. Soundness should be understood in a similar sense as 
what Gunningham and Grabosky term optimallity. An optimal regulation is that which is 
effective (as it achieves its goals) and efficient (with low  cost). In addition, the term 
regulatory strategy is preferred over ‘regulation’ alone. This is because regulation is seen as 
a stand-alone regulatory tool; while regulatory strategy implies that tools can interact with 
other instruments and actors to potentialise their effects.41  Hence, creating a regulatory 
strategy comes down to combining the right instruments and actors to achieve a pre-
established set of goals. Designing an optimal regulatory strategy is a process. Hence, this 
section will break-down this process, providing theoretical grounds for each stage of  the 
process. The different regulatory options will be briefly analysed to justify their part in the 
regulatory strategy. Finally, the optimal regulatory design will be presented.
3.1 Law, Regulation and Intervention
Before embarking in the regulatory design, the difference between law  and regulation has to 
be pointed out. This is because, the terms, while similar, are not the same. This distinction or 
relation between law  and regulation has been the topic of many debates with no clear 
solution. Furthermore, both concepts are complex concepts on their own, which tends to 
take the conversation to a conceptual level. Nonetheless, it is worth attempting to clarify this 
distinction, precisely because the object of  this work is to find a scope for Law  in eco-
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labelling. In addition, both concepts are inherently linked to interventions. This is because 
the purpose of the ‘new’ law  or regulation is to alter a current behaviour or status quo that 
otherwise will not be achieved. This ‘alteration’ of the natural course is an intervention. 
3.1.1 Defining Regulation
Regulation is a recognisable concept in Law  and Economics. However, it is also a concept 
that many use lightly and can lead to confusion.42 For example, some talk about regulation 
when in reality they mean ‘governance’, ‘control’ or a law.43 In simple terms, regulation is “an 
activity that restricts behaviour and prevents the occurrence of  certain undesirable activities 
(a red light concept) but the influence of regulation may also be enabling or facilitative (green 
light).”44  From this definition it can be deduced that regulation is aimed at changing or 
controlling the behaviour of some actor.45 However, there are other more specific definitions 
that are more appropriate for this study. For Ogus, regulation is the means by which the 
state “seeks to encourage or direct behaviour which it is assumed would not occur without 
such intervention.”46 Therefore, if  a behaviour is unlikely to appear naturally or voluntarily, 
‘public law’ will impose obligations to induce individuals and firms to achieve the desired 
outcome/behaviour.47 This definition is closely related to the understanding that many people 
have of  regulation, which is ‘command-and-control’ (CAC) regulation.48  It is precisely this 
aspect which leads to the confusion with Law. However, regulation is not always in the 
hands of  governments. In fact there are many actors that an act as regulators as they 
exercise some sort of  ‘social control’.49  Hence, regulation can happen in both public and 
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private spheres. Moreover, these two spheres interact with one another, creating hybrid 
regulatory forms that are not easily classified. This makes sense, especially if the objective is 
to find the optimal regulatory strategy: best outcome at the lower cost. This is because, it 
may be that the party who can achieve a change of  behaviour might be someone different 
than the State. Furthermore, regulatory costs have to be taken into account. When 
governments regulate many public resources are invested into that regulation. Hence, if 
there are cheaper alternatives, they should also be considered (as long as they work).
3.1.2  Regulation and Law
The problem for establishing a relationship between these two concepts is that they are both 
extremely difficult to define. Furthermore, most of the definitions will be rediscriptions of each 
other. For example a simple dictionary definition of Law  would state that it is a system of 
rules that regulates the actions of a particular group; making it a circular relationship. 
Notwithstanding this particular issue, it is possible to separate both concepts. Law  is an 
integrated system which has the function of stabilising and adapting expectations, solving 
disputes, allocating authority, as well as the assignment and limitation rights (such as 
property rights).50 Hence, the role of law  is much broader than that of regulation. Regulation, 
performs a part of  the law’s functions related to the influence of  behaviour through specific 
instruments. Still, only public regulation (that enacted by the state) performs this type of 
function. This is because “law  is an obligation backed by state sanction.”51 Therefore law  has 
an ‘authority’ that regulation (in a broad sense) does not have. Furthermore, law  can 
delegate its authority to other parties allowing them to self-regulate create agreements 
among each other. Law  is what delimits the property rights that will be used in free markets, 
as it stabilises expectations. Hence the legal system is underlying the whole range of 
regulatory activities, and without strong legal systems markets might not be able to function 
correctly. Regulations, on the other hand, are just one of  the specific actions/instruments 
used by Law to influence or change behaviour. 
3.1.3 Regulation and Intervention
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Regulatory activities are interventions. This is because, an intervention is commonly 
understood as preventing or altering a result or course of events. As it has been stated 
above, regulations are activities aimed at modifying or controlling certain behaviours. Hence, 
these regulatory activities are in fact interventions. Nonetheless, conceptually regulation and 
intervention have different connotations and uses. When talking about intervention, two 
words immediately come up: prescription and coercion. “Prescription refers to the extent to 
which external parties determine the level, type and method of environmental improvement. 
Coercion, on the other hand, refers to the extent to which external parties or instruments 
place negative pressure on a firm to improve its performance.”52  It is because of  the 
‘coercion’ element that intervention has a negative undertone. However, not all interventions 
are ‘coercive’, as its degree may vary from instrument to instrument (the same for 
prescription). For example, taxes are high on coercion and low  on prescription as they allow 
the subjects the freedom to chose their behaviour (pay high taxes or change their 
performance). On the other hand, self-regulation is high on prescription but low  in coercion. 
Furthermore, coercion is normally related with the state because of its ability to sanction. 
However, today states make an attempt to make less coercive instruments, which can be 
regarded as ‘less interventionist’. 
While less interventionist measures are always preferred, the premise should always be 
given that such measures actually work. The issue is that in some cases, “what works” 
requires a relatively high level of intervention.53  Taking the Tuna-Dolphin case from the 
Chapter VII, it can be noticed that the Mexican government opted for a direct regulation 
(command-and-control) to control the amount of dolphin settings, whereas the US chose a 
voluntary-informational approach. The Mexican government and the tuna fishery invested 
many resources in avoiding the setting of  dolphins and eventually the numbers are close to 
zero. The US on the other hand, cannot even provide this type of information, as it was left 
as a voluntary measure (as well as the fact that they started to fish elsewhere). Hence if the 
objective is to kill less dolphins, then a voluntary instrument might not be appropriate, 
especially if it goes against the private interests of corporations (profits). It can also be 
observed, that many times highly coercive interventions might be much more costly than its 
less coercive counterparts. 
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3.2 Role of Government
In eco-labelling governments have assumed different roles. In some instances they take a 
‘hands-on’ or active approach by creating eco-labelling programmes of their own. Others, 
take a behind the scenes approach by recognising property rights or other actionable rights, 
as well as giving incentives to activate eco-label markets. Others have decided to co-operate 
with the market by providing resources (human, material or technical) or mandating 
programmes for others to manage. This shows that governments are versatile and they can 
adapt to the markets needs. However, this section has a more normative flavour, as it 
attempts to figure out what such role ought to be. Governments do have a role to play in the 
market, even when following a free-market system. Hence, what matters is what type of role 
should the government play. This discussion is intensified in the environmental arena, 
because even true free-marketeers do not seem to agree on the role of the government. It 
has been contended that “for government to simply walk away and leave environmental 
protection to unfettered market forces, as some public choice theorists would advocate, is 
really no solution at all.”54 This might be true for cases in which the environmental threat is 
such that can lead to irreparable or incommensurable damages. For instance, the loss of a 
species or a nuclear or chemical spill. In these rather extreme cases it is, governmental 
action is more likely to achieve better results than private actions. This is because 
governments are likely to have more resources which will allow  them to react appropriately. 
However, when it comes to every-day environmental behaviours the government’s place is 
open to discussion. 
3.2.1 Free Market Environmentalism
In free market environmentalism it is expected that markets deliver optimal environmental 
outcomes. This can be seen as an oxymoron as markets are the source of the same 
problems it pretends to solve. As it has been pointed out, externalities and public goods are 
the most common environment-related market failures. Free market environmentalists 
suggest that these market failures occur because “it is costly to define and enforce rights in 
both the private and political sectors.”55  In other words, the political and legal costs of 
allocating rights are too high, hence rights are not properly defined. Nonetheless, if those 
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rights where properly defined the market processes would be able to determine the optimal 
amounts of  resource use. This is given that rights are “well defined, enforced and 
transferable.”56  In other words, law  plays a very important role in free markets. When the 
basis of the market has a solid legal structure it will allow  self-interested individuals to 
consider the complete trade-offs and costs of their actions. “Free market environmentalism 
entails allocating property rights for natural resources to private interests, or liability rules 
imposed in respect of harm from pollution, then allowing the market to operate unfettered by 
government intervention.”57  This is simply an interpretation of  the Coase theorem. The 
Coase theorem states that in absence of clearly defined property rights low  transaction costs 
will allow  parties to agree on the most efficient solution. Hence, where property rights are 
properly assigned, markets will tend to gravitate to the most efficient and agreeable 
outcome. 
Free-market environmentalists do not believe that the market is perfect. On the contrary 
markets will make mistakes, externalities will still be created and there will be a tendency to 
undersupply public goods. However, in a properly structured market, mistakes such as the 
creation of  externalities represent new  profit opportunities. This is because property rights 
are dynamic. The values of the environmental goods will change and there can be 
adjustments and reallocation of rights. In other words, ‘property rights will evolve.’ as the 
perceived costs and benefits of the good change.58 Furthermore, property rights should not 
only be well defined, they should be able to be transferred and defended (if  necessary) with 
ease. This means that un-owned resources, such as externalities can be susceptible to 
appropriation by creating a value for it. Entrepreneurs can ‘define and enforce property rights 
to the un-owned resource and charge the free-rider user.’59  Thereby creating a market for 
externalities.
3.2.2 Role of government in Free-Market-Environmentalism
Free-market environmentalists believe that actors in the market should be allowed to follow 
the course of action of their choice. In other words, they do not approve of external 
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intervention in the free flow  of the market. Once there is intervention, incentives will be 
distorted and the outcomes will be sub-optimal. Free market environmentalism rejects state 
intervention. However, for free-markets to work properly they need clear legal rules. 
Therefore, legal rules are called for even in scenarios where intervention is not. Laws 
provide the structure for markets to work properly. Hence, the role of  governments is to 
enact the laws that assign and recognise property rights. In this sense it is only the state 
who will have the authority to create the type of legal rules that will provide the structure of 
the market. In other words, the role of government in free-market environmentalism is to 
provide legal rules. However, this type of  role does not imply intervention. Once the legal 
rules are determined the markets are free to follow  their natural course. It is due to this 
function of  governments that the difference between law  and regulation was discussed 
previously. This is because regulations, even when they can take formal legal forms, will 
have the purpose of influencing the behaviour of others. Laws, on the other hand, will have 
the purpose of altering the market structures, hence the entire market will be altered. The 
actors in the market are not the subject of the law; it is the market itself. 
These arguments make a clear case for free-markets. However, the simple assumption of 
defined property rights that is necessary for markets to work properly is not always met. This 
is because there are political and private costs involved in the process of  enacting laws. 
Furthermore, the State is susceptible to be influenced or even captured by interested 
parties. Hence, the allocation of rights may be flawed from the beginning, which might lead 
to a bleak market outcome. Moreover, this type of scenario will lead to future interventions 
which attempt to correct the failures that the lack of  proper rights created in the first place. 
Hence, interventions will be needed from time to time. However, interventions do not need to 
be ‘intrusive’. This means that today it is easier to find regulatory strategies that are not 
considered intrusive (such as CAC regulations). This is because today governments have 
learned to harness markets and work with them instead of against them. This has become 
much common, including in the environmental arena. 
3.3 Co-regulation and Smart Regulation
Free market environmentalists raise important points regarding the structure and functioning 
of markets. While it is true that as long as markets function properly governments should 
abstain from intervening; it is also true that many times markets do not function as they are 
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expected. Hence there will be a need to regulate the market to achieve the expected 
outcomes. Up to this moment, the discussion has focused on state interventions or 
regulations. Regulation is normally understood as a public matter. However, contrary to 
conventional wisdom, most regulation is “in the hands not of  government officials but of the 
myriad individuals employed in the private sector and that, often, more can be achieved by 
harnessing the enlightened self-interest of the private sector than through command and 
control regulation.”60 Hence public regulation has, in reality, only a small part to play in the 
regulatory sphere. The State does not have the monopoly on the production of law  or 
regulation. Third-parties are also capable of prescribing behaviour of others. This point of 
view  is normally referred to as legal pluralism. Legal pluralism “suggests the existence of 
several overlapping normative legal systems [that] exist in tandem with the state legal 
system.”61 This means that there is a private normative system that co-exists and interacts 
with the public system. This makes it very difficult to separate which sphere is public and 
which is private, as both systems interact in the market and influence its behaviour and 
eventually its outcome. Furthermore, it is common to see governments co-operating with 
private parties to create better regulation. Hence the clear distinction between public and 
private is blurred. However, this might not really matter; what matters is that the overall 
regulatory strategies are efficient, regardless of their origin.
3.3.1 Co-regulation. 
Today it is common to see the government co-operating with industry or other private parties 
to create regulation. This is termed co-regulation, as private and public parties come 
together to define regulatory strategies.  Co-regulation is the middle ground between public 
regulation such as CAC and purely private activities such as voluntarism. Governments can 
be involved in different degrees making some regulations more public with a market 
orientation (such as economic instruments) or more private with government support (such 
as eco-labels). Literature normally regards co-regulation as a variant of  self-regulation. 
However, it can be contended that co-regulation is much more wide-spread as new  types of 
‘negotiated’ regulatory instruments are appearing in the markets. 
3.3.1.1 Self-Regulation
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In short self-regulation is “law  formulated by private agencies to govern professional and 
trading activities.”62 However, the ‘self’ in self-regulation is not always taken literally. These 
type of  rules normally are enacted by an industrial or professional association with the 
objective to standardise behaviour among its members. In other words, the industry or 
private group imposes behaviour restrictions on itself  (its members). “In essence, rules are 
developed, administered and enforced by the people whose behaviour is to be governed, or 
by their direct representatives.”63 In addition, self regulation can also be applied for internal 
regulations in large corporate settings. Environmental Management Systems and other 
forms of CSR can also be deemed as self-regulation, as holdings regulate the behaviour of 
subsidiaries or partners. Overall, self-regulation is private regulation as it involves parties 
other than the state regulating its own behaviour. 
Pure self-regulation is that which emanates spontaneously from private parties. It involves 
an “industry or profession establishing codes of  practice, enforcement mechanisms, and 
other mechanisms, for regulating itself, entirely independent of government.”64 However, it 
has been claimed that pure self-regulation is not very common. This is because normally 
self-regulation is mandated by the State or has some type of  State over-sight. Hence there is 
normally some degree of government involvement, which makes it look like co-regulation. 
Self-regulation can take several forms such as codes of  conduct, customer charters, 
voluntary agreements (signed between firms to reduce COs emissions or achieve a 
particular standard) or unilateral codes of  conduct (an internal policy of a company such as 
commitment to only use fair-trade sources). 
Private eco-labels are self-regulatory instruments. However, they do have the peculiarity that 
the eco-labelling body or organisation is not an industry or professional association. In other 
words, they do not always have the ‘self’ element. This is because, eco-label’s role is 
precisely to be a third-party. Industry and professional associations are not third-parties they 
are second-parties. Nonetheless, eco-labels are a type of ‘voluntary’ association in the 
sense that their members’ common traits are that they comply with the criteria. Hence eco-
labels regulate the behaviour of its members, which would otherwise be unrelated. 
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Nonetheless, if  self-regulation is taken in a broad sense, as law  formulated by private 
parties, eco-labels as certification schemes fall within this category. As commented earlier in 
this chapter as well as in Chapter II, certification has a quasi-contractual nature, hence it is a 
private mechanism. Furthermore, the eco-labels sign contracts with the users of  the eco-
labels, which will govern their relationship. These relationships will remain almost entirely in 
the private sphere. However, as it will be seen below, certain types of  government 
intervention might strengthen this private relation. 
3.3.1.2 Co-regulation: the traditional view
Co-regulation is normally seen as a variant of self-regulation. It refers to governments and 
industry working together to develop standards that will govern the behaviour of a particular 
market. This can be done in different ways, either the government can set objectives and 
allow  for the industry to develop and enforce standards. Alternatively, the government can 
set the standards in agreement with the industry (or any third party such as consumers or 
NGOs) and leave the enforcement to them. Finally, governments can take the standards 
(codes of conduct or guidelines) and back them up with legislation or legal recognition (by 
providing legal standing such standards can be used as a defence in court).65 In the end, 
this view of co-regulation could be simply named ‘enforced self-regulation’.66
3.3.1.3 Co-regulation in a broad sense.
Co-regulation goes beyond complementing self-regulatory strategies. Today governments 
attempt to be more inclusive in their regulatory designs. It can be observed that even in 
direct forms of ‘coercive’ regulations governments and private parties co-operate. This 
allows to take advantage of  the different regulatory spheres and instruments to achieve 
better outcomes. For example, as noted by free-market environmentalists, private actors 
have better information about the value of environmental goods, whilst governments have 
better means of  enforcement. Furthermore, by co-operating or co-regulating with other 
parties, regulations will be better accepted and complied with. This is because the behaviour 
will be negotiated and agreed upon beforehand with the subject of the regulation. This type 
of regulation is increasing in popularity, as governments have identified that regulations are 
not necessarily one-size-fits-all. These agreements, are tailored to the industry/firms/
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government needs. Hence they are likely to be more effective, as compliance and 
enforcement costs can be significantly lowered. Hence, this type of  co-regulation is actually 
the ‘smart’ way to regulate (cheaper with better results and acceptability). Notwithstanding 
these arguments, the literature does not consider this co-regulation, even though it is.  
An example of  this broad co-regulation can be found in the ‘new’ forms of traditional 
command-and-control regulations. Traditionally, command and control’s standards had a 
‘one-fits-all” approach. They were minimum quality standards that were applied to a wide 
range of firms and industries. However, the new  implementations are individualised site-
specific compliance plans. With this new  approach, the government negotiates with the 
industry specific standards or targets. Another variety, are “accredited licensing” by which 
governments reward ‘good performers’ by relieving them of much of  the regulatory burden 
that would normally apply. This ‘green track’ allows firms to voluntary opt in to this scheme 
by committing to certain environmental behaviour while other firms are left to follow  the 
normal regulatory track. In general these changes are a shift to ex ante controls rather than 
ex post sanctions (as they were before).67 
3.3.2 Smart Regulation
Smart regulation has the purpose of  producing better regulation. It is different from co-
regulation as its purpose is to create optimal regulatory strategies, by mixing actors and 
instruments. It is not limited to the private-public discussion of  co-regulation, it simply 
assumes it. To achieve better regulation the term regulation is used in its broadest sense. It 
includes direct regulation such as CAC as well as other forms of social control by different 
parties such as businesses or third parties. In addition, this type of  regulation prefers the use 
of multiple rather than single policy instruments, and a broader range of  actors.68 This does 
not mean that smart regulation simply adds new  instruments to what already exists, it means 
applying the instrument that is most likely to achieve the expected outcome. It also means 
that the party who is more likely to achieve the expected result should be the one regulating, 
even if  it is not the government. The regulatory strategy is an integrated system, where each 
instrument and each party have a part to play. 
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Among the many advantages of smart regulation is that it “will reduce the regulatory burden 
on ‘government, thus freeing up scarce public resources to be allocated to situations where 
government intervention or assistance is most required. Potentially second and third parties 
(business or commercial or non-commercial third parties) can act as surrogate or quasi-
regulators, complementing or replacing government regulation in certain circumstances.”69 
This means that who ever has the lowest regulation costs should be the one regulating. As 
noted by free-market-environmentalists political and legal costs can sometimes be 
substantial and this can lead to sub-optimal rules. Furthermore it is possible that other actors 
have better information or bargaining positions, making them the better regulators. It is not a 
matter of  private or public; it is a matter of  which party can do it better. Nonetheless, just like 
in free-market environmentalism, governments will have an important role in smart 
regulation. It is up to them to establish regulatory objectives, harness compliance, create 
regulatory safety nets, or,  directly intervening itself (if there is no alternative).70  
3.4 Types of regulatory instruments
To achieve an optimal mixed policy design it is first necessary to know  what regulatory 
instruments are at hand. All instruments present advantages and disadvantages and are 
probably not capable of delivering outstanding results on their own. Hence, it is better to see 
regulation as a system, in which the different instruments interact. This does not mean that 
more instruments are always better. Simply creating more regulation would lead to 
smorgasbordism,71  which is a way of describing regulatory overload. More regulation does 
not mean better regulation. Just like in chemistry mixing two substances can create 
explosive reactions, but the same substances mixed with others might not have any effect. 
This is what policy mix should look for, mixes that cause a reaction. Therefore, it is also 
important to understand how  such instruments can be mixed. This is because not all mixes 
will lead to optimal outcomes. Some instruments work better with others. Furthermore, the 
instruments do not need to be applied simultaneously. Rather, a tiered or sequential 
application of instruments will be more likely to be appropriate as different instruments have 
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71 Smorgasbord means a wide range of things, a variety. Hence, regulatory smorgabordism means having a wide 
variety of instruments, that do not necessarily relate or interact among each other (on purpose).
different scopes. Furthermore by mixing the instruments it is possible to compensate for the 
weaknesses of stand-alone policies. 
3.4.1 Command and Control Regulation
Command-and-control regulation is the ‘poster-child’ for public regulation, as it is the most 
known type of regulation. It is regulation by the state through use of legal rules backed by 
(often criminal) sanctions. It is normally viewed as an ‘authoritarian’ measure as it uses the 
force of law  (criminal sanctions) to impose certain behaviour. This is the ‘control’ element of 
the instrument. In the environmental arena, the most common approach of CAC is by setting 
standards that set uniform requirements on broad categories of  activities to achieve specific 
goals. This is precisely the ‘command’ part of the instrument. Additionally, governments 
frequently use permits and licenses to implement the standards. The biggest advantage of 
these type of instruments is their dependability.72  CAC has been proven successful for 
certain type of  problems such as “curbing aspects of  point-source pollution, outlawing 
extremely hazardous substances and the dumping of  toxic wastes, and the protection of 
endangered species.” Moreover, “they send the message that ‘polluting’ is a ‘tolerated’ 
activity and not a right”73 (as other instruments such as information dissemination might do). 
Nonetheless, as seen in the example of co-regulation in a broad sense, CAC regulations are 
taking a new more inclusive approach with less ‘control’. 
3.4.2 Self-regulation
Self-regulation, as seen above, involves a private entity (normally an association) developing 
rules that it monitors and enforces against it self, its members or, in some cases a larger 
community. According to critics, self-regulatory standards are usually weak, enforcement is 
ineffective, and punishment is secret and mild. It lacks the virtues of state regulation such as 
visibility, credibility, accountability, compulsion, rigour, cost spreading and availability of 
sanctions. However, under the right circumstances self-regulation works very well. For 
instance, “self regulation works best where there is a degree of coincidence between the 
self-interest of  the individual company or industry, and the wider public interest.”74 In this 
sense, if complying with an industry-set standard is going to bring a reduction in costs or 
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provide more security (for example if the self-regulation is recognised by courts), complying 
is the rational approach. When private and public interests meet they can be referred to as 
win-win scenarios. However, in the environmental arena self-regulation’s role is limited. This 
is because “the greater the nexus between environmental improvement and increased costs, 
the greater the incentive to renege on self regulatory objectives.”75 Hence if complying with 
self-regulatory provisions becomes too expensive participation will be low. Thereby, if  the 
costs of  environmental improvement are too large, it might be worth considering an 
alternative instrument or an economic incentive.
3.4.3 Voluntarism
Voluntarism can be considered as a type of self-regulation. It consists of a firm imposing 
limitations on behaviour on itself, with out any coercion. “In contrast to self regulation, which 
entails social control by an industry association, voluntarism is based on the individual firm 
undertaking to do the right thing unilaterally, without any basis on coercion.”76  In self-
regulation,  the association will dictate the behaviour to the firm, hence it is an external 
influence. In voluntarism, the standards or measures are internal, free from any coercion. 
Self-regulation may have a reputational effect which motivates firms to comply, but 
voluntarism does not.  Nonetheless, “voluntarism still has an important role, particularly 
where the threats to the environment require active participation to resolve.” Such is the 
case of corporate environmentalism and eco-labels, where firms will make the necessary 
changes to become pro-environmental. The trick however is making environmental 
protection a social norm. In addition, they entail high administrative costs due to negotiation 
and monitoring. Hence, the importance of eco-labelling bodies. As firms can delegate these 
functions to the eco-label body while they focus on complying with standards.77 
3.4.4 Education and information Instruments. 
These instruments are broad. As their name indicates their purpose is to improve the 
capacity of industry and communities by addressing environmental issues. They can consist 
of either providing environmental information or receiving environmental information (which 
is the education part) with the objective of  influencing behaviour. Product certification is a 
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clear example of  this type of instruments. Informational instruments can only work if the 
intended audience is reached. Hence, the need for educational instruments to complement 
them. “There is considerable evidence that educational instruments deliver improved 
management practices... The critical issue is being able to effectively target and deliver the 
message to the intended audience.”78  If  the intended audience is not educated enough the 
information will not be properly delivered, hence the instrument will not be effective. 
Education for consumers can be either to create social or internal norms. Once consumers 
internalise environmental matters as norms they will behave in an environmentally 
appropriate way. However, education can also serve to debias and to provide tools to 
identify wrongful behaviour. In other words, education can also be useful to give consumers 
tools to identify and use the environmental tools that they have at hand. If consumers 
understand what eco-labels mean they might be more keen to use them. For example, it is 
possible to teach consumers about greenwashing and how to identify and avoid it.
Information instruments also have the benefit of motivating the generation of  information that 
would otherwise remain hidden. For example when a firm decides to join an eco-label it has 
to do a self-assessment (LCA) to identify where the processes have to be adjusted to meet 
the criteria. This generates useful information that, while it is not necessarily public, it does 
have a regulatory function. Record keeping and enumeration have important regulatory roles 
at several levels (CAC, self-regulation, voluntarism and incentive-based tools all require 
information). It allows firms to observe their actual performance and that will allow  them to 
act accordingly. The largest problem of  informational strategies is finding someone to follow 
the findings and developments. Generating information with no purpose is too costly. This is 
because the value of the information depends on another party having an interest in such 
information (there needs to be a demand for the information). In eco-labels, for example, 
consumers (or other interest groups) must have an interest in following up and acting on the 
environmental information. In eco-labels, it is very clear that without consumer interest or 
willingness to pay for the information about environmental quality (the eco-label) there is no 
sense in producing it.79  
3.4.5 Economic Instruments
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These type of instruments are normally called incentive- based instruments. They attempt to 
influence private incentives so that private choices are in line with social objectives. These 
incentives are meant to influence behaviour,80  though it is done in a less coercive manner 
than CAC. Hence, they are more cost-effective than CAC measures. Incentives lower costs 
of compliance for individuals, hence it (theoretically) motivates them to take more action. 
The distinction between incentive-based instruments and free-market environmentalism is 
that incentives will always have the purpose to affect behaviour. Hence, creating incentive-
based instruments still attempts to influence or change the behaviour (it is still intervention). 
Free marketeers point out that economic instruments are “market-based variants of 
command-and-control.”81  In their view, the regulator attempts to control the outcomes by 
manipulating price signals or property rights. On the other hand, it is argued that economic 
instruments are less intrusive, hence they incentivise people to seek the most cost-effective 
solutions. 
The downside is that economic instruments are not self-enforcing and may involve 
considerable administrative costs. In addition, these instruments rely on information, which is 
normally not complete or symmetric (potential for failure). Moreover, they might not be as 
effective as their proponents want them to be, thus they may still need to be paired with a 
CAC-type instrument to function properly. In addition, because incentives are set out in the 
market, they are subject to interpretation (or misinterpretation); hence, the expected 
outcome is not always achieved. For example, subsidies might have a ‘lulling’ effect which 
means that they foster the ‘status quo’ rather than a change of behaviour. In eco-labels, for 
example, governments have to be careful not to crowd-out firms’ intrinsic motivations. 
External incentives to promote eco-labels might lead to less eco-labels rather than more. 
This is because incentives are normally tailored to ‘rational’ individuals. However, as seen in 
Chapter III and IV market actors are not always ‘rational’. This leaves a large scope for 
future research in behavioural sciences. In the meantime, governments have to be careful 
on how  they attempt to modify behaviour, even if it is just by nudging or giving incentives. 
Nonetheless, economists will always prefer an economic-instrument over a CAC approach 
to solve any given problem. There are a wide variety of incentive-based instruments, the 
most common are: 
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- Property rights. These are meant to incentivise owners to maintain a high value of  their 
property so if  they were to sell they can maximise profits. Hence there will be an incentive 
to conserve and protect the property, so it does not lose value. “Property right 
mechanisms offer a powerful means to encourage people to conserve environmental 
resources and limit their use to that which is sustainable.”82 
- Market creation. Government creates a market where none existed before, such is the 
case as tradeable pollution or resource rights. Market creation can be envisaged as a 
hybrid between free market environmentalism and direct regulation. 
- Fiscal instruments. These instruments alter the price of the goods as a way to internalise 
externalities.
- Financial Instruments. Their purpose is to mobilise additional financial resources for 
conservation and environmental protection. These instruments may be effective to 
finance a variety of environmental activities (sewage treatment, water recycling, 
reforestation). However, they may be abused (funds used for other purposes), which 
might increase the monitoring costs substantially.
- Liability Instruments. Imposing civil liability on those who devastate the environment can 
provide an economic incentive for the management and control of risk, pollution and 
waste. Firms are incentivised to internalise externalities by the threat of legal action 
This list of  instruments is not exhaustive. However it aids to see what type of tools are 
preferred by governments. The difference between these measures and market harnessing 
measures (preferred by free-marketeers) is very dim. For example, liability schemes and 
property rights can be considered as free-market tools for channelling market forces to some 
specific direction (as opposed to a specific outcome). Nonetheless, this discussion can be 
left for the theory. Now  that the most common instruments have been reviewed, what 
matters is how can they be mixed to enhance eco-labels and deter greenwashing. 
4. A Smart Regulation for Eco-labels
Eco-labels as certification schemes, have normally been considered as a stand-alone 
instrument, instead of part of a strategy. However, by using Ayres and Braithwaite’s pyramid 
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model, as well as Gunningham and Grabosky’s extended version of  such pyramid, it can be 
shown that eco-labels are part of  a complex regulatory scheme. The first part of this section 
is focused on presenting eco-labels under this ‘smart regulation’ light. Moreover, this model 
will shed light on how  the eco-labelling regulatory strategy can be improved to deter 
greenwashing. Smart regulatory strategies follow  a simple set of principles that have already 
been addressed throughout this section. According to Gunningham and Grabosky these 
principles are the heart of well functioning regulations. The principles of smart regulation are: 
• Prefer policy mixes incorporating a broader range of instruments and institutions.
• Prefer less interventionist measures. 
• Ascend a dynamic instrument pyramid to the extent necessary to achieve policy goals. 
• Empower participants which are in the best position to act as surrogate regulators. 
• Maximise opportunities for win win outcomes. 
These principles, paired up with proper planning and objective definition are likely to produce 
optimal regulatory strategies. The hard part of planning regulatory strategies is foreseeing 
which instruments actually work. As seen briefly with economic instruments, many times 
incentives can back-fire when internal motivations or other behavioural factors are not 
considered. The instrument might only influence the behaviour of  some, but not others. 
Alternatively, it could be that the instrument that seemed viable ex ante, may, in light of 
experience, prove not to be so.83  These outcomes suggest some sort of  failure of the 
regulatory instrument, it might not be responsive enough or it might need sequencing to 
increase dependability or it might be hindered by another instrument.  
4.1 The Basic Regulatory Pyramid Strategy
Ayres and Brathwaite, created a model for responsive regulation84  in which “regulators 
signal to industry their commitment to escalate their enforcement response whenever lower 
levels of  intervention fail.” This can be seen as a ‘tit-for-tat’ game, in which regulators will 
initially assume  that the industry will be ‘virtuous’ (co-operative and compliant). This will lead 
government to adopt a co-operating behaviour. Regulators will continue to cooperate as long 
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as the industry remains virtuous. However, when the regulator’s “expectations are 
disappointed, they will respond with ‘progressively’ punitive and deterrent oriented strategies 
until the regulatee conforms.”85 In other words when industry defects from the co-operative 
behaviour the regulator will respond with punishment, until the industry returns to the original 
co-operative behaviour: tit-for-tat. This model is known as an enforcement pyramid (Figure 
A). This pyramid needs two elements: gradual escalation and the existence of  a credible 
peak or tip which if  activated, will be sufficiently powerful to deter even the most egregious 
offender. Applied to eco-labelling the enforcement pyramid would look as follows:
Expulsion from 
program 
Warning and 
opportunity to 
remedy 
License Agreement between 
Eco-label and Firm 
!"#$%"&'%(")$
*(+,$-"&'%(")$
Figure 1. Enforcement Pyramid of an Eco-labelling Body.
It can be observed that coercion will increase with escalation. Furthermore, along with 
coercion, the costs of non-compliance will be higher towards the tip of the pyramid. Hence, 
at some point it becomes to costly for the regulatee to not comply. In addition, the credibility 
of the peak will depend on the regulator’s effective punishment capacity. Gunningham and 
Grabosky recall that in Australia, it was only after an environmental offender was imprisoned 
that industry started to develop audit and other due diligence defences.86  The mere 
existence of  the regulation is not deterrent enough; the capacity of the authority to enforce 
such measure needs to be credible. Figure 1, shows a very simple example of what the eco-
labelling organisation’s pyramid will look like. At the bottom, is the license agreement. In 
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case of breach of contract, it is likely that the eco-labelling organisation will allow  the firm to 
correct or remedy its actions. However, if  firms do not take appropriate actions or the 
wrongful behaviour continues the eco-label is allowed to sanction and ultimately expel the 
firm from the programme, not allowing it to use the eco-label anymore. If  a product or firm 
loses the right to use an eco-label, its reputation can be severely damaged. But the eco-
labelling regulatory strategy goes beyond this enforcement pyramid. This is because, there 
are more actors, and each actor has its own pyramid. Hence, the regulatory strategy is kin to 
Gunningham and Grabosky’s dynamic instrument pyramid. 
4.2 The Eco-label’s dynamic instrument pyramid
Gunningham and Grabosky extend Ayres and Braithwaite’s pyramid, by increasing the 
number of faces of the pyramid. This means that coercion levels can increase not only with 
one single instrument, but also across several instruments. This is because of  the interaction 
of the different parties and instruments. Just as the original enforcement pyramid escalation 
will only occur when the less coercive measures have failed. The difference is that 
escalation can be done through different facets of the pyramid; it is not strictly vertical.
Not all regulatory strategies can be represented by a pyramid, but eco-labels can. This is 
basically because in the case of eco-labels, there are four parties: consumers, businesses, 
eco-labels (the eco-label organisation or third party certification schemes) and the 
government, as it can be seen in Figure 2. Each party has its own enforcement pyramid, like 
the one shown in Figure 1. However, when placed together they interact, and arguably 
perform better than if they are considered separately. 
Consumer Business Eco-label or 
certifier 
Government 
Figure 2. Different parties of the Eco-label regulatory strategy
A) Consumers’ role in the eco-labelling regulatory strategy, is being the base of  the pyramid. 
Their regulatory role is being the subject of  education and information strategies. 
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Information is the underlying goal of  eco-labels. As it has been discussed throughout this 
work, eco-labels main purpose is to inform the market (consumers specifically) about the 
environmental qualities of a product. Hence, it is only logical that informational strategies, 
directed at the consumers are the base of  the whole strategy. In addition, informed 
consumers are the ones that will trigger the eco-labelling mechanism. However, from all 
the actors in the eco-label regulatory strategy consumers might have the weakest 
regulatory role. This is because if they were to change the regulatory strategy they would 
need to organise in large numbers to do so (to increase their regulatory muscle, which is 
coercion). This is paradoxical, as without them eco-labels would make no sense. 
B) The role of  businesses in the eco-label regulatory strategy is limited to voluntarism. It is 
up to the firms to engage in pro-environmental activities. As it can be recalled from 
Chapter III, firms have different motivations to engage in pro-environmental activity that 
goes beyond  legal compliance. However, this is always given that such actions are in line 
with private benefits. This means that if  environmental behaviour becomes too costly or is 
not within the firm’s sphere the firm will not engage in such activities. Furthermore, 
international corporations with complex supply chains, may already have a complex 
coercion structure, depending if  they are vertically integrated or not. In this sense, the 
pyramid of enforcement will follow  the natural hierarchies of the corporation. All 
environmental management systems, CSR activities, internal codes of conduct, 
environmental-self  declarations and other environmental policies corporations might 
have, fall within this facet.  
C) The eco-labelling organisation, which can be either the third party certifier or accreditation 
body (that authorises external independent certifiers) has a more complex role in the 
system. Within the regulatory system, they are considered private third-party regulators. 
This is because they are in charge of setting the criteria and signing the contracts with the 
eco-label users. Hence they can control and regulate the use of the eco-label (mark). 
Therefore, they are considered regulators because they influence and even control, to 
some degree, the behaviour of those firms who decide to conform to their criteria. In 
addition, with complying with the criteria, eco-labels are entitled to monitor the use of the 
eco-label by the members and sanction those that do not comply with their agreements. 
The largest punishment is expulsion of the programme (with possible court sanctions 
depending on the specific contract). This is shown in figure 1. 
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D) Government is the primary (or original) regulator, and its role in eco-labelling is to 
empower the whole regulatory strategy. This is because the government has access to 
more coercive instruments than the other parties. Governments normally set minimum 
quality environmental standards, they grant licenses and they can punish wrongdoers 
(even criminally). Notwithstanding the variety of  roles governments can adopt, their main 
role in eco-labelling is to provide regulatory safety nets, for when the private instruments 
fail, but above all it should use its coercive power to enhance the whole mechanism. In 
theory, the government facet of the pyramid should have a highly deterrent mechanism 
on the tip. This measure should be such that it deters all wrongdoing. However, in eco-
labelling there is no such measure in place. 
Once the actors and the facets are seen independently, it is necessary to put them together 
so they form the actual pyramid. Figure 3, shows first how  the pyramid looks in two-
dimensions. The following figures, attempt to show  how  the pyramid would look in three-
dimensions. In this way it can be seen, how  each facet has its own escalation. While 
simultaneously giving the possibility to move from one facet to the other. The tip of the 
pyramid will always represent the most coercive measures. 
Figure 3. The Eco-label Regulatory Strategy Pyramid.      
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The dynamics between the facets are as follows: assuming consumers are informed (base 
of the pyramid), firms will have motives to engage in pro-environmental activities 
(voluntarism). If  the firm so desires it can seek to join an eco-labelling programme (moves 
into the next facet). Once it is certified and has signed the license agreement the firm has to 
conform to the regulations of that facet. If the firm fails to comply with its obligations, the eco-
label is entitled to sanction the wrongdoer and even expel it from the programme (tip of the 
pyramid). In some jurisdictions the next facet is already in place, which is the government 
facet. If the eco-label desires it can register the mark as intellectual property. Once this right 
is awarded  the eco-label is the owner of the right and has the duty to defend it. Hence, the 
government provides the tools in case of  infringement. Nonetheless, while this is how  it 
works (at least in some jurisdictions) today, there is still a missing step, one with higher 
coercion that is able to deter greenwash. 
4.3 Eco-label’s tip-less pyramid and the Dual role of Government
Both the enforcement pyramid and the dynamic instrument pyramid are based on the idea 
that the tip of  the pyramid is reserved for the most coercive measure. Such measure should 
be able to deter wrong-doings as it makes it very costly for market actors to deviate from 
compliance. All facets of the dynamic pyramid have their ‘very coercive’ measure or 
instrument. Except for the government facet. Hence the eco-labelling regulatory pyramid is 
missing the tip. The tip should represent the most coercive measure capable of deterring 
unwanted behaviour such as greenwashing. Coincidentally (or not), not one government 
sanctions greenwashing. Some jurisdictions contemplate green claims guide-lines or some 
sort of deceptive advertising rules. However, these are not credible enough and they are 
meant to address environmental claims not certification. In addition, these rules are very 
difficult to enforce. Furthermore, there are no clear legal actions against these environmental 
claims, whether they are public or private actions remains unclear. Hence, without clarity and 
defined roles they do not work as regulatory threat. In short, it is possible to claim that the 
missing tip of the pyramid should be focused at deterring and sanctioning greenwashing and 
greenwashers. 
In the market for environmental goods, eco-labels are not the only informational tool in play. 
It cannot be forgotten that there are also environmental claims and other environmental 
marketing tools that compete in the same market. Eco-labels are but one of those tools, and 
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while it can be argued that they are one of the best ways to convey truthful environmental 
information to consumers, they are the minority. The majority of claims in the market are self-
declarations. This means there are two intertwined spheres: certification and claims. 
Certification is a self-regulatory mechanism, which can follow  the regulatory model proposed 
in the previous section. Whereas environmental claims, are governed by public laws or co-
regulation models. Specifically, they are normally regulated with guidelines which provide 
some sort of safe-harbour for marketeers. However, how  claims perform in the market and 
how much greenwashing they allow, will directly affect the performance of eco-labels. 
4.3.1 The Role of government in certification
The role of government is critical to eco-labels. measures fail. This is because it is the only 
facet within the regulatory strategy that provides some sort of coercion. Only when 
governments recognise property rights or liability rules, can eco-labels have access to the 
government facet. Otherwise, eco-labels remain in the private sphere with no means to 
enforce. The type of coercion governments provide, cannot be found in the private face of 
the pyramid. However, as it has been pointed out, in reality the role of  government is far from 
clear. It can be observed that some governments have opted for creating their own eco-
labelling schemes. In this case the government facet in reality covers the function of the third 
party regulator or the eco-label. Hence it duplicates a function that of another actor or it 
replaces it, leaving the structure without a legal support. Only when governments provide a 
clear legal structure, such as recognising property rights or liability rules will the regulatory 
structure resemble the regulatory model described above. In all other cases, governments 
are not taking advantage of  their main characteristic: public enforcement. Hence, their 
individual enforcement pyramid is weak or it simply does not exist, making the eco-labelling 
strategy incomplete. Which may lead to failures such as greenwashing. 
Specifically, eco-labels or certification call for governments to underpin the system with some 
simple interventions. First, as seen in Chapter V some countries regulate certification marks 
by allowing them to register in a similar manner to trademarks or geographical indications. 
This simple intervention has several benefits. First, once the certification mark is registered it 
will entitle the owner to defend the use of  its mark in the market. Hence, if there is a 
greenwasher that attempts to imitate the mark or use it without permission, the owner is 
entitled to pursue legal action. This allows for peer monitoring, which is likely to lessen 
greenwashing. Furthermore, if  for the registration it is necessary to review  the eco-label’s 
criteria and/or regulations (such as the case of Australia reviewed in Chapter V), there is an 
additional barrier for greenwashing. If the eco-label were proven misleading or exaggerated 
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the registrar or reviewing authority will be able to correct it before it goes into the market. In 
addition, it has been pointed out that certification itself  is not without its problems. 
Specifically, third party certification has an inherent conflict of interest problem. The firm that 
wants to be certified has to pay the certifier, which creates a strange situation for the certifier 
as it will have a pressure to certify otherwise it will loose business. In this case, government 
can intervene with a fourth party certification scheme. In theory, governments are 
independent from the private interests of  the certifiers. Hence, it can create a pool or fund, in 
which the firms that want to be certified (the clients) pay into this fund and the certifier will be 
randomly assigned. And the government pays the certifiers directly, not the clients. In this 
way there will be less conflict of interest. However, this structure would have to be reviewed 
in depth, which will have to be left for further research. 
4.3.2 The Role of government in environmental claims 
The laws and regulatory models that apply to certification cannot be applied to simple 
environmental claims. As it was noted before, environmental claims fall within the wide 
scope of advertising. Hence, the laws governing deceptive advertising will be applied. In 
addition, some jurisdictions have specific regulations for environmental claims. These 
normally come in a form of guidelines for marketers or producers (depending on the entity 
that enacts them). These guidelines are normally enacted by industry associations and then 
they are approved by the relevant government agency (co-regulation scheme). Following 
these guidelines would be useful for the firm that is accused of greenwashing as a defence. 
In other words they are safe-harbours. However, this system has a problem with 
enforcement. On the one hand private enforcement is unlikely, as one individual is not going 
to bear the costs of going to court over a misleading environmental claim or any type of 
greenwashing for that matter. As discussed in Chapter V, for an individual (or even a group) 
to go to court it is necessary to prove ‘harm’. Environmental attributes are unlikely to 
produce a ‘harm’ that would give rise to a legal action. On the other hand, public 
enforcement would imply very high monitoring costs. The enforcement of environmental 
claims is out of the scope of this work, and would call for further research. The only thing 
that can be easily observed is that the current system does not address the greenwashing 
problem. Greenwashing is a market failure that needs to be addressed otherwise both 
environmental claims and eco-labels will be undermined.
4.4 Trade or environment: government dilemma
As mentioned previously, legal pluralism suggests that two or more legal systems can 
coexist and co-regulate over one specific sphere. In previous sections the interactions 
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among the private and public spheres have been analysed. However, in eco-labels two 
‘public’ systems potentially overlap, creating some problems. These two systems are 
environmental and trade law. This overlapping arises due to eco-labels’ dual nature: they are 
both trade and environmental tools. This problem is not unique to eco-labels, it applies to 
many sustainable policies. This is because trade tools are normally regulated within the 
private sphere, with little to no government intervention. Whereas environmental tools 
normally have a public nature. The problem in the regulatory pyramid becomes a practical 
matter. Which authority and under which rules should the government facet of eco-labelling 
be entrusted to?  It could be assigned either to the trade or to environmental authority or 
maybe to both. There is an overlapping of  commercial and environmental interests and 
coexistence can only work if such interests are balanced. The problem lies in the fact that 
trade and environmental interests compete with each other and are not always aligned. If 
trade were to dominate the regulatory scenario it is likely that the environment would take a 
secondary role (which it is already prone to have). On the other hand, if the opposite were 
true, trade would be constrained and limited because of its environmental effects. The 
problem is intensified because the effects are not comparable. At some point trade and 
environmental policy communities (authorities and other stakeholders) will have to come 
together and decide which are the circumstances in which trade will take precedence over 
the environment and vice-versa. However, as long as it is only the trade or consumer 
protection authority taking action on eco-labels, their perspective will bias the interventions.87
Next Chapter will address the Tuna-Dolphin conflict between Mexico and the US. This case 
is a clear example of this environment-trade dilemma. In short, when Mexico decided to go 
before the WTO the US immediately opposed this action because the US and Mexico have 
a bilateral environmental treaty. Therefore, because the US considers this case an 
environmental matter (because of  the dolphins) it argued that Mexico had no right to go 
before the WTO. Mexico on the other hand, argued that because the dolphins were already 
safeguarded, the contended measures were commercial. As it can be seen the line is not 
clear. Furthermore, bodies such as the WTO cannot solve the environmental problems that 
arise within their commercial sphere. In the same case, both the Panel and the Appellate 
Body noted that dolphins outside the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean are not really protected 
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p. 41.
by any law. And while it is evident, and even frustrating, there is not much a trade authority 
can do on the matter as it is out of its jurisdiction. 
5. Conclusions
This chapter attempted to answer two main questions: is there a scope for law  in eco-
labelling and if  so how  should it look like. The answer to the first question is quite simple: 
yes, there is a scope for law  in eco-labelling. In fact, given the current scenario with the 
amount of greenwashing there is not only scope for law  there is a need for law. Not only 
because of the quantity of greenwash, but also because greenwashing is a market failure. 
Specifically, greenwashing is opportunistic behaviour that leads to an adverse selection 
problem. Hence , if it is left unattended the market will not function, just like Akerlof’s market 
for lemon’s. The second question, is slightly more complicated to answer. In theory the law 
should be such that it underpins the whole third-party (eco-labels) and voluntary systems 
that are in place. This means that there should be a statute, that provides safeguards or 
safety nets with the purpose of supporting or empowering (by giving more structure, clear 
and delimited rights) the eco-labelling system or mechanism. Moreover, it can be deduced 
from the eco-label’s enforcement pyramid and its dynamic variant, that eco-labels are 
missing a governmental enforcement mechanism. This means that while statutory 
underpinning is crucial it is not enough, there needs to be a highly coercive tip for the 
pyramid to work properly. Its purpose is to serve as a threat a deterrence instrument, that 
increases the cost of non-compliance. 
The countries that regulate certification marks have a regulatory structure that resembles the 
one proposed herein. The ones that do not are incomplete and leave an opening for failure. 
In a complete pyramid each party is taking the role they should be taking and the dynamics 
work well. Hence, firms will be focused on their pro-environmental activities, eco-labels will 
be focused on certifying and the law  will support the system and provide actions for when 
the system fails. If  any party is not doing their part, the system is unlikely to work properly. 
Nonetheless, it was also pointed out that even in the case where certification marks are 
regulated, there is still scope for public enforcement. This is because the certification 
scheme does not tackle greenwash either. It might lessen it, but it does not deter it. 
However, that can be left as a topic for further research.
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To close this work, a case study will be presented. This case study, illustrates what is 
considered a successful eco-labelling policy. In addition it provides a thorough example of 
the tension between trade and environment laws. It points out the type of problems that arise 
when trade authorities intervene with environmental matters. Also, it shows the power of 
corporate environmentalism, as the dolphin-safe policy in the US was initiated by the 
dominant firms in the tuna industry. It is a complex case, as it has many stages, thus it 
provides useful examples for many other matters discussed throughout this work. 
Furthermore, the case has recently been reviewed in the WTO. Hence, it will aid to 
determine whether there is in fact a risk for public eco-labels to be considered a protectionist 
measure. The WTO opinion might hold useful insights, as well as an official standing that 
might influence the findings of this research.   
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CHAPTER VII
The Mexico-US Tuna Conflict and the Role of the ‘Dolphin-Safe’ Eco-label
1. Introduction
This chapter’s main purpose is to provide an example of the importance of the trade related 
aspects of eco-labels. The ‘dolphin-safe’ eco-label1  (and its variants) clearly illustrates the 
impacts of eco-labels on trade, policy and the environment. Furthermore, this label has been 
recently reviewed in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) making it, a very relevant case on 
an international arena. In addition to understanding the background and the proceedings 
that took place before the WTO; the ‘dolphin-safe’ eco-label will be analysed using the 
findings of other chapters, specifically Chapter I and V. 
The tuna dolphin case is a very old case, it dates back to the 1980s. There have been many 
stages, including more than one attempts to solve it at an international level. In addition, it 
has a public sphere as well as a private one. On the one hand governments were dealing 
with the public ‘dolphin-safe’ policies and on the other, private corporations were launching 
their ‘dolphin-safe’ labels. This makes the case somewhat complicated to follow. Therefore, 
the review  will be done in a chronological manner, as it is the most simple way to address it. 
As mentioned above the WTO case will be duly reviewed. The results of the case may still 
be argued; however, when applying the findings of other chapters, it will be observed that it 
the findings are not really surprising. The analysis will show  that the case is relevant as it will 
allow  the comparison between the different regulatory options. This is because one of the 
parties of  the case opted for a mandatory measure, whereas the other opted for a voluntary 
measure. Hence this case raises important questions in the desirability of  eco-labels to 
address complex environmental problems. However, this chapter does not attempt to 
analyse the WTO or international trade matters, as that is out of the scope of  this research. It 
simply addresses a relevant case in the eco-labelling arena. 
2. The Core of the Conflict
The trade of tinned tuna has an annual global value of  $2.7 Billion dollars. The US is the 
number one consumer of  canned tuna, where the consumption per capita is of  1.5 kilos a 
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1 There have been more than one Dolphin-friendliness related eco-labels, however ‘dolphin-safe’ will encompass 
them as a group, as it really does not make a difference for the analysis. Where a distinction is necessary it will 
be pointed out. 
year, which equals 7 cans. Japan is a close second, though canned tuna is not their first 
option. These 2 countries account for approximately 60% of the world consumption. Finally, 
in Europe the United Kingdom is the largest canned tuna consumer; in 2008 alone it 
consumed 778,000,000 tins.
Everywhere from the luxury sashimi markets to the low-cost canned variety, tuna is a key 
element for the diet of millions of people around the world. There are many species of tuna, 
however the most relevant ones in world trade are skipjack (or skipper jack), yellow-fin and 
blue-fin tunas. The largest tuna fishery in terms of  volume is skipjack. Yellow-fin, is a much 
more commercially valuable species and it makes up 35 percent of  the world's catch. It is of 
far better quality than the common skipjack, it is bigger, has softer odour and the meat is 
firm, making it easy to process. The majestic blue-fin, used for the luxury sashimi markets, 
only represents 1.5 percent of the volume of  tuna, but its dollar value is astronomical. In 
2001, a single blue-fin tuna set an all time record when it sold for US$173,600 in Japan.2 
Overall, tuna is one of the world’s favourite fish and is a significant industry for many 
countries.
Tuna fisheries face several dilemmas. The most notorious is the fact that several species are 
in the brink of extinction, such as the iconic blue-fin. The second problem is that all tuna face 
overfishing. There are not enough fish to sustain the global demand. Additionally, technology 
now  allows big ships (floating factories) to fish and process in two days the amount of  tuna 
that full countries can take in a year. Moreover, fishing has always faced the problem of 
accidental by-catch of other marine species such as sharks, turtles, dolphins and other 
marine mammals. 
The tuna-dolphin case between Mexico and the United States is one of a kind. The tuna, 
specifically yellowfin, leaves Alaska and resurfaces in the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean 
(ETP)3 near Mexico, this is is shown in the map below  (figure A). This means that the US 
maritime area does not have this type of  tuna. Another peculiar aspect of this case is that for 
some reason, only in the ETP tuna tends to congregate beneath pods of  dolphins. This tuna-
dolphin association is not observed in any other ocean in the world. 
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3 The ETP lies off the coast of California, Mexico, Central America and South America all the way to the coasts of  
Chile. Only 15% of the tuna comes from the ETP. 
 Figure 1. Eastern Tropical Pacific
Dolphins swim in the surface above the schools of  tuna, making it easy for fishermen to find 
the deep sea tuna schools. For several decades fishermen maximised their fishing by using 
the ‘setting on dolphins’ fishing technique. This technique consists of  intentionally encircling 
the dolphins with boats and other less-friendly devices (‘seal’ bombs) and then letting the 
nets drop around them. The purse-seine nets close from the bottom (like a purse) and trap 
all the fish within the nets including the dolphins (see figure 2) Needless to say this method 
of fishing is responsible for the death of  millions of  dolphins. This is precisely the root of the 
tuna-dolphin conflict. 
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 Figure 2. Purse Seine Nets
However, after 1990’s the nets have been adapted so the dolphins can escape alive. Other 
fishing techniques were tested, such as log-setting. This technique did in-fact save dolphins 
but for every 29 dolphins saved, over 2000 sharks, 38 to 75 swordfish and 5 sea turtles 
would have had to be killed.4  For the specific case of the ETP tuna purse-seine fishing 
(using nets as those in figure 2) is the least harmful method. It is very specific and has a very 
low  rate of other marine by-catch.5 The problem is that despite all these efforts to save the 
dolphins, it has been contended that these still get psychologically stressed and can get 
injured during the chases. So even if  the fishing process is not lethal to dolphins anymore, 
the recovery of  the ETP dolphin species that were almost depleted6  after decades of 
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4 D.D. Murphy, The Tuna Dolphin Wars, 40:4 JWT (2006), p. 597, at 610
5 at <http://www.greenpeace.org/international/seafood/understanding-the-problem/fisheries-problems-today/
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6 A depleted stock is that which level of abundance has diminished over 40% compared to historical levels, with 
dramatically reduced reproductive capacity. It requires particularly energetic rebuilding strategies and its recovery  
time will depend on the present condition, the level of protection and the environmental conditions.
unregulated fishing is still very slow. This is the current argument used to foreclose Mexican 
tuna into the US markets. 
3. The Development of the Conflict.
Since the beginning of the 1900s the US fleet was almost the sole producer of tuna in the 
ETP. During the 1960s American fishermen developed the ‘setting on dolphins’ technique. 
However, in  the 1970s there were many large environmental movements that pressured 
governments to enact legislation protecting the environment. Among these laws is The 
Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) of 1972. The MMPA essentially limited the 
‘taking’ (harassment, hunting, capture, killing or attempt thereof) of  marine mammals during 
any type of commercial fishing activities. The US government took into its hands the 
protection and conservation of marine mammals such as dolphins, polar bears and whales. 
At this moment a quota was established for the incidental taking as well as the imports of 
such animals. 
3.1 The 1980s and The First Embargo 
As mentioned earlier the US was practically the sole exploiter of  the ETP. The Mexican fleet 
was almost insignificant until 1978 when the Mexican government decided to jump-start the 
industry. Thanks to this financial aid the Mexican fleet increased from 25 vessels in 1978 to 
42 fishing vessels in 1980.7 
In 1980 Mexico declared its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of  200 nautical miles from its 
coast. This was before the signing of the United Nations Convention on the Law  of  the Sea 
in December 1982.8 The Mexican authorities announced that all foreign vessels interested in 
fishing in its EEZ would be able to do so by obtaining a licence. Some US vessels ignored 
this announcement. In July of  1980, the Mexican Navy proceeded to seize six US vessels 
that were operating without authorisation within Mexican territory.9 These upset the US who 
retaliated by declaring an embargo to Mexican tuna. This measure was grounded on the 
Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act. This Act is the primary Law 
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7 A. Suárez Gutiérrez, Antecedentes Históricos de la Pesquería de Atún en México. 10:24. El Vigia, (January-
March 2005), 2. 
8 It is important to make the observation that the US opposed this treaty and did not sign or ratify it.
9 E.C. Marin Lopez,  Del Proteccionismo Estadounidense a la Politica Desleal: El Embargo Atunero. Problemas 
del Desarrollo. 34:134 Revista Latinoamericana de Economía. (2003), at 93.
governing marine fisheries and management in the US. It does not recognise other State’s 
sovereignty over highly migratory species (such as tuna). It prescribes that if  a vessel is 
seized by another State as consequence of claim of a jurisdiction not recognised by the US 
Laws, it will prohibit the imports of fish from such State.  
This first embargo wasn’t harmful to the Mexican tuna industry. On the contrary, the fishery 
managed to increase its volume as well as the exports. With the US border closed, Mexico 
diversified to other markets and strengthened the internal consumption. The fish was offered 
to canners in Italy, Spain, France, Japan, Costa Rica and Panama. Furthermore, the 
Mexican fleet found that by reshipping in Puerto Rico they could triangulate and still sell to 
the US.10 After six years Reagan’s government decided to lift the sanction. This of  course 
came after Mexico’s compromise to enter the US market at a slow  rate to avoid over-supply. 
Moreover, this agreement was under the condition that Mexico allowed observers from the 
Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC) to observe the fishing practices.
3.1.1 US Tuna Market Characteristics up to 1990
Before the embargo the major tuna canners from the US owned the fishing vessels. 
However in the early 1980s these major US tuna producers sold their vessels. This made it 
easier to divert their assets to spot markets in other parts of  the world.  Eventually the US 
canners dissolved their ties to the tuna fishing fleet altogether. Up to the late 1970s 
California had been the main processing centre for tuna (due to its proximity to the ETP). But 
by the early 1980s increased imports had made canning expensive. By the end of the 1989 
Puerto Rico and American Samoa, due to their tax benefits, had become the main canneries 
for US destined tuna.11 
The US tuna processing industry was an Oligopoly. Three large companies controlled 71% 
of the US canned tuna market in 1989. Heinz (Starkist, its representative brand) had 36 
percent market share, Van Camp (known for Chicken of the Sea) had 21 percent, and 
Unicord (brand name Bumble Bee) had 14 percent. Other companies combined had 29% 
percent, of which 17 were private labels and 6% were Japanese. Up to 1988 the three “big” 
companies were American-owned. However, by the end of 1988, Chicken of the Sea and 
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Bumble Bee were sold to Indonesian and Thai interests. Yet, their tuna sales remained 
mainly in the US. 
For the ‘big-three’ the cost to switching to raw  tuna suppliers in the Asian Pacific was small. 
However, for the smaller US producers these costs were not so small; their assets were 
ETP specific. These small producers relied on fishers and canneries from the ETP to reduce 
transport costs (as well as a higher quality fish). In addition, there was an increase in the 
imports of  tuna, which created an over-supply. The price of canned tuna fell from 1987 to 
1990 and costs increased for all tuna producers. Overall, ‘US tuna processors’ net income 
dropped each year from a high of $111 billion in 1986 to a net loss of  $49 billion in 1990, the 
year the embargo was enforced. The income rose in 1991, after the embargo.’12
3.1.2 The Environmentalists’ Background
In 1986, the Earth Island Institute (EII), a California-based non-profit entity, launched its 
International Marine Mammal Project. Among the first campaigns to protect dolphins was a 
consumer boycott of tuna in order to pressure the American companies to swop to ‘dolphin-
safe’ practices, to avoid the drowning of  dolphins in the tuna-nets. Additionally, in 1988 the 
biologist Samuel LaBudde, while aboard a Panamanian tuna fishing vessel managed to film 
how  hundreds of  dolphins were dying in the fishing nets. These horrifying images circled 
around the globe and gave a boost to the ongoing tuna boycott.13 This video while circulating 
not necessarily mentioned the fact that the vessel was from Panama, leading to the common 
misconception that the images were taken in a Mexican vessel.
3.2 The 1990s
By the beginning of 1990 the scenario was building pressure. First, American consumers 
were very receptive towards the killing of  dolphins whilst harvesting tuna. Second, the North-
America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was already in negotiations and US tuna 
producers feared that they would lose market share when their borders opened. Thirdly, 
there were diplomatic conflicts between the two States regarding Mexico’s EEZ. All these 
events led to an intertwined chain of events, which will be duly analysed. 
3.2.1 The Marine Mammal Protection Act
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The upcoming events had a common starting point: the US Marine Mammal Protection Act 
of 1972. By the 1990s the Act had been reformed several times, and these were the reforms 
that allowed all the embargoes to take place. As mentioned earlier, the MMPA authorises a 
limit of incidental taking of  mammals by US fisherman, pursuant to a permit and compliance 
to several regulations. Only one such permit has ever been issued and that is to the 
American Tuna-boat Association (ATA), this Association covers all US tuna fishing 
operations in the ETP. Under the permit no more than 20,500 dolphins may be incidentally 
killed or injured each year by the US fleet.14 Up to 1988 this was all regulating the internal 
market. The problem was that the new amendments extended to imported tuna too. 
The MMPA states that any fish or products from fish that have been caught with technology 
that results in incidental death or serious injury of marine mammals would be banned from 
importation. The prohibition is mandatory. There was an exception: if  the imported yellow-fin 
tuna was harvested with purse-seine nets, which would normally be prohibited, the exporting 
country could prove that it had a programme regulating the taking of marine mammals 
comparable to the one in the US. Additionally, it would need to prove that the number of 
takings is comparable to the average rate of  takings in the US. Once the information is 
complete, the Secretary [of Commerce] must make a positive finding and allow  the tuna 
import.15 
3.2.1.1 The Second Embargo
On August 28,1990 the US Government imposed an embargo on imports of  commercial 
yellow-fin tuna harvested with purse-seine nets in the ETP.16 On September 7 the measure 
was lifted for Mexico, Venezuela and Vanuatu. On October 10, 1990 the US government 
imposed an embargo on tuna from Mexico until it could prove with documentary evidence 
that the percentage of  Eastern spinner dolphins killed by the Mexican fleet over the course 
of an entire fishing season did not exceed 15 percent of dolphins killed by the US in that 
period. February 22nd, 1991 the embargo on imports of tuna from Mexico went into effect. 
Moreover, on April 3rd, 1991 the US Customs Service issued guidance implementing a 
further embargo on imports of yellow-fin tuna harvested in the ETP with purse-seine nets by 
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14 GATT Report of Panel, 3 September 1991, United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS21/R-39S/155, at 
Paragraph 2.4
15 Idem, Paragraph 2.5 
16 This action affected Mexico, Venezuela, Vanuatu, Panama and Ecuador.
vessels of Mexico, Venezuela and Vanuatu. Under this embargo, effective March 26 1991, 
the importation of yellow-fin tuna was prohibited altogether. 
With these new  amendments, an importer, in order to be allowed to enter the US would have 
to prove that no yellow-fin tuna in the shipment was harvested with purse-seines nets in the 
ETP by vessels from Mexico, Venezuela or Vanuatu. The importer would have to submit a 
‘Yellow-fin Tuna Certificate of Origin’. The country of origin is deemed the country under 
whose Laws the harvesting vessel is registered. Furthermore, importers from intermediary 
countries would also have to provide reasonable proof that it has acted to prohibit the 
importation of  such tuna from any nation from which direct export is banned in the US. On 
March 24, 1991 the intermediary nations embargo went into effect. The US Customs Service 
had to obtain from each shipment of yellow-fin tuna from an intermediary country both a 
Yellow-fin Tuna Certificate of Origin and a declaration from the importer that no yellow-fin 
tuna in the shipment was harvested with purse-seines nets in the ETP by vessels from 
Mexico. The identified intermediary countries were Costa Rica, France, Italy, Japan and 
Panama. Importations from these countries would also be refused unless the declaration 
was handed in. The effect was that these countries also stopped importing tuna from 
Mexico.
3.2.1.2 The GATT Processes 
Before the creation of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) regulated international trade. Although the GATT was not 
institutionalised as it is nowadays, its Council was still in charge of  solving the commercial 
disputes between the contracting parties.  
Mexico decided to request consultations under the GATT to the US on November 5, 1990. 
Mexico contended that the prohibition to import yellow-fin tuna from the ETP according to 
the Marine Mammal Protection Act was contrary to GATT obligations and that the ‘dolphin-
safe’ label was an unnecessary trade barrier.17 A Panel was established and on August 16th, 
1991 it presented its report. The found that the MMPA import ban constituted a quantitative 
restriction and illegitimately regulated the way tuna was caught. This decision marks the 
distinction between market access and process regulations. It also makes the distinction 
between product related or non-product related Production and Process Methods or PPMs. 
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The Panel emphasised the fact that the GATT refers to regulations over products not 
process. The resolution stated that ‘regulations governing the taking of dolphins could not 
possibly affect tuna as a product’.18  The MMPA was not regulating a product as the US 
claimed. The MMPA was regulating market access, which is considered protectionist. In 
conclusion the US embargo on Mexico’s Tuna was found to be an:
…Inappropriate heterogeneous (unilateral) approach to trade and the environment that 
discriminated against foreign nations, imposed arbitrary, retroactive and unpredictable 
restrictions on foreign firms and that went beyond the US jurisdiction and violated foreign 
sovereignty.19 
In July 1992 the European Union and the Netherlands also challenged the MMPA. Their 
claim was that the embargoes to the intermediary nations were an unfair trade practice. In 
February 1993 a Panel confirmed the findings of the previous Panel. However there was an 
important difference, this decision suggested that the MMPA could stand despite its 
extraterritorial application if  it addressed dolphin conservation more directly than through a 
secondary embargo.20  The Panel recognised that dolphins were in fact an exhaustible 
resource, in accordance with the GATT and that the US policy to conserve them fell within 
the range of policies covered by the GATT exceptions under Article XX(g).21 Some claim that 
the Shrimp-Turtle case, which in essence is very similar to the Tuna-Dolphin case, reverses 
its decision because it declares the protection of  turtles to be legitimate.22  However, sea 
turtles are an endangered species whereas dolphins (at least the ones involved in the ETP 
tuna-dolphin case) have never been in danger of extinction.  
The decisions of the Panels were never enforced. This is probably because at that time 
Mexico and the US were about to sign the NAFTA. Hence, Mexico decided it was not a good 
moment to pressure. Furthermore, due to the negotiating atmosphere between the 
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countries, Mexico assumed that it could find a bilateral solution or at least a solution within 
the NAFTA. 
3.2.2 The Inter-American Dolphin Conservation Program
After the primary and secondary embargoes the US participated in the creation of  the Inter-
American Dolphin Conservation Programme (IADCP), under the vigilance of the IATTC. For 
this programme two agreements were signed: the Jolla Agreement of 1992 and the Panama 
Declaration of  1995. La Jolla Agreement is a stringent and voluntary agreement. It calls for 
the use of fishing methods that avoid killing dolphins and that allow  the release of dolphins 
from purse-seine nets. However, because this agreement is non-binding the ban continued. 
In October 1995 the Panama Declaration was enacted. This agreement basically makes the 
La Jolla agreement binding. This programme creates a certification/verification process, 
which is designed to give consumers complete confidence that tuna from the ETP does not 
kill dolphins while harvested. 
 Figure 3. The APCID ‘dolphin-safe’ logo
3.2.3 The Americanisation of the Problem
Neither the multilateral nor bilateral negotiations (even under the NAFTA) were enough to 
grant access of Mexican tuna in the US. Mexico continued to satisfy with the strict US 
requirements in order to clear its tuna. Consequently, Mexico decided to ‘Americanise’ its 
strategy. Instead of pursuing more International-Law  mechanisms it decided to lobby directly 
in Washington to promote a reform to the Law  itself. After several years and millions of 
pesos spent in consultancy, legal and lobbying fees, Mexico managed to introduce a project 
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to lift the embargo. The initiative proposed several modifications to the Laws. The US would 
be forced to ratify the IADCP, which was incorporated as the International Dolphin 
Conservation Act by Presidential Decree on August 15, 1997. This Decree was also the base 
for the lifting of the embargo. The embargo would be lifted from March 1999.23 Nonetheless, 
simultaneous to these political/legal issues, the private sphere was also very active. 
Therefore, there was both a private and a public ‘dolphin-safe’ policy in the US. 
3.3  The private and public ‘dolphin-safe’ policy in the US
Private parties had a tremendous impact on the ‘dolphin-safe’ policy. Big corporations, 
namely Heinz, played a crucial role in the shaping and stimulating the US (both public and 
private) ‘dolphin-safe’ policy.24 Non-profit groups’ had tried for over 18 years to achieve what 
the private sector managed to do in less than a year.25  Contrarily to what the non-profit 
groups normally did (attack the regulations), Heinz actively supported the ‘dolphin-safe’ 
regulation. Starkist already had the high environmental standards and the legal 
reinforcement of its ‘dolphin-safe’ programme would secure its place as market leader. 
3.3.1 Starkists’ ‘dolphin-safe’ Programme
For Starkist switching from the ETP to the central or western Pacific was not as cheap as it 
was for its competitors. This is because, unlike its competitors, Starkist was not bought by 
asian interests. Hence the troubles of the opening the border to Mexican tuna (after the first 
embargo) hit them very bad. ‘Ironically, this encouraged Starkist to act first, to avoid being 
trumped and miss out on the first-mover advantage of increased brand recognition.’26 
Hence, Starkist had to find a strategy to secure its position in the market.
Since the 1970s, Starkist had invested in training programmes and research on ‘dolphin-
safe’ fishing techniques. By 1990 more than half  of its tuna was already ‘dolphin-safe’. But 
the situation had changed; consumers were aware of the problem and the media was paying 
a lot of attention to the matter. In an internal memo, J.W. Connolly, president of Heinz USA, 
allegedly wrote to a top manager that he was interested in ‘seizing the environmental high 
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23 Statement on Signing the International Dolphin Conservation Program Act, August 15, 1997 at: <http://
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=54540>
24 D.D. Murphy, Op. cit., p. 601.
25 Idem, p. 603.
26 Idem, p. 601.
ground by offering the only tuna guaranteed not caught off dolphins’. Heinz knew  this 
measure would be costly. The average cost of  raw  tuna for the ‘big three’ was $905 per ton 
in January 1990. Heinz estimated that the ‘dolphin-safe’ policy would raise its fish costs by 
30%, rising the ‘big three’ average cost to $1,153 per ton. Nonetheless, market surveys 
showed optimism for this strategy. They showed that three-fourths of the surveyed 
consumers said they would switch to a ‘dolphin-safe’ brand. Eighty-six of those said they 
would be willing to pay a higher price. If  this strategy worked it would be a substantial 
opportunity for the industry. It was expected that the other major producers would follow  suit. 
However, if Starkist were the first mover, it would secure brand-name recognition as the 
leading ‘green’ tuna product.27 
On April 12th 1990, Anthony O’Reily, CEO of H.J. Heinz, launched to the world the ‘dolphin-
safe’ policy. In this announcement he stated Starkists’ commitment towards the world and 
the US society to not purchase, process or retail any tuna that was captured by methods that 
harm dolphins in anyway. Heinz knew  that this announcement had to draw  enough attention 
for it to actually yield an impact on consumers. Heinz Executive Committee approved the 
project and appropriated $9.2 million to implement it. The announcement was made during a 
press conference, in which O’Reilly, representing Heinz was in company of the US Senator 
John H. Biden and David Phillips, director of the Earth Island Institute. US’ ABC News 
broadcasted clips of  the event. The network gave the story ‘top billing, as well as a 
favourable spin’. Furthermore, it is estimated that 80 million people saw  the broadcast. This 
is an advantage that no other label has ever had.
The surprise announcement was also backed-up by contracts on ‘dolphin-safe’ tuna from the 
western pacific and a marketing campaign featuring a bottle-nose dolphin. The use of  this 
type of dolphin in the campaigns was not random. In the US there was a television show  of  a 
‘friendly’ bottle-nose dolphin named ‘Flipper’, which many Americans remember dearly. The 
US consumers evidently felt sympathy for this specific type of dolphins, reason why it was 
the preferred image in the marketing of the ‘dolphin-safe policy’. This is relevant because the 
bottle-nose dolphin is not of  the variety threatened by the ETP tuna industry. In the end, 
even if the policy was environment conscious it was still a strategic business move, with 
profits as an end.
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After three years Starkists’ market share grew  from 36 to 42 percent. However, these were 
not the expected returns. After the policy was disclosed the standards started to be abused 
and weakened by competitors. Evidently, after Starkists’ announcement many (if not all) of 
its competitors started to place labels (self-declarations) on their products. Hence, 
consumers were led to mistrust the ‘dolphin-safe’ labels and marketing claims and stopped 
consuming tuna altogether. These circumstances created an over-supply of  tuna, and the 
prices started to go down, even the ‘dolphin-safe’ variety. 
3.3.2 The US ‘dolphin-safe’ Policy
The ‘dolphin-safe’ eco-label obtained legal recognition on the November 28, 1990 with the 
enactment of the Dolphin Consumer Information Act (DCIA). This piece of legislation 
specifies a labelling standard for any tuna product exported from or offered for sale in the 
US. Under this Law, it is a violation of  the Federal Trade Commission Act for any producer, 
importer, exporter, distributor or seller of such tuna products to include on the label of that 
product the term ‘dolphin-safe’ or any other term falsely suggesting its contents were fished 
in a manner not harmful to dolphins. According to this law  tuna-fishing is considered harmful 
to dolphins if it is harvested in the ETP by a vessel using purse-seine nets or is harvested in 
high seas by a vessel engaged in drift-net fishing. Even though the misleading use of the 
label would be sanctioned the label would still remain voluntary. This voluntary nature, gives 
grounds for American fisherman to fish, without regards of  the standards killing as many 
dolphins as they have to, and just sell without a label or sell in other markets. Furthermore, 
this only applies to dolphins and tuna, other fisheries such as squid (large in Alaska) that 
also has a huge dolphin toll, are excluded. 
3.3.3 The GATT Procedure and the Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act
With respect to the DPCIA, in the case taken before the GATT Mexico requested the panel 
to find whether the Act was inconsistent with GATT obligations, by virtue of the 
establishment of  discriminatory and unfavourable specific conditions for a specific 
geographical area. The ‘Dolphin Safe’ label was found to be consistent with the GATT 
obligations. Within the analysis it was expressed that ‘the GATT does not prohibit the right to 
the exercise of  consumer choice’.28 Furthermore it is pointed out that ´the use of the label 
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“Dolphin Safe” is not a requirement but is voluntary’.29  The Panel noted that the labelling 
provisions of the DPCIA do not restrict the sale of tuna products, tuna products can be sold 
freely both with and without the ´Dolphin Safe´ label. If  there is a price differential or any 
other advantage resulting from the application of the label it is a result of consumer 
preference. Finally, the labelling regulations governing tuna caught in the ETP applied to all 
countries whose vessels fished in this geographic area not only to Mexico.30 Therefore it was 
not discriminatory for Mexico.
3.3.4 After-math of the ‘dolphin-safe’ Policy 
The overall winners in the ‘dolphin-safe’ policy were Starkist and the other big companies. 
Conversely, smaller private-label canners and independent boat-owners could not absorb 
the high costs of  the new  regulations. Eventually they had to leave the market, most of them 
at a loss. Over two-thirds of  the US fleet had left the ETP by 1990. To illustrate, the US tuna 
industry in 1979 was composed of 98 large US tuna seiners working in the ETP. In 1991 only 
4 tuna vessels were regularly fishing in the ETP. And in 2002 only 2 US vessels were 
registered as active in the ETP.31 
The ‘dolphin-safe’ policy also had an economic impact in the US. The losses include 12,500 
jobs, $294 million in household income, and $1.32 billion in US Sales. The federal 
government lost $58.8 million in income tax and the state of  California lost $7.37 million in 
taxes.32 The relatively new  Mexican fishing industry was hurt even worse. They not only lost 
access to the US Market but also to the ‘intermediary’ markets that exported Mexican tuna to 
the US such as France and Italy. Reports estimated that over 15,000 Mexican fishing-related 
jobs were threatened and the cost of the policy to Mexico was of over 200 million dollars. 
Environmentally, dolphin mortality did go down considerably. The total mortality of  dolphins 
in the ETP has been reduced from about 132,000 in 1986 to less than 1,300 in 2009.33 
However, these types of  policies always have a trade-off. ‘Dolphin-safe’ fishing is not 
necessarily the best environmentally-sound fishing option. As stated before, saving dolphins 
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32 As quoted in D.D. Murphy, Op. cit., p. 608 footnote 37. 
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means killing more sharks, juvenile tuna, sea turtles and other marine mammals. Also, even 
Greenpeace accepted that ‘dolphin-safe’ eco-labels had negative spill-over effects to other 
oceans and species other than dolphins.34  Furthermore, Illegal, Unregulated and 
Unregistered (IUU) fishing is on the rise. In the ETP alone there are up-to 24 active IUU tuna 
vessels.35 Tuna laundering and pirate fishing are also another cost of stringent policies. 
3.4 The Last Decade
At the beginning of the 2000 the US government announced that Mexican tuna would re-
enter the US market. Environmental groups energetically opposed this action. There was a 
proliferation of new  ‘dolphin-safe’ labels and campaigns that created great uncertainty in the 
market. EII was one of the strongest opponents to the lifting of the ban. 
After the Congress’s enacted the International Dolphin Conservation Act (IDCA) in 1997, 
environmental groups leaded by EII started a chain of suits. The suits had a common 
objective: to avoid the new  ‘dolphin-safe’ standard. The IDCA, just as the IADCP, would 
allow  the use of the ‘dolphin-safe’ label to tuna fished with purse-seines as long as they 
proved that no dolphins were killed or severely injured. However, Congress refused to relax 
the standards and amended the MMPA. This amendment required the Secretary of 
Commerce, through the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), to 
conduct several scientific studies in order to determine whether or not the tuna fishery 
affects the dolphin population. If  evidence were found that it did affect the dolphins then 
Congress would make stronger labelling requirements. Contrarily, if  evidence were found 
that the fishery did not have adverse impacts on the dolphins, it would allow  a broader use of 
‘dolphin-safe’ labelling. The NOAA had to present its Initial Findings by March 1999 and its 
Final Findings by December 2002.
The Initial Finding of such studies sustained that the fishery was not having an adverse 
impact on the dolphin population, despite inconclusive evidence. This finding was 
challenged36  because it was considered ‘arbitrary and capricious in light of  inconclusive 
evidence’. The appeal court confirmed this finding. 
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The Final Finding, was published in December 2002. Once again the environmentalists 
brought suit and courts determined yet again that the studies were not complete and in 
conformity with Congress’ orders. Furthermore, because the studies were inconclusive, the 
Agency should not have determined that there was no adverse effect, ‘any insufficiency of 
data should be resolved in favour of  the species.’37  The District Court that reviewed the 
case, declared that ‘dolphin-safe’ labelling should not be used for tuna caught with purse 
seine nets. Furthermore, it stated that the Agency in charge of the studies was favouring 
political over scientific matters. 
The NOAA based its Final Finding on a scientific report. This report was supposed to 
complete and update the studies Congress had mandated. The NOAA did look into the 
indirect and direct causes of dolphin deaths and found that ‘the fishery is not directly killing 
the dolphins... but that the indirect effects of the fishery are inconclusive.’ The scientific 
report outlined several indirect ways the fishery could be causing dolphin deaths: ‘dolphin 
mother-calf separation during the high-speed chase and encirclement; acute cardiac and 
muscle damage caused by the exertion of avoiding or detangling from the nets; failed or 
impaired reproduction; compromised immune functions; and unreported mortalities.’ 
However, there was no reliable data on these claims, reason why the NOAA did not consider 
them ‘scientific’. The Courts and environmentalists though, determined it should have 
considered it as the best available scientific evidence. Once more, the courts found that the 
studies were incomplete, as an example, one of the studies specifically required the 
necropsy of 600 dolphins in a year. This study was impossible to complete because there 
were less than 200 dolphins to perform the necropsy to. Notwithstanding the above, the 
Final Finding was also vacated.38 The Appeal Court also confirmed this decision. 
In conclusion, the ‘dolphin-safe’ label would continue to mean that the tuna was caught 
without purse-seine nets and that no dolphins were killed or seriously injured during the 
harvest.39 Hence the IDCA enacted by Congress in 1997, which would have allowed the re-
entrance of the tuna from ETP into the US (by recognising the standards and the label of the 
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39 Earth Island Institute Earth Island Institute v. Hogarth, 494 F.3d 757 (9th Cir. 2007)
IDCP) market was overturned. This translated into the effective banning of  any import of 
tuna carrying the seal of approval (’dolphin-safe’ eco-label) of the IDCP.40
4. The Last WTO Dispute
In 2008 Mexican tuna still had practically no access to the US market. In 2009 the US spent 
$613 million dollars on tuna imports. In such period, Mexico’s exports to the US were of $7.5 
million which is less than 1% of  the US total tuna import.41  In addition, the Mexican tuna 
industry was severely affected by the US Dolphin-safe policy. Such policy had already cost 
Mexico one third of  its fleet and in 2007 Mexico had to import approximately 25 percent (30 
to 40 tons) of tuna to cover its internal demand.42  Based on these facts and other 
arguments, Mexico requested consultations to the US Government under the WTO rules on 
October 24, 2008. Officially, the consultations were due to measures concerning the 
importation, marketing and sale of tuna and tuna products, which would later become the 
name of  the case. After the consultations failed, the case was formally brought to the 
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). It was only until May 2012 that the Appellate Body delivered 
its report. The time-line of the case is as follows:
- The consultations took place in December 2008, without positive outcome. 
- On March 2009 Mexico proceeded to request to the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of 
the WTO for the establishment of a panel. 
- The panel was established on the 20th of April. On December 14, 2009 the Director-
General composed the panel. 
- On June 15, 2010 the Chairman of the panel informed the DSB that the panel expected 
to issue the final report to the parties in February 2011.43 
- However, due to practical matters such report was only delivered on the 15th of 
September of 2011. 
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41 Point 7.354 and 7.355 of the Panel Report, p. 231
42 Ramon Corral Avila, the head of Mexico’s National Aquaculture and Fishing Commission to Notimex, published 
in El Financiero online, March 9, 2010, at: <http://www.elfinanciero.com.mx/ElFinanciero/Portal/cfpages/
contentmgr.cfm?docId=176814&docTipo=1&orderby=docid&sortby=ASC>
43 <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds381_e.htm>
- United States filed an  Appeal to the Final Report of  the Panel on the 24th of January 
2012 against the main findings of the Panel.
- Mexico also filed an Appeal on the 25th of  January 2012, to address the arguments that 
the Panel had not agreed with.
- The Appellate Body delivered its report on the 16th of May 2012.  
- On the 17th of September 2012 the parties communicated to the DSB that they had 
agreed a ‘reasonable’ period of  time to implement the recommendations and rulings of 
the DSB. Such period expires on June 2013.  
This case marks the first time that a panel examined the WTO compatibility of  a label that is 
entirely voluntary, even if  it is granted by a government agency. This case brought attention 
to many third parties such as: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Ecuador, the 
European Communities, Guatemala, Japan, Korea, New  Zealand, Chinese Taipei, Thailand, 
Turkey and Venezuela. Hence there were many expectations set on the result of  this case. 
A considerable difference in this case compared to the previous Tuna-Dolphin cases is that 
this one is directly challenging the marketing of the eco-label itself  as discriminatory, not the 
standard behind it. The precedent established that the label ‘dolphin-safe’ did not violate 
GATT rules. because the measure was designed to prevent deceptive advertising for all tuna 
products, whether imported or domestically produced. Furthermore, this case challenged the 
determination of a Court (as part of  the whole ‘dolphin-safe’ policy), which is the responsible 
for the current ban on the imports of Tuna from Mexico. 
4.1 The Core Arguments
In its first submission, Mexico challenged the Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act; 
the ‘dolphin-safe’ labelling standards and the ‘dolphin-safe’ requirements for tuna harvested 
in the ETP [Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean] by large purse seine vessels.44  Finally the 
Mexican government also challenged the ruling in Earth Island Institute v. Hogarth, 494 F.3d 
757 (9th Cir. 2007). Mexico argued that the application of  all these measures ‘…have the 
effect of prohibiting the labelling of  Mexican tuna and tuna products as “dolphin-safe”…’45 In 
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general, Mexico claimed that the measures went against the GATT and Technical Barriers to 
Trade Agreement (TBT). In other words, they claimed that the US ‘dolphin-safe’ policy 
discriminated Mexican tuna products. In addition, it argued that the ‘dolphin-safe’ policy can 
be considered a technical barrier to trade and that they are more trade-restrictive than 
necessary to fulfil the policy’s legitimate objectives. These objectives are ensuring that 
consumers are not mislead or deceived and contributing to the protection of dolphins.46 
Furthermore, it argued the US had failed to meet its obligation to use international standards 
(if available) as the base of  their own technical regulations. Specifically, Mexico argued that 
the AIDCP is such international standard. Hence, dolphin-safety could be perfectly 
addressed under its standards and verification processes (which is the same measure it 
lobbied in the US in the late 1990s). In short, according to Mexico the US ‘dolphin-safe’ 
labelling policy was not only discriminatory but also unnecessary. 
The US counter-argued that the case should be arbitrated under the North American Free 
Trade Agreement.47  According to the US the WTO was not the proper mechanism to solve 
this ‘environmental matter’, especially when there is a bilateral treaty that specifies how  both 
countries will deal with environmental disputes. However, Mexico had an almost zero dolphin 
by-catch, it complied with all the international norms and its technology was up-to-date. 
Hence, Mexico sustained that the tuna issue ‘is more a commercial problem than a 
biological one. It is a zero-tariff  barrier where we have a free trade treaty’.48  According to 
Mexico, there is no reason in maintaining the embargo.49 If  the dolphin mortality rate is close 
to zero, there is no further environmental discussion, at least not under a ‘dolphin-safety’ 
shield. Furthermore, if the issue were to be resolved within the NAFTA, the solution will 
remain within the involved countries and would not set the so needed international 
precedent. 
4.2 The Panel’s Report
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After some internal complications, the Panel’s final report finally came out on September the 
15th 2011. One of the main findings is that the ‘dolphin-safe’ labelling provisions do 
constitute a Technical Barrier to Trade. The panel arrived to this conclusion after considering 
whether the labelling provisions were in-fact voluntary. The Panel found that the labelling 
rules were not voluntary but mandatory. In essence the US policy (all the different statutes, 
regulations, standards and even the case law) comprises a statutory regulation for the 
‘official’ label. At the same time it gives the provisions for other ‘dolphin-safe’ labels to 
comply with. Hence, they do allow  for multiplicity of labels, under certain rules. The use of 
any label that suggests dolphin (or other marine mammals) safety is forbidden unless, they 
can prove that they do not harm dolphins or other marine mammals. To prove this, other 
labels have to follow  the rules of the Tuna Tracking and Verification Programme, which is 
determined by the US National Marine Fisheries Service. Hence, other labels have to be 
aligned with these principles otherwise they are illegal. The fact that other labels have to 
follow  the Tuna Tracking and Verification programme (which are statutory rules) to be able to 
be marketed is what makes it ‘mandatory’ and not voluntary. 
The second finding, related also to the technical standards, is that the US ‘dolphin-safe’ 
measures or policies “are more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil their legitimate 
objectives.”50 As seen above these objectives are informing consumers and contributing to 
the protection of dolphins in relation to the impact of drift-net fishing techniques. While these 
objectives are legitimate (within the scope of the TBT) they are too restrictive.51  This 
conclusion was reached after analysing whether an alternative less-restrictive measure 
would achieve the same results. Specifically, this alternative was the AIDCP regulations, as 
suggested by Mexico. These regulations, arguably achieve the same results as the US 
‘dolphin-safe’ measures. However, the Panel pointed out that while they are less restrictive, 
it does not mean they achieve their goals. In its view  both the ‘dolphin-safe’ and the AIDCP 
provisions “only partly address the adverse effects on dolphins of  tuna fishing.” 52  In 
essence, the objectives are only partially met because the ‘dolphin-safe’ policy is limited to 
the ETP and there are no provisions for tuna outside the ETP. This means that if  dolphins 
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52 Paragraph 7.544, p. 246
were the pursued environmental goal, as the US claims, the regulations would have to be 
broader. Regarding the goal of  informing consumers, it points out that the dolphin measure 
is not appropriate either as the labels  “do not allow  the consumer to accurately distinguish 
between tuna caught in a manner that adversely affects dolphins and other tuna.”53 Ideally, 
when consumers buy ‘dolphin-safe’ product in the US, it should be “completely assured that 
no dolphin was adversely affected during the catching of that tuna in the ETP. However, 
consumers would not have equal certainty that no dolphin was killed or injured or that 
dolphins were not otherwise adversely affected in respect of tuna caught outside the ETP.”54 
Therefore, these provisions only partially address the intended goals. While the observations 
of the Panel are quite critical to the labelling system itself, in the end it is not their role to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the tool. However, considering the results and the fact that 
there are less restrictive available measures, the ‘dolphin-safe’ policies are considered trade-
restrictive.
The third finding is that the US ‘dolphin-safe’ policy does not discriminate Mexican tuna on 
the basis of origin. In the words of  the Panel, “any particular adverse impact felt by Mexican 
tuna products on the US market is, in our view, primarily the result of  ‘factors or 
circumstances unrelated to the foreign origin of the product’, including the choices made by 
Mexico's own fishing fleet and canners.”55  In this sense, the panel does recognize that 
Mexican tuna does have problems in the US market; however it is not because they are 
Mexican. If it were the case, then it would be discriminatory, but it is not. 
Finally, regarding the argument that the US did not comply with the obligation to use 
international standards as a basis of internal technical regulations; it was decided that it was 
not inconsistent. In other words, the US was in-line with such obligation. According to the 
Panel, the international standard was not appropriate and would not have been effective to 
achieve the US’s policy goals. Hence, such standard is not applicable.  
4.3 The appeals 
On January 24 and 25 of 2012 the US and Mexico, respectively, presented their appeals 
before the DSB. It was only until the 16th of May 2012 that the Appellate Body Report was 
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circulated. In essence, all of  the findings from the Panel where appealed from either one of 
the parties. Hence, the Appellate Body basically had to review all of the Panel’s findings.
The Appellate Body confirmed that the ‘dolphin-safe’ policy is in fact a Technical Regulation. 
However it reversed the finding that the ‘dolphin-safe’ policy is not discriminatory against 
Mexican tuna. In other words, the ‘dolphin-safe’ labelling policy is discriminatory against 
Mexican tuna. The Appellate Body reasoned that, “by excluding most Mexican tuna products 
from access to the ‘dolphin-safe’ label while granting access to most US tuna products and 
tuna products from other countries, the measure modifies the conditions of competition in 
the US market to the detriment of  Mexican tuna products.”56 However, it further considered 
the fact that the tuna fishing methods (drift-nets as well as other techniques) are very 
harmful to dolphins. It notes that “the measure at issue is not even-handed in the manner in 
which it addresses the risks to dolphins arising from different fishing techniques in different 
areas of the ocean.”57  Hence, the fact that it only focuses on the tuna from the ETP (or 
Mexico) does discriminate against these products. The next finding reversed the finding that 
the ‘dolphin-safe’ labelling policy is more trade restrictive than necessary. Regarding this 
point the Appellate Body found that the Panel had made a flawed comparison between the 
‘dolphin-safe’ policy and the AIDCP regulations proposed by Mexico, because they are not 
alternatives. It added that such measure is not equivalent to the US policy; hence the 
comparison was incorrect. In essence it argues that the measures are not equivalent 
because the AIDCP rules would not achieve the US objectives ‘to the same extent’ as the 
US policy would (which is fundamental for them to be considered alternatives). Furthermore, 
both show  only partial results, as they both only apply to the ETP. In addition, consumers 
would be even more misled with the alternative proposed by Mexico. In other words, 
because the measures are not comparable, the US policy cannot be regarded as more trade 
restrictive than necessary. Finally, the Appellate Body agreed with the finding that the US did 
not fail to consider the international standard to set its regulations. However, it did disagree 
with the intermediate finding that the ‘dolphin-safe’ definition and certification developed 
within the AIDCP is a “relevant international standard”. This is because such programme is 
not really considered an international standardising organisation, because participation in 
such organisation is by invitation only. 
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4.4 The conclusion of the Case
The Dispute Settlement Body adopted the Appellate Body and Panel Report. In conclusion, 
the integrated findings are that the ‘dolphin-safe’ labelling policy is a technical regulation; 
hence it goes against the TBT agreement. Second, the measure is not trade-restrictive. It 
does discriminate against the Mexican tuna and the US is not at fault with its obligations 
because it does not observe the regulations of  the AIPCD, because this organisation is not 
an international standardising organisation in the terms of the TBT. 
The US has until the 13th of July 2013 to implement the rulings and recommendations of the 
DSB. However, whether this deadline will be achieved is not certain. In the recent US 
presidential campaign, Mexico was not mentioned even once. Furthermore, there are many 
things in the bilateral agenda and whether the US will comply is not certain. This implies that 
the ‘dolphin-safe’ policy is not in the US priority list. Furthermore, the US in the past has 
bluntly disregarded international awards and recommendations, especially when the 
application of such recommendation is left to a local or judicial authority. In the past, 
whenever the US gets an international-court ruling overturning a judicial act, it claims that, it 
recognises the award; however its application is entirely on the Court’s discretion. The 
executive power, in-charge of international proceedings, does not have authority over the 
Judiciary and cannot oblige them to comply with international orders. This is relevant, 
because the part of the overall policy is the court-originated ban due to the the decision of 
Earth Island Institute v. Hogarth. Furthermore, the US might still consider simply 
acknowledging that the ‘dolphin-safe’ label is mandatory like the nutritional or organic label, 
and forget about considering it an ‘eco-label’ (which would not change the status quo). 
4.5 The Impact of the case on eco-labels
It was pointed out in Chapter V that public eco-labels might have to be careful on how  they 
address eco-labels, as there was the risk of being considered a technical regulation under 
the TBT. The present case shows precisely this point. Because of how  the overall ‘dolphin-
safe’ labelling policy is handled in the US it was considered to be mandatory. Hence it 
cannot be considered a voluntary programme. The US ‘dolphin-safe’ labelling regulations 
are more in line with their nutritional and organic labels. These last two labels are labelling 
laws, they are not eco-labels as understood in this work. The main characteristic that 
differentiates these labelling laws from voluntary certification schemes, is that the criteria to 
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obtain the label are set by law  or statute. Therefore, even if  the label is private by nature, the 
fact that it has no freedom to select its own criteria, makes it mandatory. Furthermore, the 
labelling laws regulate the use of  the label. Eco-labels as certification schemes regulate the 
criteria. The use of  the eco-label is regulated by a private contract between the licensee and 
the eco-labelling organization. In short, the US ‘dolphin-safe’ label is not an eco-label in the 
definition of eco-label adopted in this work.
Because this case specifically addressed the ‘dolphin-safe’ labelling policy and it cannot be 
considered a typical eco-label within the definition selected in Chapter I, hence the WTO 
rulings do not really apply to other eco-labels. In particular, while the ‘dolphin-safe’ label is 
not an eco-label, it is a type of environmental label. A mandatory, single resource, local 
second-party certified environmental label to be precise. However, it is not a voluntary 
environmental certification scheme, which is the current vision of eco-labels. Many eco-
labels today are the exact opposite of this label. In particular, single-criteria labels are not in 
use because they could lead to greenwashing. This is because by focusing on only one 
aspect such as dolphins it distracts from other equally important matters such as overfishing. 
In other words, they are not indicators of  overall ‘sustainability’. The ‘dolphin-safe’ label 
simply indicates that there are no dolphins killed in the process of fishing the tuna in the 
ETP. However, it does not say anything about other marine by-catch, overfishing, or even 
worse: dolphin killings outside the ETP (which is what the Panel and Appellate Body pointed 
out). Nonetheless, as seen in the following section, still there are many lessons that can be 
drawn from the ‘dolphin-safe’ experience and case. For instance, that public eco-labels do 
have a risk of being considered a technical regulation and go against their WTO obligations. 
5. The ‘dolphin-safe’ labelling policy and eco-labels
The ‘dolphin-safe’ labelling policy has played an important role in the environmental policy 
arena, including the eco-labelling arena. Specifically, it can be argued that the ‘dolphin-safe’ 
eco-label falls within the ‘original’ eco-labels (mandatory, single-issue, government) category. 
One of the most important things that this environmental label shows is that labelling policies 
can work. This can be asserted because the impacts of  this policy have been constantly 
measured (because of  all the suits, cases and lobbying efforts). Furthermore, this label can 
be taken as a base for other important discussions in the policy, environmental and 
environmental policy arena, including eco-labels. 
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5.1 The ‘dolphin-safe’ labelling policy’s effectiveness 
Normally it is difficult to assess whether an environmental policy is effective because there is 
no data on the environmental impact. However in the dolphin-tuna case, there is enough 
reliable scientific and industry-related information to say that the incidental ‘taking’ of 
dolphins is practically insignificant. Furthermore, the rate of  adoption and how  economically 
sound the eco-label is in practice is also difficult to determine because producers do not 
always disclose their financial balances. Nevertheless, it is safe to assume that if the 
producer keeps using an eco-label (considering it is legitimate) it is because it is profitable. 
In the tuna case, it was precisely the way the private sector was structured that allowed the 
‘dolphin-safe’ eco-label have the market penetration it had. In the end, eco-labels are 
commercial tools as much as they are environmental. 
Isolating the effects of  the eco-label on the environment is almost impossible. Normally, 
when there is an environmental problem it is attacked by several fronts and isolating the one 
that solves the problem can be nearly impossible. In the tuna-dolphin case the label was 
backed-up by specific legal sanction. The private sector gave the resources to start the 
labelling policy. Also it was the private-sectors resources that drew  Congress’ attention to the 
matter and obtained the legal-sanction it required to reinforce it. Non-profits normally do not 
have the resources to achieve this type of results.
However, as the WTO Panel and Appellate Body point out the ‘dolphin-safe’ policy is only 
partially effective. This is because it does not fully protect dolphins or consumers. What 
Mexico has always argued is that if the US really cared for dolphins it would sanction all 
fisheries that harm dolphins. Mexico has pointed out that in Alaska (US coast), the squid 
industry is responsible for the deaths of  15,000 dolphins per year. In this industry dolphins 
have no regulation to protect them and are not taken into account for the MMPA quota.58 In 
the end it was the tuna industry that used the dolphin shield to protect their industry from 
foreign competition, not the squid industry. This is because the tuna industry is much larger 
than the squid industry. Furthermore, if protecting dolphins were the real objective, the scope 
of the policy should encompass other geographic areas beyond the ETP. Hence, the 
‘dolphin-safe’ labelling policy is only partially effective.
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5.2 Earth Island Institute ‘dolphin-safe’ and the role of Environmental Activists
The US ‘dolphin-safe’ labelling scene had two important players, one public and one private. 
EII is considered the environmental activist of this conflict. In particular EII has played a 
central role in the development of  the conflict. There is no doubt that as a non-profit its 
objective is to protect the dolphins. The data is clear: dolphin mortality rate in the ETP due to 
the fishery is almost zero. However, EII’s argument has changed. The death of dolphins due 
to the tuna harvest is no longer the problem. The problem, nowadays, is the fact that the 
sole presence of the vessels hinders the recovery of the population of dolphins in the ETP. 
EII has kept-on insisting and pushing the matter to the point that it is the last Court decision, 
in favour of EII, that has kept the tuna ban active. 
It is expected that environmental groups would protest a lowering of  an environmental 
standard. In this case, when the US adopted the AIDCP, the legislation it allowed for the 
‘dolphin-safe’ label to be applied to tuna fished with purse-seines (with the mentioned 
restrictions). However, EII has insisted that ‘dolphin-safe’ should only be used on tuna that 
does not use purse-seines. Nowadays, EII is actively campaigning against the Department 
of Commerce’s and AIDCP ‘dolphin-safe’ label,59  using the slogan keep the label honest - 
keep nets off dolphins. 
While the purpose of  EII might be honest it is noteworthy that in 1991, EII registered the 
‘dolphin-safe’ logo as a trademark of its property and creation. From 1991 to 1997 EII 
charged a royalty of 5 cents per box of 48 cans of tuna to those who carried the label. This 
was a lawful and significant source of  income for EII. However in 1997, when the 
International Dolphin Conservation Program was enacted, Congress also declared the 
‘dolphin-safe’ brand property of  the US government. EII lost the exclusivity of the brand and 
its main source of income.60 The subsequent actions of EII do give rise to the suspicion that 
dolphins are not the only interests it’s pursuing. Hence it is possible to imply that EII is trying 
to preserve its market share by keeping the standard high. What is true is that EII’s actions 
are effectively foreclosing the market to foreign competitors. Instead of fighting its 
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USDAlabelAlert.html>
60 SEMARNAP, Pesca del Atun y Protección del Delphin, Cuadernos, México 1998, AT 29 and 30.
competition, EII should focus on informing consumers about its label and let the consumers 
decide by themselves. 
5.3 Taking Credit of Mexico’s Environmental Improvements
The improvement of  the Mexican tuna fleet is a direct consequence of  the overall ‘dolphin-
safe’ policy. Mexico’s tuna fleet is directly regulated by mandatory governmental standards. 
Whether Mexico would have adopted the strict regulations it has today without the US bans, 
is impossible to know. The US has abused the attractive size of its market to pressure small 
developing economies to improve their standards. A real concern is that for 30 years Mexico 
has been dealing with the problem posed by the US, it has complied voluntarily to the US’ 
requests with no reward. Mexico and other ETP countries will eventually search for markets 
that do reward their environmental efforts. 
Under normal circumstances, eco-labels would depend on consumer awareness and 
recognition. Consumers would be allowed to vote with their wallets for the environmental 
friendly product. However, the US market-access ban on dolphin ‘unsafe’ tuna from the ETP 
edited consumer choice. The US consumer will find tuna with and without labels from all 
over the world, except from the ETP. In Mexico there is no ‘dolphin-safe’ label. Due to the 
strict regulations, in Mexico all the tuna is ‘dolphin-safe’ regardless of consumer awareness. 
This is a crucial point for Law  and Economics, as on one side Mexico regulated the matter 
with tailor-made command-and-control regulation (this is because the fishing industry and 
the government agreed on the standards together and the government supported the 
industry by many means). On the other side, the US applied a less coercive ‘voluntary’ 
labelling policy, which would allow  the market to decide the fate of the dolphins. In the end, 
Mexico’s tuna fishery has almost zero dolphin by-catch and all the vessels have state-of-the 
art technology. Whereas the US cannot really make such statement because its programme 
is ‘voluntary’ (under quotation marks as it was found by the WTO that it is not the case). 
Furthermore, the US fishermen do not fish (in theory) in the ETP. Therefore, most of  its 
regulations do not even apply to its own fishermen. The question that necessarily follows is 
whether bans, embargoes and access-barriers are a better solution than ‘less coercive’ 
measures such as market instruments. The ‘highly coercive’ instruments do address the 
problem directly, but their costs can be quite high. Not only monetary costs, these measures 
can be harmful to trade, industry and international relations. Furthermore, strict fishing 
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standards raise production costs that may lead to many other losses. Strict regulations also 
push fisheries to forum-shop and what’s worse, illegal fishing, which has no respect for 
Laws, environment or consumers. However, these last issues are out of the scope of this 
research. 
5.4 The limits of the ‘dolphin-safe’ labelling policy
One of the biggest limits of the ‘dolphin-safe’ tuna is that it is just that, ‘dolphin-safe’. It does 
not mean that the tuna is turtle, shark or swordfish safe. It neither means that the tuna is 
sustainable and that its environmental impact is low. A current tuna eco-label would address 
all by-catch, not only dolphins. The issues keep arising and the environmental challenges 
are dynamic, hence a 20 year old eco-label does not make sense, especially if it has not 
evolved. There will always be something to improve. For instance, now  it is known that tuna 
fishing in general is unsustainable, just like many other fisheries. It is not just how  the fish 
are harvested but also how  many. There will always be new  matters to address. Boycotts 
and bans on certain types of  tuna based on how  they are harvested are already in place 
around the world.61 The ‘dolphin-safe’ tuna matter will have to be either solved or left behind 
to address the current problems that fisheries are facing. 
It has been stated several times through out the work that eco-labels have evolved over 
time. If  enough attention is paid to Chapter I, it can be deduced that the ‘dolphin-safe’ label is 
one of  the ‘original’ eco-labels. However, after 20 years the market and eco-labels have 
changed drastically. Today the eco-labels that dominate the market are international multi-
criteria sustainable certification schemes. They strive to improve the overall sustainability of 
products and production. Consumers have also changed over the last years, environmental 
preferences have been developed and information is more accessible Consumers that buy 
eco-labelled goods are interested in their overall environmental or sustainable attributes. 
Nonetheless, the ‘dolphin-safe’ label did play an important role in the early 1990s and it 
could even be argued that it served as a stepping stone for future marine eco-labels. Today, 
eco-labels are normally interpreted as a sign of overall eco-friendliness; hence the fact that 
the ‘dolphin-safe’ eco-label only refers to dolphin mortality is deceptive. The following figure 
shows how  marine eco-labels have evolved during the last thirty years. This is a good 
example of  how  eco-labels have evolved within one sector. As it can be observed even the 
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NOAA has moved on from the ‘dolphin-safe’ policies and is now  focused on programmes 
that are more comprehensive. It is not to say that the ‘dolphin-safe’ policies should be 
completely disregarded, those are still very valuable. However, it is possible that broader 
eco-labels absorb the ‘dolphin-safe’ criteria within its own.  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY   ES-10
TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY: THE ROLES AND LIMITATIONS OF CERTIFICATION
The greatest increase in fi sheries 
entering the certifi cation process 
came when market-leading 
fi rms made commitments to 
sustainability.
Seafood guides, including 
wallet cards and 
information accessible by 
cell phone, offer consumers 
convenient guidance at the 
point of purchase, but are 
not as precise as labeling 
backed by certifi cation or 
assessment of particular 
fi sheries. They recommend 
for or against a type of fi sh, 
but the consumer generally 
does not know why, or if 
some fi sh of that type are 
exceptions to the general 
guidance.    
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Dolphin Safe logo introduced
1997
MSC launched
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Friend of the Sea launched
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FAO guidelines for
sustainable !sh
standards issued
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First “sustainable seafood”
guidelines issued
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NOAA creates “Fish Watch”
Above is a timeline showing the emergence of marine certifi cation programs.
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Figure 4: The Case of Marine Certifi cation
B E S T  C H O I C E S
Arctic Char (farmed)
Barramundi (US farmed)
Catfish (US farmed)
Clams (farmed)
Cobia (US farmed)
Cod: Pacific (US non-trawled)
Crab: Dungeness, Stone
Halibut: Pacific (US)
Lobster: California Spiny (US)
Mussels (farmed)
Oysters (farmed)
Sablefish/Black Cod (Alaska & Canada)
Salmon (Alaska wild)
Sardines: Pacific (US)
Scallops (farmed)
Shrimp: Pink (OR)
Striped Bass (farmed & wild*)
Tilapia (US farmed)
Trout: Rainbow (US farmed)
Tuna: Albacore (Canada & US Pacific,  
troll/pole)
Tuna: Skipjack, Yellowfin (US troll/pole)
G O O D  A LT E R N A T I V E S
Basa/Pangasius/Swai (farmed)
Caviar, Sturgeon (US farmed)
Clams (wild)
Cod: Atlantic (imported)
Cod: Pacific (US trawled)
Crab: Blue*, King (US), Snow
Flounders, Soles (Pacific)
Flounder: Summer (US Atlantic)*
Grouper: Black, Red (US Gulf of Mexico)*
Herring: Atlantic
Lobster: American/Maine
Mahi Mahi (US)
Oysters (wild)
Pollock: Alaska (US)
Sablefish/Black Cod (CA, OR, WA)
Salmon (CA, OR, WA*, wild)
Scallops (wild)
Shrimp (US, Canada)
Squid
Swordfish (US)*
Tilapia (Central & South America(farmed)
Tuna: Bigeye, Tongol, Yellowfin (troll/pole)
A V O I D
Caviar, Sturgeon* (imported wild)
Chilean Seabass/Toothfish*
Cobia (imported farmed)
Cod: Atlantic (Canada & US)
Crab: King (imported)
Flounders, Halibut, Soles (US Atlantic, 
except Summer Flounder)
Groupers (US Atlantic)*
Lobster: Spiny (Brazil)
Mahi Mahi (imported longline)
Marlin: Blue, Striped (Pacific)*
Monkfish
Orange Roughy*
Salmon (farmed, including Atlantic)*
Sharks* & Skates
Shrimp (imported)
Snapper: Red (US Gulf of Mexico)
Swordfish (imported)*
Tilapia (Asia farmed)
Tuna: Albacore*, Bigeye*, Skipjack, 
Tongol, Yellowfin* (except troll/pole)
Tuna: Bluefin*
Tuna: Canned (except troll/pole)
Over the past 10 years, 
the percentage of wild 
fi sh landings certifi ed, 
or in the process 
of certifi cation and 
improved management, 
has approached 20 
percent. This illustration 
shows that the 
percentage certifi ed 
or in process toward 
certifi cation remains 
less than a third of the 
world’s fi sh, and of the 
two-thirds, a large share 
are in serious trouble.
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Figure 4. The evolution of marine-related eco-labels.62
6. Conclusions
Thanks to the recent WTO dispute, the tuna-dolphin relation, as well as eco-labelling and 
labelling policies have received much attention. It is a perfect fit for the rest of  this thesis as it 
is recent,  and it is applicable to its central topic. Furthermore, the case hits very close to 
home, as it involves Mexico. Nonetheless, it became clear throughout the analysis that the 
‘dolphin-safe’ labelling policy is not an eco-label. It is a labelling policy just like the US’ 
nutritional information and organic labels. As seen Chapter V, these are not eco-labels, they 
are labelling laws that regulate the criteria and the us  of  the label. They are mandatory, for 
all those that use the label. Nonetheless, they do share certain similarities with eco-labels, 
as do nutrition and organic labels. However, when it comes to drawing conclusions from the 
WTO ruling to other eco-labels, they simply do not apply. This is because eco-labels, as 
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Prepared by the Steering Committee of the State-of-Knowledge  Assessment of  Standards and Certification, p. 
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international certification schemes, do not share the characteristics that were pointed out by 
the Panel. They are not mandatory, discriminatory, nor more trade restrictive, but above all, 
they are not statutory-mandated. In other words they are not public policy and the ‘dolphin-
safe’ label is. Hence, the most relevant lesson drawn from the WTO case, for the purposes 
of this research, is that public eco-labels have to be very careful in how  they address their 
labelling policies. This is because a public eco-label can be considered a technical 
regulation, such as the ‘dolphin-safe’ eco-label. This point was discussed thoroughly in 
Chapter V and this is the proof. 
Another crucial finding of this analysis is the environmental impact of Mexico’s command-
and-control regulation compared to the US’s ‘voluntary’ approach. In short, the US ban on 
Mexico tuna pressured Mexico to improve its technology so it stopped killing dolphins. 
Mexico reacted by enacting stringent technical regulations. Mexico does not need a ‘dolphin-
safe’ eco-label as all the national tuna is ‘dolphin-safe’. The US on the other hand cannot 
account for the dolphins and other marine by-catch. Furthermore, the US was so focused on 
tuna (due to its scale) that it has never regulated the dolphin by-catch in squid-fishing. 
Hence, it might be worth considering that voluntary regulation might not yield the best results 
for this type of environmental problems. In addition, the fate of dolphins and other wild-life is 
left to the hands (or wallets) of consumers. This might be dangerous, if  it is not paired with 
significant education campaigns, and even with those consumers might not be swayed (as 
seen in Chapter IV people’s natural reaction is not to care about the environment). Hence, it 
is worth considering that in environmental matters effectiveness should be preferred over 
efficiency, whenever these are in conflict.  
Finally, it would be recommended to both Mexico and the US to move passed this ‘dolphin-
safe’ issue. There are more pressing matters regarding fisheries than saving dolphins. While 
dolphins are important, maybe countries should focus on other things beyond whether 
dolphins are traumatised by shipping vessels. Increasing the stock of dolphins in the ETP is 
important, but the dolphins are not even close to being extinct, hence it is not an urgent 
matter. What does matter is that there is an increase of  illegal fishing, that fisheries are over 
exploiting the natural resources. The fact that in one trip a single vessel can fish enough for 
a whole country to consume in one year is quite frightening. If you add these two issues 
together (illegal fishing and over-fishing) the scenario is even worse. Hence, Mexico and 
other countries with important fisheries should probably support the creation of criteria and 
The Law and Economics of Eco-labels
335
start developing policies to deter illegal fishing. The ‘dolphin-safe’ label played an important 
role, however it has to evolve.
This chapter placed an important building block into this research. On one hand it provides a 
useful example of  an eco-label that has been around for over 30 years and the impact it has 
had in an industry, the international relations and the environment. On the other hand, it also 
reviews the latest formal standing regarding eco-labels by an international organisation. 
The following chapter presents a series of policy recommendations, regarding the regulation 
of certification marks. 
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Chapter VIII
Policy Recommendations
1. Introduction 
After analysing eco-labels from different perspectives, this chapter is focused on providing 
specific policy recommendations for improving eco-label’s performance. In chapters II 
through IV eco-labels were analysed from the market and market actors perspective. It was 
shown that eco-labels have an important role to fulfil in the market as they convey 
information about environmental attributes of goods in a simple way consumers can easily 
understand. Hence, eco-labels in addition of  lowering information costs, they also lower 
cognitive costs. On the other hand, firms that that opt for certifying their goods, will enjoy the 
immediate benefits of a pre-established reputation, hence it lowers the investments in 
reputation that it would otherwise incur on its own. The following chapters focused on how 
eco-labels are regulated and how  they should be regulated. In the end, it can be observed 
that the model proposed in Chapter IV does not really re-invent the wheel. This is because 
some countries already follow  a similar regulatory model as the one proposed. However, as 
it was concluded then, there is still room for improvements. These improvements, following 
the proposed regulatory strategy, lie almost entirely on the legal side. Hence, the objective of 
this Chapter is to point out what changes or adjustments need to be made in the legal arena 
to empower eco-labels and allow them to perform optimally.  
The recommendations formulated in this Chapter have the goal of strengthening the role of 
certification of  environmental goods. This can be done by increasing eco-labels (and 
certification in general) credibility. It has been duly noted that the current regulatory system 
does not handle greenwashing very well or at all. Greenwashing directly affects the eco-
label’s credibility. Because there is so much greenwashing in the market many consumers 
simply ignore environmental claims because they do not mean anything to them. If there 
was less greenwashing, consumers would notice eco-labels and they would be more 
credible. If eco-labels were more credible it is possible that demand would increase. This 
last point is relevant due to the fact that the eco-label market has remained a niche market. 
With a larger demand the market segment for eco-labels would increase. In a large eco-label 
market more firms would seek certification, hence the market and, above all, the 
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environment is likely to be improved. However, increasing eco-label’s credibility alone will 
not suffice to deter greenwashing. Jeffrey Minetti, for instance, has argued that by reinforcing 
certification, greenwash will be deterred and environmental claims will be regulated. 
However, this vision is not shared, as it was shown that certification and environmental 
claims are different instruments. It is true that they are interrelated, but their legal nature is 
completely different. Hence in order to deter greenwash, it is likely that a different approach 
might need to be taken. However, how to deter greenwash is not scope of this research. 
This chapter will briefly address the proposals for regulating environmental claims. 
Subsequently, the proposals on how  to enhance certification marks will be reviewed and 
explained. Finally, even though it is slightly out of  scope, the deterrence of  greenwashing will 
be briefly addressed. 
2. Regulating Environmental Claims
When environmental attributes have a search or an experience nature, advertisement 
suffices to convey the information. Eco-labels in this case would be convenient, though they 
are not really needed. Consumers can observe and evaluate the claimed environmental 
attributes of their products first hand. As long as environmental claims are informative (and 
not persuasive) they are better dealt with by standards than by eco-labels. These informative 
environmental claims should be addressed by the environmental and/or agricultural (fishing, 
farming or similar) authorities not by the advertising or consumers authorities alone. The 
consumer or advertising authority can enact standards when the environmental claims are 
persuasive in nature, as their purpose is to directly influence consumers purchasing 
behaviour. In addition, these standards should be mandatory for all of those that use them. 
In other terms they should not be mere safe harbours. Products or firms using environmental 
claims that do not follow  the standards should be sanctioned. This will make producers think 
twice before using the claim. This is desirable to reduce greenwashing. As seen in Chapter 
II, keeping silent about the environmental impacts is not greenwashing, it is only 
greenwashing when you state false (or incomplete) information. In any case, increasing the 
sanctions would reduce the amount of frivolous or empty claims. Therefore reducing the 
amount of  environmental information in the market. It is true that enacting this type of 
standards would imply creating environmental policy. However the market is not able to 
select the truthful claims and deter the false ones on its own. 
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In relation to the last point, how  these standards should be enforced is out of the scope of 
this research. Whether private enforcement mechanisms would be an effective means to 
deter greenwashing or some public enforcement mechanism will do is not clear. As said 
before, if  it were private enforcement, consumers would have to be sufficiently affected by 
greenwashing to be motivated to pursue legal actions. On the other hand, public 
enforcement (administrative or criminal procedures) could also work to deter greenwashing 
but it might be too costly. However, this research will not address these issues, even though 
they are crucial in reinforcing eco-label’s credibility.  
3. Enhancing Certification Marks.
Certification marks are protected with property rights, intellectual property rights to be 
precise. This has many advantages both for the regulator and for the owners of the 
certification marks. First, owners have the obligation to protect their mark from unauthorised 
use. Hence, if  there is infringement on the certification mark by third parties the owner has a 
procedure to defend the mark.  Furthermore, the owners can create branches or franchises 
of the certification mark, which allows the mark to expand, thereby gaining more market 
access. Secondly, the fact that the mark is granted protection by the authority immediately 
creates a registry of the certification marks that are in the market. This would make it easier 
to identify false labels that are circulating in the market. Furthermore, if  the marks are 
registered but are not being used, the registration can be lost and someone else is entitled 
to use the mark (including its criteria). In the States that require review  and authorisation of 
the regulations (and criteria) for their registration also ensure the distinctiveness of each 
certification mark. Thirdly, registering a certification mark is not cheap or easy, it is an 
investment. This serves as a guarantee that the eco-labels that seek registration do so 
because they are committed to pursuing eco-labelling in the longer term (they are unlikely to 
apply a ‘fly-by-night’ strategy). However, the system could be perfected so eco-labels (and 
other sustainability labels) could become more credible by giving even more security to the 
owners. 
3.1 Pre-authorisation of the criteria
It was noted in Chapter V that the Australian system is particular because the Certification 
Trademarks applications are reviewed by the ACCC. After the Trademark Registrar receives 
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and analyses the application as if it were a normal trade mark it remits it to the ACCC for its 
approval. Once the ACCC receives the regulations and criteria it publishes them so that 
interested parties can make their comments on the criteria and if  it considers it necessary it 
can even call on experts on the subject. Specifically, the fact that the ACCC reviews and 
approves the criteria and regulations before the trademark is granted is a very good idea. 
This is because it recognises the particular nature of  certification marks in contrast with an 
ordinary trademark. However, by sending it to the ACCC it can only seek to protect 
competition and consumer welfare. While this is not an undesirable thing, with eco-labels it 
is important to seek the view  of an environmental authority (call it forestry, farming, 
agriculture or fisheries) not only the trade side. Therefore for eco-labels and other 
sustainability labels the trademark authority that receives the application, should send it for 
pre-approval to the correspondent environmental authority. Additionally it can also be sent to 
the consumer or competition authority. However, the environmental authority should have a 
division that evaluates and analyses the eco-label’s criteria (as well as keeping record). 
Furthermore this approval should serve as a guarantee that the standards are in fact 
designed to provide a true environmental benefit. Alternatively, the authority could request 
the owner that the criteria and the regulations are pre-approved by the environmental 
authority before they submit the application. By doing this, the costs would be bared by the 
owner of the certification mark and only the final version of  the criteria would be submitted. 
However, if it is done like this, the trademark registry would be free to deny the certification 
mark for lack of distinctiveness or other grounds. What matters is that the environmental 
authority should keep track and approve the criteria before the certification mark is awarded. 
In essence the main difference with Australia’s current system, is that the application should 
be sent to the environmental authority. It is true that there might not be one environmental 
authority capable of  regulating all the environmental aspects of  all the products in the 
market. Therefore, the system has to be flexible enough to channel the application to the 
competent authority for the specific eco-label at hand. If the eco-label is energy efficient, 
then the energy authority should review  the criteria. Likewise if  the eco-label is regarding 
fair-trade, then even the labour authority could approve the criteria. In this sense, the criteria 
can be reviewed by the authority that is specialised in the matter of the criteria. This will also 
allow  the criteria to gain a degree of formality as well as inclusiveness, as the authority could 
ask for meetings and reviews with the owners to discuss the criteria and regulations. This 
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would enhance eco-labels as an environmental tool. However, the granting of the 
certification mark in the end is still under the authority of  the trademark authority. The trade 
mark authority is in essence the trade authority which is what gives the balance eco-labels 
need between trade and the environment. By sending the application to another trade-
authority such as the ACCC, it would still be biased towards trade. 
Finally, with a register of this type, the authority could track overlapping criteria of different 
eco-labels. If  this were to happen the authority could propose a merger or a licensing of the 
eco-label. If the parties do not want to do so, they will have to prove that their criteria are 
sufficiently distinct or that the geographical scope does not overlap and is unlikely to cause 
confusion. Furthermore, potential licensees could have access to the criteria to determine 
which eco-labels are more convenient for their use. All this in general would make eco-labels 
more accessible and at the same time they it gives them a certain degree of formality which 
would allow  them to distinguish themselves from regular environmental claims and 
greenwash. 
3.2 The creation of a universal symbol for registered certification marks
In theory eco-labels on their own are sufficient to distinguish themselves from other 
environmental claims. However, in reality there are many fake labels in the market that 
imitate eco-labels but are not. Therefore, at least until greenwash is sufficiently deterred, 
eco-labels and other certification marks should have a symbol that distinguishes them from 
the others. This proposed system is similar to that used in trademarks such as ™ or ®. 
Specifically it could be a variation of  the ™ by placing a C in-front: CTM (as in certification 
trademark) or CM (as in certification mark). This little symbol would be placed next to the 
eco-label (or any other registered certification mark) to denote registration. This is quite 
simple but sufficiently significant for distinguishing purposes. Specifically, consumers are 
already familiar with these symbols and it is easy to teach them what the symbol means. 
Therefore as long as the eco-label has a CTM or a ® symbol they can be assured that the 
mark is registered. In addition, if  there where a false eco-label using one of  these symbols 
then the trademark authority could pursue it under its laws. All this would serve to reinforce 
eco-labels and deter greenwash. 
3.3 Implementation of this system in other legal systems
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While the majority of the countries that have specific certification mark regulations are from 
the Anglo-American legal traditions, it is not (and should not) be limited to them. Civil-Law 
systems normally do have regulations for Geographical Indications. It is in these countries, 
where normally the appellation system is established.1 Geographical Indications, essentially 
are a limited scope certification mark. Therefore, countries that have a geographical 
indication registry could implement a parallel registry for certification marks (environmental 
and others). As long as the countries have a trademark authority it would be easy for them to 
create an application for this type of marks. It would be to the discretion of each country to 
determine whether they will ask for pre-approved criteria or if  the authority would remit the 
application to the competent authority for approval. 
In any system, these proposed modifications are quite simple and non-intrusive. Thus, they 
are also less costly as they are based on a system that already exists. There is no need to 
create a new  law  for eco-labelling or even to create a new  eco-labelling organism. With the 
current legal structure of trademarks and geographical indications, eco-labels and other 
certification marks (sustainable or not) can be perfectly accommodated. In addition, the 
burden of  monitoring infringements will be shared with the owners, which will somehow 
increase the monitoring in the market, making it less attractive for greenwashers. 
As a final note, the environmental authorities need to have a stand in eco-labels and 
environmental claims. They are the only ones that can provide a balance between trade and 
environment. While it is true that eco-labels do function without intervention, governments 
cannot expect great environmental outcomes from a pure market tool. Therefore if eco-
labels are to reach their potential environmental authorities will have to get involved and 
create environmental policy.
3.4 Recognition and homologation of foreign eco-labels
It has been shown that greenwash is partly enabled because of  the amount of eco-labels 
that are in the market. There is a redundancy in eco-labels. This means that there are many 
eco-labels that are in essence the same. This is exacerbated when the good has presence 
in different markets which have their own eco-labels. A certified good might comply with the 
criteria of many eco-labels. Therefore, if  the producer has the opportunity, he will obtain as 
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1 The appellation system, is the one that requires the conformity to certain quality standards in addition to the 
geographical requirements.
many eco-labels as it can with its certification. This can lead to multiplicity of  eco-labels on 
the same product. The proposed modifications may aid in this situation as there will be more 
control on the criteria. If  two eco-labels are similar or identical, the opportunity to merge, 
license or change the criteria could be given to the later eco-labels. The potential 
redundancy could be caught on time and be avoided. Therefore only relevant eco-labels will 
be in the market. On an international level this is quite different as there is no international 
registry, nor is there a need for one. However, recognition agreements could be made 
among agencies. The purpose of  these agreements would be to recognise the validity of the 
other parties certification and eco-labels, hence there will be no need to duplicate 
certification or eco-labels. Moreover, this type of  recognition can be very important when it 
comes to enforcing the eco-labelling mechanism. When producing countries are exporting 
their certified goods to other countries (probably more developed countries) it is important 
that such certifications are recognised by the importing countries, otherwise their efforts are 
useless. It is not to say that all certifications have to be recognised, as not all certifications 
are of  the same quality. However, recognising the efforts of  other eco-labelling entities gives 
credibility to the system. But above all, it will aid in the reduction of  the amount of 
redundancy, which damages the credibility of the system. 
4. Deterring greenwash
The magnitude and impact of greenwashing on the eco-label market is one of  the core 
findings of this work. It has been pointed out constantly that there is no law  that directly 
attacks greenwashing or greenwashers. It is an activity that today goes practically 
unpunished. While it is true that there are some reputational mechanisms that can work 
against it, it is not enough. The first step would be to define the types of greenwashing. This 
is because the effects of  exaggerating the environmental attributes of  a product or using 
vague terms is not the same as using false or imitation labels. The damage of the second 
type of  greenwashing is much worse than the others. Furthermore, when a greenwasher 
uses this type of  tool it can be presumed that it was done intentionally and it knew  what it 
was doing. Hence, from the seven types of greenwashing (hidden trade-off, no proof, 
vagueness, false labels, irrelevance, lesser of two evils and fibbing)2 the most offensive ones 
should be selected. Those, should be regulated in a way to drive them out of the market. 
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The others need not be so severe (they were unintentional or do not cause that much harm). 
While providing eco-labels with legal actions in case of  infringement is useful; it is only be 
triggered if the eco-label is directly affected (imitation or similarity of the label to the point of 
confusion). Hence, while it could be effective it would still be too small in scale to deter 
greenwash. Hence, further research should focus on finding a way to deter greenwashing 
from the market. 
5. Conclusions
This brief chapter has the sole purpose to propose small changes to the current law 
(certification mark laws specifically) that would improve eco-labels. The whole purpose is 
that eco-labels are properly supported by the law  so they can reach their potential as a 
regulatory tool. The proposed changes pose several benefits on the practical side. First, they 
do not suggest that an entire new  system or regulatory body should be created, it is possible 
to work with what is already available. Which leads to the second point, the regulatory costs 
of these changes are not very high. Therefore, these changes would make a significant 
impact on the performance of eco-labels at a reasonable regulatory cost. 
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CONCLUSIONS
1. Overview
This book had the purpose of making a classic law  and economics analysis about eco-
labelling and certification. Eco-labelling and certification are popular topics at the moment, 
since there is a hype for all things ‘sustainable’. Hence, the idea to apply a law  and 
economics approach seemed sensible and original. In the end, it proved to be correct as 
many insights of the research would not have been attained with any other discipline or 
approach. Specifically, the research aimed at finding whether there is a scope for law  in eco-
labelling. While attempting to answer the question it came evident that there is a scope for 
law  in eco-labelling. Hence, the question was adapted into how  law  and economics could 
improve the current eco-label market. Therefore, by applying law  and economic insights a 
sound regulatory strategy for eco-labels was proposed. 
Through out this work it has been pointed out that eco-labels are not perfect, in fact as 
market instruments, their equilibrium is extremely delicate. There are too many factors 
influencing such equilibrium which is likely to make them fail. Nonetheless, in markets for 
environmental goods, eco-labels and certification are not only desirable they are necessary. 
This is because eco-labels are marks that prove to the market that the product has the social 
or environmental attributes it claims it has. Eco-labels become proof  of the environmental or 
social attributes because of  certification. This means that a certified product carries different 
consequences than simple trademarks or advertising claims. Certification implies that the 
product has been evaluated by a competent entity that can vouch for the existence of the 
attributes. This allows the market for environmental goods to exist, as the certification tells 
the market that such goods are there. The work also pointed out that there are certain 
attitudes from market actors that will allow  eco-labels to succeed. Eco-labels have the 
capacity to capitalise on pro-environmental attitudes and preferences. Consumers and firms 
have certain behavioural traits that will benefit the eco-labelling mechanism. Hence, it is 
useful to understand the motivations and preferences so eco-labels can take advantage of 
them.
In the end this work presents a sound regulatory strategy for eco-labels as well as a detailed 
proposal for reforms to the current system. It was shown that the optimal regulatory strategy 
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involves all market actors not just the government. This regulatory strategy is dynamic as it 
allows for escalation and movement between the different spheres. Precisely due to its 
dynamism it is crucial for the system to have safety nets to hold the system in case it fails. 
This safety net is the law. Law  has the purpose of enabling the market by providing security 
to the parties that if something goes wrong the law  is there to handle it. Each party has a 
role to play, therefore if  their roles are to be fulfilled they need the certainty of what they are 
doing will be backed up by the law. This is not a coercive intervention. This is simply giving 
the eco-label market the underpinning it needs to function properly. It will still not be a 
perfect market, however if  there is a failure it can be corrected. Specifically, the proposed 
law  consists in the recognition of  property rights to the owners of eco-labels. In addition to 
property rights, the law  should also have strong liability schemes that allow  parties to 
vindicate their rights in case they are affected. But above all, the law  should have a highly 
coercive measure that is capable of deterring unwanted behaviour in the market. This 
element is crucial, as it will raise costs of non-compliance for the parties, hence it will 
motivate people to behave as expected.   
2. Main Contributions and Findings
This work has an holistic approach to eco-labels. All the areas that are relevant were dealt 
with. This was the only way to provide a clear view  of the effects and impacts of eco-labels in 
the market and the market actor’s behaviour. Much of the work is based on putting together 
the relevant information already available to make a complete and thorough assessment. 
However there are several original contributions derived from this work. 
- While analysing the development of eco-labels it was revealed that much of the 
‘essential’ literature of  eco-labelling was in fact outdated as it did not fit the reality of 
either eco-labels or the market. Hence, this proved the need for a new  eco-labelling 
theory. This is specially worrying for all the studies done in other disciplines that use 
brief definitions from the most salient authors. This is because they create models and 
experiments based on outdated information, making their assumptions inaccurate. This 
work took a step forward in actualising the information available, and hopefully 
contributes to the building of this new theory. 
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- It was found that eco-labels are necessary for the market of environmental goods. This 
is because environmental goods are credence goods. A credence good market cannot 
exist without certification, because there is no other possible way to prove the 
existence of the attributes or credence goods. Therefore, in the environmental goods 
markets eco-labels fulfil a key role. On a similar note, it was pointed out that 
environmental goods in addition to having a credence nature they also have an 
uncertain nature. Uncertain information has certain characteristics that make the 
markets based on it very frail. This is basically because uncertain information causes 
gaps in the information. It was later seen how  people have a tendency to fill in these 
gaps with other information such as previous knowledge or other people’s opinions, 
and with their personal beliefs and preferences. This makes the uncertain information, 
such as environmental information, subject to interpretation. Hence, eco-labels depend 
in a grand part on how  the public is receiving and interpreting the information it has at 
hand. The public opinion is a very strong force which can either break the equilibrium of 
the market or reinforce it. 
- From the variety of economic theories used to analyse eco-labels, the competition and 
intellectual property approach were quite innovative, as it had not been done before. 
The competition insights however, proved to be limited, as eco-labelling is still not 
sufficiently widespread as to distort the market in undesired ways. Nonetheless, it was 
shown that they do have the potential to do so. The Intellectual Property approach was 
the most surprising of all the findings. Specifically, when eco-labels were defined as 
environmental certification marks the immediate reaction was to seek for information on 
that matter, with disappointing results. Hence, this forced the search towards more 
technical approaches. This new  search into trademark handbooks and guidelines 
proved quite useful. There it was revealed that certification marks are considered a type 
of collective marks, similar to geographic indications. Moreover, the description of 
certification marks was a perfect fit for eco-labels. This left no doubt that eco-labels are 
certification marks. This finding led the subsequent research into the law  of certification 
marks. This legal analysis provided even more insights into the functioning and 
operation of certification schemes such as eco-labels. 
- Greenwashing is not a finding per se, as it was not discovered in this work. However, 
not much formal work had been done on greenwashing. While it is true that there is 
The Law and Economics of Eco-labels
347
much information and surveys done by NGOs and think-tanks, for some reason 
academics have shown little interest in the matter. The most relevant paper on 
greenwashing is dated 2011, which for such an important phenomenon is quite recent.1 
However, greenwashing proved to be much more significant than originally expected. 
Again, it was another game-changer for the remainder of the research. As it proved that 
there is a huge failure in eco-labelling. This because at a conceptual level eco-labels 
function properly, but at the implementation level they do not. In other words, it is an ex 
post side effect of eco-labelling. However, it is so widespread that it has the power to 
undermine the whole system. Hence there is a clear need for a legal intervention. This 
is because no law directly addresses the greenwashing problem. 
- Certification is only as good as the criteria behind it. The criteria or standards behind 
certification are what makes each eco-label distinct from each other. However, 
effectiveness of  the criteria or standards will be directly influenced by the mandatory or 
governmental standards that are in place. In jurisdictions where the mandatory legal 
standard is high certification might not be that relevant as the criteria might be similar to 
the mandatory standard. Therefore, there is not much to differentiate as all law-abiding 
firms will be able to obtain certification. However, in jurisdictions with lax mandatory 
minimum standards or no minimum standards certification becomes much more 
relevant. This is because it will be able to differentiate certified firms from the mere law-
abiding ones. Moreover, in the international arena where each country has its own 
mandatory minimum standards, certification will be able to level the playing field as it is 
criteria are not subject to one jurisdiction. 
- From the analysis of  eco-label’s enforcement pyramid and its dynamic variant, it was 
found that eco-labels are missing a governmental enforcement mechanism. As many 
self-regulatory instruments, eco-labels are incapable of regulating the behaviour of 
individuals outside its scope. At most, the owner of an eco-label can bring suit to those 
who infringe its mark. This creates a private enforcement mechanism for the owners of 
the certification marks. However, this is not enough to deter unwanted behaviour such 
as greenwashing. This is why there needs to be a higher level of enforcement. While it 
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Disclosure Under Threat of Audit, Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Volume 20, Number 
1, Spring 2011, 3-41.
might need more research, initially it is suggested that it should be a public 
enforcement mechanism.
3. Further Research
While this research was quite extensive, it does not by any means have the last word on 
eco-labels or how  they should be regulated. As mentioned throughout the work, the 
evaluation of eco-labels as environmental tools started quite recently. Many eco-labelling 
entities are not aware of their effects on the environment. This means that at this moment 
many of the eco-labels are running on the expectation of having a meaningful environmental 
impact, as it cannot be proven. While it is true that eco-labels have positive effects, these 
are indirect and influence in other areas such as management and governance. These are 
not undesirable effects, however it has to be considered that if these are the only proven 
effects maybe the concept of eco-labels needs to be re-adjusted. Nonetheless, empirical 
research is in process. This means that in sometime in the near future eco-labels will need 
to be re-assessed, taking into consideration the data from the ongoing research. 
This thesis did not allow  for empirical testing of several of  the findings. This means that 
many arguments of this work are mere deductions or intuitions. Though these are 
theoretically sustained and pose solid arguments, they still lack empirical testing. For 
example, many arguments from the Eco-labels and Consumers chapter could easily be 
tested with experiments. On the other hand, the section on prices in Chapter II, still has 
scope for theoretical testing. This is because most of the studies done on eco-label pricing 
are empirical. However, there is still a lack of  a theoretical background. This work managed 
to extract some of  the insights from the wide variety of  empirical studies, and included 
material from industrial organisation and management. However, a complete and thorough 
economic study of eco-label pricing is still warranted. 
Social and internal norms are very relevant when analysing pro-environmental behaviour. It 
was seen that in societies or communities where pro-environmental behaviour is already 
internalised as a norm it is easier for individuals to engage in this behaviour. It has been 
argued in the work that pro-environmental behaviour is generally motivated by image or 
social concerns, both in human and non-human entities (such as firms). Furthermore, there 
are many studies that analyse the role of  these social or image motivations in reinforcing 
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formal laws. Specifically, in criminal law  there are many studies that analyse ‘stigma’ or the 
negative reputation an individual gains when it deviates from the social norm. However, such 
studies are missing for the formal analysis of  ‘status’ which is the opposite of  ‘stigma’. This is 
the positive reputation effects an individual has for going beyond the norms, but in a positive 
way. Hence, it could be hypothesized that just like stigma can reinforce a formal norm so can 
status. However, this topic calls for further research. 
Regarding the WTO case analysed in Chapter VII it pointed out a serious issue that has to 
be addressed eventually: public eco-labels can be considered a protectionist measure. 
While the case was very particular, the US ‘dolphin-safe’ policy was found to be a technical 
regulation, which are not allowed under the TBT. This was determined because while 
analysing the different instruments that composed the entire regulation a one of  the 
instruments referred to another, which was mandatory. This detail made the whole regulation 
mandatory and not voluntary as the US claimed it was. Hence, it is very risky for 
governments to sustain these types of  programmes. Nonetheless, this topic is out of  the 
scope of this research, nonetheless it is worth taking note for further discussions. 
Finally, there needs to be more research in how  to tackle greenwashing. The magnitude of 
this issue is such that it did not allow  to be covered in this work. Eco-labelling is missing an 
extremely deterrent tool that will drive away or diminish greenwashing to a reasonable 
amount. Exaggerating environmental claims is one thing but outright lying is completely 
different. The future research could focus on whether which enforcement mechanism can 
effectively deter greenwashing. Whether criminalisation of greenwashing is called for; or if 
simple administrative sanctions would suffice, for example can be topics within such 
research. The Law and Economics framework has sufficient tools to deal with the matter. 
4. Final remarks
The market for eco-labels is not perfect, just like any other. However with a few  changes it 
can be adjusted to function better. While there is still missing information about the 
environmental benefits of  eco-labelling. The information available on the actual benefits of 
eco-labels, suffices to motivate improvements in the current system. In short, there is no 
need to reinvent the wheel. The eco-labelling mechanism has proven to work. However 
there are some adjustments that will enable the mechanism to work better. Some countries 
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are almost there, as they already have laws for certification marks. In these countries, the 
adjustments are relatively minor. However in the other countries which do not contemplate 
any laws for eco-labels, the implementation could be quite easy. Enabling the eco-label 
market will allow  it to perform better, by reaching more consumers and making more 
information available in the market. Which will always be a benefit.
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SUMMARY
Eco-labels and certification are one of the many environmental policy tools that have been 
under scrutiny in recent years. This is because the damages of  environmental degradation 
are becoming more apparent over time. Hence there is a pressure to come up with tools that 
help solve even small parts of the problem. Eco-labels have been around for over 30 years. 
However the market, the environment and eco-labels have changed drastically during this 
period. Moreover, in the last 5 years there has been a sudden increase in eco-labels making 
them more visible in the market and to the average consumer. All this has made evident that 
little is known about the effectiveness of eco-labels as environmental policy tools. Hence, 
there is a call to find answers regarding the actual effects of eco-labels on the market and on 
the environment. While this work cannot address whether eco-labels have an environmental 
impact it addresses the effects of  eco-labels on the markets. Moreover, this work aimed to 
find the role of  law  in eco-labelling. In addition, it aims to find a legal solution that would 
improve the performance of eco-labelling and certification. 
Eco-labels are on-pack, independently-verified marks that communicate to the market that a 
product has certain environmental or social attributes. This simple mark is intended to trigger 
a mechanism called eco-labelling that will ultimately lead to environmental improvements. It 
was seen that in the eco-labelling mechanism there are three main actors: consumers, 
producers and the eco-labelling or accreditation entity. Consumers are the trigger of  the eco-
labelling mechanism, they are the demand side of  the eco-label market. Each time a 
consumer choses an eco-labelled good it signals his pro-environmental preferences to the 
market. Producers will take note of consumer’s signals and if it is within its private interests it 
will adjust his production processes to comply with the eco-label’s criteria. Once this is done 
it seeks certification from an accredited certification body. This accreditation entity or eco-
label organization is in charge of setting the criteria, accrediting independent certifiers, and 
monitoring compliance. The firm and the eco-label will sign a license agreement for a 
specific time. It is up to the eco-label to keep the credibility and reputation of the eco-label, 
which is why it is in charge of monitoring and sanctioning the use of  the eco-label both by its 
members and third parties.  
As all tools, eco-labels have advantages and disadvantages. Among its advantages, is that 
is capable of  capitalizing on the pro-environmental attitudes of market actors. Additionally, 
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because they are normally privately run, their reach goes beyond jurisdictions. Thus, for 
international trade, they might level the playing field by assuring that the quality of  the eco-
labelled good is constant in the different geographic markets. However, if the eco-label is 
publicly owned this might become a disadvantage as it can be regarded as a technical 
regulation, which is considered a protectionist measure. However, the largest disadvantage 
is that due to the nature of environmental and social attributes it is extremely easy to cheat 
the market. The market is plagued with opportunistic behaviour. This is because the law  is 
simply too lax or inexistent. Hence there needs to be a law  to stop this opportunistic 
behaviour because it has the capacity to completely discredit eco-labels. Eco-labels and 
certification depend on their credibility.  
This work provides a complete regulatory strategy for eco-labelling. This comprehensive 
strategy is based on the ‘smart regulation’ principles. Therefore it takes into consideration 
the roles of  each actor as well as their interactions. Above all it focuses on the role of the 
government in the optimal eco-labelling regulatory strategy. In this optimal setting, 
government has a behind-the-scenes role where it provides the system with legal 
underpinning. This legal underpinning consists of the recognition of eco-labels as intellectual 
property rights as well as a structured liability system that allows eco-label owners to 
vindicate their rights when these are affected. In addition, certain specific reforms are 
proposed to the current systems that are likely to improve the performance of eco-labels. 
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SUMARIO
Las eco-marcas y la certificación son algunas de las muchas herramientas de política 
ambiental que han estado bajo estrecha vigilancia en años recientes. Esto se debe a que 
los daños por degradación ambiental se han hecho más evidentes a través del tiempo. Por 
consiguiente, existe una presión por desarrollar herramientas que ayuden a resolver incluso 
partes pequeñas del problema. Las eco-marcas han existido desde hace más de 30 años. 
Sin embargo, el mercado, el medio ambiente y las eco-marcas han sufrido cambios 
drásticos durante este período. Además, en los últimos 5 años hubo un repentino 
incremento en las eco-marcas, haciéndolas más visibles en el mercado y para el 
consumidor promedio. Todo esto ha hecho evidente lo poco que se conoce acerca de la 
eficacia de las eco-marcas como herramientas de política ambiental. Además, existe un 
llamado a encontrar respuestas sobre los efectos reales de las eco-marcas en el mercado y 
en el medio ambiente. Aunque este trabajo no puede abordar el tema de si las eco-marcas 
tienen un impacto ambiental, sí aborda los efectos de las eco-marcas en los mercados. 
Asimismo, este trabajo tiene como objetivo encontrar la función de la ley en el eco-
etiquetado. Y también, busca encontrar una solución legal que mejore el rendimiento de las 
eco-marcas y la certificación.
Las eco-marcas son etiquetas en el empaque, independientemente verificadas, que le 
comunican al mercado que un producto tiene ciertos atributos ambientales o sociales. Esta 
simple etiqueta tiene como objetivo detonar un mecanismo llamado eco-etiquetado que en 
última instancia llevará a mejoras ambientales. En el mecanismo del eco-etiquetado existen 
tres actores principales: los consumidores, los productores, y la entidad de eco-etiquetado o 
de acreditación. Los consumidores son el detonante del mecanismo de eco-etiquetado; 
representan la demanda del mercado de las eco-marcas. Cada vez que un consumidor 
elige un bien con eco-marca, envía una señal de sus preferencias pro-ambientales al 
mercado. Los productores tomarán nota de las señales de los consumidores, y si se 
encuentra dentro de sus intereses particulares; ajustarán sus procesos de producción para 
cumplir con los criterios de las eco-marcas. Una vez realizado esto, se busca obtener la 
certificación de una entidad acreditada para certificar. Esta entidad de acreditación u 
organización de eco-marcas tiene como función establecer los criterios, acreditar a 
certificadores independientes, y monitorear el cumplimiento. La empresa y la eco-marca 
firmarán un acuerdo de licencia por un tiempo determinado. Es responsabilidad de la eco-
marca mantener la credibilidad y la reputación de la eco-marca, y es por esto que está a 
cargo de monitorear y sancionar el uso de la eco-marca, tanto por sus miembros como por 
terceros.
Como todas las herramientas, las eco-marcas tienen ventajas y desventajas. Dentro de sus 
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ventajas, se encuentra la capacidad de capitalizar sobre las actitudes pro-ambientales de 
los actores del mercado. También, como usualmente pertenecen al sector privado, su 
alcance va más allá de la jurisdicción. Así, para el comercio internacional, pueden nivelar el 
terreno de juego asegurándose que la calidad del bien con eco-marca es constante en los 
diferentes mercados geográficos. Sin embargo, si la eco-marca es propiedad pública, esto 
puede convertirse en una desventaja ya que puede ser vista como una norma técnica, que 
es considerada una medida proteccionista. No obstante, la desventaja más grande es que 
debido a la naturaleza de los atributos ambientales y sociales, es extremadamente sencillo 
engañar al mercado. El mercado se encuentra plagado de comportamiento oportunista. 
Esto porque la ley es simplemente muy tolerante o inexistente. Por lo tanto se necesita que 
exista normatividad que detenga este comportamiento oportunista, ya que tiene la 
capacidad de desacreditar por completo las eco-marcas. Las eco-marcas y la certificación 
dependen de su credibilidad.
Este trabajo provee una estrategia normativa completa para el eco-etiquetado. Esta 
estrategia exhaustiva está basada en el los principios de “normatividad inteligente”. Por lo 
tanto toma en consideración las funciones de cada actor y sus interacciones. Sobre todo, se 
enfoca en la función del gobierno en la estrategia óptima de normatividad en el eco-
etiquetado. En este escenario óptimo, el gobierno juega un papel en segundo plano donde 
provee al sistema de un sustento legal. Este sustento legal consiste en reconocer a las eco-
marcas como derechos de propiedad intelectual, así como establecer un sistema de 
régimen de responsabilidad que permita que los propietarios de las eco-marcas defiendan 
sus derechos cuando éstos sean afectados. Además, se proponen ciertas reformas 
específicas a los sistemas actuales, las cuales seguramente mejorarán el desempeño de 
las eco-marcas.
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SAMENVATTING 
 
Milieukeurmerken en -certificering zijn een van de vele milieubeleidsmaatregelen waar in de 
afgelopen jaren veel aandacht aan is besteed. De reden hiervoor is de verslechterende toestand 
van het milieu en het groeiende besef daarvan. Vandaar dat er een zekere urgentie is om 
maatregelen te bedenken die het complexe milieuprobleem kunnen helpen oplossen. Ongeveer 30 
jaar geleden zijn milieukeurmerken geïntroduceerd. Gedurende deze periode hebben de markt, 
het milieu en de milieukeurmerken zelf ingrijpende veranderingen ondergaan. De afgelopen vijf 
jaar was er een sterke toename van milieukeurmerken waardoor ze in de markt beter zichtbaar zijn 
geworden voor consumenten. Er is echter weinig bekend over de effectiviteit van 
milieukeurmerken als milieubeleidsmaatregel. Vandaar dat het nuttig is om te onderzoeken wat de 
daadwerkelijke gevolgen zijn van milieucertificering voor de markt en het milieu. In dit onderzoek 
kan niet worden onderzocht wat het gevolg is van een milieukeur voor het milieu, maar wel wat de 
gevolgen van milieukeurmerken zijn voor de markt. Tevens is het doel van deze studie om te 
onderzoeken of er een rol is weggelegd voor het recht bij de milieukeurmerken en -certificering. 
Deze studie beoogt daarnaast een bijdrage te leveren aan het verder verbeteren van de werking 
van milieukeurmerken en –certificering door middel van een juridische oplossing. 
Milieukeurmerken staan op verpakkingen in de vorm van een merkteken waarmee wordt 
aangegeven aan de consument dat het product bepaalde eigenschappen heeft in verband met het 
milieu of andere maatschappelijke doelstellingen. Deze eenvoudige aanduiding is gericht op een 
mechanisme dat milieukeurmerken wordt genoemd en dat uiteindelijk zal leiden tot verbetering van 
het milieu. In het mechanisme van de milieukeurmerken kunnen we drie actoren onderscheiden: 
consumenten, producenten en de organisatie die de milieukeurmerken of de accreditatie uitgeeft. 
Zonder consumenten zou er geen mechanisme voor milieukeurmerken zijn, zij staan immers aan 
de vraagkant van de markt. Iedere keer als een consument een product koopt met een 
milieukeurmerk geeft hij daarmee een signaal af aan de markt dat hij het milieu een warm hart 
toedraagt. Producenten merken deze signalen op en als dat in hun belang is, zullen zij hun 
productieproces aanpassen om daarmee te voldoen aan de criteria van het milieukeurmerk. Als dit 
eenmaal is gebeurd, zal de producent proberen om door de accreditatieorganisatie erkend te 
worden. Deze accreditatieorganisatie of keurorganisatie bepaalt de criteria, erkent onafhankelijke 
certificatoren en houdt toezicht op de naleving. Het bedrijf en de keurorganisatie tekenen een 
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licentieovereenkomst voor bepaalde tijd. De keurorganisatie moet waken over de 
geloofwaardigheid en reputatie van het milieukeurmerk. Daarom dient toezicht te worden 
gehouden op het gebruik door zijn leden en derden van het keurmerk, eventueel gevolgd door 
sancties. 
Zoals met alle maatregelen hebben milieukeurmerken zowel voor- als nadelen. Een van de 
voordelen is dat de pro-milieu houding van de marktactoren te gelde kan worden gemaakt. 
Bovendien overschrijden ze jurisdicties omdat het particuliere initiatieven zijn. En zo zouden ze 
gelijke voorwaarden kunnen scheppen in de internationale handel, door ervoor te zorgen dat de 
kwaliteit van de producten met een milieukeurmerk constant is in verschillende geografische 
markten. Als het milieukeurmerk echter in handen van een overheid is, kan dit een nadeel zijn 
omdat het beschouwd kan worden als technische regulering, wat kan worden gezien als een 
protectionistische maatregel. Het grootste nadeel is echter dat door de aard van de 
milieueigenschappen en maatschappelijke doelstellingen het zeer gemakkelijk is om de markt te 
misleiden. De markt wordt geteisterd door opportunistisch gedrag. Dat komt omdat het recht 
eenvoudigweg òf niet streng genoeg is òf lacunes vertoont. En daarom dienen er wettelijke 
maatregelen te komen om dit opportunistische gedrag tegen te gaan omdat dit anders ertoe kan 
leiden dat milieukeurmerken schade oplopen. Milieukeurmerken en -certificering bestaan bij de 
gratie van hun geloofwaardigheid. 
In deze studie is een volledige reguleringsstrategie opgenomen voor milieukeurmerken. Deze 
alomvattende strategie is gebaseerd op grondslagen van 'slimme regulering'. En dus wordt de rol 
van iedere actor in overweging genomen evenals hun interacties. Maar bovenal is deze studie 
gericht op de rol van de overheid voor de optimale strategie wat betreft keurmerkregulering. In 
deze optimale setting heeft de overheid een rol achter de schermen door te zorgen dat het 
systeem wordt ingebed in een juridisch kader. Dit kader bestaat uit de erkenning van 
milieukeurmerken als intellectuele eigendomsrechten evenals een gestructureerd 
aansprakelijkheidssysteem dat eigenaren van een milieukeurmerk de mogelijkheid biedt om 
naleving van hun rechten te vorderen als daar inbreuk op wordt gemaakt. Bovendien worden er in 
deze studie aanbevelingen gedaan voor specifieke hervormingen van het bestaande systeem met 
als doel de prestaties van de milieukeurmerken verder te verbeteren.  
 
